The legal regime for anti-cyberlaundering by Leslie, Daniel Adeoye
 
 
 
 
 
THE LEGAL REGIME FOR ANTI-CYBERLAUNDERING 
 
BY 
DANIEL ADEOYE LESLIE 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
Doctor of Laws in the Faculty of Law of the University of the Western 
Cape, South Africa 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: 
Professor Lovell Fernandez 
Faculty of Law 
University of the Western Cape 
4 October 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
DECLARATION 
 
I, Daniel Adeoye Leslie, declare that The Legal Regime for Anti-
Cyberlaundering is my work and that it has not been submitted for any 
degree or examination in any other university or institution. All the sources 
used, referred to or quoted have been duly acknowledged. 
 
 
Daniel Adeoye Leslie 
 
Signed........................... 
 
4 October 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I thank God for the strength, fortitude and grace given to me to undertake this 
thesis. I am beholden in gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Lovell 
Fernandez, of the Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape, Bellville, 
South Africa, and Co-Director of the South African-German Centre: Criminal 
Justice Division. I am grateful for his assiduous supervision and careful 
guidance. I am also grateful for his constructive criticism always given 
timeously; and for his detailed attention and always prompt, searching and 
insightful comments on my drafts. My very special thanks goes to Professor 
Gehard Werle, of the Facuilty of Law, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany, 
and Co-Director of the South African-German Centre: Criminal Justice 
Division, for his guidance and unwaning support throughout the research, and 
for making it possible for me to carry out the needed research in Germany. 
I am deeply indebted to the Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst 
(German Academic Exchange Service) for funding the research and for 
causing it to become reality. I heartily thank Dr. Moritz Vormbaum for his kind 
assistance and support during the research. I am also grateful to Dr. Paul 
Christoph Bornkamm for availing himself, lending his advice and 
encouragement during the research. I would also like to acknowledge the help 
of Mr. Jonathan Hancock for his editorial assistance with the thesis. 
I thank Mr. Nicolas von zur Mühlen, of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign 
and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, Germany, for his help and assistance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
during my research stay at the Institute. I owe gratitude as well to Frau Anja 
Schepke and Frau Ulrike Brodien for their helpful administrative support, and 
for making my research stay in Germany most comfortable. I also 
acknowledge the kind assistance of the library staff of the Peace Palace 
Library, The Hague, the Netherlands, as well as the library staff of the Law 
Libraries of Humboldt University, Berin, Germany, and of the University of 
Leiden, Leiden, the Netherlands. I thank Ms. Sylvia Papadoupoulous, of the 
Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa, for her advice 
and guidance since the start of the research. I also thank Ms. Elzet Hurter, of 
the Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa, who has 
remained very supportive of me.  
My most profound depth of gratitude goes to my family. I am grateful for the 
incorruptible values instilled in me from very early in life by my late father, 
Hon. Justice Dr. Sunday Idowu Leslie and my mother, Mrs. Magaret Modupe 
Leslie. I appreciate my siblings, Kayode Leslie, Tayo Leslie, Yetunde Leslie, 
Bimbo Leslie, Vera Leslie, Kenneth Leslie, Buki Leslie and Bolanle Leslie, for 
their unwavering love and support.  
I would also like to thank my colleagues, Juliet Okoth, Sostenes Materu and 
Windell Nortjie, as well as my friends in South Africa, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Nigeria who have kept me in their thoughts and prayers 
during the course of the research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Declaration         ii 
Acknowledgement        iii 
Table of Contents        v 
Abstract         xvii 
Key words and Abbreviations      xviii 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 PROLOGUE        1 
1.2 EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS OF STUDY    1 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY      3 
1.3.1 The problem of cyberlaundering: A legal concern   3 
1.3.1.1 Cyberlaundering and organized crime    5 
1.3.1.2 Cyberlaundering and terrorism     6 
1.3.1.3 Cyberlaundering and the world economy    7 
1.3.2 The non-existence of a proper ACL legal regime   9 
 
1.4 LITERATURE SURVEY      10 
1.5 FOCUS OF STUDY       12 
1.5.1 Research question       12 
1.5.2 Aims and objectives of study      13 
 
1.6 SCOPE OF STUDY       15 
1.7 METHODOLOGY       16 
1.8 STUDY OUTLINE       17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
CHAPTER 2 
MONEY LAUNDERING AND CYBERCRIME: 
A BACKGROUND STUDY 
 
2.1 INTROCUTION        20 
2.2. MONEY LAUNDERING: AN OVERVIEW    20 
2.2.1 Understanding the meaning of money laundering   20 
2.2.2 The history and evolution of the  
anti-money laundering legal regime     24 
2.2.2.1 The regulation and prevention phase    25 
2.2.2.2 The criminalization and internationalization phase  28 
2.2.2.3 The supranalization phase      30 
 2.2.2.4 The terrorist financing phase     31 
2.2.3 The process of money laundering     32 
2.2.3.1 Placement        33 
2.2.3.2 Layering        34 
2.2.3.3 Integration        36 
2.2.4 Money laundering techniques      37 
2.2.4.1 Cash         37 
2.2.4.1.1 Cash smuggling       38 
2.2.4.1.2 Cash structuring/Smurfing     38 
2.2.4.2 Wagering        40 
2.2.4.2.1 Casinos        40 
2.2.4.2.2 Horse racing and lotteries      41 
2.2.4.3 Insurance policies       41 
2.2.4.4 Securities        42 
2.2.4.5 Hawala        42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
2.2.4.6 ‘Shell’ companies       43 
2.2.4.7 Wire transfer        44 
2.2.4.7.1 What it means       44 
2.2.4.7.2 The mechanism       45 
2.2.4.7.3 The problem       46 
 2.2.5 Money laundering and rising challenges: Impact  
and weight of the problem      47 
 
2.3 AN INTROCUTION TO CYBERCRIME:  
THE ‘CYBER ROOT’ OF CYBERLAUNDERING   51 
2.3.1 General         51 
2.3.2 Understanding the term ‘cybercrime’     52 
2.3.3 The evolution of cybercrime in brief     55 
2.3.4 The present state of the anti-cybercrime: an overview  56 
2.3.4.1 Advantages of ICT for criminal enterprises    57 
2.3.4.2 Challenges of the present anti-cybercrime regime   58 
 2.4 SUMMARY        61 
 
CHAPTER 3 
CYBERLAUNDERING: CONCEPT AND PRACTICE 
 
 3.1 INTRODUCTION       62 
3.2 DECYPHERING CYBERLAUNDERING    63 
3.2.1 The meaning of cyberlaundering            63 
3.2.2 Catalysts of the cyberlaundering dilemma      64  
3.2.2.1 Speed of technology       64 
3.2.2.2 Access to the internet       65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
3.2.2.3 Anonymity                                   69 
3.2.2.4 Boundless borders       70 
3.2.3 Categorizing cyberlaundering      72 
3.2.3.1 Cyberlaundering as a subset of cybercrime    73 
3.2.3.2 Cyberlaundering as a technique of money laundering   73 
 3.2.3.3 Cyberlaundering: ‘Money Laundering 2.0’   74 
3.2.4 Elements of the crime of cyberlaundering:  
  A deductive analysis       76 
3.2.4.1 Elements of crime: money laundering and cybercrime  77 
3.2.4.2 Elements of the crime of cyberlaundering     79 
3.2.4.2.1 Actus reus        79 
3.2.4.2.2 Mens rea        83 
 
3.3 ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS:  
NEW TOOLS FOR LAUNDERING     87 
3.3.1 Electronic money       89 
3.3.2 Models of electronic payment systems    92 
3.3.2.1 The merchant-issuer model      93 
3.3.2.2 The bank-issuer model                               94 
3.3.2.3 The non-bank issuer model      94 
3.3.2.4 The peer-to-peer model      95 
3.3.3 Storing methods and examples of electronic money   96 
3.3.3.1 ‘Software money’       96 
3.3.3.2 ‘Real time or prepaid tokens’     97 
3.3.3.3 ‘Electronic cheques’       101 
3.3.3.4 ‘Alternative methods: The e-barter system’    102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
 3.4 CYBERLAUNDERING AND THE  
 THREE-PRONGED PROCESS      103 
3.4.1 Placement         104 
3.4.2 Layering        105 
3.4.3 Integration        107 
 
3.5 VULNERABLE INDUSTRIES AND  
TECHNIQUES OF CYBERLAUNDERING    108 
3.5.1 Online banking        109 
3.5.1.1 Examples of cyberlaundering through online banking  113 
3.5.2 Online auctioneering             114 
3.5.2.1 Example of cyberlaundering through online auctioneering 115 
3.5.3 Online gambling       116 
3.5.3.1 Example of cyberlaundering through online gambling  121 
3.5.4 Online barter trade       122 
3.5.4.1 Example of cyberlaundering through online barter trade  125 
3.5.5 Virtual worlds        126 
3.5.5.1 Example of cyberlaundering using virtual worlds   134 
 
3.6 WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR CYBERLAUNDERING 135 
3.6.1 The advent of mobile payment systems    136 
3.6.2 Growth in predicate offences for cyberlaundering   138 
3.7 SUMMARY        141 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
CHAPTER 4 
THE PRESENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AGAINST 
CYBERLAUNDERING: A SURVEY OF RELEVANT LAWS AND 
POLICIES 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION       143 
PART 1 
4.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT  
AML LEGAL REGIME       144 
4.2.1 General         144 
4.2.2 Pillar 1: Prevention       147 
4.2.2.1 Customer due diligence and record keeping   147 
4.2.2.1.1 CDD for banks       149 
4.2.2.1.2 CDD for correspondent banks     161 
4.2.2.1.3 CDD for mutual funds and pooled investment vehicles  164 
4.2.2.1.4 CDD for wire transfers      165 
4.2.2.1.5 CDD and the risk-based approach    169 
4.2.2.1.5.1 Specific risks criterion for PVs     173 
4.2.2.1.5.2 Risk variables and further measures    173 
4.2.2.1.5.3 High measure CDDs versus simple measure CDDs  176 
4.2.2.2 Reporting        177 
4.2.2.2.1 Grounds for reporting      177 
4.2.2.2.2 The obligation to report      181 
4.2.2.2.3 To whom reporting should be made    183 
4.2.2.3 Regulation and Supervision      185 
4.2.2.4 Deterrent measures       186 
4.2.3 Pillar 2: Enforcement       187 
4.2.3.1 The principle of mutual legal assistance: a bind chord  188 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
4.2.3.1.1 Grounds upon which money laundering may be refused  191 
4.2.3.1.2 Formalities        193 
4.2.3.1.3 Investigation and prosecution of money laundering  196 
4.2.3.1.4 Assets recovery       201 
4.2.3.4.1 Methods of confiscation      205 
4.2.3.4.2 Reparation        209 
4.2.4 Pillar 3: Compliance       210
  
  PART II 
 4.3 THE ACL LEGAL REGIME:  
A SURVEY OF EXISTING RELEVANT LAWS, POLICIES  
AND INTIATIVES        212 
4.3.1 General        212 
4.3.2 Present legal framework for cyberlaundering   213 
4.3.2.1 General        213 
4.3.2.2 The relationship between the AML and ACL legal regime  213 
 4.3.2.3 Cyberlaundering and the Council of Europe  
Convention on Cybercrime     214 
 4.3.2.4 Present attempts to regulate  
cyberlaundering through international policies   217 
4.3.2.4.1 The FATF        218 
4.3.2.4.2 The Wolfsberg Group      220 
4.3.2.4.3 The Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision  221 
4.3.2.4.4 The Egmont Group      221 
4.3.2.4.5 The World Bank       222 
4.3.2.4.6 International Police Organization    224 
4.3.3 Present national legal framework for cyberlaundering  225 
4.3.3.1 General        225 
4.3.3.2 Germany        226 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
4.3.3.3 United Kingdom       228 
4.3.3.4 India         230 
4.3.3.5 United States        231 
4.3.3.5.1 The Federal Bureau of Investigation    233 
4.3.3.5.2 The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network   233 
4.3.3.5.3 The Drugs Enforcement Administration    234 
4.4 SUMMARY        236 
 
CHAPTER 5: 
REGULATING CYBERLAUNDERING 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION       238 
5.2 RATIONALE FOR REGULATION     239 
5.3 REGULATORY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES   241 
5.3.1 Corporate concerns       241 
5.3.2 Fluidity of the cyberlaundering process    243 
5.3.3 Enforcement challenges      244 
5.3.4 Problems associated with root concepts of cyberlaundering  246 
 5.4 AN ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO  
REGULATING CYBERLAUNDERING    247 
 
5.5 PREVENTION PILLAR FOR THE ACL LEGAL REGIME  248 
5.5.1 General preventive measures against cyberlaundering  248 
5.5.1.1 Threshold considerations: Premise for regulation   248 
5.5.1.1.1 Conceptualizing cyberlaundering legally for  
regulatory purposes      249 
5.5.1.1.2 Fighting predicate offences     251 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
5.5.1.1.3 Awareness towards lax jurisdictions    253 
5.5.2 Target approach to cyberlaundering regulation   255 
5.5.2.1 Adopting new CDD measures     256 
5.5.2.1.1 Modifying the KYC principle     257 
5.5.2.1.2 Adopting new wire transfer models    262 
5.5.2.2 Protected biometry and cryptography    265 
5.5.2.2 .1 Employing biometric methods for identification   265 
5.5.2.2.2 Ensuring better encryption methods    267 
5.5.2.3 Regulating electronic payments systems    270 
5.5.2.3.1 Establishing electronic money institutions   271 
5.5.2.3.2 Stricter controls for smart cards     274 
5.5.2.3.3 Fusing the money-trail with the bit-trail    278 
5.5.2.4 Regulating online gaming      280 
5.5.2.4.1 Measures against the avenue of virtual worlds   281 
5.5.2.4.2 Measures against the avenue of online gambling   285 
 
5.6 COMPLIANCE PILLAR FOR THE ACL LEGAL REGIME  287 
5.6.1 Duty to comply       288 
5.6.2 Duty to ensure compliance      289 
5.7 SUMMARY        291 
 
CHAPTER 6 
PROSECUTING CYBERLAUNDERING 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION       293 
 6.2 PATH TO PROSECUTING CYBERLAUNDERING:  
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES      294 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiv 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
6.2.1 Practical and logistic challenges     295 
6.2.2 The right to privacy       296 
6.2.2.1 Personal information and new electronic devices   296 
6.2.2.2 The legal protection of personal data  
versus investigative needs      298 
6.2.2.3 Balancing the scale between privacy and public  
interest values       300 
6.2.3 Electronic evidence and the question of admissibility  301 
6.2.3.1 Nature and characteristics of electronic evidence   301 
6.2.3.2 The admissibility of electronic evidence    304 
6.2.3.3 Electronic evidence and cyberlaundering    307 
 
6.3 INVESTIGATING CYBERLAUNDERING    308 
6.3.1 Applicability of conventional money laundering  
investigative techniques      310 
6.3.2 Fundamentals of digital investigation     311 
6.3.2.1 Role players in the investigative process    311 
6.3.2.2 Concept and methodologies of computer forensics   312 
6.3.2.3 Scientific techniques and digital investigations   316 
 6.3.3 Employing digital investigative techniques for cyberlaundering: 
A practical assessment      317 
6.3.3.1 Threshold considerations      319 
6.3.3.1.1 Adopting the scientific approach     320 
6.3.3.1.2 Case management       320 
6.3.3.1.3 Statutes of limitation      321 
6.3.3.2 Detection        322 
6.3.3.3 Survey        326 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xv 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
6.3.3.3.1 Establishing the actus reus element of cyberlaundering  327 
6.3.3.3.2 Authorization       330 
6.3.3.4 Seizure and confiscation of potential evidence   331 
6.3.3.5 Preservation        333 
6.3.3.6 Examination        334 
6.3.3.7 Analysis        336 
6.3.3.7.1 Knowledge of the illegality of the funds    337 
6.3.3.7.2 Associative intention with the funds    338 
6.3.3.8 Reporting and testimony      340 
6.3.4 Mutual legal assistance for cyberlaundering investigations  341 
 
6.4 ESTABLISHING JURISDICTION  
 FOR CYBERLAUNDERING      342 
6.4.1 Applicability of money laundering principles of jurisdiction  346 
6.4.2 Applicability of cybercrime principles of jurisdiction  349 
6.4.2.1 The territoriality principle      350 
6.4.2.1.1 Location of the act       351 
6.4.2.1.2 Location of the computer      353 
6.4.2.1.3 Location of the victim      356 
6.4.2.1.4 Location of the effect      357 
6.4.2.2 The nationality principle      358 
6.4.2.3 The universality principle      359 
6.4.3 Guidelines for establishing cyberlaundering jurisdiction  362 
6.4.3.1 Determine the cyberlaundering conduct    363 
6.4.3.2 Determine the cyberlaundering avenue    363 
6.4.3.3 Determine the applicable jurisdictional principles   364 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xvi 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
6.5 THE NEED FOR AN ACL PROSECUTORAL  
  FRAMEWORK: CASE STUDIES     367 
6.5.1 United States of America v E-Gold Ltd, Douglas Jackson,  
Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson    367 
6.5.1.1 Facts         368 
6.5.1.2 How cyberlaundering comes into play    369 
6.5.2 The pending case against Megaupload Ltd    372 
6.5.2.1 Facts         372 
6.5.2.2 How cyberlaundering comes into play    374 
 
 6.6 FORMALITIES INVOLVED IN  
ESTABLISHING THE ACL LEGAL FRAMEWORK  377 
6.7 SUMMARY        379 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 GENERAL        380 
7.2 THE TRIPPLE-PILLAR COMBAT TRATEGY   380 
7.2.1 Increased awareness amongst regulatory authorities   381 
7.2.2 Continuous research       385 
7.2.3 Capacity building       386 
7.3 EPILOGUE        387 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES       389
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xvii 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
ABSTRACT 
 
Along with its inumerable wonders, the advent of the internet has brought 
with it very bad vices. The notion of convenience, which comes with the use 
of the internet, can be attributed to criminals who wish to disguise the 
proceeds of their ill-derived funds, or what is better known as 
cyberlaundering. Cyberlaundering is a phenomenon that seems negligible on 
face value, but, to the contrary, has very dire effects, especially on national 
economies, which are in no way trifling.  
This study describes the problem of cyberlaundering, pointing out the various 
legal issues pertaining to it. Given that cyberlaundering is a comparatively 
new crime, which is not yet conceptualized legally, criminal justice 
authorities find it hard to detect, investigate and prosecute cyberlaundering. 
An adequate legal regime against cyberlaundering is currently non-existent, 
as there is presently no concise international or national legal framework in 
place to contain the problem. Whilst the chief focus of the thesis is to devise a 
legal framework to combat cyberlaundering, considerable attention is also 
devoted to the tension that arises between public and private interests, 
amongst several other legal issues that come to play along the way. This is a 
debate that necessarily arises when legislatures resort to more radical anti-
cyberlaundering laws. The study advocates a middle ground, which leads to 
the desired end of curbing the exponential growth of cyberlaundering, at the 
very least. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 PROLOGUE 
Cyberlaundering refers to the way in which the mechanism of the internet is 
used to launder illegal proceeds of crime in order to make such proceeds 
appear clean.  The advent of the internet has yielded this new breed of crime. 
On the internet, there are various avenues exploited by criminals to convert 
‘dirty’ money into ‘clean’ money.1 What has been understood as money 
laundering in the past is not necessarily the case anymore. Money laundering 
now wears the cloak of cyberlaundering, because criminals today are one step 
ahead of the law. These criminals are constantly devising new ways in which 
to evade the prying eyes of law enforcement, hence the shift to 
cyberlaundering.  
 
1.2 EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS OF STUDY 
The subject of cyberlaundering has constantly been evaded.
2
 This is mainly 
because it is a hybrid subject which merges aspects of information 
                                                          
1
  Prevalent avenues, amongst a host of others, include online banking, online gambling, e-gaming, 
online auctioning and digital payments methods. These methods will be further explained in detail 
in the chapters below. 
2
   The topic has constantly been avoided simply because little is known about it. For instance, in July 
2009, the House of Lords’ European Union Select Committee issued a report titled ‘Money 
Laundering and Financing of Terrorism’ available at <http://www.parliament.uk/business/ 
committees/committee-archives/>  [accessed on 11 February 2011], yet nowhere does it deal with 
the issue of cyberlaundering, in spite of its relatedness to terrorist financing. Also, as evidenced in 
this study, present international laws against money laundering and cybercrime have not been 
reviewed in light of the currency of the dilemma. For money laundering, examples of such laws are 
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technology, computer science and law. Its evasiveness has caused it to be 
very mystifying. As long as the internet remains an integral part of our lives, 
criminals will continue to exploit this avenue for laundering proceeds of 
crime, unless possible means of regulation and control are devised. Very little 
is known about cyberlaundering because very little research has been done on 
it. This is the main impetus for undertaking this research. 
The broader field of money laundering is one that is also fraught with 
regulatory challenges, with very strong links to organised crime and 
terrorism, which are also colossal problems in the world today,
3
 and which 
current legal infrastructures are battling to contain. These issues are 
seamlessly interrelated, and with cyberlaundering, the link is only fortified 
further, with the internet being used frequently to ‘wash’ the proceeds of 
organised crime and to fund terrorist activities. By effectively combating the 
problem of cyberlaundering, one is ripping out one of the main roots of these 
problems, thus helping to subdue other related vices such as money 
laundering, cybercrime, fraud and corruption.   
The subject of cyberlaundering has reached a point where it can no longer be 
swept under the rug and alas, its current state is not anywhere nears its peak. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
the UN Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances - ‘The 
Vienna Convention’ - adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 December 
1988, and came into force on 1 November 1990; the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, Resolution 55/25 - ‘The Palermo Convention’ -  adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 November 2000, and came into force on 29 
September 2003, and the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism – ‘The Warsaw 
Convention’ - adopted by the Council of Europe on 16 May 2005, and came into force on 1 
December 2009. Also, for cybercrime, an example is the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Cybercrime adopted by the Council of Europe on 8 November 2001 and which came into force on 1 
July 2004. 
3
  Cf discussion in paragraphs 1.3.1.1 and 1.3.1.2 below. 
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Although it is often said that the law is dynamic, in truth, the same can be 
said of crime. As proposed in this study,
4
 there is a desperate need for the 
‘adaptation’ of relevant policies, laws and regulations to deal effectively with 
the menace of cyberlaundering, failing which the enactment of new laws 
becomes imperative. This study therefore explores the problematic aspects of 
cyberlaundering comprehensively. It does so by identifying the reasons why 
it has evolved into the legal concern it is today; how it manifests itself in 
practice; whether current laws exist to deal with the problem; and more 
importantly, what laws can be introduced or adapted to surmount the 
problem. In other words, this study seeks to establish an anti-cyberlaundering 
(ACL) legal regime. 
 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The proposed ACL legal regime springs from a gap in the law that needs to 
be filled. It is therefore important to understand the significance of this 
research, which serves as a rationale that constitutes the basis for the ACL 
legal framework that will be proposed in this study.  
 
1.3.1 The problem of cyberlaundering: A legal concern 
Cyberlaundering originated with the advent and exponential growth of the 
internet.
5
 With more and more people gaining access to it, many lives are 
                                                          
4
  Cf discussion in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.4. 
5
  Cf detailed discussion on the catalysts of the cyberlaundering problem in Chapter 3, paragraph 
3.2.2.2. The predecessor of the internet is known as ARPANET, known to be the first wide area 
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‘lived’ on the internet. It has become a medium through which we talk to 
each other and socialize with each other. However, the bitter and very 
unsettling truth here is simply that the advent and rapid expansion of the 
internet has also given rise to menacing practices, cyberlaundering being one 
of such, but what a diabolical one at that! The issue is one of legal concern as 
it foretokens formidable legal questions that need to be answered. 
As a fundamental reason explaining the problematic nature of 
cyberlaundering, law enforcement agencies are yet to fathom fully the 
phenomenon of internet criminality. Several regular internet operations that 
seem to be common, perfunctory practices that appear untainted with 
illegality, such as e-gaming and online gambling are sanctuaries for criminals 
who desire to ‘wash’ their ill-derived funds. The problem of cyberlaundering 
cannot be couched in simple terms. To better understand the enormity of the 
problem, one needs first to assess its effects and the areas where the problem 
rears its head. To further comprehend the dire effects of cyberlaundering, one 
need only look to see how it ties up with organized crime, with terrorism and, 
more broadly, how it impacts on the world economy. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
packet-switching network. In 1985, the ARPANET became more global in scope and was no longer 
confined to government use, as was the case in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Arguably, it can be said that the internet exploded onto the world stage when, in the mid-1990s, 
private organisations gained access to it. See Living Internet ‘History of the Internet’ an undated 
internet article available at <http://www.livinginternet.com> [accessed on 10 February 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
1.3.1.1 Cyberlaundering and organised crime 
Cyberlaundering bears an inextricable link to organized crime, and the 
organized crime pattern in West Africa is a case in point. Organised criminal 
activities in West Africa are evidenced in the operations of the ‘419 
syndicates.’6 These criminals are popularly known to be scam artists who use 
the internet to perpetrate their wicked schemes. They send out scam emails 
and notices to lure people into dealing with them. At the end of the day, their 
victims are duped and fleeced of their money. The 419 syndicates are 
synonymous with cyber criminality, having propagated and popularized its 
different forms. The image of Nigeria, as well as other West African 
countries, has been severely blemished as a result of the activities of these 
criminal gangs.  
One might be inclined to ask, where do the proceeds of these crimes go, or 
how are they funnelled back into the pockets of the perpetrators? The answer 
lies mainly within the concept and compass of cyberlaundering. There is a 
huge amount of ‘dirty’ money circulating on the internet, and the proceeds of 
these crimes rarely leave the realm of the internet. This is because the 
criminals want to ‘wash’ the proceeds in some way, in order to make them 
look ‘clean,’ hence the concept of cyberlaundering. The crimes of cyberfraud 
and cybertheft that are often perpetrated by these criminals are all predicate 
                                                          
6
  The term ‘419 criminal’ originated in Nigeria, and refers to violators of section 41(9) of the 
Nigerian Criminal Code, which deals mainly with fraud. 
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offences
7
 for money laundering activities, and in this case, cyberlaundering. 
To this end, several cyberlaundering techniques, such as online banking
8
 or 
online gaming
9
 can be used. Cyberlaundering is therefore a viable means to 
an evil end.  
 
1.3.1.2 Cyberlaundering and terrorism  
Cyberlaundering is also inextricably linked to terrorism. It is said that the 
attacks by Al-Qaeda on the Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2001 
were financed mainly through internet fraud.
10
 This caused a rude awakening 
about how the internet can be used to commit heinous crimes. However, a 
perplexing question that has since defied any answer is how the proceeds of 
these crimes were converted to ‘clean’ money, which served to foster the 
aims of Al-Qaeda. In other words, how did these proceeds ‘travel out’ of, or 
how were they siphoned out of the internet? 
The Financial Action Task Force
11
 (FATF) tried to solve this riddle by 
conducting a typology survey of new money laundering techniques.
12
 The 
                                                          
7
  A predicate offence is an offence which precipitates the crime of money laundering. It is the 
underlying offence that gives rise to the money laundering offence. Money laundering has an 
endless list of predicate offences, like theft, fraud, robbery, etc. For a concise list of these predicate 
offences, see article 2(h) of Palermo Convention. Cf Appendix to the Warsaw Convention. 
8
  Cf detailed discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.1. 
9
  Cf detailed discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.4. 
10
  Jacobson and Levitt (2010:34). Cf Lilley (2006: 28). 
11
  The Financial Action Task Force is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the Group of 
Seven (G7) Summit, comprised of Ministers of its Member jurisdictions. It is tasked with protecting 
the integrity of the international financial system by setting global and uniform standards against 
money laundering, terrorism and corruption, amongst other threats posed to the international 
financial system. Recently, in a way similar to that done in 2004, the mandate of the FATF was 
extended to the year 2020. See Financial Action Task Force (2012B: 2) and Financial Action Task 
Force (2004A: 1). Cf in relation to the regulation of cyberlaundering, see detailed discussion on the 
FATF in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.2.4.1. 
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FATF identified the internet as a “new risk area” for money laundering, and 
stated that the avenue of online casinos opens up endless possibilities for 
money laundering.
13
 The fact that cyberlaundering is a ‘new risk area’ is the 
only thing known about it at present. Its mechanisms have not yet been 
explored thoroughly, neither are there currently clear-cut legal provisions 
against the problem. Given the clandestine nature of terrorist activities, which 
is a mould within which cyberlaundering is embroiled, its instrumentality and 
significance to terrorist operations cannot be over-emphasized. 
 
1.3.1.3 Cyberlaundering and the world economy 
The global economy is but one sphere in which the impact of cyberlaundering 
is most felt.
14
 Currently, on a global scale, the amount of money being 
laundered annually is unfathomable. The World Bank recently estimated that, 
globally, about $4 trillion is laundered annually, but the amount is what is 
called a mere guestimate or “questionate.”15 Nevertheless this amount equals 
the combined value of the economies of most underdeveloped countries. 
What is more, this amount is set to triple if cyberlaundering is not kept at bay. 
One’s fear is further heightened by a recent report by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which indicates that about five to seven per cent of the 
world’s gross domestic product (GDP) is laundered annually.16 As far back as 
                                                                                                                                                                         
12
  Financial Action Task Force (2001B: 2). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 2). 
13
  Financial Action Task Force (2001B: 2). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 2). 
14
  See Unger (2007: 158), who identifies other sectors like the real estate sector and the legal 
profession as equally threatened by the activities of modern day money launderers. 
15
  Kellerman (2004:12). Cf Lilley (2006: 28). 
16
  International Monetary Fund (2008: 1). Cf Hinterseer (2007: 155). 
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1998, money laundering was said to be the world’s third largest market, after 
the US domestic bond market and the Euro bond market.
17
 With economics 
statistics from the United Nations Crime and Justice Database, in 1998, a 
model for estimating money laundering was devised, which put the amount of 
money laundered annually at $2.85 trillion.
18
 Over the years, an identifiable 
feature of money laundering has been its non-static nature. The figures 
identified above are growing numbers, and with the escalation of money 
laundering activities, especially on the limitless world of the internet, the sky 
is the limit for money launderers. In fact, the problem has reached such 
alarming proportions that the FATF believes that it is hard to publish actual 
estimates for fears or unreliability, given its growing nature.
19
  The fact that 
money laundering has an indirect impact on the economy
20
 is a veil covering 
the true nature and gravity of the money laundering dilemma.  
The truth is that several stagnant and collapsing economies today are the 
consequence of money laundering activities
21
 – a fact that is unknown to 
many. The emergence of the cyberlaundering phenomenon further 
compounds what is already a colossal problem. Cyberlaundering is therefore 
a problem which should not be underplayed, because without any form of 
legal regulation, it has the dire effect of hindering economic growth and 
development. 
                                                          
17
  Robinson (1998: 14). Cf Scholte (1997: 427). 
18
  Walker (1998: 2). Cf Price (2002: 12). 
19
  See Financial Action Task Force (2012) ‘Frequently Asked Questions: Money Laundering’ an 
internet article available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en _32250379_32235720_1_1 
_1_1_1,00.html> [accessed on 21 March 2011]. 
20
  Unger (2007: 149). Cf Hinterseer (2007: 156). 
21
  Unger (2007: 170). Cf Bartlett (2002: 1). 
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1.3.2 The non-existence of a proper ACL legal regime 
This significance of this research also lies in the fact that there is, as yet, no 
proper legal framework against cyberlaundering.
22
 This is ascribable to a key 
feature of cyberlaundering, which is the element of disguise inherent in the 
concept. If cyberlaundering activities cannot be easily identified or detected, 
how much more its regulation. These activities change as new avenues for 
laundering money on the internet are always sniffed out by criminals. Due to 
the vacillating nature of the fabric with which the internet is built, which 
constantly renders the internet susceptible to attacks and threats, present 
attempts to regulate cyberlaundering have been rendered futile. It is almost as 
if one is shooting at a moving target. The fact of the matter is that the existing 
anti-money laundering (AML) laws have remained static while the evil that 
they seek to eradicate mutates constantly. It is primarily because of this state 
of affairs that this study will attempt to come up with a legal framework to 
combat cyberlaundering. As we shall see in the course of this study, attempts 
have been made to come to grips with the problem, and this will be evaluated 
too.
23
 For example, on the international plane, in 2008, the FATF conducted a 
survey of online casinos as a possible avenue for cyberlaundering.
24
 In its 
report, the FATF recommends certain regulatory measures to which online 
casinos should be made subject.
25
 Similarly, the World Bank also made 
                                                          
22
  Cf Chapter 4 of this study, which explores and justifies the reality of this position by examining the 
current legal and international legal framework against cyberlaundering 
23
  Cf discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.1. 
24
  Financial Action Task Force (2008: 3) and Financial Action Task Force (2009B: 4). Cf detailed 
discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.2.4.1. 
25
  Cf detailed discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.2.4.1. 
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certain recommendations for the regulation of cyberlaundering. In one of its 
reports, it points out certain deficiencies in the electronic payment system (e-
payments systems).
26
On the national plane, little or nothing has been done to 
curb cyberlaundering.
27
 
 
1.4 LITERATURE SURVEY 
There is a dearth of literature on the subject of money laundering and 
cybercrime.
28
 Most of the literature does not address the issue of 
                                                          
26
  Kellerman (2004: 32). Cf Lilley (2006: 108). 
27
  Cf detailed discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.3. 
28
  Some examples of literature on money laundering include Beare, ME (2005) Critical Reflections on 
Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering and Corruption University of Toronto Press: 
Toronto.; Blunden, B (2001) The Money Launderers, how they do it, and how to catch them at it... 
Management Books: Gloucestershire; Higgins, GE (2010) Cybercrime: An Introduction to an 
Emerging Phenomenon McGraw-Hill: Columbus; Kshetri, N (2010) The Global Cybercrime 
Industry: Economic, Institutional and Strategic Perspectives Springer: Heidelberg; Lilley, P (2006) 
Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, International Crime and 
Terrorism (3
rd
 ed) Kogan Page: London; Madinger, J (2012) Money Laundering: A Guide for 
Criminal Investigators (3
rd
 edition) CRC Press: Boca Raton; Pillai, K and Julian, A (2008) 
Prevention of Money Laundering Legal and Financial Issues The Indian Law Institute: New Delhi; 
Reichel, P (ed) (2005) Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice Sage: Los Angeles; Reuter P 
and Truman, H (2004) Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight against Money Laundering Peterson 
Institute for International Economics: Washington DC; Robinson, J (1998) The Laundrymen, Inside 
the World’s Third Largest Business (2nd ed) Pocket Books: London; Richards, JR (2006) 
Transnational Criminal Organisations, Cybercrime, and Money Laundering CRC Press: Boca 
Raton and Savona, E (2000) Responding to Money Laundering: International Perspectives Taylor 
and Francis: Amsterdam.  Other examples of literature on cybercrime include Casey, E (2004) 
Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic Science, Computers and the Internet (2nd edition) 
Academic Press: London; Clough, J (2010) Principles of Cybercrime Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge; Curtis, G (2011) The Law of Cybercrimes and Their Investigations CRC Press: 
Washington; Grabosky, P and Smith, R (1998) Crime in the Digital Age, Controlling 
Telecommunications and Cyberspace Illegalities The Federation Press: Sydney; Gragido, W and 
Pirc, K (2011) Cybercrime and Espionage: An Analysis of Subversive Multi-Vector Threats 
Elsevier, Inc: Burlington;  Moore, R (2011) Cybercrime, Second Edition: Investigating High-
Technology Computer Crime Elsevier Inc: Oxford; Parker, D (1976) Crime by Computer Charles 
Scribner’s Suns: New York; Reyes, A, Brittson, A, O’Shea, K, and Steele, J (2007) Cyber Crime 
Investigations: Bridging the Gaps between Security Professionals, Law Enforcement, and 
Prosecutors Syngress: Massachusetts; Taylor, RW, Caeti, T. J., Loper, K., Fritsch, E. J., and 
Liederbach, J. (2006) Digital crime and digital terrorism Prentice Hall: New Jersey; Wall, DS 
(2007) Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Information Age (PCSS-Polity Crime and 
Society) Polity Press: Cambridge; and  Yar, M (2010) ‘The Private Pricing of Internet Crime’ in 
Yar, M and Jewkes, Y (eds) Handbook of Internet Crime Willan Publishing: Devon. 
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cyberlaundering. Even though some of the literature has touched on the 
topic,
29
 these works merely scratch the surface of the subject, without an in-
depth legal investigation into the concept and its legal ramifications. The 
reality of this fact forms part of the theoretical basis for embarking on this 
study. 
In addition, the available literature on cyberlaundering does not have a legal 
direction. This might be a reason for the lack of a juridical focus on the 
subject. Despite the fact that the bulk of the material on cyberlaundering 
focuses on its techniques, the available literature on the subject is bereft of 
legal focus. This is precisely why this study seeks to etch out a new path in 
the law by attempting to erect an ACL legal regime. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
  Some examples of articles that have touched upon the subject of cyberlaundering include the 
following: Bumeter, BH (2001) ‘Cyberlaundering: Low Tech Meets High Tech’ Maven Mappers 
Information available at <http://www.softduit. com/mavenmappersinformation /2001/06/07/ 1 
cyberlaundering-low-tech-high-tech/> [accessed on 21 July 2011]; Filipkowski, W (2008) ‘Cyber 
laundering: An analysis of typologies and techniques’ 3(1) International Journal of Criminal 
Justice Sciences 233; Kellerman, T (2004) ‘Money Laundering in Cyberspace’ 11(15) The World 
Bank Financial Sector Working Paper 1; Lilley, P (2006) Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth About 
Global Money Laundering, International Crime and Terrorism (3
rd
 ed) Kogan Page: London; 
Lilley, P (2007) ‘E-Money and Cyberlaundering: Virtual Dirty Dealing’ available at <http:// 
proximal review.squarespace.com/e-money-cyber-laundering/> [accessed on 12 July 2011]; 
Molander, RC, Mussington, DA, Wilson, PA (1998) Cyberpayments and Money Laundering: 
Problems and Promise RAND: Santa Monica; Mussington, DA, Wilson, PA, Molander, RC (1998) 
Exploring Money Laundering Vulnerabilities through Emerging Cyberspace Technologies: A 
Carribean-Based Exercise RAND: Santa Monica;  Philippsohn, S (2001A) ‘Money Laundering on 
the Internet’ Computers & Security 20(6) 485-490; Philippson, S (2001B) ‘The Dangers of New 
Technology - Laundering on the Internet’ 1(5) Journal of Money Laundering Control Thomason 89 
and Ping, H (2004) ‘New Trends in Money Laundering – From the Real World to Cyberspace’ 5(1) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 50. 
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1.5 FOCUS OF STUDY 
Cyberlaundering is problematic because of the absence of an ACL legal 
regime. There are several questions that crop up, and it is presently these that 
this study addresses: 
 
1.5.1 Research question 
The principal question that this study attempts to answer is this: How can an 
ACL legal regime be established? 
This question is one under which other legal issues are subsumed. There are 
no straightforward answers, nor are there simple solutions. The questions that 
are addressed in this study include how cyberlaundering can be legally 
conceptualized; how existing national and international laws can be adapted 
to address the problem; how the legal regulation of cyberlaundering is 
possible through establishing prevention and compliance mechanisms; and as 
an equally indispensable issue, how cyberlaundering can be regulated by 
establishing adequate enforcement mechanisms. The latter will include 
looking at how cyberlaundering can be investigated, and how jurisdiction can 
be founded for it. 
This study proceeds from the standpoint that the legal issues that will be 
identified are concerns for states that attach great value to procedural fairness 
and the features of a constitutional state based upon the Rule of Law 
(Rechstaat). Even though cyberlaunderers are bent on undermining the 
authority of the state and its institutions, it would be counterproductive for the 
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state to chisel away at the very foundations upon which it is built in its 
attempts to bring cyberlaunderers to book. To flout constitutional and 
procedural safeguards would serve only to undermine the integrity of the law 
even more, thus rendering the state even more vulnerable to the machinations 
of money launderers. 
The legal issues mentioned above represent the parameters of this study. By 
disserting on them and on the way they can be brought to bear on the 
menacing problem of cyberlaundering, we open up practical and realistic 
ways of responding effectively to the problem. 
 
1.5.2 Aims and objectives of study 
In light of the above, broadly speaking, there are four objectives that this 
research seeks to achieve. They are the following:  
1.  Given that cyberlaundering currently lacks any form of legal 
conceptualization or categorization, and given, too, that the logic and 
rationale underlying the first step to be taken in addressing a problem is 
to define it, this study attempts to conceptualize cyberlaundering 
legally.
30
  
2. The second objective is to analyse and assess whether these are existent 
laws at national and international level that have any bearing on 
cyberlaundering. This is done in order to see how laws can be adapted 
                                                          
30
  This is the primary goal of Chapter 3 of this study. Also, the supporting concepts of money 
laundering and cybercrime, which are root concepts of cyberlaundering, as discussed in Chapter 2 
of this study, contributes to an undertsanding of the  latter. Cf Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2, and 
Chapter 5, paragraph 5.5.1.1.1. 
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and co-ordinated to form a formidable arsenal of legal measures that 
could be used to counteract cyberlaundering
31
  
3. Thirdly, this study seeks principally to set in place legal measures that 
can ensure the regulation of cyberlaundering. Identifying the problem and 
laws is one thing; it is entirely quite another to fashion out measures 
necessary to regulate cyberlaundering. In addition to establishing ACL 
measures that are adapted from existing hard and soft laws, the third 
objective of this study is to establish preventive and compliance pillars 
that will form part of the ACL legal regime.
32
  
4. The fourth objective is to complement the regulations with an 
enforcement pillar. Certain legal issues that serve as a barrier to the 
effective prosecution of cyberlaundering will be addressed. These 
pertinent prosecutorial issues include how cyberlaundering can be 
investigated; how jurisdiction can be founded or determined for it, and, 
more broadly, how certain technical considerations involving the 
realization of the ACL legal regime can be addressed. By addressing 
these very pertinent issues, together, the enforcement pillar of the ACL 
legal regime can be assured.
33
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
  This is is the primary purpose of Chapter 4 of this study. 
32
  Chapter 5 of this study serves this purpose. 
33
  Chapter 6 of this study is devoted to achieving this purpose. For deliberation on these issues, see 
Straub (2002: 35) and Ping (2004: 29). 
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1.6 SCOPE OF STUDY 
The study focuses solely on the concept of cyberlaundering. However, as is 
inevitable and necessary, certain other subject areas that are related to 
cyberlaundering are addressed as well. A focus on these other areas is 
important for the understanding of cyberlaundering and for devising 
regulations against it. Given the novelty of cyberlaundering in this regard, 
one is guided by the parameters of this study, as determined above.
34
 As such, 
in this study, other than frequent references to certain principles of 
cybercrime and money laundering, which are the two main roots of 
cyberlaundering, reference is also made to certain principles of information 
technology, computer forensics and certain general principles of international 
law. 
Though money laundering is one of the main legs of cyberlaundering, this 
study does not explore the entire academic landscape of the subject, but only 
considers it to the extent that it is relevant or related to cyberlaundering and 
its proposed regulation.
35
 To this end, money laundering, as a subject area, is 
considered mainly as a background to cyberlaundering in light of the fact that 
an understanding of the AML legal framework is indispensable for 
understanding and establishing an ACL legal regime.  
In addition, although money laundering is inextricably linked to terrorist 
financing, which is a separate subject area on its own, this study does not 
                                                          
34
  Cf discussion in paragraph 1.3 above. 
35
  The bulk of the discussion on the subject of money laundering is in Chapters 2 of this study, which 
is a background chapter, and Chapter 4, which addresses present international and national laws 
against cyberlaundering. 
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consider the latter, except for its causal relatedness to the advent of 
cyberlaundering as discussed earlier.
36
  
Similarly, this study recognizes cybercrime as the second main leg of 
cyberlaundering, but just as with the subject of money laundering, the subject 
of cybercrime is given attention only to the extent that it is related to the 
discussion on cyberlaundering and its legal regulation, without substantial 
regard to other various forms of cybercrime that exist. Hence, 
cyberlaundering as it relates only to money laundering and cybercrime 
constitutes the scope of this study. 
 
1.7 METHODOLOGY 
This is a desk-based study. Relevant sources have been garnered from various 
institutional libraries and resource centres, such as resources at the Max 
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, 
Germany;  the Law Library of Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany; the 
University of Applied Sciences, Coburg, Germany; the Law Library of 
Leiden University, Leiden, the Netherlands; the Peace Palace Library in the 
Hague, Netherlands; the Law Library of the University of the Western Cape, 
Bellville, South Africa, and the Law Library of the University of Pretoria, 
Pretoria, South Africa. 
The study is based mainly on an analysis of primary materials such as 
relevant treaties, conventions and agreements on cybercrime and money 
                                                          
36
  Cf paragraph 1.2.1.2 above. 
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laundering. Several official reports issued by reputable anti-money laundering 
institutions and agencies are also considered. The study furthermore 
references certain national laws insofar as they have any bearing on 
cyberlaundering. To a certain degree, a country’s level of adherence to 
current AML laws is a yardstick that determines why that country’s national 
law is studied in the first place.
37
 Other primary sources used in this study are 
decided court cases and indictments. 
The secondary sources to which this study will refer include books, journal 
articles, internet articles, newspaper articles and commentaries. But given the 
paucity of secondary sources on the subject of cyberlaundering, this study 
also relies largely on cyberlaundering operations in practice. As regards the 
latter, the study assesses the activities of certain online companies and 
websites insofar as they are linked to the main focus area.
38
  
 
1.8 STUDY OUTLINE 
Broadly, this study is divided into seven chapters. A summary of each chapter 
is given briefly below. 
Chapter 1, the Introduction, sets out the essence of what this study contains. 
The chapter introduces, albeit generally, the concept of cyberlaundering; the 
significance of the study; the focus of the study, which includes the question 
                                                          
37
  In the past, the FATF black-listed countries having weak, or non-existent AML laws, branding them 
as Non-Compliant Countries and Territories (NCCTs). For the list of countries previously on the 
FATF’s black list, see Financial Action Task Force (2002A: 11). Currently, the FATF no longer 
uses the black-list system to ensure adherence. Cf detailed discussions in Chapter 4, paragraph 
4.3.3, and Chapter 5, paragraph 5.5.1.1.3 below. 
38
  This exercise is, largely, a constituent part of Chapters 3, 5 and 6 below. 
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of research and aims and objectives of the study, as well as the methodology 
adopted to achieve the purposes of the study. 
Chapter 2, Money Laundering and Cybercrime: A Background Study, 
provides the needed background to the study. It uncovers the roots of 
cyberlaundering. Here, the concepts of money laundering and cybercrime are 
discussed generally with a view to forming a better understanding of the 
concept and practice of cyberlaundering. 
Chapter 3, Cyberlaundering: Concept and Practice, investigates 
cyberlaundering as a legal concept and how it manifests itself in practice. It 
attempts to demystify the concept of cyberlaundering and attempts to 
conceptualize it legally, which is one of the primary aims of this study. 
Chapter 4, The Present Legal Framework against Cyberlaundering, explores 
and compares existing laws in place against cyberlaundering. Part I sets out 
broadly the current AML legal regime, with the primary focus on the 
international level. Part II examines the current ACL legal regime and the 
attempts presently made to establish one. The latter serves the purpose of 
identifying the strengths and weaknesses of certain AML laws and anti-
cybercrime (ACC) laws at a national and international level, with a view to 
finding and establishing an appropriate regulatory framework for the problem 
of cyberlaundering, which grows out of both subject areas. 
Chapter 5, Regulating Cyberlaundering, attempts to construct a legal 
regulatory framework for cyberlaundering. Borrowing from the founding 
pillars upholding the current AML legal regime, an adaptive approach is 
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posited in order to establish and fortify the prevention, compliance and 
enforcement pillars, which are proposed for the ACL legal regime. However, 
this chapter considers only the prevention and compliance pillars. The 
enforcement pillar, which has unique issues, is discussed in the following 
chapter. 
Chapter 6, Prosecuting Cyberlaundering, is an extension of the previous 
chapter. It proposes an enforcement pillar for the ACL legal regime. It 
explores certain prosecutorial issues relating to cyberlaundering, such as the 
investigation of cyberlaundering and how jurisdiction can be founded for it. 
This chapter also addresses the technicalities involved in the overall 
establishment of the ACL legal regime.  
Chapter 7, the Conclusion, concludes the study with a set of 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MONEY LAUNDERING AND CYBERCRIME: A BACKGROUND 
STUDY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is a background study of money laundering and cybercrime. It 
focuses on certain historical aspects that are crucial to the primary task of the 
study, which is to study how an effective legal framework can be established 
for combating cyberlaundering. The chapter serves two main purposes: First, 
it seeks to put cyberlaundering into perspective by exploring the history and 
development of money laundering and cybercrime in tandem. Secondly, it 
traces the development of these two main roots of cyberlaundering, thereby 
attempting to uncover certain deep-seated issues currently associated with 
this problematic concept. 
 
2.2 MONEY LAUNDERING: AN OVERVIEW 
2.2.1 Understanding the meaning of money laundering 
Before one goes ahead to attempt to define money laundering, it is important 
to note from the outset that the concept of money laundering is constantly 
evolving. This has affected its definition over the years, even though the 
principle that underlies the concept remains unchanged. Perhaps one of the 
earliest and most  important definitions of money laundering is outlined in 
Article 3(b) of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
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Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
39
  (the Vienna Convention), 
which reads as follows: 
The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from 
any [drug trafficking] offense or offenses or from an act of participation in such 
offense or offenses, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of 
the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an 
offense or offenses to evade the legal consequences of his actions; The concealment 
or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with 
respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from an 
offense or offenses or from an act of participation in such an offense or offenses.  
 
Article 3(c)(i) of the Convention further adds: 
The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at the time of receipt that 
such property was derived from an offense or offenses […]  or from an act of 
participation in such offense or offenses. 
 
Interestingly, the term ‘money laundering’ was never used in the Convention, 
although its provisions create the widest possible ambit within which the 
conduct of laundering money would fall. Another key feature of this 
somewhat encompassing definition is that the conduct described is limited to 
the predicate offence of drug trafficking, which is understandable, given the 
nature of the Convention, its aims and objectives.
40
 However, the direct legal 
                                                          
39
  The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 7 December 1987, 
and it came into force on 11 November 1988. 
40
  For more elaborate discussions on the Vienna Convention as it pertains to money laundering, see 
the following: Stessens (2000: 25); Savona (2000: 40); Levi (2002: 38) and Gill and Taylor (2004: 
587). 
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implication of this definition is that a criminal would go scot-free if the 
underlying predicate offence for which he is charged is not a drug-related 
offence, such as theft, robbery, kidnapping, tax evasion, etc. Subsequent 
international legal instruments such as the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime
41
 (the Palermo Convention) attempted a 
correction of this anomaly by broadening the scope of the predicate offences 
for money laundering to include serious offences.
42
  
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
43
 finally put its stamp of approval 
on the definition of money laundering described in the Vienna Convention by 
adopting certain technicalities of the definition.  It includes a very salient 
recommendation in line with the provisions of the Palermo Convention, 
which requires that predicate offences for money laundering be widened as 
far as possible to include all serious offences.
44
  
According to the FATF’s definition, money laundering is the “the processing 
of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin in order to legitimize the 
ill-gotten gains of crime.”45 But this is no more than a fine-tuned and succinct 
version of the definition set out in the Vienna Convention.  In what looks to 
be a following of the trend set by the Vienna Convention, academics have 
                                                          
41
  The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 November 
2000, and came into force on 29 September 2003. 
42
  See Article 2 of the Palermo Convention. Cf discussion in Gill and Taylor (2004: 590). 
43
  See footnote 11 above. 
44
  See Recommendation 3, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 12). Cf Recommendation 4 Financial 
Action Task Force (2003:23). 
45
  The Financial Action Task Force ‘What is money laundering?, Basic Facts About Money 
Laundering’ an undated internet document available at <http//www.oecd.org/fatf> [accessed on the 
15 April 2011]. Cf World Bank (2003) ‘Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Definitions 
and Explanation’ <http:www.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/> [accessed on 15April 2012]. 
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built on this traditional definition of money laundering. For example, money 
laundering has also been defined as “the process by which criminals try to 
hide the origins and ownerships of proceeds of their criminal activities.”46  
The definitions given above can be grouped into traditional definitions of 
money laundering. As can be garnered from these definitions, the overall aim 
of money laundering is to enable criminals to retain control over the proceeds 
of their crime(s). The most common words used to describe how criminals 
can ‘retain control of their illegal funds, are ‘washing,’ ‘cleaning,’ 
‘disguising,’ ‘hiding’ and ‘converting’ ‘dirty’ money. The upshot of most of 
the metaphoric associations to the act of money laundering, (i.e. the 
traditional concept) is that such definitions often have the concept of actual 
money as a main subject. This is an anomaly, and is not suited to modern 
times and realities. Currently, money laundering does not simply entail 
washing dirty money, because in many instances actual money is not 
involved. The current trend shows that criminals are trying to distant 
themselves from the ‘loot’ as far away as possible by creating a complex web 
of transactions in order to evade detection and to detach the illegal proceeds 
from their origin.  
In light of this modern trend, Hopton gives a descriptive definition  of  money 
laundering as follows: “Money laundering occurs every time any transaction 
takes place or a relationship is formed which involves any form of property or 
                                                          
46
  See Hopton (2009: 1) where the traditional concept of money laundering is expounded further. Cf 
Savona (2000: 33) and Stessens (2000: 22). 
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benefit, whether it is tangible or intangible, which is derived from criminal 
activity.”47      
This definition is more plausible for the following reasons: 
1. The notion of ‘benefits’ is not only confined to money (the so-called 
object of the crime) but other things of value derived from criminal 
activities, and as such, it casts a much wider net; 
2. Following on the above, the definition is particularly relevant to the 
concept of cyberlaundering, given the very complex trails criminals create 
on the internet in laundering illegal proceeds. In this case, the concept of  
‘proceeds’ extends to things of value, for example, stolen software, which 
is often of great value, and which a thief could conceal or launder without 
actually reducing it to monetary value. 
 
2.2.2 The history and evolution of the anti-money laundering legal 
regime 
The syntactic origin of the phrase ‘money laundering’ does not lie in the 
mechanism of a washing machine, as could be easily presumed, even though 
one would understand the underlying euphemism. The term ‘money 
laundering’ was coined as a result of the Watergate scandal involving 
President Richard Nixon in the United States in 1973 and 1974. An enquiry 
was launched to unveil the shroud over the receipt of certain anonymous 
campaign contributions made to Nixon’s Committee to Re-elect the President 
                                                          
47
  Hopton (2009: 2). Cf definitions and observations provided in Reuter and Truman (2004: 16), and 
Levi (2002: 30). 
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(‘CRP’).48 The press used the term ‘laundering’, albeit colloquially, to refer to 
the highly publicized activities and conduct of the CRP.
49
 The first legal 
usage of the term ‘money laundering’ is traceable to the United States 
Supreme Court decision of 1982 -  United States of America v $4,255, 625, 
39
50
 -  a case which involved the civil forfeiture of large sums of money.
51
 
The development of the global anti-money laundering (AML) legal regime, 
however, dates as far back as the 1980s. At the time, the Nixon scandal had 
become an anecdote for this new breed of economic crime. The pivotal points 
in the history of money laundering will be discussed under the following sub-
headings: the regulatory and preventive phase; the criminalisation and 
internalisation phase; the supranisation phase and the terrorism-influenced 
phase of money laundering law. 
 
2.2.2.1 The regulation and prevention phase 
The development of the money laundering legal regime began on a domestic 
scale. This first stage in its evolution started with the enactment of the United 
States Bank Secrecy Act 1970 (BSA).
52
 Given its neatly stipulated reporting 
and record keeping requirements, it is clear that the BSA was put in place to 
regulate the crime of money laundering rather than to control or repress it. 
The BSA’s record keeping requirements provide for the ‘Know-Your-
                                                          
48
   Robinson (1998: 6). Cf Strafer (1989: 150). 
49
  Shams (2004: 2). Cf Robinson (1998: 4). 
50
  551 F Supp 314 (1982). 
51
  In this case, the court concluded that the financial transfers that took place constituted, more likely 
than not, a money laundering process. See page 325 of the United States of America v $4,255, 625, 
39, 51 F Supp 314 (1982). See also Shams (2004: 2). 
52
  The Bank Secrecy Act (1970), PubL 91-508; 841114. 
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Customer’ (KYC) principle, which is now a corner stone of the current AML 
legal regime. In terms of the KYC principle, financial institutions are required 
to keep a record of the identity of every customer who conducts a transaction 
with the bank, and record such transactions in line with the basic principles 
set out in the Act.
53
 A violation of the record keeping requirements would 
constitute a felony under the BSA, and is punishable by imprisonment of a 
period not exceeding five years or a fine not exceeding $10,000, or both.
54
 
The BSA also provides for very stringent reporting requirements. It places an 
obligation on financial institutions to report domestic transactions valued at 
more than $10, 000.
55
 Similarly, persons transporting money or monetary 
instruments into or out of the United States in excess of $5000 are required to 
report such activity to the relevant body.
56
 Another significant provision of 
the BSA is the obligation placed upon United States citizens conducting 
business within the United States to file reports of their transactions or 
relationships with foreign financial institutions.
57
  
However, the stringent provisions of the BSA were a thorn in the flesh for 
many financial institutions in the United States, and consequently, they 
caused much controversy. In the case of California Bankers Association v 
Schultz,
58
 certain banks in the state of California were averse to the 
cumbersome provision of the BSA, and contested their constitutionality. The 
                                                          
53
  See section 101, Title I of the Act. 
54
  Section 101, Title I of the Bank Secrecy Act. 
55
  See sections 221, Title II of the Act. Also see Shams (2004: 19). 
56
  See sections 231, Title II of the Act. Also see Shams (2004: 19). 
57
  See section 231, Title II of the Act, and Shams at 19. 
58
  39L ed 2d 812 (1974) n5. 
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United States Supreme Court found their allegations to be baseless, and 
confirmed the constitutionality of the BSA. The court noted that the right 
which the BSA seeks to protect far exceeds the inconvenience it might cause 
to financial institutions.
59
 
After the enactment of the BSA, similar regulatory and preventive laws were 
passed in Switzerland, known for its strong bank secrecy laws. With the 
growing nature of the Swiss financial sector, it became important for 
Switzerland to adopt self-regulatory laws in order to protect its image and 
reputation, especially with its international clients. As a consequence, in 
1977, financial institutions in Switzerland signed an Agreement on the 
Observance of Care by Banks in Accepting Funds and on the Practice of 
Banking Secrecy.
60
 
Aside from the attempts made domestically in the United States and 
Switzerland to regulate money laundering at the time, signs of regulation at 
the international level had begun to surface gradually. In 1973, the US-
Switzerland Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
61
 (MLAT) was signed. The 
MLAT came as a result of the growing concerns of the United States 
government that Swiss banks had started to house illegal funds of criminals. 
Thus, the MLAT also served as a necessary safeguard for the United States. 
                                                          
59
  See pages 745 to 803 of the judgment. The dissenting judgment of Judge Douglas at 851-857 of the 
judgment is also noteworthy. The Act has also been criticized by academics. For example, see 
Hughes (1991: 283) and Richards (1999: 44). 
60
  A revised version of the agreement was made in 1998. This can be found in the Agreement on the 
Swiss Bank Code of Conduct with Regard to the Exercise of Due Diligence (28 January 1998), 
available at <http://www.swissbanking.org/en/home/> [accessed on 11 January 2011]. For an 
elaborate discussion of this, see Shams (2004: 24). 
61
  27 UST 2019, TIAS 8302. The treaty was signed on 23 May 1973 and came into force on 23 
January 1977. 
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The main purpose of the MLAT is to foster international cooperation between 
Switzerland and the United States in criminal investigations and proceedings. 
 
2.2.2.2 The criminalization and internationalization phase 
The 1980s witnessed a significant development in the field of anti-money 
laundering law. The concept of money laundering as a crime began to take 
shape both within domestic borders and in the international sphere. The first 
landmark in this embryonic stage of money laundering law, as recorded by 
authorities,
62
 is the first legal usage of the term money laundering by the 
United States Supreme Court in US v $425562539.
63
 In this case, the court 
repeatedly used the word ‘laundering’ without defining it expressly or 
elaborating on it further.
64
  
In the mid-1980s, there were parallel developments in the field of money 
laundering law in the United States and the United Kingdom. Both countries 
enacted far-reaching laws that criminalised the laundering of criminal 
proceeds with the widest possible ambits.
65
 In the United States, for example, 
the Money Laundering Control Act
66
 – symbolic for criminalising money 
laundering at the Federal level – was enacted. On the other hand, the United 
Kingdom enacted laws such as the Drug Trafficking Offences Act
67
 and the 
                                                          
62
  Gilmore (1995: 23) and Shams (2004: 26). 
63
  551 F Supp 314 (1982). See above at footnote 10. 
64
  See Pages 322, 324 and 325 of the decision. For a critique, see Shams (2004: 26). Cf Naim (2005: 
23). 
65
  In the United States, the Money Laundering Control Act 18 of 1986 was enacted. 
66
  Act 18 of 1986. 
67
  Chapter 32 of 1986. 
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Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act.
68
 While the latter was 
the first law in the United Kingdom to criminalise the laundering of proceeds 
of drug trafficking, the former was one of the earliest indicators of a link 
between terrorist activities and money laundering. 
On the international plane, the term ‘money laundering’ was first used by the 
Select Committee of Experts on Violence in Present Day Society in 
Recommendation R(80)10 - ‘Measures Against the Transfer and Safekeeping 
of Funds of Criminal Origin.’69 The upshot of this document was its non-
binding nature, although it encouraged member states to criminalise the 
transfer of funds of criminal origin.  
A more pertinent international anti-money laundering instrument was the 
Vienna Convention of 1988. Aside from providing a very extensive definition 
of money laundering,
70
 the Convention was the first international instrument 
that burdened states parties with the obligation to criminalise the laundering 
of the proceeds of drug trafficking. The Vienna Convention made the fight 
against money laundering a matter of international concern. It was given 
further momentum by the adoption of subsequent international legal 
instruments such as the Palermo Convention
71
  and the Statement of 
Principles on the Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the 
                                                          
68
  Chapter 4 of 1989. However, this Act was later repealed and replaced with the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 807of 1997. 
69
  Council of Europe: Measures Against the Transfer and Safekeeping of Funds of Criminal Origin: 
Recommendation No R (80) and Explanatory Memorandum, adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on 27 June 1980. See Gilmore (1995: 171), where the 
recommendation is reproduced. 
70
  See the discussion in 2.2.1 above. 
71
  See the discussion in 2.2.1 above. 
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Purposes of Money Laundering
72
 issued by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision.
73
 The latter instrument is significant for the fact that it 
entrenches a very salient principle in the anti-money laundering legal regime, 
namely that financial institutions should not be used for purposes of hiding 
illegal funds. 
 
2.2.2.3 The supranationalisation phase 
Towards the late 1980s, the nature and character of the crime of money 
laundering as a truly transnational crime had become entrenched. Most 
countries in North America and Western Europe began to respond actively to 
the growing phenomenon. With the Vienna Convention and the 
recommendations of the Basel Committee in place, the international 
cooperation of the international community in forging a strong anti-money 
laundering (AML) regime had been triggered. However, the AML regime did 
not gain full momentum until the FATF was established in 1989.
74
 The FATF 
has succeeded in supranationalising money laundering law. Its ‘carrot and 
stick’75 methods of inducement and coercion have opened up a new level of 
                                                          
72
  The Basel Committee ‘Statement of Principles on the Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking 
System for the Purposes of Money Laundering’ The Basel Committee Compendium of Documents, 
Chapter III, Volume 1 (May 2001) available at <http://www.bis.org> [accessed on 18 February 
2011]. 
73
  The Basel Committee was established in 1974, and it consists of central bank governors of countries 
consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, Japan, Italy, Germany, France, Canada and Belgium. See The Basel Committee ‘About 
Basel Committee’ available at <http://www.bis.org/about [accessed on 20 February 2011]. 
74
  The FATF was established in 1989 by the Group of Seven (G7) consisting of France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Italy and Japan. See the Financial Action Task Force 
(an undated internet webpage) ‘About the FATF’ available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/> 
[accessed on 21 February 2011]. See footnote 11 above. 
75
  Shams (2004: 4). Cf Naím (2005: 33). 
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global awareness of the problem, and have ensured compliance with certain 
basic standards in respect of AML law.
76
 Thanks to the efforts of the FATF, 
the issue of money laundering has been put at the top of the priority list of 
major international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development.
77
 Also, the AML regime has been 
entrenched in the legal framework of most national jurisdictions. 
 
2.2.2.4 The terrorist financing phase 
This phase can be described as the darkest in the evolution of the AML 
regime. After the Al Qaeda attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City on 
11 September 2011, the crime of money laundering appeared in a new light. 
There was a need to look into tackling the crime from the angle of terrorist 
financing, as it became a novel field needing attention. The AML regime 
became the only likely remedy and the most appropriate apparatus with 
which to control terrorist financing. The September 11 attacks have spawned 
the enactment of various domestic anti-terrorism and AML laws in different 
countries, the most notable of which is the United States Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
                                                          
76
  Primarily, the FATF monitors to see whether countries abide by its measures, recommendations and 
standards as set out in the FATF’s 40 Recommendations and Nine Special Recommendations 
(available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatf_40_Recommendations> and accessed on 
11 February 2011). It was the practice of the FATF to blacklist countries that are non-compliant 
with its recommendations (the so-called ‘Non-Compliant Countries and Territories’ - NCCTs). The 
FATF no longer follows this system of assessment, and there are currently no countries blacklisted 
by the FATF. 
77
  Shams (2004: 4). Cf Kochan (2006: 87). 
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and Obstruct Terrorism Act
78
 (US PATRIOT ACT). The inextricable link 
between terrorist financing and money laundering was further evidenced by 
subsequent terrorist attacks such as the attacks in London on 7 July 2005.  
Not many agree that terrorist financing should be necessarily linked to money 
laundering. Some authors are of the view that terrorist financing should not 
be seen as an extension of the subject matter of money laundering.
79
 These 
authors argue that terrorism should be seen as principle-based, and it should 
be considered as a due process limitation to AML law.
80
 However, regardless 
of how it is couched, what is clear is that there are no clear-cut parameters of 
the dangers posed by money laundering, and the link to terrorism makes this 
glaring. 
 
2.2.3 The process of money laundering 
The ‘cleaning’ or ‘conversion’ of ‘dirty money’ to ‘clean money’ involves a 
resort to transactions, real or imagined, which would be designed to confuse 
the onlooker and confound the inquirer.
81
 On face value, it becomes clear that 
misrepresentation is a fundamental denominator underlying the process of 
money laundering. Such ‘misrepresentation’ often unfolds, as commonly 
described, in three main stages – the placement, layering and integration 
stages.  
                                                          
78
  Act 115, Statute 272 of 2001. 
79
  Norton and Shams (2002: 104). For diiferent approaches, see Zagaris (2004: 47) and Koker (2006: 
41). 
80
  Norton and Shams (2002: 104). Cf Shams (2004: 3) and Kochan (2006: 32). 
81
  Rider (1999: 40). See Hopton (2009: 10). 
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Before discussing the three stages of money laundering, it should be noted 
upfront that these stages are often blurred, especially in modern times, with 
the advent of cyberlaundering. Broadly speaking, money laundering can 
occur without necessarily following the three processes. Tax evasion is a 
good example. If one places the proceeds of a legitimate activity directly into 
a bank account in another country, there is no problem because the money is 
legitimate. But where the account holder fails to declare his income on a tax 
return in a country where this was earned, the funds are laundered through the 
bank, although the bank would be unaware of this. Therefore, the following 
discussion should be considered with circumspection, as the placement, 
layering and integration stages are not a closed list of the money laundering 
process. 
 
2.2.3.1 Placement 
The term placement refers to the initial process of money laundering where 
the proceeds derived from crime are deposited in a financial institution. The 
amount of money placed in a financial institution would depend on money 
laundering techniques adopted by the criminal. These proceeds are usually 
large amounts or denominations which the criminal disperses across several 
financial institutions. The idea here is to evade the reporting requirements 
outlined in such laws as the Bank Secrecy Act.
82
 
 
                                                          
82
 See the discussion in paragraph 2.2.2.1 above. 
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2.2.3.2 Layering 
Layering is the second key stage in the money laundering process. It refers to 
an attempt to forge the ultimate disguise of the illegal funds. The criminal 
uses various tactics to evade traceability. The layering stage involves several 
sub-processes. Firstly, the criminal would need to ‘wash’ these illegal 
proceeds in order to give them a legitimate appearance. This can be done by 
either mixing the dirty money with the clean money.
83
 As an example, illegal 
proceeds can be integrated with the legal proceeds of legitimate businesses 
such as a pizzeria or by under-invoicing the imports of an international 
business trade in the form of a commodity trading company,
84
 or by defacing 
the medium through which the money is paid. A clear example of the latter 
case is usually where casino chips are purchased, using illegal proceeds (in 
the case of a traditional casino game) which are then converted back into 
cash. Another method of washing is the concealment of the beneficial 
ownership of the tainted funds by financial institutions, such as creating fake 
mortgages to purchase securities in bearer form, and using a lawyer’s trust 
account.
85
 
Within the contextual framework of cyberlaundering, the complexities which 
criminals try to create reach a distinctive peak. The internet has become a 
very effective means through which illegal proceeds can be washed, and more 
often than not, smart cards are used to foster such purposes, given that these 
                                                          
83
 Hinteseer (2002: 18). Cf Hopton (2009: 1). 
84
 Hinterseer (2002: 18). Cf Rider (1999: 40). 
85
 Hinterseer (2002: 18). Cf Savona (2000: 33). 
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cards can be simply loaded with money and used to conduct all manner of 
transactions online. 
Over the years, Offshore Financial Centres
86
 (OFCs) have become crucial to 
the layering process of money laundering. It is becoming a steady norm that 
criminals with illegal proceeds prefer to spread these proceeds across various 
OFCs. Two main explanations can be given for this: Firstly, the criminal tries 
to evade the prying eyes of local law enforcement, and secondly, OFCs often 
thrive on their large base of foreign clienteles. For many years, countries in 
the Caribbean with fervent OFCs have been attractive to money launderers on 
the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Some of the countries like the Cayman 
Islands, Nauru and Barbados were blacklisted by the FATF as Non-
Compliant Counteries and Territories (NCCTs). However, the FATF has 
done away with the method of blacklisting countries to ensure compliance 
with its basic recommendations. Though abrogated, this method of 
compliance could be considered successful in light of the fact that most of the 
blacklisted countries made genuine attempts to domesticate the global AML 
regime in their jurisdictions by adopting and implementing local anti-money 
laundering laws.
87
  
                                                          
86
  The International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) has defined OFCs as financial centres where the bulk of 
financial sector activity is offshore on both sides of the balance sheet, that is, the counter-parties of 
the majority of financial institutions liabilities and assets are non-residents, where the transactions 
are initiated elsewhere, and where the majority of institutions involved are controlled by non-
residents. See International Monetary Fund Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department (2000) 
‘Offshore Financial Centres: IMF Background Paper’ available at <http:www.fsfoum.org> 
[accessed on 22 April 2011]. 
87
  At its Eighth Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 2006-2007 dated 12 
October 2007, the FATF listed no countries as non-cooperative or non-compliant. Financial Action 
Task Force (2007: 4). However, on 25 February 2009, the FATF did issue a statement that Pakistan, 
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2.2.3.3 Integration 
The integration stage of money laundering comes as a result of the need to 
reintegrate the illegal proceeds back into the legal economy or the 
commercial world. Although it is arguable that a criminal could continue to 
layer his ill-derived funds without the need to reintegrate them, reintegration 
makes economic sense because “the economic realities associated with the 
opportunity cost of money means that a portion of the criminally derived 
money will need to be invested in other endeavours, regardless of whether 
they are legal or illegal.”88 
The buy-back technique is probably the most popular method through which 
criminal proceeds can be reintegrated into the legal economy. An example of 
the buy-back technique is as follows: X has illegal proceeds derived from 
drug trafficking, and he uses such proceeds to buy a recording company. He 
signs himself as a record producer to this company, and contracts the terms in 
such a way that the company will pay him royalties every month, even though 
he would not be producing any record. In such a way, the illegal proceeds are 
‘cleaned’ and reintegrated into the commercial cycle.  
There are various other techniques at the disposal of criminals who seek to 
reintegrate criminal proceeds back into the commercial world. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Sao Tome and Principe were very lax in their respective AML 
policies. See Financial Action Task Force (2009A) ‘FATF Statement-25 February 2009’ available 
at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/18/28/42242615.pdf> [accessed on 14 September 2011]. 
88
 Hinterseer (2002: 19). Cf Hopton (2009: 12) for a similar logic. 
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2.2.4. Money laundering techniques 
An attribute that is common to most money launderers is the art of conniving. 
A money launderer who has successfully acquired funds that are derived from 
criminal activities can clean such funds, using a wide range of tricks and 
techniques at his/her disposal. These techniques are in no way exhaustive – 
and this fact forms the underlying rationale that explains the complexity 
inherent in the concept of money laundering. It is important to understand 
that the numerous techniques which a criminal adopts to hide his/her illegal 
funds, because this reflects on the very essence of the crime of money 
laundering as a process crime. An understanding of these techniques is also 
important for the purpose of fostering the AML campaign, because one fights 
blindly should one try to fight the crime without understanding it. Also, it is 
important to study briefly some of these techniques because it helps to paint a 
better picture of how the techniques involved in money laundering have 
transitioned to cyberlaundering. Of the almost infinite chain of traditional 
money laundering techniques, a select few are discussed below. 
 
2.2.4.1 Cash 
As a fundamental basis, the profits derived from a crime often return to the 
criminal in the form of cash, which then needs to be reintroduced into the 
mainstream commercial sector in order to feign legitimacy. Cash can 
therefore be manoeuvred in different ways in order to execute such a purpose.  
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2.2.4.1.1 Cash smuggling 
Cash smuggling is probably the oldest but most practical method of 
laundering dirty money. In the early days of money laundering, it was 
common practice for ‘dirty cash’ to be concealed in very surreptitious places 
in order to evade law enforcement and to remove the illegal funds as far away 
as possible from the scene of the crime. It is often the case that these illegal 
funds are transported across borders, and there are truly endless possibilities 
involved here,- ranging from the concealment in cargo ships, car tyres, tin 
trunks, doors, airplanes and even in the sole of the criminal’s shoe. Cash 
smuggling does not always have to be clandestine. Money launderers could 
simply use courier services such as the United Parcel Service (UPS) or 
Federal Express (FedEx) in order to launder cash, or could purchase 
legitimate businesses, such as a shipping business, in order to store cash 
inside the cargo.
89
 
Cash smuggling is a good example of the placement stage of money 
laundering, and it is probably the most obvious method available to money 
launderers in order to evade the numerous reporting and record keeping 
requirements. 
 
2.2.4.1.2 Cash structuring / Smurfing 
Cash structuring entails breaking down a large quantity of cash into amounts 
that fall within the stipulated reporting threshold of the relevant financial 
                                                          
89
  Reuter and Truman (2004: 28). See also Rider (1999: 45), Levi (2002: 188) and Leong (2007: 149). 
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system. This is also known popularly as smurfing.
90
 The money launderer 
often uses the services of persons acting as agents who are in cahoots with 
him (also called smurfs). The idea is that the smurfs would make deposits 
systematically in banks of amounts below the prescribed threshold.  In the 
United States, for instance, the reporting threshold set in the BSA is $10, 
000.
91
 Cash smurfing is one of the several flaws occasioned by the BSA, 
which the subsequent Money Laundering Control Act sought to correct.
92
 
Cash structuring can be done through different avenues. Firstly, a regular 
deposit of the funds can be made into accounts in amounts that fall below the 
reporting threshold. Secondly, the illegal funds can be used to purchase 
negotiable instruments such as bank cheques and bank drafts, or, in the case 
of cyberlaundering, to load onto credit cards or smart cards, or onto gift cards 
in amounts falling below the reporting threshold. Thirdly, multiple deposits of 
the illegal funds can be made into several branches of a financial institution, 
often in quick succession in order to avoid detection.
93
 Alternatively, the 
money launderer opens accounts at different financial institutions, or could 
use third parties, for example, smurfs to make deposits into a single account 
or multiple accounts. In a nutshell, the possibilities are legion. 
                                                          
90
  The term ‘smurfing’ is derived from the little blue cartoon characters in the popular 1980s 
television show called The Smurfs.  
91
  See section 101 of the Act. Most jurisdictions have a similar threshold. In Canada, for example, the 
threshold is 10,000 Canadian Dollars, as outlined in the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) 
and Terrorist Financing Act (S.C. 2000, c. 17). Also in Europe, the European Union has set a 
threshold of €10,000, in terms of the Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005, adopted by the 
European Parliament on 26 October 2005 and which came into force on 15 December 2005. 
92
  For an extensive criticism of the Act see Hughes (1991: 283). Cf Reuter and Truman (2004: 18). 
93
  Madinger and Zalopany (1999: 30). Cf Hopton (2009: 33). 
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Cash structuring is also a good example of the placement stage of money 
laundering, and, as is obvious, the main goal is to evade the various reporting 
and record-keeping requirements. 
 
2.2.4.2 Wagering 
Betting or wagering services have also proven to be a safe hub for money 
launderers. Casinos, horse racing and lotteries are very good examples. These 
are discussed further below. 
 
2.2.4.2.1 Casinos 
Casinos are known to be very lucrative for hiding illicit funds.
94
 Illegal funds 
are often used to buy casino chips, which a criminal would then trade in for a 
cheque in the name of a third party (usually in cahoots with the criminal).
95
 It 
appears irrelevant for a criminal to play with his chips, given the risk of 
losing associated with games of chance and the lack a standard rule in casinos 
that all chips must be used or played. 
The fact that casinos have multijurisdictional establishments makes it even 
easier for criminals to transfer funds across borders. This convenience has 
been further facilitated by the advent of online casinos, which makes it all the 
                                                          
94
  In its March 2009 report on the Vulnerability of Casinos and the Gaming Sector, the FATF 
identified casinos as a wide open avenue for money laundering. See Financial Action Task Force 
(2009B: 12). 
95
  Reuter and Truman (2004: 28). Cf Madinger and Zalopany (1999: 30) and Pillai and Julian (2008: 
133). 
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more difficult for law enforcers to establish the physical location of the 
launderer. 
 
2.2.4.2.2 Horse racing and lotteries 
In the case of horse racing, a money laundering operation is as simple as a 
criminal buying a winning ticket at a low premium, which he can then claim 
back. The catch here is that the launderer will be able to evade payment of 
taxes on his winnings and he could also collect a cheque from the track.
96
 
With lotteries, it works even more easily because a criminal could simply use 
his illegal funds to purchase winning tickets from the winners as they arrive 
at the lottery office.
97
 
 
2.2.4.3 Insurance policies 
Illegal funds can be laundered through insurance policies, using several 
methods. A single insurance premium is a good example. Here the criminal 
uses his illegally obtained funds to pay the full premium once-off rather than 
in instalments, thus enabling him to redeem his full policy at a discount.
98
 By 
paying all required fees and penalties and getting ‘clean’ funds back from the 
insurance company, the criminal invariably launders his funds. 
 
 
                                                          
96
  Reuter and Truman (2004: 31). Cf Rider (1999: 30). 
97
  Reuter and Truman (2004: 29). Cf Leong (2007: 149).  
98
  Lawrence (2008: 82) and Reuter and Truman (2004: 30).  
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2.2.4.4 Securities 
In its 2002 report, the FATF points out that there is now a steady shift of 
laundering operations from the traditional banking sector to the non-bank 
financial sector, such as the securities market.
99
 The securities market is an 
attractive arena for laundering activities, particularly at the layering and 
integration stages. A launderer could purchase securities with illicit funds 
transferred from one or more accounts, and could use the proceeds of the 
securities as legitimate money when resold.
100
 In addition, the security market 
often has an international dimension, making it ideal for embezzlers, security 
fraudsters and insider traders, amongst others, who are present within the 
financial system.   
 
2.2.4.5 Hawala 
Hawala
101
 is an informal money transfer system which is based on mutual 
trust between the parties to the agreement. Hawala works in such a way that 
money is made available internationally without actually moving it or leaving 
a record of the transaction. The system often involves at least three persons – 
the hawaladar who offers the remittance service; the client who wishes to 
transfer money abroad; and the hawala agent in the destination country who 
makes delivery of the service.  
                                                          
99
  Financial Action Task Force (2002B: 44). In this report the FATF identifies the vulnerabilities of 
the securities market for purposes of money laundering by pointing out the glaring loopholes. It also 
details some corrective measures which are most feasible for remedying the problem. 
100
 United States General Accounting Office (2001: 23). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2002B: 45) 
Pemberton (2000: 12) and Gill and Taylor (2004: 589). 
101
 The term ‘hawala’ is an Arabic word which means an underground banking system of an 
international nature. 
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Although the hawala system appears to be peculiar to most Middle Eastern 
and South Asian societies, it is not a strange concept in other societies. For 
instance, in China it is known as ‘fe chi’en,’ and in Cameroon it is known 
commonly as a ‘cooperative.’ In a more formal set up, the hawala system can 
be likened to formal money transfer systems such as the popular Western 
Union money transfer.
102
 
 
2.2.4.6 ‘Shell’ companies 
A shell company is usually set up to facilitate the layering of illegal funds. 
More often than not, it is based offshore, complete with banks accounts to aid 
the layering of the funds.
103
 A shell company serves as a vehicle for business 
transactions without itself having any significant assets or operations. 
Although shell corporations are not in themselves illegal, they may have 
legitimate business purposes.
104
 A classic example of how shell corporations 
intertwine with money laundering involves the real estate market. Real estate 
can be bought with illicit funds and then resold for a nominal sum to one’s 
own shell corporation, which can again be resold to an innocent third party 
for the original purchase price.
105
 
                                                          
102
 There is currently a brewing argument about the difference between the hawala system as an 
informal money transfer system and the more formal establishments such as Western Union. Some 
argue that there is an invisible line between the two, even though the latter is often illegal and the 
former is not. See Nkhasi (2007: 475) and Perkel (2004: 194). Cf Cuéller (2003: 450). 
103
 Reuter and Truman (2004: 31). Cf Lilley (2006: 154). 
104
 Madinger and Zalopany (1999: 32). Examples are where a a criminal who has a fully functioning 
oil company in an OFC uses the same company as a camouflage to facilitate his illicit activities by 
siphoning funds through such a company. Lilley (2006: 154), Gill and Taylor (2004: 543). 
105
 Reuter and Truman (2004: 29). Cf Kochan (2005: 123). 
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However, the current trend involves the setting up of shell corporations on the 
internet. As will be explored later, the boundless borders of the internet, along 
with its anonymity features, have paved a way for shell companies to flourish. 
It has become much easier to establish such companies on the internet, as it 
only takes a few clicks of the mouse.
106
 With the advent of the internet, 
criminals have been able to bypass the hassle of fulfilling certain long-
standing prerequisites for establishing physical companies, such as the 
lodging of an application with the registrar of companies, notifications of the 
local tax revenue services, amongst several others. The loopholes in local 
laws and international laws regarding the establishment of companies on the 
internet, which inadvertently foster cyberlaundering activities, will be 
considered further in later chapters of this study. 
 
2.2.4.7 Wire transfer 
The concept of wire transfer is intertwined with the notion of 
cyberlaundering. For this reason, it deserves a closer attention. 
 
2.2.4.7.1 What it means 
Wire transfer, or credit transfer, is a type of electronic funds transfer 
according to which funds, or the value thereof, are transferred from one 
person, or from one institution, to another. Wire transfers are often effected 
from one bank account to another, or at a cash office where the transfer of 
                                                          
106
 The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (‘FinCEN’) identified this in its 2006 report. See 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2006: 17). 
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cash is usually done.  As a method of money laundering, wire transfer is 
peculiar to the subject of cyberlaundering, especially online banking, because 
it occasioned the dawn of electronic payment systems, which form the 
bedrock of cyberlaundering.  
In the past, an order to transfer funds was done by way of telegraph. This was 
before the shift to cables. Today, funds are transferred electronically. Wire 
transfer is an individualized transaction which can be effected both locally 
and internationally.
107
 
 
2.2.4.7.2 The mechanism 
For wire transfers that are done locally, depending on the country, there are 
several electronic funds messaging services that are established with the 
purpose of effecting such transfers. For example, in the United States, the 
Federal Reserve Bank has the FedWire system. For international wire 
transfers, there are also several electronic funds messaging services that 
perform wire transfers. The most common of these is known as the Society 
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT).
108
 SWIFT 
                                                          
107
 Pillai and Julian (2008: 219). Cf Reuter and Truman (2004: 34) and Kochan (2005: 112). 
108
 SWIFT is by far the largest and most popular electronic messaging service. According to its 
website, ‘SWIFT has its headquarters in Belgium and has offices in the world's major financial 
centres and developing markets. SWIFT provides additional products and associated services 
through Arkelis N.V., a wholly owned subsidiary of SWIFT, the assets of which were acquired 
from SunGard in 2010.  SWIFT does not hold funds nor does it manage accounts on behalf of 
customers, nor does it store financial information on an on-going basis. This activity involves the 
secure exchange of proprietary data while ensuring its confidentiality and integrity.’ See SWIFT (an 
undated website document) ‘Company Information’ available at <http://www.swift.com/ about_ 
swift / company_information / index.page?lang=en> [accessed on 15 September 2011]. 
  As at September 2010, SWIFT had 9,700 financial institutions in about 209 countries and 
territories.See website above. Cf eHow (an undated website document) ‘How SWIFT wires funds’ 
available at <http://www.ehow.com/swift/> [accessed on 14 May 2011]. 
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is known for its ability to process high value transactions. For example, in the 
United States, this includes credit payments of up to $2 million and debit 
transfers of up to $100,000.
109
 
 
2.2.4.7.3 The problem 
Wire transfer is relevant to all stages of money laundering, especially the 
layering stage. This can occur by transferring funds across several 
jurisdictions in order to erase all trails leading back to the source of the 
funds.
110
 Also, with the use of smurfs who deposit funds into several accounts 
often located in an OFC, a launderer can successfully transfer funds 
electronically from such accounts, without leaving a trail that leads to the 
original source of the funds. 
This transfer technique is made possible because of the gaping lacuna that 
exists in the SWIFT service when there is a wire transfer involving a local 
and an international bank. This problem is elucidated as follows: 
When a bank wants to wire a customer’s money to another bank, one of the several 
types of SWIFT messages may be used as instructions for the transfer. This 
message is sent through SWIFT separately from the actual settlement of the funds. 
When a customer’s bank does not have a direct relationship with the ultimate 
receiving bank [especially with international transfers] banks may use either cover 
payments or serial payments to send money through one or more intermediate 
banks. [In terms of cover payments]... two separate SWIFT messages [the MT103 
                                                          
109
 Pillai and Julian (2008: 219).  Cf  Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2008A: 12). 
110
 Reuter and Truman (2004: 32). 
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and the MT 202] are sent... The MT 202 sent to the intermediary bank did not retain 
originator and beneficiary information [as the MT 103].
111
  
Thus, criminals deliberately effect wire transfers involving intermediary 
banks, knowing full well that investigators cannot trace the funds back to 
them, because such banks are unable to retain records of the person making 
the transfer and the beneficiary. This clearly overrides the record-keeping and 
reporting requirements currently prescribed by the present AML regime. 
 
2.2.5 Money laundering and rising challenges: Impact and weight of the 
problem 
As far back as 1998, when money laundering had not yet reached its current 
state of growth, it was ranked the world’s third largest market, next only to 
the US and the Euro bond markets.
112
 The impact of money laundering on a 
global scale is of a great magnitude. Very often the weight of the problem is 
undermined because money laundering is a crime of an unassuming nature. 
For a better understanding, it is crucial to distinguish clearly the impact of 
money laundering in the direct sense of the word on the one hand, and in the 
indirect sense, on the other hand. The direct effects of money laundering 
should not be difficult to ascertain, since the costs of the predicate offence 
can be related easily to the victim and society.
113
 It is the latter – the indirect 
impact of money laundering – which poses as a colossal problem, as the focus 
is turned away from victims, and shifted to the economy, politics and society 
                                                          
111
 The National Drug Intelligence Program (2010: 14). 
112
 Robinson (1998: 14). Cf Scholte (1997: 427). 
113
 Unger (2007: 149). Cf Tanzi (2005: 91). 
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on a global scale. The indirect impact of money laundering justifies the nature 
of the crime as being a truly transnational one.
114
  
The glaring effects of money laundering cut across various sectors of society, 
chief of which is the financial sector. With the upsurge of money laundering 
across the world, the integrity, stability and reputation of the financial sector 
is gravely undermined, and consequently put at risk.
115
 When illegal funds are 
finally comingled with legitimate funds at the integration stage of money 
laundering, arguably, the entire financial sector becomes tainted with 
illegality. Also, the stability of the financial sector is undermined when there 
is an influx of high capital into commerce and interest rates and exchange 
rates are rendered volatile.
116
 These indicators suffice to force an economy 
into a recession. 
Money laundering also has a dire impact on the business sector. Economists 
have argued that money laundering can affect relative prices, which in turn 
could lead to inflation in the market.
117
 Given that money launderers are 
willing to pay for assets which are more than their actual worth, in a bid to 
disguise the illegal origin of their funds, this can affect the general price of 
such commodities.
118
 For example, in the 1980s, the Medellin Group in 
Colombia purchased hectares of land in an alleged money laundering 
operation, which pushed prices up in the real estate market from $500 to 
                                                          
114
 This is further buttressed by the fact that the ‘act’ or ‘conduct’ requirement of this crime could take 
place in more than one national jurisdiction across the world, thereby establishing jurisdiction in 
several states simultaneously. 
115
 Unger (2007: 151). Tanzi (2005: 91). 
116
 Unger (2007: 151). Cf Bartlett (2002: 12). 
117
  Keh (1996: 38) and Unger (2007: 153). 
118
 Keh (1996: 15). Cf Tanzi (2005: 96). 
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$2000 per hectare.
119
 The problem of money laundering is especially 
pertinent to the real estate sector because it is a non-transparent market, 
where the actual value of objects is somewhat uncertain, and where there are 
sporadic fluctuations in prices.
120
 
In the public sector, money laundering manifests its effects in the form of 
unpaid taxes or tax evasion. Tax evasion is a problem that is not only typical 
to developed economies, but to developing and under-developed economies 
alike. Recent estimates show that in the Netherlands and the United States, 
tax evasion is the largest part of the estimated criminal income, constituting 
between 4% to 6% and 6% to 15% of the Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) of 
these countries, respectively.
121
  
In addition, a government’s efforts to promote privatisation are thwarted if 
public enterprises such as transportation, electricity and water supply fall into 
the hands of criminals who obtain such enterprises for the purpose of 
laundering money.
122
 In the end this cuts short a society’s hopes for growth 
and development. At the societal level, certain crimes go hand in hand with 
money laundering, and as a rippling effect, such crimes gain currency with 
the spread of money laundering operations. Corruption and the pollution of 
legal activities through illegal activities are but few examples that can be 
given.
123
 
                                                          
119
 Unger (2007: 156). Cf Bartlett (2002: 12). 
120
 Unger (2007: 157). 
121
 Amedeo, Bagella, and Busato (2008: 18). 
122
 Unger (2007: 147). 
123
 For further elaboration see Lankhorst and Nelen (2003: 44) and Unger (2007: 151). Cf Bartlett 
(2002: 22). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Lastly, money laundering activities have calamitous political effects, by 
virtue of the fact that money laundering can be used to finance terrorism, 
which invariably causes an increase in terrorist activities, and also 
undermines political institutions. The latter is a sore point, as it forms one of 
the principal challenges faced by the current AML regime. It has become 
increasingly difficult to implement AML laws in most developing countries 
where political leaders are themselves the perpetrators of the crime. For 
example, Duvalier, the former president of Haiti, and his son ‘Baby Doc,’ 
virtually emptied the government coffers during their successive terms as 
presidents.
124
 Governments of underdeveloped nations sometimes appear to 
be deliberately inactive towards the money laundering activities prevalent in 
their countries, not only for personal gain, but also in the national interest. For 
instance, the trade restrictions imposed on Iraq in the early 1990s by several 
neighboring countries were often not implemented. This was done purposely, 
as some of the countries were of the view that it would be in their own 
economic interests not to abide by those sanctions, even though money 
laundering activities that came as a consequence of trade relations with Iraq 
were continuously fostered on the side.
125
 
The notion of cyberlaundering and its dire effects are not detached from the 
overall effects of money laundering. Some of the effects pointed out above 
hold equally true for cyberlaundering, because the latter taints commerce on 
                                                          
124
 Van Auken (an undated website document) ‘‘Baby Doc’ Duvallier Arrested’ World Socilaist 
Website available at <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/19january/> [accessed on 24 January 
2011].  
125
 For an elaborate discussion see Hinterseer (2002: 40). Cf Unger (2007: 151). 
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the World Wide Web with illegality; it serves as an instrument for political 
instigation and terrorist financing, and is a good tool with which to facilitate 
tax evasion, amongst a host of other things. Hence, the frightening impact of 
money laundering is precisely what makes the threat of cyberlaundering so 
imminent.  
From the discussion thus far, we see that the notion of money laundering has 
come a long way in its evolution. This subject-matter, as has been understood 
over the years, is what is termed the traditional concept of money laundering. 
Cyberlaundering builds on this framework. The concept of cyberlaundering 
as it appears as another level of money laundering is discussed 
comprehensively in the next chapter.  
 
2.3 AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBER CRIME: THE ‘CYBER ROOT’ 
OF CYBERLAUNDERING 
2.3.1 General 
At the outset, it was stated that cyberlaundering is an offspring of two very 
distinct and indigenous forms of criminality – money laundering on the one 
hand, and cybercrime on the other. Having considered the concept of money 
laundering, it becomes equally important to explore briefly the concept of 
cybercrime. This section attempts to trace the roots of cyberlaundering to 
cybercrime, for this helps to put the concept of cyberlaundering in its 
appropriate frame. 
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2.3.2 Understanding the term ‘cybercrime’ 
There is often linguistic confusion surrounding the term ‘cybercrime.’ The 
terms ‘cybercrime,’ ‘computer crime’ ‘computer-based crime’ and ‘computer 
abuse’ are all synonyms of the same thing.126 Thus, for the sake of linguistic 
clarity, this study will use the term ‘cybercrime,’ even though, in some 
definitions that are yet to be analysed below, the term ‘computer crime’ is 
used. 
Defining ‘cybercrime’ is no doubt a difficult task. Various authors have 
proposed different definitions for it, some of which will be considered. One 
of the earliest definitions is given by Don Parker, who uses the term 
‘computer abuse,’ and defines it as “any incident involving an intentional act 
where a victim suffered, or could have suffered a loss, and a perpetrator made 
a gain and is associated with computers.”127 Building on this definition, other 
authors have drawn out four distinct categories which Parker’s definition 
presents, being: 
i. The computer as the target or the object of the crime; 
ii. The computer as an instrument of the crime; 
iii. The computer as incidental to a crime; and 
iv. Crimes associated with the prevalence of computers.128 
 
                                                          
126
 The term ‘high-technology crime’ is often used interchangeably with the term ‘cybercrime,’ which 
is not correct. High technology crime refers to the use of information and telecommunications 
technology to commit or further a criminal act against a person, property, organisation or a network 
computer system. See Pocar (2004: 45). 
127
 Parker (1976: 25). Cf for comparable definitions, Wall (2007: 14), and Clough (2010: 11). 
128
 Casey (2004: 14) and Taylor, Caeti, Loper, Fritsch, and Liederbach, (2006: 21). 
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Parker’s definition, and the four categories of cybercrime derived from it is 
problematic because it is technology-specific. It says nothing about what 
constitutes the crime itself. 
Other authors have taken a different approach to defining cybercrime. Majid 
Yar distinguishes between computer-assisted crime on the one hand and 
computer-focused crime on the other.
129
 The former entails crimes that 
predate the internet, but which have taken on a new appearance since the 
advent of the internet, making such crimes to wear a new look. These include 
theft, pornography, fraud, sexual harassment, hate speech and money 
laundering. Cyberlaundering is found within this cocoon. The second 
category of cybercrime, as identified by Yar, the computer-focused crime, 
encompasses crimes that emerged with the advent of the internet, and which 
could not have come about without the existence of the internet. Examples 
here are website defacement, viral attacks, phishing and hacking.  
Besides the two terms often used to categorise cybercrime, catch-phrases are 
commonly used to group some of the various types of cybercrimes. For 
instance, the phrase ‘cyber-trespass,’130 usually includes computer-focused 
crimes falling within the second category of cybercrime, whereas the terms 
‘cyber-deception,’131 under which cyberlaundering falls132, and ‘cyber-theft,’ 
‘cyber-pornography’ and ‘cyber-violence,’ which include hate speech and 
                                                          
129
 Yar (2005: 408). Cf Taylor, Caeti, Loper, Fritsch, and Liederbach  (2006 : 22). 
130
 Clough (2010: 22), Kshetri (2010: 33), Rohrbach, (2011: 56). 
131
 Moore (2011: 23), Koops and Brenner (2006: 23) and Wall (2007: 32).  
132
 Interestingly, other than this categorization, a much broader system of categorization was adopted 
by the International Telecommunication Union, which classifies cyberlaundering as a combination 
offence, along with cyberterrorism, cyberwarefare and phishing. See International 
Telecommunications Union (2009: 51). 
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stalking, are all computer-assisted crimes falling under the first category of 
cybercrime.
133
 
Hence, in light of the above, the following succinct yet complete definition of 
cybercrime is submitted: Cybercrime is an act that is punishable by law, using 
an automatic electronic device that performs mathematical or logical 
functions.
134
 This definition highlights the existence of a crime as a main 
focus, and equally portrays the second important aspect, which is the means 
through which the crime is facilitated – computer/internet/high technology 
(hence the word ‘cyber’) - which is used to either facilitate the commission of 
the crime; which is incidental to the crime, or is a target of the crime. 
Cybercrime has been difficult to define because of the constantly evolving 
and growing nature of the concept. It is no wonder that Parker’s definition, 
which was given in 1976, cannot be as accurate as the definition given by 
Reyes and others, simply because cyberlaundering did not exist at the time. 
This, again, shows the currency of the cyberlaundering dilemma. 
                                                          
133
 Reyes, Brittson, A, O’Shea, K, and Steele, J (2007: 30). Cf Higgins (2010: 55). 
134
 Cf Reyes, Brittson, O’Shea, and Steele, (2007: 33), Koops and Brenner (2006: 20) and Wall (2007: 
12). A comparable but more elaborate definition is as follows: ‘Cybercrime is the criminal use of 
any computer network or system on the internet; attacks or abuse against the systems or networks 
for criminal purposes; crimes and abuse from either existing criminals using technology, or a new 
crime that has developed with the growth of the internet.’ Pocar (2004: 33). Several international 
legal instruments and domestic laws have refrained from giving an outright definition of 
cybercrime. As is the usual pattern, some laws provide the definition of a computer system, and in a 
very expansive form, detail all types of cybercrime, in a bid to encapsulate sufficiently all 
computer-related crimes. This is evident in Chapter II of the Council of Europe’s Convention of 
Cybercrime 23.XI, which was adopted by the Council on 12 April 2001, and which came into force 
on 1 July 2004, available at <http://www .aph.gov.au /house/committee/jsct/1march 2011/report 
/chapter11.pdf> [accessed on 16 September 2011]. Cf: The violation of information systems, akin 
to the definition of cybercrime in Article 1 of European Council: Council Framework Decision 
2005/222/JHA on attacks against information systems adopted by the European Parliament on 24 
February 2005. 
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2.3.3 The evolution of cybercrime in brief 
Since its early days, the topic of cybercrime is one which has been dreaded by 
criminal investigators and prosecutors. Cybercrime crime cases would be 
often referred to computer experts for deciphering. Although, as an 
innovative phenomenon, the computer has been appealing to many since its 
creation, the technicalities around its operation have not been entirely 
alluring.  Technical terms such as packets, e-mails, instant messaging service 
(IMS), encryption and decryption are quite tortuous to technophobes. The 
seemingly complex nature of computer technology creates a ‘layer of 
confusion,’ and, as a result of this overshadowing effect, the underlying crime 
component of cybercrime is often overlooked. As a result, growth in the 
response to the cybercrime epidemic has been slow. 
Given that the internet was at an embryonic stage in the early days of 
computer technology - in the late 1970s and early 1980s – there were no 
persons personally present on the internet who committed crimes. At the 
time, the computer was more a target of crime than it was a tool for criminal 
activities.
135
 The predominant crimes against computers were hacking of 
government computers, phone phreaking
136
 and spreading viruses.
137
This 
changed in the 1990s with the development of the World Wide Web, when 
people began having a more personal presence on the internet, and when 
                                                          
135
 Reyes, Brittson, O’Shea, and Steele, (2007: 32). Cf Curtis (2010: 22) and Moore (2011: 23). 
136
 Phone phreaking can be described as the art and science of cracking a phone network in order to use 
it illegally. An example would be where a phone network is cracked in order to make a long 
distance call. See Telephone Tribute (an undated website document) ‘Phone Phreaking’ available at 
<http://www.telephonetribute.com /phone phreaking.html> [accessed on 16 September 2011]. Cf 
Moore (2011: 23). 
137
 Cf Curtis (2010: 22) and Clough (2010: 22). 
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there were more opportunities for interpersonal crimes.
138
 In the 2000s, with 
the outburst of social networks on the internet, cybercrimes reached a record 
high.
139
 
The notion of cybercrime has come a long way since its days of infancy in the 
late 1970s. No longer is the label attached to mere sinister attacks against a 
college computer facility or telephone infrastructure,
140
 but cybercrime now 
encapsulates traditional crimes which take on a new life in cyberspace – a 
clear example being cyberlaundering. 
 
2.3.4 The present state of the anti-cybercrime legal regime: An overview 
Unlike international conventions such as the Palermo and Vienna 
Conventions that pertain to money laundering, there are currently no far-
reaching international laws against cybercrime. The only true anti-cybercrime 
(ACC) law, which is comparable, is the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime
141
 (the Budapest Convention). However, this Convention is a 
regional one.  
                                                          
138
 Reyes, Brittson, O’Shea, and Steele, (2007: 32). Gragido, W and Pirc, J (2011: 22). 
139
 In 2010 alone, the Internet Crime Complaint Center (‘IC3’), which is a division of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (‘FBI’), received over 2 million cybercrime complaints and processed about 
25,000 per month. See Internet Crime Complaint Centre (2010: 1). 
140
 Taylor, Caeti, Loper, Fritsch, and Liederbach (2006: 22) and Reyes, Brittson, O’Shea, and Steele, 
(2007: 33). Cf Higgins (2010: 15). 
141
 The Convention was drawn up by the Council of Europe in Strasburg with participation of the 
Council of Europe and observer states Japan, Canada and China. The Convention was adopted by 
the Committee of the Ministers of the Council of Europe at its 109th session on 08 November 2001. 
On 23 November 2003, it was open for signature in Budapest, and on 1 July 2004, it came into 
force. As at 9 June 2012, the Convention had been ratified by 32 states parties. Together with the 
Convention is the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime: Additional Protocol to the 
Convention adopted by the Council of Europe on 7 November 2002 and came into force on 1 
March 2006. For more information see the Treaties Office of the Council of Europe at 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
The fight against cybercrime has proven impractical and contentious for law 
enforcement agencies lacking knowledge and expertise in information and 
communications technology (ICT). For them, the intangible nature of the 
internet simply complicates the problem. This section will look briefly into 
why ICT has become very useful for criminals. It will explore the existing 
gaps in the law in that regard. 
 
2.3.4.1 Advantages of ICT for criminal enterprises 
The current marriage between ICT and crime is more evident now than ever 
before. ICTs have certain, known unassailable attributes, which explains why 
they are good breeding grounds for criminals. They are the following:
142
 
a) ICTs clear each spatial hurdle and permit a global reach; 
b) ICTs are globally avoidable; 
c) ICTs are generally speedy; 
d) ICTs basically guarantee anonymity; 
e) ICTs can be very secure; 
f) ICTs are characterised by multimedia capability; 
g) ICTs are invariably inexpensive; 
h) ICTs are easy to use; 
i)  ICTs are still under-regulated; and 
j)  ICTs are difficult for law enforcement authorities to investigate. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
<http://conventions.coe.int/> [accessed on 9 February 2012]. Cf discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 
4.3.2.3. 
142
 Savona and Migone (2004: 9). Cf Higgins (2010: 20) and Kshetri (2010: 39). 
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From the features listed above, it is clear that there are loopholes in the ICT 
system that criminals exploit. These loopholes do not only exist because of 
the fast pace at which technology continues to evolve, but mainly because the 
legal responses needed to contain the problem are slow, or in many instances, 
non-existent. This, in short, is the main the dilemma of cyberlaundering and a 
reason why it needs to be dealt with legally. 
 
2.3.4.2 Challenges of the present anti-cybercrime legal regime 
The notion of cyber criminality only came to light in conjunction with the fast 
growth of the internet. Much of the elusive character of cyberlaundering lies 
in the obscure notion of cybercrime. Investigators, prosecutors and 
researchers continue to struggle with finding a definitive formula for 
investigating and prosecuting cybercrime. This is a Herculean task – one 
which is almost dissimilar to the traditional system of investigation and 
prosecution of ordinary crimes. 
Cybercrime experts, especially investigators, usually operate within the field 
of computer forensics which, today, is still in its infancy. For example, the 
American Academy of Forensic Sciences only recently accepted computer 
forensics as a separate discipline under its much broader field of forensic 
sciences.
143
 Given its novelty and currently fluid and undefined state, the 
current state of computer forensics has certain negative legal ramifications for 
cybercrime investigators. The first, and perhaps most glaring, is the existing 
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 American Academy of Forensic Sciences (2011: 14). Cf Reyes, Brittson, O’Shea, and Steele, 
(2007: 33). 
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disparity between the rate at which technology changes and the rate at which 
laws are made. The lethargic bureaucracies involved in enacting legislation 
are no match against the speed with which technology changes. This impacts 
negatively on efforts to combat cyberlaundering and other sub-genres of 
cybercrime, as criminals continue to have a field day.  
Another legal ramification created by computer forensics relates to the 
collection of evidence. Of all forms of real evidence that exist, electronic 
evidence has the highest and the most rigid standard of proof. Investigators 
are required to preserve the data exactly as it appeared during the collection 
phase.
144
 Consequently, any form of alteration or editing would render such 
evidence inadmissible in a criminal trial. Given the intangible nature of 
electronic evidence and its susceptibility to corruption and defacement by 
viruses and other harmful programmes, it is often difficult for prosecutors to 
reproduce the exact same evidence before court.
145
 
Thirdly, the fluid state of computer forensics has indirectly resulted in the 
proliferation of crimes through the internet. As noted above, apart from 
cyberlaundering, there are several crimes that are increasingly being 
facilitated on the internet. If computer forensics remains static, law 
enforcement will continually struggle to come to grips with the dilemma. 
Furthermore, the proliferation of these crimes has a negative impact on the 
                                                          
144
 Reyes, Brittson, O’Shea, and Steele, (2007: 13). Cf Curtis (2010: 72), Koops and Brenner (2006: 
20), Moore (2011: 73) and Richards (2006: 65). See also Chapter 5 below for further discussion. 
145
 Reyes et al (supra) argues that the standard set for electronic evidence is too high, and should be 
lowered in order to help the work of cybercrime investigators. Reyes, Brittson, O’Shea, and Steele, 
(2007: 15). 
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economy. Take online piracy,
146
 for example: It is currently one of the biggest 
predicate offences for cyberlaundering.
147
 Online piracy deprives 
governments of huge sums in tax revenues. A recent study of the economies 
of most countries in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) shows that by reducing 
software piracy
148
 by 10 percent in four years from the year 2010, $566 
million in new economic activities would be delivered and 841 new 
information technology (IT) jobs would be created in the UAE.
149
 Also, the 
report shows that $23 million in additional tax revenues, which the UAE 
governments would have otherwise been deprived of, can be generated by 
2013. These statistics pertain only to the UAE. On a global scale, the report 
shows that reducing the global piracy rate by 10 percent over four years 
would create roughly $142 billion in new economic activity, while adding 
about 500,000 jobs and generating about $32 billion in new tax revenue by 
2013.
150
 Given the catastrophic effects of online piracy on a global economy, 
and the fact that it is a multi-billion dollar industry, one can only imagine 
how much money is being laundered through it alone. 
This does not only show the currency of the cyberlaundering dilemma, but it 
shows the gravity of the situation and why all existing gaps in cybercrime 
                                                          
146
 Online piracy refers to the unauthorized use of copyrighted or patented material. It is also known as 
online plagiarism. One of the most common examples is software piracy. See Chapter 3 below, 
paragraph 3.6.2. 
147
 See Chapter 3 for further discussion. 
148
 Software piracy means illegal access granted to internet users to use or download internet software 
free of charge. 
149
 Cherrayil (2011) ‘Pirates still making headway in cybercrime’ available at <http://www. gulfnews. 
com/mobile/business/technology/pirates> [accessed on 4 April 2011]. 
150
 Cherrayil (2011) ‘Pirates still making headway in cybercrime’ available at <http://www. gulfnews 
.com/mobile/business/technology/pirates> [accessed on 4 April 2011]. For similar projections, see 
also Gragido, W and Pirc, J (2011: 22). 
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need to be filled in order to forge an effective legal regime for 
cyberlaundering. Also, as is shown in the course of this study, the nature of 
the Budapest Convention, and the fact that it is the only international ACC 
law, does not help the fight against cyberlaundering.
151
 
 
2.4 SUMMARY  
This chapter paves the way for the ensuing discussions on cyberlaundering. 
As indicated at the outset, this chapter represents the brick and mortar of this 
study. It lays the necessary foundation and maps the terrain on which the 
purpose of this paper can be achieved, which is forging a legal framework to 
combat cyberlaundering. By properly delineating and understanding the two 
legs of cyberlaundering - money laundering and cybercrime – subsequent 
discussions on the subject, its jurisprudence and legal ramifications will not 
be alien concepts. 
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 Cf discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.2.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
CHAPTER 3 
CYBERLAUNDERING: CONCEPT & PRACTICE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the concept of cyberlaundering and attempts to 
deconstruct the concept legally.
152
 Bearing in mind that cyberlaundering 
borders the fields of money laundering and cybercrime, the chapter starts off 
by investigating the rationale behind the advent of cyberlaundering. 
Furthermore, this chapter attempts to understand and categorize 
cyberlaundering as a legal concept, after which the elements of the crime of 
cyberlaundering are identified. 
This chapter also delves further into some technical aspects of 
cyberlaundering by assessing the ‘tools’ used for cyberlaundering, in the form 
of electronic payment systems, which are conducive to the commission of the 
crime. One needs to understand this at the outset in order to fully grasp the 
different methods and techniques used by criminals on the internet. This 
enables one to get an idea of what cyberlaundering might look like in the 
future. The latter is important for two primary reasons: First, given that the 
understanding of the cyberlaundering phenomenon is limited, it would be 
useful to describe the current trend, in order to understand aspects of 
cyberlaundering better. Secondly, knowing the direction in which the 
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 The content of this chapter is an elaborate extension of the author’s LLM thesis entitled Anti-
Cyberlaundering Regulation and Control. See Leslie (2010: Chapter 3). 
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cyberlaundering wind is blowing helps to devise the regulatory legal 
framework to minimize the dangers it poses.  
 
3.2 DECYPHERING CYBERLAUNDERING 
3.2.1 The meaning of cyberlaundering 
The definition of cyberlaundering should necessarily reflect both the money 
laundering and cybercrime elements of it. 
Money laundering is something that occurs every time any transaction takes 
place or a relationship is formed that involves any form of property or benefit, 
whether it is tangible or intangible, which is derived from criminal activity.
153
 
It is a process crime which, invariably, is not aimed directly at a person or 
property but against the machinery of justice itself.
154
 Much like the logic 
behind other process crimes, such as obstructing the course of justice, 
contempt of court, and perjury, money laundering is effected by masking or 
hiding the predicate (or underlying) offence through a web of deceitful and 
evasive processes. 
Cyberlaundering, however, adds a technological perspective to this because it 
also traverses the much broader terrain of cybercrime. Cybercrime can be 
defined as an act, which is punishable by law, using an automatic electronic 
device that performs mathematical or logical functions,
155
 for example, a 
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 Hopton (2009: 2). See Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.1. 
154
 Murphy (2009: 1). 
155
 Cf Reyes, Brittson, O’Shea, and Steele (2007: 33); Koops and Brenner (2006: 20) and Wall (2007: 
12). See Chapter 2, paragraph 2.3.2. 
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computer. The interplay with cyberlaundering occurs when the relevant ‘act’ 
in question is that of money laundering. 
Therefore, in light of this, the following definition of cyberlaundering is 
proffered:  
Cyberlaundering is the use of a computer
156
 to form a transaction or a 
relationship involving property or benefit, whether tangible or 
intangible, which is derived from criminal activity.  
Although the computer is the tool, the playing field remains the internet, 
hence the need now to explore the internet as a playing field for money 
launderers.  
 
3.2.2 Catalysts of the cyberlaundering dilemma 
In order to fully grasp the concept of cyberlaundering, one has to know how it 
evolved. The phenomenon of cyberlaundering was triggered with the advent 
of the internet, which criminals have come to use to ply their trade of money 
laundering. Some of the unique features and traits of the internet that form the 
blueprint upon which cyberlaundering thrives will now be discussed. 
 
 3.2.2.1 Speed of technology 
Computers today are designed in such a way that they are able to process data 
at an extraordinary speed, thanks to the capabilities of the computer’s central 
processing device (‘CPU’). The CPU is measured in giga hertz (‘GHz’), 
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 See paragraph (c.) of the discussion in paragraph 3.2.4.2.1 below. 
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which determines the speed with which data is processed. What also 
determines speed is the computer’s Random Access Memory (‘RAM’) and 
the graphics card.
157
 The former refers to a depository where current files are 
being used or stored. Hence, with a very fast RAM, easy access to one’s files 
can be guaranteed. The graphics card on the other hand is the hardware that 
processes graphics. With a very fast graphics card, more graphics, or 
displayed images or frames, can be processed per second, which is crucial for 
computer and online gaming.
158
  
The speed of computers is further complemented by an equally fast internet 
service. With the transition from dial-up internet access to broadband internet 
access – the latter averaging about four megabytes per second, as opposed to 
the former’s sixty kilobytes per second – a high data rate connection is 
guaranteed.
159
 
It is certainly not far-fetched to think that cyberlaundering is linked directly to 
all these basic features of technology, because without these features, the 
notion of cyberlaundering will be non-existent. This becomes clearer in the 
discussion on cyberlaundering methods and techniques. 
 
3.2.2.2 Access to the internet 
The internet is the virtual playground for cyberlaundering. Evolving 
originally from several military projects of the United States government in 
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 Cf Shelly (2010: 9) and Molly and Parker (2010: 23). 
158
 Molly and Parker (2010: 23). Online gaming refers to gaming activities that occur within the 
environment of the internet. Cf discussion in paragraphs 3.5.3 and 3.5.5 below. 
159
 Cf Shelly (2010: 44). 
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the late 1960s,
160
 the internet today aids cyberlaundering because it has 
become a common luxury for all, given its ubiquitous nature and presence. In 
its early days, which is the 1990s,
161
 the internet was popular only amongst 
businesses and households, mainly in the United States (US) and the United 
Kingdom (UK). This popularity was based on an increased awareness of the 
internet’s functionalities and infinite capacity. This is why it can be said that 
cyberlaundering is borne out of the globalization of the internet. Gone are the 
days when only an elite class of people had sole access to such opulence. 
Today the world is a global village, thanks to the internet. But for certain 
human activities that cannot be done on the internet, such as eating and 
drinking (at least not yet), numerous things are doable on the internet.  
Access to the internet continues to grow. Recent statistics show that over 2 
billion people, of a world population of more than 6 billion people, have 
access to the internet.
162
 In the previous decade, this number was a measly 
360 million.
163
 The number has increased by a solid 480% between the years 
2000 and 2011.
164
 
The fact that one’s everyday life basically revolves around the internet has 
caused it to be an indispensable resource for numerous human activties. 
                                                          
160
 Living Internet (an undated internet article) ‘History of the Internet’ available at <http:// 
www.livinginternet.com> [accessed on 10 February 2011]. Cf Ryan (2010: 3). 
161
 Cf Ryan (2010: 3) and Living Internet (an undated internet article) ‘History of the Internet’ 
available at <http://www.livinginternet.com> [accessed on 10 February 2011]. 
162
 A breakdown of the figure shows the following: In Africa, there are about 118, 609, 620 people; in 
Asia 922, 329, 554; in Europe 476, 213, 935; in the Middle East, 68, 553, 666; in North America, 
272, 066, 000; in Latin America, 215, 939, 400, and in Oceania/ Australia, 21, 293, 830 people.  
See Internet World Stats <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats/htm> [accessed on 15 July 
2011]. 
163
 Internet World Stats <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats/htm> [accessed on 15 July 2011]. 
164
 Internet World Stats <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats/htm> [accessed on 15 July 2011]. 
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Accessibility to the internet has become a hotly contested topic, and the 
debate has even shifted onto the legal sphere, giving rise to many 
deliberations over the years. In 2003, during the United Nations World 
Summit on the Information Society, it was proposed that access to the 
internet should be entrenched as a fundamental human right.
165
 Since then, 
several countries such as Finland, France, Greece, Spain and Estonia have 
made access to the internet a part of the basic fundamental rights of an 
individual.
166
 This shows the seriousness and importance of the issue of 
internet accessibility. In the aforementioned countries, and in others as well, it 
goes without saying that having access to the internet in modern times is 
crucial for all individuals. It is almost now on the same pedestal as the right to 
life. The International Telecommunications Union (‘ITU’) has also joined in 
the campaign to globalize access to the internet, and has spearheaded several 
projects across multiple continents in order to achieve this goal.
167
 The 
European Union (‘EU’) is also hard at work ensuring that the right to internet 
access is safeguarded. This is evidenced by the EU Amendment 138/46 of the 
Telecommunications Reform Package,
168
 now article 1(3)(a) of the 
Framework Directive,
169
 which is to be adopted into law into all EU countries 
that are states parties. 
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 World Summit on the Information Society (2003: 1). Cf Lucchi (2011: 646).  
166
 British Broadcasting Cooperation <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8548190.stm>[accessed on 15 July 
2011]. 
167
 For more information on the projects of the ITU see <http://www .itu.int/ africainternet 
2000/Documents/doc7_e.htm> [accessed on 15 July 2011]. 
168
 COM (2007) 697 and COD/2007/0247. 
169
 Council of Europe: Council Directive 2009/136/EC, on universal service and users’ rights relating 
to electronic communications networks and services, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 25 
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Other countries that share this notion, but that have yet to entrench it as a 
fundamental human right, are South Korea, Mexico, Brazil, Turkey and 
Nigeria.
170
 In the same survey conducted, results show that these countries 
feel strongly against government regulation of the internet, although a 
majority of other countries in Asia and Europe have disagreed.
171
  
Furthermore, access to the internet has not only become affordable, but also 
convenient, especially with the notion of cloud computing.
172
 The latter 
means anything that involves delivering hosted services over the internet and 
it works in such a way that one can gain access to data/information contained 
in a hosted service on the internet, using different computers.
173
 What is 
more, in this modern age, a computer need not be a desktop or laptop 
apparatus; it could also be a phone or any personal digital assistant (‘PDA’). 
                                                                                                                                                                         
November 2009 and came into force on 18 December 2009. Cf Article 1 of the Council of Europe: 
Council Directive 2002/58/EC, on the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between 
national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws adopted by the 
Parliamentary Assembly on 12 July 2002 and came into force on 31 July 2002. 
170
 British Broadcasting Cooperation available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8548190.stm> [accessed 
on 15 July 2011]. 
171
 Government interference or regulation of the internet has always been a sensitive issue. As this 
study shows, regulation of the internet is very expedient in order to prevent problems such as 
cyberlaundering that plague economies the world over.  However, the main issue is not whether or 
not regulation should occur, but the extent of it. For instance, in the United Kingdom (‘UK’), the 
controversial Digital Economy Act 2010 (Chapter 24) promises to deliver universal broadband in 
the UK by 2012. This law gives regulators new powers to disconnect or slow down the internet 
connections of illegal file-sharers and other cyber criminals. Countries such as France and Germany 
are also considering introducing similar laws. British Broadcasting Cooperation <http://news.bbc 
.co. uk/2/hi/8548190.stm> [accessed on 15 July 2011]. 
172
 Searching Cloud Computing (an undated website document) ‘Cloud Computing’ available at 
<http://searchcloudcomputing.techtarget.com/definition/cloud-computing> [accessed on 15 July 
2011]. 
173
 Cloud computing differs significantly from a traditional hosting service, as it is sold on demand. 
The user can determine how much of the service it wants at a given time and the service is fully 
managed by the relevant provider. See Searching Cloud Computing (an undated website document) 
‘Cloud Computing’ available at <http://searchcloudcomputing.techtarget.com/definition/cloud-
computing> [accessed on 15 July 2011]. 
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One very glaring fact is that easy accessibility to the internet on a global scale 
will spiral in growth over the next couple of years, as statistics have shown. 
As a downside, without efficient regulators in place to minimize its abuse, 
especially for purposes of money laundering, the phenomeon of is bound to 
grow concomitantly. 
 
3.2.2.3 Anonymity 
The issue of anonymity has always been a subject of contention, even before 
the debate shifted to internet anonymity. Initially, the issue of anonymity was 
pitted against one’s fundamental right to freedom of expression, free speech, 
privacy and so on.
174
 This debate has been transposed onto the internet since 
its advent. The internet has the feature of anonymity, as it allows individuals 
to conduct activities without disclosing their true identities or without any 
possible direct traceability. However, the notion of anonymity in this context 
differs from some of its variants, such as pseudonymity and allonymity.
175
 
The latter forms of anonymity, when used on the internet, could have good 
purposes.
176
 Amongst some of the advantages that anonymity holds is its 
possible use by people under a repressive political regime to vent their 
opinion.
177
 It could be used to disclose information that is extremely personal, 
such as sexual problems. It could serve as a platform to express opinions, thus 
                                                          
174
 See the elaborate discussion in Mandujano (2003: 4). Cf Reiter and Rubin (1998: 21). 
175
 Pseudonymity refers to the case where one uses another’s name or takes on another’s persona in 
order to make an artistic or literary expression. Allonymity is a slight variant of the former, as it 
refers to a writer’s assumption of an historic literary figure in a literary writing. 
176
 Cf Joinson (2001: 177), Wallace (1999: 3) and Abelson (2001: 1). 
177
 Joinson (2001: 177) and Abelson (2001: 1). Cf Palme and Berglund (2002: 3). 
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promoting egalitarianism and rendering attributes of gender and race 
immaterial.
178
 
Unfortunately, the few benefits associated with anonymity on the internet are 
overshadowed by the more glaring disadvantages. From the seemingly 
endless list of demerits of anonymity that are germane to the internet’s 
framework, a criminal could spin a perfect web of transactions over the 
internet, thus obliterating all traces of the original act. This essentially, is 
what cyberlaundering is. Given the many dangers that are caused by the 
internet as a result of its anonymity feature, several authors have argued for a 
‘reconstruction’ or ‘restructuring’ of the internet to ensure universal 
identification, thus completely burying the notion of anonymity.
179
 Though 
logical, this argument implies, albeit generally, that one should wipe the slate 
clean on which the internet’s framework is sketched because anonymity is 
part of the very fabric of the internet, and forms a core of its blueprint. The 
pros and cons of this argument are considered in an ensuing discussion.
180
 
  
3.2.2.4 Boundless borders 
For much of its life, the internet has witnessed sporadic changes in 
development, but a constant factor in its evolution is its incessant nature of 
shrinking the world into one small space. The manner in which information is 
accessible through the internet traverses physical borders and known 
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 Scheiner (2010: 1). Cf Palme and Berglund (2002: 2). 
179
 See Kiviat (2010: 2), Chawki, M (2010: 32) and Kirtley (2010: 1478). Cf for conflicting views: 
Moore (2009: 58) and Palme and Berglund (2002: 2). 
180
 Cf discussion in paragraph 6.2.2 of Chapter 6. 
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boundaries. Indeed, the phenomenon of the internet defines modern times. 
However, such convenience has raised eye-brows and continues to spur 
curiosity. On the one hand, many wonder why governments of the day are 
overly cautious about censoring the internet, whereas, on the other hand, the 
fundamental right of access to information is asserted vigorously.
181
 For the 
first argument, the current situation in Italy, involving the presence of the 
giant internet company, Google, serves as an example. The Italian 
government recently recognized YouTube
182
 as a television station which is 
subject to television regulations.
183
 This implies that Google would have to 
start paying taxes as a television broadcaster, and it would be liable for its 
contents. YouTube has been banned in several countries such as China and 
Morocco, as people often post videos that their governments have deemed 
offensive and having the capabilities of inciting anti-government protests.
184
 
Also, in January 2010, the Libyan government blocked access to the website 
for this reason.
185
 
The instances cited above, however, are only isolated incidents. The fact still 
remains that information sharing over the internet continues to grow, and 
several governments, amongst them those of the United States and the United 
Kingdom, still promote anti-censorship and strongly uphold the rights of 
freedom of expression. It could therefore be said that, currently, the pendulum 
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 Baran (2011: 2). 
182
 Youtube is owned by Google and is the world’s largest video sharing website, boasting billions of 
users from around the world. 
183
 Baran (2011: 2). 
184
 Baran (2010: 1). Cf Schroeder (2007) ‘Censored: List of Countries That Banned YouTube’ 
available at <http://mashable.com/2007/05/30/youtube-bans/> [accessed on 10 July 2012]. 
185
 Human Rights Watch (2011: 65). 
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is swinging in favour of a borderless internet environment. The difficulty of 
this issue is expressed below: 
 
The difficult area is that while countries understand the benefits of 
information sharing on the internet, they also see that practices such as digital 
terrorism, large-scale crime, fraud, spam, stalking and pornography are on the 
rise[...] The sensitive part of the debate, as with all debates about censorship, 
is not whether some of these areas need to be excluded from the internet but 
where the line is drawn between legitimate threat or security risk and 
governments taking on the role of our political, moral and ethical minders.
186
 
 
The proliferation of information through the internet and the ease of gaining 
access to it have resulted in both good and evil, with the latter manifesting in 
the form of cyberlaundering, as further discussions will show. 
 
3.2.3 Categorizing cyberlaundering 
Cyberlaundering traverses two distinct fields of crime – cybercrime on the 
one hand, and money laundering on the other. This makes it a hybrid 
discipline that poses the question: How should one see cyberlaundering and 
under what category of crime does it fall? As part of the quest to understand 
the subject for purposes of establishing an appropriate legal framework for it, 
it is necessary to see it through the right lenses. From the outset, therefore, it 
must be fitted in the right frame. Without establishing the parameters of 
                                                          
186
 Hughes (2010: 1). 
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cyberlaundering, one may falter along the way, as the notion itself could be 
ensconced in one big conceptual blur. The following discussion juxtaposes 
the varying possible categories into which the concept of cyberlaundering 
falls, or ‘lenses’ through which it should be seen. 
 
3.2.3.1 Cyberlaundering as a subset of cybercrime 
Should cyberlaundering be couched just as a subset of cybercrime? If 
cyberlaundering is indeed seen as a subset of cybercrime, it would mean that 
it falls squarely within the area of cybercrime, without the element of money 
laundering. If this is the case, one may be forced to look solely to the field of 
informatics
187
 to find regulatory measures for it.  
However, this notion cannot be entirely acceptable. Although it is accepted 
that cyberlaundering has roots in cybercrime, one must not lose sight of the 
core element of money laundering. Hence, the crime at its core is money 
laundering, with a technological aspect. 
 
3.2.3.2 Cyberlaundering as a technique of money laundering 
Another popular school of thought on cyberlaundering considers not only the 
money laundering element, but sees cyberlaundering solely as a mere 
                                                          
187
 Informatics is the science of information, the practice of information processing, and the 
engineering of information systems. Informatics studies the structure, algorithms, behaviour, and 
interactions of natural and artificial systems that store, process, access and communicate 
information, i.e. the computer. It also develops its own conceptual and theoretical foundations and 
utilizes foundations developed in other fields. Fourman (2002: 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
technique within the marquee of money laundering.
188
 For this reason, when 
the method used by a criminal to launder funds is internet-based, then the 
conclusion is quickly drawn that money laundering has been committed 
through that technique. This notion might be plausible if one looks at the 
broad concept of money laundering, which entails several other aspects, for 
instance, trade-based money laundering.  
It would nevertheless be entirely incorrect to accept that cyberlaundering is 
only a technique of money laundering. To think of something as a ‘technique’ 
of another would mean that the latter is a means to an end, and, impliedly, 
that it cannot stand on its own. As regards cyberlaundering, the fact that a 
criminal utilizes technological resources does not make such resources 
merely a tool for the money laundering enterprise; conversely, this makes the 
criminal’s activity the money laundering enterprise.  
 
3.2.3.3 Cyberlaundering: ‘Money laundering 2.0’ 
So what then could be the correct conceptual phrasing of cyberlaundering? 
The answer lies at the heart of the crime itself, which is money laundering. A 
rather astute answer is that cyberlaundering is money laundering, which 
appears at a more advanced level, given its roots in technology. Although it 
overlaps with the concept of cybercrime, it should not be seen entirely in that 
light. Arguably, the gravity of the cyberlaundering problem, which already 
                                                          
188
 Some authors have described cyberlaundering in this light. See Hunt (2011: 133) and Filipkowski 
(2008: 4). 
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embodies the behemoth weight of money laundering, exceeds the severity of 
other kinds of cybercrimes combined.
189
  
It is important to know the right category in which cyberlaundering falls, 
because understanding the right framework, would inadvertently determine 
the kind of liability it creates. Having accepted that cyberlaundering is money 
laundering, the primary liability it creates is the liability for money 
laundering. However, cyberlaundering is unique for the fact that it is likely to 
create subsidiary or ancillary liability for the criminal other than the liability 
for money laundering.  It could incur liabilities under the broad notion of 
cybercrime, or other subsets of cybercrime, in jurisdictions where such crimes 
are recognized. Such ancillary liability differs from the traditional predicate 
offences that usually establish liability for the crime of money laundering. For 
instance, a cyberlaunderer is likely to be found liable for crimes such as 
hacking or cyber-vandalism, both of which might not necessarily be predicate 
offences for the main crime of money laundering. This comes to light in the 
ensuing discussion on the vulnerable industries for cyberlaundering.
190
  
Another point that supports this conceptual phrasing of cyberlaundering is the 
aspect of prosecution.
191
 When a prosecutor prosecutes individuals who have 
                                                          
189
 This is highly debatable. One report shows that in the United Kingdom alone, banks loose up to ₤1 
million per day in phishing and malware attacks. See Evron, G (2008: 1). Another report shows 
that, on an annual basis, an average of $52 million is lost to organisations in the United States alone 
as a result of cybercrime attacks. See ArcSight (2010: 1). These statistics, however, present sector-
based facts. There are not very detailed statistics showing the economic impact of cyberlaundering 
as yet. However, riding on the notion that over $5 trillion is laundered on an annual basis (as far 
back as 2007), and that a substantial percentage is added through cyberlaundering, the statement 
would not be far-fetched. See Ehrenfeld and Lappen (2007: 1). 
190
 See paragraph 3.5 below. 
191
 See Chapter 5 for further discussion. 
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engaged in cyberlaundering activities, the name of the crime that should 
reflect on the charge sheet is the phrase ‘money laundering,’ not 
cyberlaundering.
192
 In essence, cyberlaundering is not a separate crime from 
that of money laundering. It remains under the umbrella of the latter. The sad 
reality is that the gravity of the cyberlaundering dilemma gives rise to an 
escalation of the current money laundering problem. This hinges on the 
overall purpose of this study, which assesses the possibilities of forging a 
proper legal framework to counteract the problem. However, a foreseeable 
challenge to actualizing this goal lies in one underlying truth - 
cyberlaundering is a legal problem with very complex legal ramifications. 
 
3.2.4 Elements of the crime of cyberlaundering: a deductive analysis 
It is often said that computers do not commit crimes, but people do. However, 
regarding cybercrime, particularly for law enforcement agencies, identifying 
the person(s) behind the computer is much like finding a needle in a hay-
stack. Given the highly complicated intricacies of information technology that 
criminals play on, one is almost led to believe that computers might well be 
the perpetrators. This is compounded even further when the crime in question 
is that of money laundering, in which the criminal adopts the existing 
complexities of the internet to hide illegal proceeds. 
Therefore, proceeding from the standpoint that cyberlaundering is a crime 
premised on money laundering, as the mother crime, and with an extension to 
                                                          
192
 This is so because of the question of legality, hence why cyberlaundering has to be conceptualized 
legally. See discussion in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.5.1.1.1. 
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cybercrime, it is important to examine the various elements of the crime. The 
elements of the crime of cyberlaundering, as discussed below, are not 
supplementary to the elements of the crime of money laundering, but only 
complementary. Not only is this important for the sake of having a better 
understanding of it, but also, knowing the elements of the crime is crucial for 
prosecuting the crime, as is shown in a subsequent chapter of this study.
193
 
Understanding these elements will aid criminal investigators, as they would 
be able to identify and prove the existence of cyberlaundering activities, 
which will help them show that the criminal is guilty of money laundering.  
Just as was done with regard to the definition of cyberlaundering given 
above, it is vital to examine the various elements of the crimes of money 
laundering and cybercrime, as a basis for determining the elements of 
cyberlaundering. It is only by juxtaposing the elements of these crimes that 
one can one deduce definitively the elements of the crime of cyberlaundering. 
 
3.2.4.1 Elements of crimes: money laundering and cybercrime 
In criminal law, in order for a conduct to constitute a crime, two distinct 
elements must be present – mens rea on the one hand, and the actus reus on 
the other. Mens rea refers to the culpable mental state of the perpetrator, 
otherwise known as the internal or subjective element.
194
 Actus reus is the so-
called external or objective element, which means the prohibited act or failing 
                                                          
193
 See Chapter 6. 
194
 The full Latin phrase is actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, which means that the act does not 
make the person guilty unless the mind is also guilty. Cf Welling (1989: 234), and Schell (2004: 
19). 
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to act when one is under a duty to do so. In order for one to be liable for a 
crime, both these elements – the subjective and objective elements - must be 
present. 
For money laundering, the actus reus requirement exists as the object of the 
crime and the objective aspect of the crime.
195
 The object of the crime refers 
to the violation of government or state activities and its management system 
by causing instability in its financial sector, and obstructing the normal 
activities of the judicial investigation of crime.
196
 The objective aspect of the 
performance refers to the disguise and concealment of the proceeds of the 
relevant criminal activity.
197
 In addition, knowledge or intention must exist on 
the part of the perpetrator for the conduct described under the actus reus, in 
order to fulfil the mens rea element. 
The actus reus and mens rea also form the two main components of the 
elements of cybercrime. For the actus reus, there must be a violation of a 
right, by way of an act or an omission (the object of the crime), using an 
automatic electronic device that performs mathematical or logical functions, 
i.e. a computer (the subject of the crime). The concept of cybercrime is an 
embedded term which embodies different kinds of crimes, such as 
cyberlaundering. For example, the right that is violated would therefore 
depend on the nature of the relevant crime. Thus, for cybercrime, the 
minimum requirement is for the violation of a right or interest to have 
                                                          
195
 Welling (1989: 288). 
196
 Welling (1989: 289). 
197
 This aspect of actus reus usually follows the money laundering circle of placement, layering and 
integration. See Welling (1989: 288). 
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occurred with the instrumentality of information technology or a computer.
198
 
The ambit is clearly wide enough to accommodate the concept of 
cyberlaundering, as will be apparent from the ensuing discussions below. The 
perpetrator must also have knowledge or intent in tandem with what is being 
done (the act or omission). Also, coupled with the actus reus and mens rea, 
for cybercrime, there must be harm caused to persons and/or property.
199
 
 
3.2.4.2 Elements of the crime of cyberlaundering 
In view of the definition given of cyberlaundering, and the elements of the 
crimes of money laundering and cybercrime, the following elements of the 
crime of cyberlaundering are identified: 
 
3.2.4.2.1 Actus reus 
In order to fulfil the actus reus requirement of cyberlaundering, certain 
principal requirements must be met, namely a predicate offence, illegal funds, 
an activity and a computer.
200
 These are elaborated upon as follows: 
 
(a.) Predicate offence and illegal funds  
The presence of illegal funds as an element of cyberlaundering has a direct 
bearing on the traditional notion of money laundering. By establishing that a 
criminal is in possession of illegal funds, prosecutors would be able to 
                                                          
198
 Cf Brenner (2007: 17), Fafinski (2009: 20) and Walden (2007: 09). 
199
 Brenner (2004: 29) and Schell (2004: 10). 
200
 For a practical understanding of these elements, see Chapter 6, paragraph 6.3.3.3.1. 
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establish successfully the fact that the crime of money laundering has been 
committed. It is important to reiterate, as stated earlier, the jurisprudential 
resolve that cyberlaundering is still money laundering, albeit appearing at a 
more advanced level. 
The presence of illegal funds means, inadvertently, that a crime must exist 
(otherwise called a predicate offence) from which such funds are derived. In 
other words, there must be a predicate offence which occasioned the 
cyberlaundering activity. As discussed earlier,
201
 in the spirit of the Forty 
Recommendations plus Nine Special Recommendations of the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), the notion of predicate offences for money 
laundering entails all serious offences, and is not at all confined to a particular 
class of offences or crimes.
202
 Similarly, the predicate offences for 
cyberlaundering are in no way limited, neither to ordinary internet crimes, or 
cybercrimes, nor to traditional crimes such as theft and fraud.  
The source of the illegal funds that criminals use to conduct activities over 
the internet must be considered from the hindsight of the notion of legality 
and illegality. As a standard norm, if one’s conduct is considered a crime in 
terms of customary law or the statutory law of the relevant jurisdiction where 
the crime was committed, and at the time it was committed, the principle of 
legality is met.
203
 If otherwise, then one would be dealing with the notion of 
                                                          
201
 See Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2. 
202
 See Recommendation 3, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 12). Cf Recommendation 4, 
Financial Action Task Force (2003: 1). 
203
 This principle of legality is also known as the nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege 
principle – a literal translation being no crime without law, no punishment without a law. Cf Kreß 
(2010: 32). 
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illegality, which would imply that the inherent rationale behind the nulla 
poena sine lege principle has been defied. All crimes are premised on this 
notion, and it is an important consideration when ascertaining the presence of 
a predicate offence, or the fact that the suspect is in possession of illegal 
funds. Thus, in this sense, illegal funds are funds that are derived from an 
activity or conduct deemed criminal.  With that said, one must remember to 
judge every case according to its own merits.  
 
(b.) An activity 
A cyberlaunderer must have been involved in an activity of some sort. 
According to its dictionary definition, “an activity is a condition in which 
things are happening or being done or a busy or vigorous action or 
movement.”204 In light of this definition, an activity could be a transaction, 
amongst several other possibilities. What constitutes a transaction depends on 
the circumstances of each case. However, a transaction is often understood, in 
the commercial sense of the word, as involving the purchase or sale of goods 
or items. A good example would be where a criminal purchases casino chips 
online at an online casino with the proceeds of crime.
205
 Alternatively, it is 
possible for the criminal to simply transact with himself. A perfect example is 
where the criminal opens a shell company on the internet, and records 
invoices for phantom transactions in order to create a veneer of legitimacy.  
                                                          
204
 Oxford English Dictionary (an undated webpage) ‘Activity’ available at < http://oxforddictionaries 
.com/definition/activity> [accessed on 6 June 2011]. 
205
 Cf paragraph 3.5.3 below. 
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By using the word ‘activity,’ instead of the word ‘transaction,’ one is careful 
not to be entirely restrictive, given the fact that there are innumerable ways 
through which a criminal can manoeuvre illegal funds over the internet which 
would not necessarily constitute a transaction. For instance, the criminal 
could merely play online games with illegal proceeds. This activity does not 
exactly fit into the meaning of a transaction, but engaging in such activity 
might fulfil this fundamental element.  
 
(c.) A computer 
A computer is known by several names. It is usually described as an 
automatic electronic device that performs mathematical or logical 
functions,
206
 or, put simply, a data processing device. The computer is 
probably the most powerful innovations in the history of humanity. 
Computers have enabled people to perform staggering amounts of 
computations at a very high speed, given that large amount of information is 
crunched, organized, and displayed at the wink of an eye.
207
  
Years back, the idea of a computer was, strictly speaking, a large box 
(commonly known as a desktop), with an equally large central processing 
devise (CPU); a key board and a mouse, the hand-held device. Over time, 
with tremendous technological advancements, the computer was scaled down 
with reduced energy requirements in order to broaden its capabilities. Today, 
other than the traditional desktops and laptops, interactive devices of all sorts 
                                                          
206
 Reyes, Brittson, O’Shea, and Steele (2007: 33). Cf Wall (2007: 32). See Chapter 2, paragraph 2.3.2. 
207
 Cf Shelly (2010: 34) and Molly and Parker (2010: 61). 
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now contain their own computers. For instance, there are cellular phones, 
portable organizers, personal digital assistants (PDAs – also called palmtop 
computers and personal data assistants), automated teller machines (ATMs), 
and most recently, tablet computers with audio-visual capabilities.
208
 In spite 
of the kinds of computers that exist today, and their state of the art features, 
computers are poised to become more pervasive with the advancement of 
technology. 
And what would the world be without the internet? The internet complements 
the use of computers and has even inspired the present state of the computer 
technology.
209
 Some of the interactive devices mentioned are virtually useless 
without them having internet capability. Hence, with the presence of 
computers and the internet, the perfect combination is created. Albeit good 
and bad, the latter resonates in the area of cybercrime, and, for purposes of 
this study, cyberlaundering. 
Thus, a computer plays a vital role in establishing the actus reus element of 
the crime of cyberlaundering. 
 
3.2.4.2.2 Mens rea 
The element of mens rea is an element of a criminal conduct that is necessary 
to incur liability. Mens rea refers to the state of mind of the accused – the so-
called internal or subjective element – which tends to justify the conduct, or 
act, or, omission of the accused. This element is applicable to virtually all 
                                                          
208
 Cf Shelly (2010: 43). 
209
 Cf Molly and Parker (2010: 30). 
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kinds of crimes, except strict liability crimes, in terms which the state of mind 
of the accused plays no role. Determining the relevant mens rea always 
proves to be daunting, due to the fact that it is not very easy to ascertain the 
contents of the human mind. Before one delves into how mens rea is 
ascertainable within the spectrum of cyberlaundering, it is important to first 
engage in a careful deconstruction of the notion. 
Given the fluidity of the human mind, there are several levels or categories of 
this subjective element in the form of intent, knowledge, recklessness, 
negligence and wilful blindness.
210
 Intent is the highest level of mens rea, and 
it means that the person’s state of mind is such that he/she desired to carry out 
the action and can foresee the results.
211
 Intent is often determined by 
studying any available evidence in order to determine the state of mind of the 
accussed when he committed the relevant crime.
212
 Depending on the relevant 
crime, intent could be general (that the accused consciously performed the act 
that constitutes the offence) or specific (that the accused had a further intent 
to commit the particular crime in addition to the general intent he has 
already).
213
  
                                                          
210
 Snyman (2002: 167). 
211
 Determining the relevant mens rea can be quite daunting, and even more so within the context of 
cyberlaundering. Cf discussion in Chapter 6, paragraph 6.3.3.7. 
212
 Snyman (2002: 167). 
213
 Good examples are the crime of breaking and entering with the intent to commit an indictable 
offence, or assault with the intent to commit grievous bodily harm. For a more elaborate discussion 
on this, see Snyman (2002: 167). 
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Knowledge is also another form of mens rea. In this case, mens rea is 
determined from the wording of the relevant statute or law.
214
 Here, 
knowledge of certain facts will be sufficient to provide mens rea without 
proving that the accused had the intent to perform the said act.  
Mens rea could also appear as recklessness, which means consciously taking 
an unjustifiable risk with the safety and property of others that a reasonable 
person would not take. Mens rea could also be present by way of negligence. 
Negligence would suffice where the accused failed to take certain steps to 
avoid a danger which a reasonable person would have taken if in the position 
of the accused, but the accused failed to do so.
215
 The latter differs from 
wilful blindness which occurs where a person acts knowing, almost 
convincingly, that his/her actions are criminal but decides to turn a blind eye 
to it.
216
 
The possibility of applying the different levels of mens rea to the case of 
cyberlaundering would depend entirely on the merits of each case, and the 
facts upon which the prosecution relies to prove its case.
217
 Gleaning from the 
different components of the actus reus requirement, as a general rule, the 
mens rea for cyberlaundering should often include the following: 
 
 
                                                          
214
 For example, section 342 (1) (d) of the Criminal Code of Canada, Revised Statute of Canada, 1985, 
states that ‘everyone who uses a credit card that knows is revoked or cancelled is guilty’ of an 
offence. Therefore, here, one need only prove that the accused used the credit card, knowing it is 
revoked. 
215
 Cf Snyman (2002: 168). 
216
 Cf Snyman (2002: 168). 
217
 See Chapter 6, paragraph 6.3. 
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(a.) Knowledge of the illegality of the funds 
A cyberlaunderer should have knowledge of the fact that the funds in his/her 
possession are illegal. It is not sufficient that the accused merely thinks, or is 
negligent of the origin of the funds. Actual knowledge is essential to found 
liability. This requirement will not be met where the accused is in possession 
of illegal funds and is ignorant that such funds are illegal. 
(b.) Associative intention with the illegal funds 
In order to completely establish the mens rea element, it would not suffice for 
the cyberlaunderer to have only knowledge of the fact that the illegal funds in 
his/her possession are illegal. An associative intention is necessary. This begs 
the question: For what purpose are the funds held? Herein lies the requisite 
intention. An accused should be in possession of the illegal funds for the 
purpose of conducting one or more of the following activities: 
(i.) Hiding funds from law enforcement bodies; or 
(ii.) Concealing or disguising the nature, location, source and or ownership 
or control of the proceeds of the crime; or 
(iii.) Avoiding a legal obligation to report the transaction under the law. 
These three possibilities are all geared towards one overarching purpose, 
which is to prevent the violation of the protected interests of the Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) regime.  The protected interests of the AML regime are 
the stability of the economy, both local and international, and the effective 
operation of judicial and law enforcement bodies and/or agencies. When a 
criminal tries to ‘clean’ ‘dirty money’ by circumventing standards, norms, 
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rules and regulations that exist to maintain the stability of the local and/or 
international economy, this has a crippling effect on the economy as the 
conduct destabilizes both local and international economies.
218
 Moreover, the 
functions of the judiciary and law enforcement bodies are undermined by the 
criminal’s connivances and trickery. 
These actus reus and mens rea elements are discussed more practically in 
Chapter 6 of this study.
219
 
 
3.3 ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEMS: NEW TOOLS FOR 
LAUNDERING 
It was once said that money does not have to be a legal tender created by 
governments. Like law, language and morals, it can emerge spontaneously.
220
 
The exponential growth of electronic payment systems (e-payment systems) 
caused by the internet affirms this statement.  
E-payment systems refer to the means through which payment can be made 
over the internet.
221
 It entails a financial exchange, usually in the form of an 
encrypted financial instrument, such as an encrypted credit card number, 
digital cash or an electronic cheque, which is usually backed by a bank, an 
                                                          
218
 Cf discussion in Chapter 1, paragraph 1.2.1.3. 
  
219
 The actus reus and mens rea elements are discussed elaborately in Chapter 6 of this study, which 
deals with the prosecution of cyberlaundering, at paragraphs 6.3.3.3.1, 6.3.3.7 and 6.5. 
220
 Von Hayek (1978: 12). Cf Dionysios (2010: 19). 
221
 Business Dictionary (an undated website document) ‘Electronic Payment System’ available at 
<http://www.businessdictionary.com /definition/electronic-payment-system.html> [accessed on 25 
July 2011]. 
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intermediary, or a legal tender.
222
 The evolution of e-payment systems began 
with the concept of electronic funds transfer
223
 (EFT) in the 1940s.
224
 EFT 
gave rise to the notion of a transferable information-based data through 
computer and telecommunication components. The concept of EFT has now 
been largely replaced with electronic commerce payment systems which are 
online-based. 
E-payment systems are becoming more institutionalised by the sheer 
propagation of its trust-based system,
225
 even as established institutionalized 
financial infrastructures fail to fully comprehend the workings of this novelty. 
Similar to the terrestrial commerce systems which depend entirely on the 
notion of trust between strangers, the exacerbation of the e-payment system is 
fuelled by this rationale, because trust between its users is being forged 
increasingly.
226
  
Cyberlaundering is based on the concept of e-payments. As a sickle is to a 
wheat farmer, so is electronic money, or e-money, to a cyberlaunderer. E-
money is particularly significant because of the notion of ‘illegal e-money.’ 
In the terrestrial world where the traditional notion of money laundering is the 
order of the day, the opposite concept exists in the form of illegal hardcash. 
Illegal e-money refers to funds which are either derived from the cyberworld, 
                                                          
222
 Manzoor (2008: 213). Cf IGNOU (an undated website document) ‘Electronic Payment Systems’ 
available at <http://webserver .ignou.ac.in/virtualcampus/adit/course/cst304/ecom2.htm> [accessed 
2 August 2011]. 
223
 Electronic Funds transfer refers to the transfer of funds initiated through an electronic terminal, 
telephonic instrument, or computer or magnetic tape in order to instruct or authorize a financial 
institution to debit or credit an account. Manzoor (2008: 214) and Lassila (2011: 54). 
224
 Lassila (2011: 54) and Manzoor (2008: 214). Cf Geva (2011: 23).  
225
 Dionysios (2010: 19). 
226
 Newman and Clarke (2003: 23). Cf Fukuyama (1995: 15). 
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which is the environment of the internet,
227
 or funds that were originally 
illegal hardcash, but became converted into illegal e-money.
228
 With respect 
to the second category, illegal hardcash can be converted into illegal e-money 
through the use of e-payment systems. This is why the ensuing discussion is 
of great relevance. 
In this section, the notion of e-money is explored in further depth, in order to 
bring to light the practicalities surrounding it, and why it represents the 
perfect weapon being wielded for cyberlaundering purposes. 
 
3.3.1 Electronic money 
Electronic money (‘e-money’) can be described as monetary (or equivalent) 
value which is represented in an electronic format.
229
 A more elaborate 
definition is as follows: 
[Electronic money] is a system that allows a person to pay for goods or services by 
transmitting a number from one computer to another. Like the serial numbers on real 
dollar bills, the digital cash numbers are unique. Each one is issued by a bank and 
                                                          
227
 An instance where illegal funds can be derived from the cyberworld is when one profits from 
running an unlicensed website on the internet. See elaborate discussion in Chapter 6, paragraph 
6.5.2 below. 
228
 An example of this can be seen in several cyberlaundering techniques, such as virtual worlds, online 
banking, online gambling and online barter trade to name a few. See discussion in paragraph 3.5 
below. 
229
 Cf an alternative definition by the European Union: “Electronic money means electronically, 
including magnetically, stored monetary, stored monetary value as represented by a claim on the 
issuer which is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of making payment transactions […], and 
which is accepted by a natural or legal person other than the electronic money issuer.” See Article 
2(2), Council of Europe: Council Directive 2009/110/EC on the taking up, pursuit and prudential 
supervision of the business of electronic money institutions, adopted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly on 16 September 2009, and which came into force on 30 October 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
represents a specified sum of real money. One of the key features of digital cash is 
that, like real cash, it is anonymous and reusable.
230
 
 
A key feature of e-money is that it is usually held in online banking systems, 
and not in physical form. In countries such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States, only a small fraction of money is held in cash, as most of it is 
in the digital form.
231
 Despite the dip in the economies of these countries in 
recent times, domestic e-commerce climbed 10.8% from $185 billion (₤113 
billion) in the year 2008 to $205 billion (₤125 billion) in the year 2009, 
respectively.
232
  This increase was facilitated by the spiralling growth in e-
payment systems in the 2000s.
233
 It has been estimated that the e-payment 
market will jump to a mammoth $2,700 billion by the year 2015 from $740 
billion in the year 2010.
234
 Such a big jump in figures would translate into a 
                                                          
230
 Webopedia (an undated website document) ‘Digital Cash’ available at <http://www.webopedia 
.com /TERM/ D/digital_cash.html> [accessed on 04 August 2011]. Several other definitions of e-
money have been proposed as well. For example, the Electronic Money Institutions European 
Directive defines it as monetary value as represented by a claim on the issuer which is: (i) stored on 
an electronic device; (ii) issued on receipt of funds of an amount not less in value than the monetary 
value issued; (iii) accepted as means of payment by undertakings other than the issuer.’ See 
Directive 2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the 
taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions 
(O.J.E.C. L275/39, 27/10/2002). The latter definition is very elaborate. One very important 
criticism that can be levied against it is that it confines the notion of electronic cash to monetary 
value, thereby automatically excluding internet cash, such as DigiCash and store reward points. 
231
 Investopedia (an undated website document) ‘Electronic Money’ available at <http://www. 
investopedia.com/terms/e/electronic-money.asp> [accessed on 4 August 2011]. 
232
 Javelin Strategy and Research (2010) ‘Online Retail Payments Forecast 2010 – 2014: Alternative 
Payments Growth Strong but Credit Card Projected for Comeback’ available at <https:// 
www.javelinstrategy.com/research/Brochure-171> [accessed on 4 August 2011]. 
233
 Javelin Strategy and Research (2010) ‘Online Retail Payments Forecast 2010 – 2014: Alternative 
Payments Growth Strong but Credit Card Projected for Comeback’ available at <https:// 
www.javelinstrategy.com/research/Brochure-171> [accessed on 4 August 2011]. 
234
 Companies and Markets (2011) ‘The Future of Online and Mobile Payments’ available at 
<http://www.companiesandmarkets.com/Market-Report/the-future-of-online-and-mobile-payments-
625842.asp> [accessed on 04 August 2011]. Cf Yahoo Finance (an undated website document) 
‘Revenue of Online Payment set to hit $2700 billion by 2015’ available at 
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proliferation of cyberlaundering practices over the internet, should the status 
quo of the dilemma remain unchanged.  
The advent of e-money can be attributed to several factors, such as the 
continuous decrease in the costs of technology. This can be attributed further 
to the growing affordability and availability of computers on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, the advent of the internet.
235
 The ubiquitous nature of 
technology has driven commerce online, and is causing an unprecedented 
growth in e-commerce.
236
 What is more, traditional payment systems are 
becoming cumbersome, especially when compared to the ease and 
convenience created by e-payment systems, and the fact that the customary 
payment systems do not support micro-transactions in a way the internet is 
known to do and to facilitate.
237
 Another important consideration is the fact 
that e-money is shrouded in anonymity, which renders it a more attractive 
tool for cyberlaunderers. E-money guarantees anonymity either directly or 
indirectly.
238
 For the former, a cyberlaunderer could make use of truly 
anonymous products that do not use customer identification, whereas, for the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
<http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/Revenues-From-Online-Payment-businesswireuk-
9382019.html?x=0> [accessed on 04 August 2011]. 
235
 Fairlie and Chatterji (2011: 23). Cf paragraph 3.2.2.2 supra. 
236
 In the United States, between 2009 and 2010, e-commerce grew from an estimated $157 billion to 
$176 billion, respectively, and by 2015 this growth is expected to reach $279 billion. Forester (an 
undated website document) ‘US Online Retail Forecast, 2010 to 2015’ available at 
<http://www.forrester.com/rb/Research/us_online_retail_forecast, _2010 _to_ 2015/q/id/58596/t/2> 
[accessed on 12 August 2011]. In Europe, it is estimated that the number of online buyers that 
currently stands at 157 million in 2011, and will grow to 205 million by 2015. Forester (an undated 
website document) ‘European Online Retail Forecast, 2010 to 2015’ <http:// forrester.com 
/rb/Research/ european_ online_retail_ forecast%2C_2010_to_2015/q/id/58597/t/2> [accessed on 
12 August 2011]. 
237
 Chaudhary et al (2010: 30). 
238
 Cf Financial Action Task Force (2010C: 7). 
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latter, the cyberlaunderer could abuse personalised products by using false 
identities, smurfs,
239
 or a nominee third party.
240
 
According to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (‘FinCEN’),241 the 
surging proliferation of e-money in modern times might have its advantages 
for consumers, albeit incomparable to the threat it poses, as shown below:  
 
The common element is that these systems are designed to provide the transacting 
party with immediate, convenient, secure and potentially anonymous means by which 
to transfer financial value. When fully implemented, this technology will impact users 
world-wide and provide readily apparent benefits to legitimate commerce; however, it 
may also have the potential to facilitate the international movement of illicit funds.
 242
 
 
3.3.2 Models of e-payment systems 
E-payments can either be card-based or software-based.
243
 In order to 
understand these methods or kinds of e-payments in greater depth, it is crucial 
to delineate the different patterns or models of e-payment systems. According 
to a report by the World Bank, there are predominantly four e-payment 
systems that expose the different avenues through which e-payments can be 
made.
244
 These include the merchant-issuer model, the bank-issuer model, the 
                                                          
239
 Cf discussion in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.4.1.2 above, and footnote 89. 
240
 Cf Financial Action Task Force (2010C: 7). 
241
 FinCEN is the financial intelligence arm of the United States Department of Treasury. It is tasked 
with the regulation and control of financial crimes. See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(2009: 2). 
242
 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (an undated report) ‘Money in Cyberspace’ <http//www. 
fincen.org/resource-moneyincyberspace/1212> [accessed on 17 June 2011]. 
243
 Jailani, Yatim, Yahya, Patel and Othman (2008: 240). Cf Vincent, Folorunso, Akinwale and Akinde 
(2010: 157). See also discussions in paragraph 3.3.4 below. 
244
 Kellerman (2004:3). 
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non-bank-issuer model and the peer-to-peer model. An understanding of these 
models of e-payment is crucial because they represent the different 
possibilities of payment systems on the internet. This is important to the study 
of cyberlaundering, due to the fact that the system of e-payment forms the 
bedrock for cyberlaundering. These models will be closely considered. 
 
3.3.2.1. The merchant-issuer model 
The merchant-issuer model of e-payment refers to a rather ambiguous 
scenario where both the issuer of a smart card, or pre-paid card, and the seller 
of goods are the same person. In other words, one is faced with the situation 
where the merchant, who sells the goods and services to whom payment 
would be made, is also the issuer of the services. The object that is traded 
here is often an electronic card. Some examples of companies of this kind are 
Barclaycard, Visa, the Oyster card used by the Transport of London, and the 
Creative Star card used by the Hon Kong transit system.
245
  
This model does not pose a threat immediately on face value. However, the 
risks exist that it is used for illegal purposes, especially in the case of lesser 
known card companies. Merchants/issuers could be unscrupulous business 
men or organized crime syndicates that operate businesses online and use 
their enterprise as a façade for washing illegal funds. The ultimate goal is for 
these merchants to conceal their identities from law enforcement officers.  A 
                                                          
245
 Jamali (2009:14) and Reuter and Truman (2004:124). Countries in the Carribean have often been 
the dumping ground for funds derived from criminal activities, as they are known to have very 
weak financial systems. It is only recently that the Financial Action Task Force removed several of 
those countries from its black list.  
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study has shown that a majority of these companies are registered in 
jurisdictions that hoard funds unscrupulously, such as Costa Rica, Curacao, 
Antigua and Cyprus.
246
  
 
3.3.2.2. The bank-issuer model 
The bank-issuer model is the direct opposite of the merchant-issuer model. In 
this case the merchant and the issuer of the electronic cards are two separate 
entities. This scenario is commonly seen in the traditional financial system, 
where a bank-customer relationship exists. The traditional financial system is 
used to clear transactions, and for this reason, it is a more secure model of 
electronic payment. Good examples are the Danmont card, used in Denmark, 
and the Banksys’ Proton card in Belgium. 
 
3.3.2.3. The non-bank issuer model 
In this case, the customer or user buys electronic cash from the issuers using, 
traditional money, after which he/she uses the electronic cash to conduct 
transactions online with participating merchants. These merchants would then 
redeem the traditional cash equivalent of the electronic cash from the original 
issuers.
247
 Traditional banking systems are not involved in the process, which 
raises curiosity about the legality of the transactions. This is not to say that 
this model is entirely smeared with illegality. The model could not be more 
tailored for cyberlaundering practices, for cyberlaunderers prey on avenues 
                                                          
246
 Reuter and Truman (2004:124). Cf Kellerman (2004:3). 
247
 Kellerman (2004:3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
that are completely detached from reporting and record-keeping regulations. 
Popular examples of the non-bank issuer model are the electronic coin 
product of Cybercash,
248
 the Virgin Card and the Freedom Eagle Card.
249
 
 
3.3.2.4. The peer-to-peer model 
The peer-to-peer model features a scenario wherein bank and non-bank-
issued electronic cash is transferable between users. This system is rather 
flexible, given that electronic cash is transferable between users without 
encumbrances. Thus, the only point of contact between the traditional 
payment system and electronic cash is when the electronic cash is initially 
purchased from the issuer and when it is later redeemed from merchants and 
individuals.
250
 Therefore, as with the physical activity of handing over cash 
directly to another, electronic cash could be transferred directly from one 
person to another, either with or without the use of traditional banking 
systems. The MONDEX stored value card is a good example of the peer-to-
peer system.
251
 Also, an electronic barter trader such as E-gold Ltd is a very 
good example.
252
 
                                                          
248
 Cybercash (an undated website document) ‘About us’ available at <http: //www .cybercash .com 
/about/file/> [accessed on 19 June 2011]. 
249
 The Virgin pre-paid cards are especially popular in the USA, South Africa, the UK and other parts 
of Europe. For more information, see Virgin Cards (an undated website document) ‘About us’ 
available at <http://www.virgin.co.uk/pre-paidcards> and Freedom Eagle Card (an undated website 
document) ‘About’ available at <http://www.freedomeagle.com> [both accessed on 19 June 2011].  
250
 Jamali (2009:14).  
251
 See Mondex Card (an undated website document) ‘About’ <http:// www .mondex.com/about/> 
[accessed on 19 June 2011]. PayPal is another very similar example of a company that utilizes the 
peer-to-peer system. See PayPal (an undated website document) ‘About us’ available at 
<http://www.paypal.com> [accessed on 9 June 2010]. 
252
 See paragraph 3.5.4 below. 
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The peer-to-peer model has the characteristic of defying jurisdictional 
borders, which portends many dangers for the traceability of funds, especially 
for law enforcers. Hence, when illegal funds are transferred from one user to 
another, in another country or jurisdiction, the transaction would reflect that it 
originates from another person - the sender or original user - and not the 
issuing company, merchant or bank, if issued originally by one.
253
  
Clearly, the peer-to-peer model of e-payment creates infinite latitude amongst 
individuals, with minimal oversight by issuers and merchants. This holds dire 
consequences that are far-reaching, for the risk inheres in the fact that very 
complex trails can be created by criminals with illegal funds who seek to 
transfer e-money, at different times, to several accomplices or co-
perpetrators. This possibility is considered further in this study.
254
 
 
3.3.3 Storing methods and examples of electronic money 
Other than the overarching models of e-payment discussed above, which are 
largely broad in nature, the ensuing discussion delves into narrower examples 
of different forms of e-money, and the several ways in which it can be stored. 
 
3.3.3.1 ‘Software money’ 
‘Software money’ is a system through which software is stored in a computer 
hard drive by means of a proprietary software system.
255
 This program creates 
                                                          
253
 See Reuter and Truman (2004:125). 
254
 See paragraph 3.5 below. 
255
 Chuah (2000: 182). Cf Guadamuz (2003: 8). 
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an electronic wallet, also known as e-wallet, which can be loaded with money 
from an existing bank account. With this e-wallet, the user can purchase 
goods and services from merchants and vendors. However, this transaction is 
encrypted and the identity of the user would be unknown to the merchant.
256
 
A good example of a company that provides such software is E-cash.
257
  
 
3.3.3.2 ‘Real time or prepaid tokens’  
Real time or prepaid tokens refers to the use of prepaid instruments to 
conclude transactions. Prepaid tokens usually take the form of cards such as 
smart cards, debit cards, e-wallets
258
 and gift cards issued by most department 
stores. These cards are quite secure, given that they have well-encrypted 
microchips, and monetary value can be stored on them. This is very 
convenient, especially for banks that issue debit cards or banks cards. 
Virtually every bank with a competitive edge today issues debit cards to its 
customers, enabling them to conclude transactions. Customers could easily 
swipe the card on a teller machine, or could merely type in an encrypted code 
of the card online. Given the convoluted nature of smart cards and their 
distinct dynamism, the concept will be considered more closely. 
As examples of a real time or prepaid token, smart cards are very pertinent to 
the study of cyberlaundering. The service provider of a smart card, also 
                                                          
256
 Robertson (1999: 253). Cf Guadamuz (2003: 8). 
257
 See Ecash available at <http://www.ecash.com/online/> [accessed on 4 August 2011]. Similar 
companies are CyberCash available at <http://www.cybercash.com> [accessed on 4 August 2011], 
and NetCash available at <http://www.netbank.com/~netcash>[accessed on 4 August 2011].  
258
 In spite of the discussion in the preceding paragraph, e-wallet can also be considered as a prepaid 
token because it has the feature of a prepaid instrument, even though it is created by a software 
programme. 
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known as the issuer, operates the networks on which the cards can be used. 
There is also a prepaid account that is established by the issuer which is 
linked to the value of the smart card, similar to the nature of debit or credit 
cards.
259
 Smart cards are generally divided into open-loop or closed-loop 
cards.
260
 Closed-loop cards are limited in nature, and their uses are very 
specific. A smart card can, for example be, for example, limited to a pre-
determined value without the possibility of reloading it. Smart cards exist that 
enable the card holder to add value to the card to a certain limit, and there are 
smart cards that can be reused or reloaded by the card holder.
261
 Examples of 
the closed-loop smart cards are gift cards, long distance service and transmit 
system cards.
262
  
Open-loop smart cards, on the other hand, are more diversified, with a wider 
range of purposes, and have the key characteristic of being multi-
jurisdictional. By reason of the fact that their use transcends local borders, 
they appeal more to international clients with large scale businesses. Also, 
open-loop smart cards can be used by multiple parties, and not just a single 
party. These cards are often linked to e-payment merchants such as 
MasterCard or Visa, which facilitate use on an automated teller machine 
(ATM). Good examples are payroll cards and cash cards which are meant for 
                                                          
259
 Financial Action Task Force (2006: 4). 
260
 Financial Action Task Force (2006: 4). Payments Council (2010) ‘The Way We Pay 2010, The 
UK's Payment Revolution’ available at <http://www.paymentscouncil .org.uk// files/payments_ 
council/the_way_we_pay_2010_final.pdf> [accessed on 30 August 2011].  
261
 Financial Action Task Force (2006: 4). 
262
 Financial Action Task Force (2006: 4). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 13). 
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persons without bank accounts and are often reloadable.
263
 Such 
extraordinary capabilities render the open-loop smart cards more susceptible 
to use by money launderers. 
Transactions on the internet today are better effected with smart cards, which 
are often the preferred avenues for internet service providers (ISPs). Smart 
cards can be quite simple to use, given the easiness with which the credit card 
can be credited with funds. The card could simultaneously be used as a debit 
or credit card, depending on the purpose the user has in mind.
264
 The fact that 
smart cards are generally tarnished by being prone to misuse for money 
laundering purposes undermines their benefits, chief of which is the 
convenience that they offer, considering the unease and unwieldiness 
accompanying the physical carrying of bulk cash.
265
 In the year 2009, it was 
reported that about US $120 billion was loaded onto smart cards, and this 
number is expected to surpass US $440 billion by the year 2015.
266
 
Smart cards carry a great risk of danger because of the way in which money 
is transferred onto them. Funds could be transferred easily onto a smart card 
                                                          
263
 Financial Action Task Force (2006: 4). 
264
 Reuter and Truman (2004:123). Cf United States Government Accounting Office (2009: 1). See 
also Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (an undated report) ‘Money in Cyberspace,’ available 
at <http//www.fincen.org/resource-moneyincyberspace/1212> [accessed on 17 June 2011]. 
265
 A smart card certainly has numerous advantages, as it does not merely create convenience for 
individuals personally, but for governments and institutions as well. Recently, the Pakistani 
government partnered with a bank to distribute smart cards with a value up to about 25,000 
Pakistani rupees to its citizens. At the same time the bank and the smart card company set up 
wireless point of sale terminals where people can buy basic supplies. This initiative comes as result 
of the fact that most Pakistanis are without bank accounts, making it impossible to make payments 
directly into any bank account. Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 13). Cf Visa Corporate Site 
(2010) ‘Financial Inclusion - Pakistan eases the burden of displaced citizens by delivering financial 
support through “Visa,”’ available at <http://www.currency ofprogress.com /_ media/pdfs/case 
_studies/VISA_Inclusion-Pakistan.pdf> [accessed October 2010]. 
266
 Payment News (2010: 23). 
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by several means. For example, this could be done via a telephone, or either 
from an e-wallet
267
  or an ATM machine, or from the hard drive of one’s 
computer, or online from one’s bank account, or, more generally, from 
cyberspace (the legitimacy of which is always questionable).
268
  
Also, smart cards are problematic because majority of them do not presently 
require transactions to be reported to a central computing system. A good 
example is the MONDEX card, which is part of MasterCard International.
269
 
What is more, some of these cards do not even require one to have a bank 
account, as is the case with the PayPal card, and persons with false identities 
can be in possession of them effortlessly. This is a crucial trait of the 
cyberlaundering phenomenon, for the evasion of reporting requirements 
remains a recurring theme within the study of money laundering.
270
  
Cyberlaunderers exploit prepaid tokens because of the very high possibility of 
circumventing the Know Your Customer (‘KYC’) procedures271 – the very 
heartbeat of the current anti-money laundering (AML) regime. Most ISPs are 
very unscrupulous and inapt about verifying the identity of their customers. 
For example, the United Kingdom-based Freedom Eagle Cash Card, amongst 
                                                          
267
 United States Government Accounting Office (2009: 1). Also see Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (an undated report) ‘Money in Cyberspace’ available at<http//www.fincen.org/resource-
moneyincyberspace/1212> [accessed on 17 June 2011]. 
268
 This is usually the case with the occurrence of identity theft, where criminals acquire monetary 
value by stealing another person’s details, like a credit card or account number. This is called 
identity theft. 
269
 Mondex Card (an undated website document0 ‘About us’ available at <http://www.mondexcard. 
com/about/file838/> [accessed on 17 June 2010]. 
270
 This was noted by Stanley Morris (the director of FinCEN) in his 1995 address to the Congress 
Banking Committee, available at <http://www.fincen.org/resource> [accessed on 17 June 2011]. 
271
 The Know Your Customer principle was first introduced in section 100 of the Bank Secrecy Act 
(1970), PubL 91-508; 841114. The principle mandates financial institutions and the like to undergo 
a thorough vetting process for prospective customers before transacting with them. See Chapter 2, 
paragraph 1.2.2 for greater details. 
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a slew of others, does not require any kind of identification from potential 
customers. This card can be purchased online easily within minutes, and can 
be recharged repeatedly, with no actual limit on the value stored on the 
card.
272
 This method of e-payment is wholly unfettered, and this raises the bar 
for potentially curbing the dilemma of cyberlaundering.
273
 
 
3.3.3.3 Electronic cheques 
Electronic cheques, also known as e-cheques, occupy a separate category of 
the unique form that e-money can take. An e-cheque is no different from a 
paper cheque, because it serves as a message to a bank to make payment to a 
third party. The only exception is that it assumes a technological format, with 
sophisticated protection measures. The account number on an e-cheque is 
usually encrypted, and its digital signature and digital certificate are used to 
validate the payer, the payer's bank, and the account.
274
 This makes it more 
advantageous than conventional cheques. 
 E-cheques can carry illicit funds, which a cyberlaunderer would use to 
transact over the internet. However, the threat is analogous to prepaid tokens, 
such as smart cards, given the fact that they are considered to be safe security 
measures.  
 
                                                          
272
 Freedom Eagle Cash Card available at <http://www.freedom-card.co.uk/> [accessed on 2 
September 2010]. 
273
 Cf Encyclopedia (an undated website document) ‘E-Cheques’ available at <http://www . 
encyclopedia.com/doc/1O12-electroniccheque.html> [accessed on 4 August 2011]. 
274
 Encyclopedia (an undated website document) ‘E-Cheques’ available at <http://www . encyclopedia 
.com/doc/1O12-electroniccheque.html> [accessed on 4 August 2011]. 
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3.3.3.4 Alternative methods: the e-barter system 
Other than software money, prepaid tokens and electronic cheques, payment 
can be made electronically using other methods. Online barter trade, in which 
commodities are traded for other commodities or cash, is a good example. For 
instance, the trade in electronic metals such as e-gold has been the trend for a 
while now.  
E-gold is a digital electronic currency that operates in the World Wide Web. 
It is operated by the Gold and Silver Corporation, under the name e-gold 
Ltd.
275
 E-gold is account-based. As a traditional gold barter trade, specified 
weights of gold can be traded with another e-gold account holder, and 
ownership is exchanged.
276
 Because this suits international transactions, its 
operations are aided by the borderless nature of the internet. E-gold Ltd also 
purports to trade other e-metals such as e-silver, e-palladium and e-
platinum.
277
 However, e-gold Ltd is plagued by illegality, having encountered 
legal woes since its inception because of its strong money laundering 
capabilities.
278
 
As in the case of e-gold, several other alternative e-payments methods have 
been developed to rival the afore-mentioned examples of e-payments 
systems. They claim to have much tighter in-built security measures for 
fending off fraudsters, thus making them attractive to both merchants and 
                                                          
275
 E-gold (an undated website document) ‘About’ available at <http://www.e-gold.com/unsecure/ 
qanda.html> [accessed on 14 August 2011]. 
276
 E-gold (an undated website document) ‘About’ available at <http://www.e-gold.com/unsecure/ 
qanda.html> [accessed on 14 August 2011]. 
277
 E-gold (an undated website document) ‘About’ available at <http://www.e-gold.com /unsecure/ 
qanda.html> [accessed on 14 August 2011]. 
278
 This is discussed extensively in Chapter 6, paragraph 6.5.1. 
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customers. An example is Bitcoin, which was created in 2009. Bitcoin is a 
virtual or digital currency which uses the peer-to-peer system, and given the 
nature of peer-to-peer transactions, there is no central authority that issues 
new money or tracks transactions.
279
 However, Bitcoin has attracted much 
criticism, such as that it is susceptible to hackers and money launderers.
280
 
Another criticism is that Bitcoin is plentifully available, which robs it of its 
intrinsic value – a feature of any true currency.281 
 
3.4 CYBERLAUNDERING AND THE THREE-PRONGED PROCESS  
This aspect is reminiscent of a very crucial characteristic of money 
laundering, namely the triadic cycle of placement, layering and integration.
282
 
Given the fact that money laundering is a process crime, these standard stages 
help to explain the flow, the process and the workings of the crime. 
Cyberlaundering also embodies this process, with each stage having a 
technological ambit to it. Although money laundering on the internet is an 
entirely different playing field than that of its terrestrial analogue, the 
rationale remains unchanged. The fact remains that illegal funds are made to 
                                                          
279
 Nakamoto (2009: 1). Cf Bitcoin (an undated website document) ‘About’ available at <http: 
//www.bitcoin.org> [accessed on 8 August 2011]. 
280
 Scrofina (2011) ‘If one were to make a competitor for Bitcoin, what would it be?’ available at 
<http://www.quora.com [accessed 5 August 2011]. Cf The Daily Attack ‘A comprehensive critique 
of the weaknesses of Bitcoin’ <http://thedailyattack.com/2011/07/23/a-comprehensive-critique-of-
the-weaknesses-of-bitcoin/> [accessed 5 August 2011]. 
281
 Scrofina (2011) ‘If one were to make a competitor for Bitcoin, what would it be?’ available at 
<http://www.quora.com [accessed 5 August 2011]. Cf The Daily Attack ‘A comprehensive critique 
of the weaknesses of Bitcoin’ <http://thedailyattack.com/2011/07/23/a-comprehensive-critique-of-
the-weaknesses-of-bitcoin/> [accessed 5 August 2011]. 
282
 See Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.3. The three stages of money laundering are always described 
extensively in almost every discussion on money laundering. The following are some examples of 
works that provide such detailed discussions: Reuter and Truman (2004: 43), Madinger and 
Zalopany (1999: 54), Filipkowski (2008: 45) and Ping (2004: 43). 
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wend their way through all kinds of nooks and crannies, making them almost 
impossible to trace, let alone recognise. However, it should be added that the 
three-phased process is not cast in stone, as some phases can be made to 
overlap, resulting in less complex processes. But, the process is crucial as it 
helps one to understand the underlying intricacies better. The ensuing section 
looks at how the three-phased process manifests itself in the cyberworld, 
which is the realm of cyberlaundering. 
 
3.4.1 Placement 
In the world of cyberlaundering, placement occurs when e-money, having the 
label of illegal funds, is used to purchase goods and services with the 
intention to clean or convert it into ‘clean money.’ This is one of the many 
wonders of e-money, which has very adverse effects in the commercial 
world: Its virtue lies in the fact that it alleviates the need to ‘carry’ cash 
money physically. It also renders face-to-face transactions superfluous.
283
 
Thus, e-money can be exchanged from one person to another, or between 
multiple parties, without the involvement of any intermediary. This is further 
made possible because transactions involving the use of e-money are 
shrouded in anonymity, on which cyberlaundering thrives.  
Method wise, illegal e-money can be ‘placed’ in various ways, many which 
would involve online transactions. For instance, illegal e-money can be used 
to purchase foreign currency for the purpose of re-selling it, as shares in the 
                                                          
283
 Philippsohn (2001: 490). Also see Jamali (2009: 14). 
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stock-exchange, or it can be invested in a totally legitimate business 
enterprise.
284
 Online gaming, particularly online casinos, can also be used to 
place the funds. This is done by buying gambling chips on the casino, using 
illegal e-money.
285
 A win results in the casino paying out the winnings in 
cash, thus legitimizing the illegal e-money. Also, online barter trade that 
involves several businesses such as e-gold is also a very lucrative platform for 
placement. E-gold, for example, has been largely labelled as such.
286
 Other 
methods of placement include transfers of values stored in one’s hard-drive or 
email account, or transfers done from an ATM, or sometimes, simply, 
telephonically.
287
 
The placement stage is probably the simplest of the three stages. Where the 
goods or services purchased are consumables, the buck often stops here. This 
often means that there is no need to proceed to the stages of layering or 
integration. However, for cyberlaundering on a more complicated level, the 
placement stage is only the beginning. 
  
3.4.2 Layering 
The layering stage of cyberlaundering is the attempt at an ultimate disguise, 
as the intention of the cyberlaunderer comes to bear. Here, the criminal tries 
to mastermind the most complex of plans, schemes and designs to whisk the 
                                                          
284
 Philippsohn (2001: 489). Cf Ping (2004: 55) and Jamali (2009: 32). 
285
 See paragraph 3.5.4. below for a full discussion on this. 
286
 See the full discussion on E-gold Ltd in paragraph 3.5.4. below. 
287
 The process could be as simple as an existing customer of an electronic card company calling the 
company to credit an already exhausted smart card, or to give an order to transfer some value from 
an electronic card with illegal money to another person’s account. 
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illegal funds as far away as possible from the source of the criminal activities. 
Simply put, this stage usually entails a very difficult maze that the criminal 
devises and negotiates with the illegal funds. The inherent possibilities are 
indeed endless.  
The process entails a separation of the illegal funds from their true origin and 
then dispersed or ‘layered’ through different avenues. Amongst existing 
possibilities is the use of several online shell companies
288
 to transfer the 
funds, or simply purchasing goods online for purposes of resale, or by paying 
company or income taxes on the funds.
289
 Other than these, online banking 
has proven to be the main tool for the purposes for layering funds. As 
discussed further below, online banking is a very effective layering 
mechanism because an internet bank account can be opened without a face-
to-face contact and an existing link to a traditional bank account. Thus, online 
banks with very poor vetting processes run the risk of serving 
cyberlaunderers who exploit their ineffective system to perform endless 
layering transactions. A cyberlaunderer is able to open different bank 
accounts online with a false identity and transfer funds amid several 
jurisdictions without creating audit trails. The use of electronic funds 
transfers (EFTs) also comes in handy at this stage for the cyberlaunderer, as is 
                                                          
288
 See Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.4.6 for discussion. An online shell company serves as a vehicle for 
business transactions, without itself having any significant asset or operation. It is usually set up to 
aid the layering of funds, and has several key features, such as being registered in very 
unscrupulous jurisdictions and having an existing bank account that facilitates the movement of 
funds. See Reuter and Truman (2004: 33). 
289
 Philipsohn (2002: 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
a complementary feature or consequence of online banking.
290
 The mix of e-
money and online banking forms a powerful combination for 
cyberlaundering, especially in the internet environment where anonymity and 
boundless jurisdiction are key features. The numerous possibilities for 
cyberlaunderers that exist at this stage are seen further in the discussion on 
the vulnerable industries and techniques for cyberlaundering.
291
 
 
3.4.3 Integration 
The integration stage of cyberlaundering comes as a result of the need to 
create an appearance of legitimacy to the outside world. This stage is 
distinguishable from the layering stage because of the underlying rationale 
behind it. At the layering stage the key intention is to create a web of 
complexities in order to evade traceability from regulatory authorities, 
whereas at the integration stage, the cyberlaunderer intends to feign 
legitimacy of the funds. The latter can be accomplished by integrating the 
funds into the broad commercial market. There are several plausible avenues 
through which this can be achieved. While, in the traditional sense, this can 
be accomplished by creating fake invoices for goods and services, in the case 
of cyberlaundering, illegal funds can be reintegrated into the commercial 
world by opening online shell companies that render ostensible services of 
different kinds. Online shell companies are not only relevant to the layering 
stage, as indicated above, but, also, they play a key role in the integration of 
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 Jamali (2009: 14). 
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 See paragraph 3.5 below. 
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funds, especially when these companies have been created for legitimate 
purposes. Thus, using an existing bank account created in the name of the 
company, the illegal funds can be commingled with legitimate funds, thus 
creating the impression that the flow of illegal funds is geared towards 
fulfilling a legitimate purpose. Furthermore, it does not help that majority of 
these online shell companies are registered in very porous jurisdictions 
having very weak financial regulations.
292
 Online gaming companies such as 
online casinos exhibit such traits.
293
 Such companies try to keep within the 
confines of their ‘legitimate businesses’ in order to prevent raising the eye-
brows of regulatory authorities. After all, the overall purpose of integration is 
established when there is lack of adequate oversight by such authorities. 
 
3.5 VULNERABLE INDUSTRIES AND TECHNIQUES OF 
CYBERLAUNDERING 
Cyberlaundering thrives in very peculiar environments on the internet. This 
aspect delves into the nitty-gritty of cyberlaundering operations, identifying 
the most infested industries and most common techniques available on the 
internet that perpetuate the operations of cyberlaundering. The tides are rising 
more than ever before, as various industries are increasingly being exploited, 
such as online banking, online gaming, online auctioneering and online barter 
trade. It is a very prominent trait of money launderers to exploit perfectly 
legitimate commercial industries for laundering purposes, thereby tainting 
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 Hinterseer (1997: 160). Cf. Reuter and Truman (2004: 41) and Hunt (2011: 134). 
293
 Filipkowski (2008: 6). 
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such industries as a result. The ensuing discussion identifies some of these 
industries and unravels some of the techniques being currently used for the 
purposes of cyberlaundering. 
 
3.5.1 Online banking 
Online banking refers to the use of an internet-based bank to perform regular 
banking activities such as account inquiries, payment of bills and transfer of 
funds. With the advent of online banking, customers enjoy a new level of 
convenience, because customers can conclude certain basic banking 
transactions without being physically present at the bank. This, again, is one 
of the many good fruits that the internet yields. With the growth and 
dominance of the internet, the world has become a cyber-hub and a truly 
global village. This is further evidenced by recent statistics showing that 
97.7% of all the banks in the world today, regardless of their location, have 
become internet-based.
294
  
Online banking has become the most dominant technique of 
cyberlaundering.
295
 It facilitates cyberlaundering operations for the following 
reasons: 
(i.) Cash held by most internet-based banks (electronic cash or e-cash) does 
not fall within the ambit of hard cash, which is subject to regulation and 
control. For instance, in the United States, most banks are insured under 
                                                          
294
 Wise Geek (an undated website document) ‘What is online banking?’ available at <http://www 
.wisegeek.com/what-is-online-banking92338> [accessed on 12 June 2011]. 
  295 Cf Filipkowski (2008: 233), Kellerman (2004: 2), Lilley (2007: 1) and Ping (2004: 50). 
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the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
296
 which guarantees 
the safety of deposits in member banks. However, given that e-cash is 
often created by private vendors, rather than the Federal Reserve Bank, 
it is unaffected by monetary supply or policy as it does not form part of 
the market place of hard currency. This makes it difficult, and virtually 
impossible, to apply for e-cash the regulatory measures prescribed in 
laws such as the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986
297
. Hence, the 
highly revered KYC principle, which requires terrestrial banks to report 
suspicious transactions to law enforcement agencies, cannot be applied 
directly to online banks.
298
 Needless to say, those online banks that fall 
outside the ambit of current banking regulations have no obligation to 
file currency transaction reports (CTRs); 
(ii.)  Also, opening an account at an online bank can be done with the 
greatest of ease and convenience, without any substantial vetting 
process conducted by the relevant bank. The identity of the potential 
customer is not verified, neither is it authenticated. At terrestrial banks, 
there is a face-to-face encounter at the bank, where potential customers 
are required to present identification documents, which are verified 
before opening an account at a bank. This is not so with online banks. 
                                                          
296
 The FDIC was created by the Banking Act of 1933 (Public Law Number: 73-66). The Act is 
generally known as the Glass-Steagall Act, after its legislative sponsors, Senator Carter Glass and 
Senator Henry B. Steagall. The Act introduced major banking reforms in the United States, which 
include a differentiation in the activities of commercial banks and investment banks. The FDIC 
currently guarantees the safety of deposits by individual depositors to the tune of $250,000. See 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2012) ‘Frequently Asked Questions About the FDIC’ 
available at <http://www.fdic.gov/about/affaq.html> [accessed on 02 September 2011]. 
297
 Act 18 of 1986. See paragraph 2.2.2.2, Chapter 2, for more detailed discussion. 
298
 Filipkowski (2008:6). Cf Ping (2004: 44). 
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The marketing strategy of most online banks is designed to allow 
anyone to open an account, regardless of where the person is located. 
Hence, whatever information is provided for the opening of an account 
is the only evidence seen by the bank, and the true identity of the 
criminal seated at the other end of the computer remains unknown; 
(iii.) Another advantage of online banking for cyberlaundering is the fact 
that it perpetuates layering. Layering can be achieved easily, especially 
where a criminal uses smurfs to disperse illicit proceeds into several of 
his/her accounts held at an online bank.
299
 Another factor to consider is 
that online banks are not registered at the place where deposits are 
made, and this rules out the possibility of direct regulation. Along with 
the common problem that smurfs operate under the monetary limit or 
stipulated threshold, which negates the need for online banks to file a 
CTR, it is extremely difficult to identify the activity of smurfing or 
structuring, especially in such an illusive environment as the internet. 
Most governments/agencies have to rely on bank employees to blow 
the whistle on suspicious activities. An important issue that intertwines 
with this is the right to privacy, which, in this case, includes the right to 
unauthorized interception of electronic communications, and which 
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 Ping (2004: 41). Cf Hunt (2011: 135). 
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begs the question: To what extent are law enforcement agencies 
allowed to ferret out crime because of a hunch or suspicion?
300
 
As a complementary tool, smart cards come in handy for layering illicit 
funds over the internet. With smart cards, especially the open-looped 
types, the possibilities of layering are indeed endless. It is the perfect 
tool with which a web of deception is created, and not a single trail is 
left; 
(iv.) As with other cyberlaundering techniques, the issue of jurisdiction 
further compounds the vulnerability of online banking for 
cyberlaundering purposes. An online bank is not always registered at a 
place that falls within the limits of any international standard regulating 
it.
301
 It is unclear which country would have jurisdiction if the website 
of an online bank is registered in a place different from where the 
customer operates,
302
 since such international norm is lacking, and the 
reporting standards adopted by conventional banks are not mandatory. 
To compound the situation, most countries still refuse to cooperate with 
one another in sharing intelligence on such issues; and 
(v.)  Furthermore, with the spiralling growth of identity theft on the 
internet, cyberlaundering through online banking is aided, as a 
consequence. Hackers are using very complex encryption methods that 
                                                          
300
 The issue of privacy is a very sensitive one, as it affects the fundamental right of the person as well 
as the public interest, and the interests of justice. Cf detailed discussion on the right to privacy in 
Chapter 6, paragraph 6.2.2. 
301
 Jamali (2009: 18). Cf Marshall, Robinson and Kwak (2005:115) and Pillai and Juian (2008: 14). 
302
 The question of jurisdiction is one of the many grey aspects of cyberlaundering, which this thesis 
attempts to answer. This is discussed thoroughly in Chapter 6 below, paragraph 6.4. 
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make online banking permeable to their devices. Without leaving a 
single shred of evidence, hackers can encrypt certain programs to 
transfer funds electronically from one bank account to another.
303
 
Hackers also have special software that can be used to retrieve or steal 
an individual’s personal data, such as bank details and credit card 
numbers, which could be useful to a cyberlaunderer when conducting 
certain banking operations online.
304
 The trend currently leans towards 
purchasing fake identities from hackers, which are then used to open a 
bank account online. Within this web of complexity, the placement and 
layering stages of cyberlaundering are well secured.
305
 
 
3.5.1.1 Example of cyberlaundering through online banking 
The following presents a hypothetical scenario of how online banking is 
exploited for cyberlaundering purposes: 
Jack Sparrow is a jobless man who is very conversant with the 
internet. He constantly browses job websites like 
www.findjobs.com and www.jobfinder .co.uk in search of job 
opportunities. John Doe, on the other hand, is a fraudster, who 
runs a fake charity organisation on the internet called Aid-For-
All www.aidforall.com (a shell company). Amongst several of 
the other illegal activities operated by John Doe, this is the most 
lucrative. John Doe opened a bank account at an online bank (B 
Bank) for this organisation in its name. As John Doe constantly 
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 Marshall, Robinson and Kwak (2005:115). 
304
 Marshall, Robinson and Kwak (2005:115). Cf Jamali (2009: 19). 
305
 Jamali (2009:18). Cf Pillai and Juian (2008: 14). Another method by way of which one’s identity 
can be stolen online is through the use of spoof websites. These websites make certain attractive 
offers to the visitors on the condition that they provide them with certain personal details. See Atta-
Asamoah (2009:109). 
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scours jobsites on the internet looking for gullible accomplices, 
he crosses paths with Jack Sparrow, who, agrees to help John 
Doe wash the proceeds of his illegal activities. The aim is to 
siphon these funds into the mainstream commercial sector. John 
Doe deposits a portion of the illicit funds into his savings 
account in B Bank (i.e. placement). Jack Sparrow then loads 
several smart cards and gift cards with the remaining funds, 
albeit at different times, in order to evade suspicion. Jack 
Sparrow employs another party, Sally Shore, and they both make 
deposits under different identities and in the form of a donation 
to the bank account of the charity organisation (i.e. layering). 
Jack Sparrow and Sally Shore both perform these operations 
online at B Bank. Note: John Doe could accomplish his aims 
quicker and in a more elusive manner by employing several 
other smurfs along with Jack Sparrow and Sally Shore. 
Alternatively, and even more simply, John Doe could do without 
anyone’s assistance by buying the stolen personal data of 
individuals from a hacker, and in place of a smurf, use their 
details in the guise that ‘they’ are the donators to his charity 
organisation. 
 
3.5.2 Online auctioneering 
Albeit unknown to many, online auctioneering is a booming industry on the 
internet, not just for legitimate merchants, but criminals as well.
306
 
Cyberlaunderers, in particular, find this avenue convenient for ‘washing’ 
dirty funds. An online auction website enables persons that are registered on 
                                                          
306
 This is due to the large number of users of auction websites per month. They are now estimated at 
16 million, and as a result of the concomitant side effects, 87% of fraud cases are believed to be 
related to auction websites. As far back as 1987, when the internet was still in infancy, consumer 
complaints of online auction websites being used as tools for fraud was estimated at 1280 per anum. 
This rose to an unsettling estimate of 10660 per anum in 1999. Today, the complaints are 
innumerable. Newman and Clarke (2003: 15). Cf Haney (2001: 26) and Messner (2000: 4). 
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it to put up items or articles on the website for sale. Other users of the same 
website can bid for any item of choice. Just as one would find in auctions 
generally, the item, which is the subject of the sale, is sold to the person with 
the highest bid. Thereafter, the buyer would pay the agreed price to the bank 
account of the company, whilst, sometimes simultaneously, the seller sends 
the item to the buyer directly. Afterwards, behind the scenes, the company 
would pay the seller of the item and charge its own commission, if, according 
to the terms of sale, the buyer finds the product acceptable as advertised.
307
 
Given that online auctioneering companies are legitimate ones, in most 
instances, online auctioneering is often not considered a high-risk industry for 
a criminal enterprise. But the loophole is in the bidding process. A criminal 
could exploit this avenue by employing a smurf who could keep bidding 
continuously in high amounts until the item is sold to him or her, because in 
an auction sale without reserve, there is no limit to the bid made by a 
buyer.
308
 
 
3.5.2.1  Example of cyberlaundering through online auctioneering 
The following serves as an example of how online auctioneering is used in 
practice for purposes of cyberlaundering: 
Jack Sparrow is a drug dealer living in Turkey. He would like to 
convert the funds he has acquired from crime to legitimate his 
wealth. Jack Sparrow is registered on the auction site called 
Auction Express (www.AuctionExpress .com). In cahoots with 
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 Filipkowski (2008:9). 
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 Jamali (2009:18). Cf Marshall, Robinson and Kwak (2005:112). 
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Sally Shore - a smurf living in Cambodia, who is also registered 
on Auction Express - they agree to put up a very valuable relic for 
sale on Auction Express on a specific day and time. Jack Sparrow 
purchases a smart card, which he loads with the illegal funds. He 
sends the encryptions of the smart card to Sally Shore via emai. 
She decrypts it and extracts the value in the smart card. At the 
time agreed, the relic is put up on the auction site. Sally Shore 
bids the highest for the relic, and it is sold to her. Thereafter, Sally 
Shores pays the money into the bank account of Auction Express, 
and, at the same time, Jack Sparrow sends the painting to Sally 
Shore. After this, the necessary verifications are made and the 
money is paid to Jack Sparrow. At this stage the money has been 
integrated fully into the commercial world, as it has been 
‘cleaned.’ Note: Jack Sparrow could do this activity in multiple 
sequences, and several smurfs can be used for different items to 
further create the veneer of legitimacy. 
 
3.5.3 Online gambling 
Gambling is one of the few industries that have been transposed onto the 
internet successfully. Online gambling is a large part of the billion-dollar 
online gaming industry.
309
 By definition, online gambling refers to “the 
provision of opportunities to play games of chance or to obtain access to 
sports or race bookmaking via computer networks.”310 Statistics show that 
online gambling is fast becoming as buoyant as terrestrial casinos, if not 
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 As at 2010, online gaming was estimated as having a world-wide worth of US$20 billion, with 
future estimations showing an increase to US$30 billion by 2012, and with online gambling 
constituting more than half of the gross. KPMG (2010: 4). 
310
 Mussington, DA, Wilson, PA, Molander, RC (1998:53). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2009B: 
2). 
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more.
311
 It is common knowledge that terrestrial casinos are often warehouses 
for money laundering activities.  
When judged side by side, online casinos are hardly different from terrestrial 
casinos. However, a very glaring fact is that online casinos are way more 
addictive, because one in every five persons that visits online gambling sites 
is deemed to be a pathological gambler, as compared to the same ratio of 
persons who visit terrestrial casinos.
312
 Several factors attest to this: First, just 
as with other activities performed on the internet, it is much more convenient 
to use online gambling than terrestrial casinos. One can gamble online from 
the comfort of one’s home, or from virtually anywhere, as long as one has 
access to the internet. Also, online gambling sites offer very attractive 
incentives that are very enticing, such as gambling for free for a stipulated 
number of minutes or hours, and, or, at very low rates. This is hardly the case 
with terrestrial casinos. Given the nature of competition on the internet, 
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 In the period 1999 to 2001, the revenue derived from online gambling spiked from $651 million in 
1999 to $2238 million in 2001 (See NUA (an undated website document) ‘Surveys’ available at 
http://www.nua.org> [accessed on 3 September 2011]). In Europe, Italy has the biggest online 
gambling market, which grew from €3.4 billion in 2009 to €4.8 billion in 2010. In Greece, also, 
online gambling rakes in an estimated €2 billion annually, and the government is currently 
considering taxing the industry and regulating it, considering that its annual revenue can go a long 
way in helping its crumbling economy. Despite the dwindling economies of these countries, this 
industry still thrives, and was unaffected by the recent recession that plagued several countries in 
Europe. See Online Poker News (an undated website document) ‘Italian Online Gambling worth 
€4.8 billion’ available at <http://www.onlinepoker.net/poker-news/poker-law-industry-news/italian-
online-gambling-worth-48bn-rising-legislation/9394> [accessed on 3 September 2011]. See also 
Streak Gambling (an undated website document) ‘Online Gambling worth 2bn in Europe’ available 
at <http:// www.streakgaming .com/forum/ online-gambling –worth -2-billion-greece -t22194.html> 
[accessed on 3 September 2011]. 
312
 Times (an undated website document) ‘Online Gambling’ available at <http://www.timesonline. 
co.uk/tol/news/politics/article620834.ece> [accessed on 21 July 2011]. Cf discussion in Schopper 
(2002: 309). 
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where there are thousands of online gambling sites that sprout up every day, 
such incentives are a marketing strategy.
313
 
One may ask: How has online gambling become lucrative for purposes of 
cyberlaundering? Cyberlaundering can be accomplished through online 
gambling in two ways: A criminal could either use an existing online 
gambling service, which might appear legitimate, or set up one for the sole 
purpose of cleaning his/her ‘dirty’ funds.314 The latter would be a riskier 
method for the criminal, given that the existing online gambling website 
he/she seeks to exploit might or might not have strict internal regulations, 
laws and general oversight of the gambling activities. Also, with this method, 
the criminal would not have actual control over the gaming activities, and 
would stand a real chance of either winning or losing.
315
  
On the other hand, the former scenario, which involves establishing an online 
gambling site solely for the purpose of fostering a money laundering 
enterprise, appears more plausible for criminals. This method can be putative 
in nature, as it guarantees the criminal total control and, in most cases, a 
certain degree of anonymity. The very danger of online gambling inheres in 
this form. The following points explain this further: 
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 In 2009, the number of online gambling sites was estimated at around 1800. This number was 
predicted to triple in the coming years. See The United States Government Accounting Office 
(2009: 1). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2009B: 2). 
314
 Bumeter (2001:2). Cf Schopper (2002: 310). A third form of online gambling, called live-based 
gambling, exists. It enables more interaction between players or participants in the gambling 
activity. However, it is not very significant for the purposes of this study, as compared to the other 
two forms. 
315
 With this option, however, a cyberlaunderer need not even play or engage in actual wagering 
activities, given the possibility that funds could be merely ‘dumped’ into one’s account at a casino, 
which could be recorded as ‘winnings’ and which, thereafter, could be moved to another account, 
without the fear that the casino might be monitoring the activities in question. Cf Gottfried (2004: 
26). 
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(i.) Where a criminal creates an online gambling site solely for the purpose 
of laundering money, the most logical thing to do is to employ an 
army of smurfs to foster this objective. The illegal funds could be 
distributed among these smurfs to gamble on the site. It is immaterial 
whether the smurfs win or lose, for, in any case, it is the criminal who 
wins, simply because the proceeds will revert to him. This system is 
commonly known as “the drumming up business scenario;”316 
(ii.) Also, it is easy to set up an online gambling website. This can be 
attributed to the boundless boundaries and jurisdictional freedom of 
the internet, which are the main pillars supporting any online gambling 
enterprise. The method of online gambling for laundering money 
represents one of the negatives aspects of having a world of boundless 
boundaries on the internet. This feature of the internet makes the 
regulation and control of online gambling sites almost impossible. 
Especially where the laws of the relevant country permit online 
gambling, establishing an online gambling site is a hassle-free task for 
criminals. The regulation of online gambling remains a common 
problem amongst countries. At present, internet gambling is a legal 
activity in many countries.
317
 In very few countries, such as India
318
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 Schopper (2002: 312). Cf Bumeter (2001:7). 
317
 This includes most countries in Europe, the Caribbean and North America. See KPMG International 
(2010: 23). In Africa, only South Africa has express provisions legalizing internet gambling, 
although these are subject to certain regulations under the National Gambling Act 7 of 2004. 
318
 The Bombay Wager Act IV of 1887 (Part 1). 
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and some parts of the United States (US), online gambling is illegal.
319
 
In the US, whereas online gambling is not per se deemed illegal in 
terms of federal law, the electronic transmission of betting and 
wagering activities is illegal in terms of The Wire Act of 1961; and
320
 
(iii.) The feature of anonymity also rears its head within this discussion. As 
is typical with all money launderers, a person who devises an 
enterprise such as online gambling, for purposes of laundering money, 
seeks to cover his tracks and evade being traced. Luckily, the internet 
provides this feature, and an online gambling site can be created under 
such veil of anonymity. This can be amply possible if the criminal 
avoids the registration of his internet provider (IP) address. In 
countries or jurisdictions with very lax internet control policies or 
AML laws, this is often the case. 
Moreover, the smurfs who are used by the criminal to play on the 
online gambling site can also enjoy anonymity. Even where the first 
scenario applies – where a legitimate online gambling site is exploited 
by a criminal – the principle still holds and the identity of the smurfs 
would not be determined. This is attributable to the fact that online 
gambling sites are not financial institutions; they are not required to 
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 Some states in the US such as Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, South 
Dakota, and Washington have strong laws against online gambling. Bluejay (2012: 1). 
320
 The Federal Wire Act 87 of 1961 (popularly called ‘The Wire Act’). In the US, in a recent case of 
United States of America v. Scheinberg et al 10 Cr. 336 (2011) three online poker companies were 
indicted for circumventing US laws that prohibit the operations of unlicensed online gambling 
websites that accept illegal funds for the purposes of gambling online. The rationale was 
reemphasized that the electronic transmission of betting and wagering activities is illegal under the 
laws of the Wire Act. 
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observe customer verification (i.e. the KYC principle), neither are they 
under a similar obligation to report suspicious activities to law 
enforcement bodies.
321
 
 
3.5.3.1 Example of cyberlaundering through online gambling 
Below is an example of cyberlaundering through the method of online 
gambling, and, in particular, using the ‘drumming up business scenario:’ 
Jack Sparrow is a fraudster residing in New York City, US. He 
has US$1 million in criminal proceeds, which he wishes to 
launder. Jack Sparrow, therefore, opens an online casino 
(‘Caesar’s Casino’) in Pakistan through an acquaintance, John 
Doe, who is resident in Pakistan. Jack Sparrow intends to use 
John Doe and his friends as smurfs to ‘wash’ his ‘dirty’ funds for 
him. For this reason, Jack Sparrow obtains their e-mail addresses, 
and purchases several smart cards which he loads with varying 
amounts of the illegal funds. He then sends the details of these 
cards to the smurfs in Pakistan with encrypted software, along 
with their individual commissions on the encrypted cards. With 
the decrypted smart cards, the smurfs open an account at Caesar’s 
Casino. The smurfs then use the cards to gamble, but deliberately 
lose all the funds to the casino. These losses form part of the 
casino’s income, which reverts to Jack Sparrow (the owner of the 
casino) in monthly instalments. Alternatively, if John Doe is by 
chance the manager of the casino, he remits the money to Jack 
Sparrow.  
Conversely, should it happen that the smurfs win at Caesar’s 
Casino, they then acquire the funds, which they send directly to 
Jack Sparrow in monthly instalments, or pay back to Caesar’s 
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 Schopper (2002: 304). 
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Casino as a donation or as payment for a putative service 
rendered.  
Note: This arrangement might well represent only one of 
numerous other possibilities, for Jack Sparrow could make similar 
arrangements with smurfs in various other countries 
simultaneously. 
 
3.5.4. Online barter trade 
According to the FATF, the reason for the advent of new e-payment systems, 
such as e-barter trading or digital payment systems is that it helps with certain 
key transactions on the internet, without reverting to traditional currencies, or 
having foreign exchange concerns.
322
 Although there are several e-barter 
trading companies such as WebMoney, Netpay and GoldMoney, this study 
will look more closely at E-gold Ltd and its operations as an example of e-
barter trade, given that it is the only online e-barter trading company that has 
been most plagued with money laundering allegations amongst a slew of 
other criminal allegations.
323
 This is considered below in greater depth. 
E-gold is an electronic currency created solely for the internet. It is issued by 
E-gold Ltd, and is backed 100% by gold bullion in allocated storage.
324
 One 
peculiarity of e-gold is that it is entirely unrelated to traditional currencies, 
such as the Dollar, the Euro, the Yen, the Rand etc. The system is account-
based, which implies that only account holders can conclude transactions 
                                                          
322
 Financial Action Task Force (2006: 44). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 13). 
 
323
 The resulting case of United States of America v. E-Gold Ltd, Douglas Jackson, Barry K.   
Downey, and Reid A. Jackson, 521 F.3d 411, 417 (D.C. Circuit) (2008), is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6 below at paragraph 6.5.1. 
324
 E-gold (an undated website document) ‘About us’ available at <http://www.e-gold.com /unsecure / 
qanda.html> [accessed on 14 July 2011]. 
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with the e-gold currency by spending specified weights of gold of the e-gold 
currency with other account holders.
325
 It is a prerequisite, therefore, that e-
gold trading is kept within the circle of account holders, and as a consequence 
of any barter trade, only ownership is exchanged. The holder or recipient of 
an e-gold currency could do whatever they want with the currency – it could 
be traded further with other persons or merchants accepting the currency, or it 
could be converted to cash.
326
 E-gold Ltd makes profits by charging a 
percentage of fees on each transaction conducted. In the 2005 fiscal year 
alone, transactions worth $1.5 billion were repoted to have been conducted.
327
 
The e-gold system is created to suit international transactions, considering the 
fact that it is borderless in nature. Traders using this system can trade this 
currency with other persons in several other countries.
328
  
This method of e-barter trade lends itself to be used to complete the full 
money laundering circle - placement, layering and integration. Also, e-gold 
                                                          
325
 E-gold (an undated website document) ‘About us’ available at <http://www.e-gold.com /unsecure/ 
qanda.html> [accessed on 14 July 2011]. 
326
 There are several ways in which e-gold can be converted to traditional cash. One can load a debit 
card with e-gold and cash it out at an ATM. However, the debit card must be anonymous in order 
not to leave a trail. Most anonymous debit cards do not require any form of identification and social 
security numbers, such as Cash Cards Internationals and RoboXchange Cards. Another method of 
conversion is through the use of some ‘electronic money merchants’ who accept e-gold currency. 
These types of merchants will accept e-gold for cash at commercial merchants. Also, some 
merchants trade certain products for e-gold. For example, a smart card company known as ‘gCard’ 
can be purchased with e-gold, which can be converted to cash through an ATM. In addition, e-gold 
currency can be converted to traditional cash, using the e-gold cirrus maestro ATM debit card, 
which is cashable at most ATMs. Cf Grow, Cady, Rutledge and Polek (2006) ‘Gold Rush: Online 
payment systems like e-gold Ltd are becoming the currency of choice for cybercrooks’ available at 
<http://www.businessweek .com/magazine /content /06 _ 02/b3966094.htm [accessed on 1 January 
2011]. 
327
 Grow, Cady, Rutledge and Polek (2006) ‘Gold Rush: Online payment systems like e-gold Ltd are 
becoming the currency of choice for cybercrooks’ available at <http://www.businessweek 
.com/magazine /content /06 _ 02/b3966094.htm [accessed on 1 January 2011]. 
328
 Grow, Cady, Rutledge and Polek (2006) ‘Gold Rush: Online payment systems like e-gold Ltd are 
becoming the currency of choice for cybercrooks’ available at <http://www.businessweek 
.com/magazine /content /06 _ 02/b3966094.htm [accessed on 1 January 2011]. 
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follows the peer-to-peer issuer model of e-payment, and as shown earlier, 
there are big risks associated with it.
329
 
  E-gold poses a threat for the following reasons: 
(i.) First, it is very easy to open an e-gold account. It has been structured in 
such a way that it is not cumbersome for potential customers. The 
process does not include a vetting process, which would naturally 
require a thorough verification of the customer’s identity. Just as with 
any system with little or no regulatory measures, it becomes very 
attractive to cyberlaunderers; 
(ii.) Also, e-gold guarantees anonymity. As bees are attracted to a 
honeycomb, so, too, does anonymity attract criminals such as 
terrorists, hackers who steal and sell stolen identities, pornographers, 
and, above all, cyberlaunderers. This is evident in the following 
quotation: 
Some of e-gold's customers have been unsavory. Omar Dhanani used e-gold 
to launder money for the ShadowCrew, a cybercrime gang with 4,000 
members worldwide, according to an October, 2004, affidavit by a Secret 
Service agent. Based in a stucco house in Fountain Valley, Calif., Dhanani 
used his PC to hide the money trail from the sale of thousands of stolen 
identities, bank accounts, and credit-card numbers, the government said. 
Accomplices sent him Western Union (FDC ) money orders, which, for a 
fee, he filtered through e-gold accounts. On Oct. 4, 2004, Dhanani, 22, who 
used the nickname Voleur -- French for thief -- boasted in a chat room that 
he moved between $40,000 and $100,000 a week. He pled guilty in 
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 See paragraph 3.3.2.4 above. 
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November to conspiracy to commit fraud and faces up to five years in 
prison.
330
 
E-gold has been embroiled in many legal problems because of its very 
porous characteristics,
331
 which have attracted the scrutiny of several 
law enforcement agencies, leading to several investigations into its 
activities, and 
(iii.)  Given that e-gold does not fit the frame of a financial institution, as 
envisaged by regulatory instruments, such as the Bank Secrecy Act 
and the Money Laundering Control Act in the United States, it is not 
under any obligation to observe the Know Your Customer (KYC) 
principle, It therefore does not make any Currency Transaction Reports 
(CTRs), nor is it under any obligation to report suspicious activities. In 
addition, websites like e-gold are registered in jurisdictions with very 
lax law enforcement regimes. For this reason, it is not surprising to 
learn that e-gold Ltd has its server in Luxemburg.
332
 
 
3.5.4.1. Example of cyberlaundering through online barter trade 
For a better understanding of how online barter trading works, a hypothetical 
scenario in which e-gold is used as a currency is sketched below: 
                                                          
330
 Grow, Cady, Rutledge and Polek (2006) ‘Gold Rush: Online payment systems like e-gold Ltd are 
becoming the currency of choice for cybercrooks’ available at <http://www.businessweek 
.com/magazine/content /06_02 /b3966094.htm [accessed on 1 January 2011]. 
331
  Cf discussion in Chapter 6, paragraph 6.5.1. 
332
 E-gold (an undated website document) ‘Contact’ available at <http://www.e-gold.com/unsecure/ 
qanda.html> [accessed on 14 July 2011]. Cf Phil Osborne’s quoted commentary in Kellerman 
(2004: 4). 
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Jack Sparrow is a drug dealer living in Luxemburg. Within one 
year he amassed $10 million in profits from the drug trade. 
Mindful of the risks involved in depositing the funds directly into 
his bank account, he goes online (www.e-gold.com) and opens an 
account with E-gold Ltd, where he uses the $10 million to 
purchase an equivalent value of e-gold (i.e. placement). He does 
this to avoid being subjected to the KYC and customer due 
diligence procedures which are typical for most banks. After 
placing the funds, Jack Sparrow purchases assets and financial 
products online from various companies that accept the e-gold 
currency (i.e. layering).
333
  He also purchases a financial stake in a 
company listed on the stock exchange, and also resells some of the 
assets that he purchased for traditional cash (i.e. integration). Note: 
Jack Sparrow could, alternatively, have more than one e-gold 
account in which he could deposit portions of the illegal proceeds 
to feign legitimacy). 
 
3.5.5 Virtual worlds 
To date, the use of virtual worlds to launder money is certainly the most 
innovative and unassuming technique devised by criminals. Its uniqueness, 
which lies at the furthest end of Machiavellian tactics, makes the laws 
prescribed by the present AML regime look farcical. It is by far the most 
problematic, yet certainly one of the cleverest techniques used, and one 
without which any discussion on cyberlaundering would be incomplete. 
                                                          
333
 This is an example of a real-life scenario involving e-gold Ltd. See Grow, Cady, Rutledge and 
Polek (2006) ‘Gold Rush: Online payment systems like e-gold Ltd are becoming the currency of 
choice for cybercrooks’ available at <http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content /06_02 /b3 
966094.htm [accessed on 1 January 2011]. 
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A virtual world is part of online gaming, which is also known as Massively 
Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPG). As the name suggests, 
MMORPGs are internet-based games with attributes of a social network, and, 
in very colloquial terms, allow players to ‘live’ in a simulated environment 
that is very much akin to the real world. In other words, an almost exact 
replica of real life is represented in a virtual environment.
334
 In a virtual 
world, the players are represented by their avatars,
335
 with which they can 
conduct regular activities that mirror real life in its entirety. In practice, 
however, it is possible for an individual to create more than one avatar.
336
 The 
‘gaming’ aspect of virtual worlds lies in the activities of players who are 
often competing with other players, particularly in an attempt to amass wealth 
by way of building virtual houses and buying virtual land. The innovation of 
virtual worlds is indeed the very apex of the continuously evolving genre of 
online gaming. Whilst certain virtual worlds are centred on a virtual-fictional 
world, others rely on user-generated content and the co-creation of digital 
objects by users, for example, the virtual world known as Second Life 
                                                          
334
 Cf Klimmt (2011: 1) and Bishop (2009: 5). 
335
 An avatar is a digital representation of an individual on the internet. An avatar can be created by the 
online gamer, who has the liberty of cloning this digital representation into any form or appearance 
he chooses. Given the highly developed state of graphic arts and designs at present, the idea of an 
avatar far exceeds merely a cartoon figure, as the semblance with reality is often uncanny. 
336
 In many cases, for individuals seeking to use the business aspect of participating in virtual worlds, 
this task is outsourced to certain skilled individuals. Every avatar in a virtual world has to undergo 
evolution and development of skills, which it can perform within the virtual economy. Given the 
painstaking nature of the required evolution, at present, this initial process is being outsourced to 
certain persons in India, China, Pakistan or to most other developing countries with developed 
cyber expertise, who are, in turn, paid a few dollars as remuneration. Once avatars are brought up to 
a certain standard, they are then passed over to their original creator, who could then use them to 
invest considerable sums of money into the online economy. These persons are also known as 
identity brokers, who invest hours in creating and building up avatars to perform specific tasks in 
these virtual worlds, after which they are auctioned. Demetis (2009: 11). 
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(SL).
337
  Virtual worlds can be sub-divided into three basic types: (a) 
MMORPGs, which are virtual worlds that are centred on a virtual fictional 
world, such as the World of Warcraft, where players, through their avatars, 
interact with thousands of other players, collecting digital objects of diverse 
kinds, resolving tasks and organizing themselves into groups to overcome 
certain challenges;
338
 (b) virtual worlds that rely on user-generated content 
that perpetuates the co-creation of digital objects by users, such as SL,
339
 
Entropia Universe, Kaneva, Active Worlds and IMVU;
340
  and (c) virtual 
worlds that take on the character or features of social network sites, such as 
Facebook or Twitter. These virtual worlds host a virtual representation of 
many real individuals, without providing a virtual spatial environment which 
users can navigate through.
341
 Links between social profiles make social 
relationships visible and many modalities exist that create social dynamics 
and appeal, such as online groups and shared interests.
342
 
Virtual worlds are certainly good business and are gaining popularity by the 
day. Other than the appearance of the real world, virtual worlds also 
experience the same conditions and situations that exist in real life. This is 
due to the fact that they have their own functioning economies, political and 
social lives. In a recent report by the World Bank, the current worth of all 
                                                          
337
 Klimmt (2011: 3).  
338
 Klimmt (2011: 3). Cf Cornelius and Hermann (2011: v). 
339
 Klimmt (2011: 3).  
340
 There are several other types such as Twinity, Fregger, PlayStaion Home and There, which are 
mostly social virtual worlds that exist permanently in three dimensional (3D) display, popularly 
called metaverses. See Cornelius and Hermann (2011: v). 
341
 Klimmt (2011: 3). Cf Laue (2011. 21). 
342
 Klimmt (2011: 3). Cf Lodder (2011: 79). 
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virtual worlds combined stands at about US$18 billion,
343
 with an average of 
800 million users worldwide.
344
 In the year 2011, Entropia Universe had an 
annual turn-over of more than 1.5 billion PED – the virtual currency in the 
online space meaning ‘Project Entropia Dollar.’ By the end of 2012, virtual 
worlds might each have an average of approximately US$1 billion.
345
  One 
virtual world, Second Life, will be singled out here because of its 
popularity
346
 in order to better explain the nature of virtual worlds and how 
they are relevant in the cyberlaundering discussion. 
SL was developed by Linden Labs in the United States in 2003. The players 
in SL are known as ‘residents,’ who, through their avatars, can “explore, meet 
other residents, socialize, participate in individual and group activities; create 
and trade virtual property and services with one another or travel throughout 
the world.”347 The currency used in SL is known as Linden Dollars (L$). 
Much like the real world, the activities of all residents revolves around money 
(i.e. the L$), as it is necessary to eke out a living and for the flow of 
commerce. Shrewd residents actually make profits from their inworld 
transactions. As a start-up, residents receive a stipend of L$300 a week, but 
are not limited to this amount because in SL, residents can convert real-world 
money, such as the US Dollar or the Euro, into L$. SL has a special currency 
                                                          
343
 Lehdonvirta & Ernkvist (2011: 12). Cf Cornelius and Hermann (2011: 2). 
344
 Cornelius and Hermann (2011: v). Cf Klimmt (2011: 3). 
345
 Cf comparisons made in Drug Enforcement Administration (2007) ‘2007 National Money 
laundering Strategy’ available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/nmls.pdf> [accessed on 
29 July 2010].  
346
 SL currently has more than 20 million users. See Second Life (an undated website document) 
‘Current User Metrics for Second Life’ available at <http://secondlife.com/xmlhttp/secondlife.php> 
[accessed on 22 July 2011]. 
347
 See Jamali (2009:32). 
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or money exchange service known as Xstreet, which makes it possible for 
such conversion to be done. With money in hand, residents can do virtually 
anything they wish, including creating virtual objects and purchasing real 
estate.
348
 
To conceive of virtual worlds as mere game sites would be to underestimate 
them, since unlike other online games, they transcend the virtual world into 
the real world, taking a heavy toll on it, with dire consequences. One such 
consequences is the window of opportunity it opens for criminals who wish to 
wash illegal funds. The potential of virtual worlds for money laundering is 
explored below, using SL as a sample case. 
(i.) In virtual worlds such as SL, where attempts have been made to 
duplicate real life, apparently only the dazzling parts and pleasantries of 
the real world are immitated, not the daily grind of human life and the 
hard realities of the law. There are very few regulations or laws that 
control individual relations. AML laws are, consequently, non-existent. 
The existing laws in virtual worlds take the form of Terms of Service, 
which mainly serve to protect residents or players from harassment, 
disclosure, indecency, intolerance and assault.
349
 What a dreamland for 
money launderers! Innovators of virtual worlds possibly did not foresee 
this eventuality. So, the question that arises is this: Given SL’s limitless 
                                                          
348
 For more information see Second Life (an undated website document) ‘About us’ available at 
<http://www. secondlife.com/terms_of_service/> [accessed on 22 July 2011]. Cf Jamali (2009:41). 
Interestingly, in 2010, being the first time ever, a real-world amount of US $1.5 million was used to 
buy a virtual island in Entropia Universe. Demetis (2010: 9). 
349
 Second Life (an undated website document) ‘About us’ available at <http://www. secondlife .com / 
terms_of_service/> [accessed on 22 July 2011].   
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capability to mimick real life, is it plausible to create virtual police or 
virtual law enforcement agencies to combat money laundering in the 
virtual world? Would the existence of a virtual criminal justice system 
not serve as a deterrent for potential money launderers desirous of 
escaping from the strictness of cumbersome regulations and red tape? 
The question is whether it is at all possible to enact laws in the virtual 
world which can, in fact, be aimed at combating money laundering in 
the virtual world. In other words, can we create a virtual world in which 
avatars can be arrested, tried and sent to prison?  
The fact of the matter is that, even though a virtual economy operates 
like a real world economy, it is not as controlled as one. For instance, 
SL’s Xstreet creates the possibility for residents to change real-world 
money to L$ at often profitable rates. Conversely, the reverse is also the 
case. Similarly, in Entropia Universe, the virtual exchange rate is 10/1 
(i.e. 10 PEDs to United States $1), with which to convert money back 
and forth into USD.
350
 The conversion is done mainly through ATMs, 
which now accommodate virtual currencies.
351
 Given the current 
statistics that approximately US $1.5 million change hands every day in 
SL,
352
 the playing field is widened further for criminals. With the 
capability of Xstreet, if the exchange is done with illegal funds, 
integration would have occurred, as the dirty money, having been 
                                                          
350
 Demetis (2010: 9). Cf Spiegel (2007: 3). 
351
 Demetis (2010: 9). 
352
 Demetis (2010: 9). Cf Spiegel (2007: 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
washed, would be integrated into the real-world commerce. As a caveat, 
Xstreet is not a real financial institution; it is not under any obligation to 
comply with the reporting obligations, nor is it required to file CTRs, as 
is expected from terrestrial financial institutions in the real-world. 
(ii.) Virtual worlds also create the possibility of tax evasion. In SL, by way 
of principle, only residents that live in countries which are considered 
part of the European Union may be charged value added tax (VAT).
353
 
VAT is charged on all transactions conducted by the resident, using the 
L$ for which the resident pays Linden Lab,
354
 but not charged in 
transactions in L$ between residents. Due to the fact that residents do 
not have to disclose their source of income, and resident-to-resident 
transactions are not subject to taxation, it is easy for residents to evade 
payment of taxes, especially on goods or services which might be 
taxable in the real world. And given that tax evasion is but one of the 
many predicate offences for money laundering, it is also more 
convenient to ‘wash’ such illegal proceeds in such an environment. 
(iii.) Also, anonymity is an advantage. Players in virtual worlds are very 
indistinct and vague, and the idea of a ‘resident’ could really be a veil 
                                                          
353
This principle originates from the Council of Europe: Council Directive 2002/38/EC on the value 
added tax arrangements applicable to radio and television broadcasting services and certain 
electronically supplied services, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 7 May 2002 and which 
came into force on 1 July 2003. According to the Directive, VAT should be levied on the supply 
through electronic networks of software and computer services generally, and compliance is 
mandatory for all member countries of the European Union. 
354
 This includes purchases from the land store, premium account registration, land use fees (tier), 
private region fees, LindeX transactions, and land auctions. Second Life (an undated website 
document) ‘About us’ available at <http://www.secondlife.com/corporate/vat.php> [accessed on 23 
July 2011]. Cf Jamali (2009:45). 
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for anyone, saint or criminal. Other than the information a fellow 
resident puts into his profile, which is visible to other residents, and the 
representation of an avatar, residents know nothing about each other. 
This is further exacerbated by the fact that virtual worlds do not have to 
verify the identity of any player before joining the relevant community. 
Since one’s true identity cannot be ascertained correctly in anyway, such 
an environment is bound to propagate crimes such as identity theft and 
fraud, which are also predicate offences for money laundering. 
What is more, in some virtual worlds such as SL, there are the so-called 
‘virtual banks’ that house L$ or the relevant virtual currency which 
operates as real-world banks and where residents can open legitimate 
bank accounts. Also, here, the opening of a bank account is completely 
hassle-free, with no due diligence performed by the virtual bank. Thus, 
again, the true identity of the resident remains unknown. This is 
reminiscent of the problems identified earlier on online banking.
355
 The 
fact that basic banking laws are non-existent in virtual worlds has 
numerous repercussions for the real-world economy, one of which is the 
proliferation of money laundering activities. 
(iv.) In addition, the act of smurfing thrives in virtual worlds. The idea that 
any person can become a player or resident in a virtual world as an 
anonymous entity, or with fake identification, after which he or she can 
go about his/her business in the community without raising an eye-brow, 
                                                          
355
 See paragraph 3.5.1 above. 
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appears as a perfect plot to a smurf story. Innumerable ways exist in a 
virtual world in which a criminal can employ smurfs to layer illegal 
funds in the community, and because of the attribute of anonymity, the 
chances of getting caught are slim. This is further mitigated by the fact 
that Xstreet exists with which L$ can be converted to real-world money, 
and vice-versa.
356
 At the end of the process, the money is integrated into 
real-world commerce, appearing untainted.  
 
3.5.5.1 Example of cyberlaundering using virtual worlds 
Virtual worlds present an environment in which a criminal can weave and 
connive brilliant schemes through which his/her illegal funds can be placed, 
layered and integrated all at once, without leaving behind a single trail. An 
example is sketched below: 
Jack Sparrow is a drug dealer living in South Africa. His 
annual turnover from his unlawful enterprise is about US$ 2 
million. He learns about virtual worlds from a friend who is a 
game addict, and about the possibility of using such a novel 
method to launder his funds. Jack Sparrow, thereupon, joins 
SL as a resident. He buys a virtual land on which he later 
builds a big multi-purpose entertainment company called ‘The 
Lounge.’ The Lounge offers all sorts of social activities, 
ranging from night clubs to a diner and coffee shops. Jack 
Sparrow makes it a condition that visiting The Lounge is by 
invitation only.  John Doe is an acquaintance of Jack Sparrow 
who often served as a middle-man in his drug dealings. Jack 
Sparrow employs John Doe as a smurf, together with several 
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 Jamali (2009:45) and Klimmt (2011: 3). 
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other people who live on different continents in the world. For 
a commission, Jack Sparrow requires the smurfs to become 
residents on SL in order to clean his funds. Jack Sparrow buys 
several smart cards which he tops with varying value from his 
illegal funds. Thereafter, he sends the smart cards to all the 
smurfs. Jack Sparrow further invites the smurfs to The Lounge 
on an exclusive basis. Also, Jack Sparrow charges a 
membership or joining fee to the smurfs which is equivalent in 
value to the amount or value on each smart card in their 
possession. The money is paid to Jack Sparrow in L$. 
Thereafter, Jack Sparrow converts some of the monies back to 
real-world money, and further trades with the other smurfs 
with the remainder, after which, again, he converts the 
proceeds derived into real-world money. 
 
3.6 WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR CYBERLAUNDERING 
Years ago, one could have said that the development of this area of crime was 
still in its embryonic phase, but not so today. At present, cyberlaundering is 
well beyond its adolescent stage, but has certainly not reached the peak of its 
development. Just as this phenomenon was spawned by the realities of 
modern times, concomitantly, and in line with such trends, its growth and 
development can be foretold easily. Cyberlaundering is poised to develop in 
line with technological progress, and seeing that the latter is anything but 
static, one should anticipate criminals to be equally dynamic. Sadly, the 
future is anything but bleak for technologically-savvy criminals. This is 
evidenced by the development in certain key areas of electronic commerce 
and crime. This section investigates these areas by identifying some key 
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developments in the areas of e-payment systems, as well as some emerging 
crimes that represent predicate offences for cyberlaundering. 
 
3.6.1 The advent of mobile payment systems 
The World Bank identifies four basic mobile payment systems:
357
 (i) The 
mobile financial information services;
358
 (ii) mobile bank and securities 
account services;
359
 (iii) mobile payment services; and (iv) mobile money 
services. The latter two methods are more pertinent to this study, as they are 
characterized by having low regulation and supervision. Mobile payment 
services refer to the use of a mobile phone by non-bank account holders and 
non-securities account holders to make payments.
360
 Viewed objectively, the 
possibility exists that the payment service providers may have some security 
and regulatory measures in place,
361
 although this is unlikely as most are 
known to be unscrupulous. The mobile money services method appears more 
fascinating due to the fact that cellular network subscribers may store actual 
                                                          
357
 World Bank (2008: 20). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 18). 
358
 This refers to the ability of online users to view general financial information held by their 
respective banks, but without the ability to conduct financial transactions. The FATF considers this 
method a low risk. Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 18). Cf World Bank (2008: 19). For a 
more detailed discussion on the risks that inhere in this method, see South African Reserve Bank 
(2008: 23). 
359
 This method is very much akin to internet banking. This is because financial transactions conducted 
via internet banking can be conducted similarly on a mobile device. The FATF is of the opinion that 
mobile service and security account services are likely to be regulated and supervised. Therefore, 
this method bears little risk. Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 18). Cf World Bank (2008: 21). 
360
 FATF (2010D: 18). 
361
 For example, in South Africa, a bank contracted a mobile phone service provider to provide a 
banking service that allows accounts to be opened with a mobile phone, without the need for 
personal contact between the account opener and the bank. To allay fears of irregularity, the South 
African Reserve Bank issued a guidance paper that sets the minimum criteria that should be met in 
the identification and verification process when such accounts are opened. See Finaincial Action 
Task Force (2010D: 52). Cf South African Reserve Bank (2008: 12). 
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value on their cell phones. This enables them to use phone credits or airtime 
as tender for payment at accepting merchants.
362
 Just as with mobile payment 
services, payment service providers are likely to be less prudent and lax about 
supervision and regulation. 
Mobile payment systems, especially the latter two discussed, are burgeoning 
rapidly. They are projected to represent the bulk of future electronic payment 
commerce. It is reported that 1.4 billion people will use mobile phones to 
remit money by 2015.
363
 The mobile payments industry was said to be worth 
$100 billion in 2010, and projected to be worth between $200
364
 and $250 
billion
365
 by 2012. What is worrying is the thought that mobile payments 
systems are fusible with e-payment systems which, on their own, are already 
plagued by numerous problems and loopholes.
366
 One of them is the 
possibility for mobile service providers to offer open-loop prepaid cards that 
can be linked to the accounts of their customers.
367
 This could guarantee 
trans-border services between multiple parties, and perpetuate anonymous 
illicit transactions.
368
 
Another key factor that explains this booming sector is the fact that mobile 
payment systems can facilitate peer-to-peer transactions. From the discussion 
                                                          
362
 Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 18). 
363
 World Bank (2008: 14). 
364
 Mobile Enquirer (undated internet article) ‘Mobile Payments to Grow to $200 Billion by 2012’ 
available at <http://www.mobileinquirer.com/2011/mobile-payments-to-grow-to-200-billion-by-
2012/>  [accessed on 12 September 2012]. 
365
 Little (2009) ‘Global M-Payment Report Update – 2009’ available at <http:// www.adl.com/ 
uploads/tx_e xtthoughtleadership/ADL _Global_M_Payment _Report_Update_ 2009_ Executive _ 
Summary.pdf > [accessed on 12 September 2011]. 
366
 See the discussions in paragraph 3.3 above. 
367
 Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 20). 
368
 Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 20). 
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earlier, it is obvious that peer-to-peer model of e-payment systems is a fertile 
ground for cyberlaundering operations to thrive solely because traditional 
financial institutions, such as banks, which are governed by regulations, are 
not involved. Another consequence of this system is the fact that withdrawals 
can be made from ATMs without using ATM cards. This can be made 
possible by using encrypted codes which can be tranfered through mobile 
payment services. This means that all that the receiving party needs to do to 
obtain cash, is to type the key into the ATM.
369
 
Mobile payments systems are becoming so prevalent that they will become 
indispensable. This creates a whole new level of convenience for consumers, 
but the question is whether this is safe. Mobile payment services and mobile 
money services would represent perfect laundering avenues for 
cyberlaunderers, without adequate regulation and prudent control. The issue 
of regulation and control is undoubtedly a recurring theme within the broad 
discussion of cyberlaundering. Whether the law can keep pace with the 
growth of technology is still an unsolved riddle in light of other social and 
policy issues which are equally important, although extraneous to the subject 
of cyberlaundering. 
 
3.6.2 Growth in predicate offences for cyberlaundering 
Recalling the early years of the AML regime, when attempts were made to 
grapple with the phenomenon of money laundering, one of the defining steps 
                                                          
369
 Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 20).  Cf World Bank (2008: 14) and South African Reserve 
Bank (2008: 23). 
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taken was to expand the ambit of predicate offences for the crime as wide as 
possible, and this included all serious offences.
370
 This was done in order to 
ensure that there are no loopholes which criminals can exploit to evade 
liability for money laundering. Also, this was a necessary safeguard for 
prosecutors and law enforcement agencies.  
However, as a caveat to the above, the concept of serious crimes or offences 
is far-reaching because presently, it has broken traditional boundaries. This is 
clearly shown by the advent of cybercrime, and cyberlaundering is unique in 
this respect. Aside from the traditional notion of physical illegal cash, 
cybercrimes with monetary dimensions are commonly the foundations upon 
which cyberlaundering is built.
371
 This fact feeds the emergence of what is 
today known as illicit e-money.
372
 Simply put, criminals are spared the 
trouble of converting the traditional cash to e-money through smart cards and 
the like. E-funds in their electronic state are better ‘washed’ in that state 
before they are integrated fully into the legal economy.  
Currently, there is a spiralling growth in cybercrimes involving illicit e-
money, chief of which is online piracy. Online piracy is a multi-billion dollar 
industry which is becoming a growing dilemma in modern times, and it 
represents one of the biggest predicate offences for cyberlaundering. A report 
                                                          
370
 See Article 2 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 15
th
 of November 2000, and came into force on 
29 September 2003. For a more detailed discussion see paragraph 2.2.1 of Chapter 2. 
371
 In a recent report by the FBI, almost 90% of all reported crimes in the United States in 2010 were 
money-related crimes. Internet Crime Compliant Centre (2010) ‘2010 Internet Crime Report’ 
available at <http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2010_IC3Report.pdf> [accessed on 9 
September 2011]. 
372
  Cf discussion in paragraph 3.3 above. 
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shows that by eradicating software piracy completely - which is only one 
aspect of online piracy - this would create about $142 billion in economic 
activity globally by the year 2013.
373
 Online piracy is growing simultaneously 
with the growth of several online activities such as online gaming and the 
online music industry. Income derived from the unlawful trade or activities in 
these industries yields illegal funds, which criminals would be more tempted 
to launder using the internet. In the United States, the online music piracy
374
 
results in about “$12.5 billion dollars in losses to the U.S. economy as well as 
more than 70,000 lost jobs and $2 billion in lost wages to American 
workers.”375 This number is set to triple in the coming years, and, 
concomitantly, so would cyberlaundering.   
According to the International Intellectual Property Association (IIPA), the 
issue of copyright piracy ranks number one on its list of key issues and 
challenges.
376
 Concerned bodies are battling with the dilemma, and much 
brain-storming is currently taking place on what kind of laws to enact and 
directives to promulgate to combat the problem. For instance, it is reported 
                                                          
373
 Cherrayil (2011) ‘Pirates still making headway in cybercrime’ available at <http://www. 
gulfnews.com /mobile/business/technology/pirates> [accessed on 4 April 2011]. 
374
 Online music piracy means music acquired illegally from the internet. See Recording Industry 
Association of America (an undated website document) ‘Who Music Theft Hurts’ available at 
<http://www.riaa. com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=piracy_details_online> [accessed on 9 
September 2011].  
375
 Recording Industry Association of America (an undated website document) ‘Who Music Theft 
Hurts’ available at <http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy .php?content_selector=piracy _details _ 
online> [accessed on 9 September 2011]. 
376
 International Intellectual Property Association (2011) ‘Statement of the  International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (IIPA): The Copyright Industries Celebrate ‘World Intellectual Property Day 
2011’ and Call Upon Governments to Redouble Their Efforts to Combat Global Piracy’ available at 
<http://www.iipa.com /pdf/IIPA2011 WorldIPDay Statement042611 .pdf> [accessed on 9 
September 2011]. 
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that the European Commission will issue a directive by late 2012 which 
might propose solutions to the problem in Europe.
377
  
Online fraud is also on the rise, led chiefly by credit card fraud. It is uncertain 
how much this industry is currently worth, given that in the past 10 years its 
growth has peaked at over 1000%.
378
 In 2008, it was said to be worth about 
£4.5 billion.
379
 But the Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘FBI’) estimates its 
worth in tens of billions, and this is an estimate that has been increasing by at 
least 2% annually in the past ten years.
380
 
What this shows is that it is not only the proliferation of industries and 
markets through the internet that generate staggering amounts in profits for 
criminals, but also the growth of predicate offences for cyberlaundering, and 
by implication, money laundering. The potential that this creates for 
cyberlaundering is almost indescribable. 
 
3.7 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the concept of cyberlaundering is deflated and explored 
thoroughly in order to demystify the aura of evasiveness around it. An 
                                                          
377
 Groen (2011) ‘American ISPs take action against online piracy’ available at <http://www. 
futureofcopyright.com/home/blog-post/2011/08/24/american-isps-take-action-against-online-
piracy.html [accessed on 9 August 2011]. 
378
 See Internet Crime Compliant Centre (2010) ‘2010 Internet Crime Report’ available at <http:// w 
ww.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2010_IC3Report.pdf> [accessed on 9 September 2011]. 
379
 Techradar (an undated website document) ‘Online fraud worth billions’ available at <http://www . 
techradar.com/news/internet/online-fraud-trade-worth-billions-says-symantec-488116 [accessed on 
9 September 2011]. 
380
 Internet Crime Compliant Centre (2010) ‘2010 Internet Crime Report’ available at <http://www .ic3 
.gov/media/annualreport/2010_IC3Report.pdf> [accessed on 9 September 2011]. 
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understanding of cyberlaundering is the first step in finding a legal solution to 
the problem. 
However, the importance of cyberlaundering goes beyond merely finding a 
solution for law enforcement bodies and guardians of the current AML 
regime. It is also not just another grey area of the law, which a mere 
perfunctory research can make clear. The issue of cyberlaundering is a legal 
concern that echoes across the board, and its unfavourable impact on 
commerce is but one of its many negative effects. Without adequately 
identifying these issues and bringing them to light, cyberlaundering will 
continue to be an evasive issue, and its future will remain as bright as it 
currently appears. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK AGAINST CYBERLAUNDERING 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The stand against money laundering has come a long a way since ways were 
conceieved on how to combt this kind of economic crime. More than ever 
before, there is a need to fortify existing barricades, and with the advent of 
cyberlaundering, create new ones.  
This chapter embroiders on the legal relationship between money laundering 
and cyberlaundering, otherwise known as the ‘branch and stem’ relationship, 
discussed in the preceding chapter.
381
 To reiterate, cyberlaundering is an 
extension of money laundering and is thus not a separate or detached concept. 
With this in mind, a proper comprehension of the present anti-
cyberlaundering (ACL) legal regime first calls for a basic understanding of 
the present anti-money laundering (AML) legal regime. Hence, one needs to 
consider closely the existing AML legal framework. This chapter discusses 
current AML laws and legal principles, the aim being to identify its deficits as 
regards cyberlaundering and conceive of solutions to curb its growth. 
Therefore, as a precursor, the current AML legal framework is set out in Part 
I of this study. Part II discusses the present ACL legal framework. To ensure 
a complete comprehension of the ACL legal regime, it is discussed at both 
                                                          
381
 See discussion in paragraph 3.2.2, Chapter 3. 
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national and international levels. For the present ACL legal regime of local 
jurisdictions, this chapter samples certain countries such as the United States 
(US), the United Kingdom (UK), India, and Germany. The criteria used to 
determine these jurisdictions is that of relevance and prevalence – that is, on 
the one hand, the relevance of the ACL laws within such jurisdictions, and, 
on the other hand, the prevalence of the ACL laws within those jurisdictions. 
Additionally, in these jurisdictions, there is an increased awareness of the 
cyberlaundering problem, given the high chances of vulnerability that 
exist.
382
 
This chapter represents the basis for the proposed ACL legal regime that is 
discussed in subsequent chapters, for it identifies the inadequacies of relevant 
laws that are pertinent to fighting the problem of cyberlaundering. 
 
PART I 
4.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING REGIME 
4.2.1 General 
The AML legal regime began in a piecemeal fashion, starting locally in the 
US in the 1970s and gradually spreading internationally from the mid-
1980s.
383
 Laws such as the Bank Secrecy Act
384
 (BSA) and the Money 
                                                          
 
382
 Take Germany for example. It is greatly susceptible to money laundering because of its large 
economy and financial centre, as well as its international linkages; its strong position and strategic 
location in Europe. About €60 billion of criminal proceeds are generated in Germany alone. The 
fact that Germany shares the same Euro currency with other European countries only increases this 
propensity and its predisposition to money laundering activities. Financial Action Task Force 
383
 See the discussion in Chapter 2, paragraphs 2.2.2.1. 
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Laundering Control Act
385
  laid the foundation for a myriad of local and 
international laws that now represent the current AML legal regime.
386
  
The following discussion on the existing legal framework against money 
laundering is rooted in certain basic legal principles. Primarily, this study 
relies on relevant laws contained in treaties and conventions. The second 
legal basis for this study is the principle of customary international law,
387
 
which is applicable where a codified law is lacking on the matter. Lastly, due 
to the fact that the current AML legal regime is comprised significantly of 
soft laws,
388
 which include principles, policies, directives and 
recommendations from certain non-governmental organisations and 
international private sector entities, such as the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), these soft 
laws form the third legal basis for the ensuing discussion. Over the years, 
these soft laws have become legally recognized standards that have been 
transplanted into the domestic legal systems of most countries. These laws 
carry much weight because, arguably, they have attained, or, for some, are 
                                                                                                                                                                         
384
 The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 31 United States Code 1051 (Public law number 99-570).  
385
 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 United States Code 1956; 1957 (Public law number 99-
570). 
386
 For discussions on the history and development of the AML regime, see paragraph 2.2.2 of Chapter 
2.  
387
 Customary international law is a fundamental source of international law that derives from custom. 
In order for a principle to be welcomed as customary international law, it must satisfy the 
requirements of jus cogens and state practice. That is, the principle must amount to something 
which the international community accepts as non-derogable rights which states have accepted as 
law, and the general practice of states. For more details see Cassesse (2005: 117). Cf Werle (2009: 
51). 
388
 Soft laws are so-called quasi-legal instruments that are not legally binding, or which, as opposed to 
hard laws, might be have a weaker binding force in comparison. Cassese (2005: 161) and Evans 
(2010: 70) and Shaw (2003: 68). 
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attaining the status of customary international law in the field of AML law, 
due to the fact that they have become custom or practice for obligated states. 
But one should not be naïve to think that the AML legal regime is comprised 
solely of laws. The essence of the AML legal regime encompasses all efforts 
made to combat the money laundering dilemma, and it includes the enactment 
of laws, the enforcement of such laws by relevant authorities, and the 
compliance with such laws by the concerned parties, persons and institutions 
alike. On this basis, one can argue that the current AML legal regime rests on 
three pillars: the prevention pillar; the enforcement pillar; and the compliance 
pillar. But some authors have argued that the current AML legal regime is 
comprised only of the first two pillars.
389
 This study holds the contrary. As is 
the trend of the current AML legal regime, compliance has proven to be just 
as crucial as prevention and enforcement.  
This section is devoted to dissecting the various constituents of the three 
pillars in order to ensure a better understanding of later discussions on the 
current ACL legal regime. The constituents of the current AML legal regime 
that are discussed later on are premised on the standards set by the FATF in 
its Forty Recommendations
390
 and its Nine Special Recommendations.
391
 
These recommendations are a significant part of the soft laws alluded to 
earlier. The FATF’s recommendations and standards laid the foundation upon 
                                                          
389
 See Reuter and Truman (2004:46), Sherman (2008: 636), Schott (2006: 33), Alford (1993: 143) and 
Zagaris (2004: 194). Cf Alexander (2001: 232), Hopton (2009: 62), Madinger (2012: 14) and Rider 
(2002: 31). 
390
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 8). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 3) and Financial 
Action Task Force (2001A: 2). 
391
 Financial Action Task Force (2001A: 3). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 2). 
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which the current AML legal regime stands today at both national and 
international levels. Thus, to comprehend the current AML legal regime 
properly, one needs to understand the existing standards. In addition, the 
ensuing discussion of the three pillars of the current AML legal regime is also 
crucial to the overall purpose of this study, as these pillars form the basis 
upon which a concrete ACL legal regime will be proposed.
392
 
 
4.2.2 Pillar 1:  Prevention 
The prevention pillar of the current AML legal regime is comprised of the 
following: customer due diligence; reporting; regulation; supervision; and 
sanctions. These constitutive activities are discussed below. 
 
4.2.2.1 Customer due diligence and record-keeping 
The customer due diligence (CDD) and record-keeping standard is prescribed 
in Recommendations 10 and 11 of the FATF’s Forty Recommendations, now 
contained in its International Standards on Combating Money Laundering, the 
Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation.
393
 Given that most CDD measures 
often include record-keeping obligations, the term ‘CDD’ alone will be used 
in the discussion that follows. Generally, these CDD standards are a 
constellation of various strategies which primarily include a policy paper 
which was earlier adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
                                                          
392
 Cf discussions on the Regulation of Cyberlaundering in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.1, and the 
Prosecution of Cyberlaundering in Chapter 6, paragraph 6.1. 
393
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 6). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 7). 
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(‘BCBS’),394 as well as several national laws.395 The CDD standards place an 
onus on financial institutions
396
 and on other third parties or intermediaries, 
such as correspondent banks, juristic persons and other non-financial 
institutions, as is disclosed below.  
 
 
                                                          
394
 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is comprised of members from Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(SAR), India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, who foster cooperation on banking supervisory matters. The aim of the Committee is 
to promote understanding of banking supervisory issues and to improve the quality of banking 
supervision worldwide. See Bank for International Settlements (2012) ‘Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision’ available at <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/> [accessed on 04 July 2012] and 
Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (1988: 1). 
395
 These measures are generally reflective of United Kingdom guidance notes and the Swiss law. Cf 
Pieth and Aiofil (2003: 3). 
396
 For purposes of this paper, the term ‘financial institutions’ take on the meaning outlined by the 
FATF, which is any person or entity conducting as a business one or more of the following 
activities or operations for or on behalf of a customer (inclusive of private banking) entailing the 
following: 
(i) Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public;  
(ii) Lending [that includes, inter alia, consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring, with or 
without recourse, and finance of commercial transactions (including forfeiting)];  
(iii) Financial leasing, excluding financial leasing arrangements in relation to consumer 
products; 
(iv) The transfer of money or value, which includes financial activity in both the formal and 
informal sector, for example, alternative remittance activity, excluding any natural or legal 
person that provides financial institutions solely with message or other support systems for 
transmitting funds; 
(v) Issuing and managing means of payment (for example credit and debit cards, cheques, 
traveler’s cheques, money orders and banker’s drafts, electronic money); 
(vi) Financial guarantees and commitments; 
(vii) Trading in money market instruments such as cheques, compacts discs, and derivatives; 
foreign exchange; exchange, index and interest rates instruments; transferable securities, 
and commodity futures trading; 
(viii) Participation in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to such 
issues; 
(ix) Individual and collective portfolio management; 
(x) Safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons; 
(xi) Otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons; 
(xii) Underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance, such 
that includes agents and brokers, as well as, 
(xiii) Currency and money changing. Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 115). Cf Financial 
Action Task Force (2003: 16). 
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4.2.2.1.1 CDD for banks 
With the advent of the AML legal regime, financial institutions, such as 
banks, were the first to be affected by the ‘purging’ caused by the enactment 
of strict AML measures. Undeniably, the adoption of AML measures 
revolutionised banking operations, and awakened lax banks that slept through 
the quiet operations of money launderers. But of course, as with any reaction 
to change, the new system did not sit well with the banks
397
 because they 
were the ones that bore the main burden of the AML legal regime. For a long 
time, financial institutions have served as the washing machine of money 
launderers, and it is only understandable that the current AML measures, 
especially those on CDD, place a heavier burden on financial institutions. 
This is because they can play a major role in clamping down on money 
laundering operations. Also called Know Your Customer (KYC) principles, 
the CDD measures exist to ensure that a bank’s reputation and integrity are 
protected. Such measures represent sound risk management for the banks.
398
 
Conversely, non-adherence to the set CDD measures is sure to subject banks 
to legal and operational risks.
399
 
                                                          
397
 An example of this predates modern times. As far back as the mid-1970s, a group of banks in 
California were averse to the stringent provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act and had unsuccessfully 
contested the constitutionality of the Act in the case of California Bankers Association v. Schultz 
39L ed 2d 812 (1974) n5. In rejecting their application, the Unites States Supreme Court noted that 
the right that is being protected in the Act outweighs the concerns and inconveniences caused to the 
banks as a result. See the discussion in paragraph 2.2.2.1, page 10, Chapter 2.  
398
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 3). A bank’s adherence to the set CDD 
standards represents good risk management because it provides a good basis for “identifying, 
limiting and controlling risk exposures in assets and liabilities, including assets under 
management.” Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A:  3). Cf Basel Commttee on 
Banking Supervision (2001B: 4). 
399
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 4). Cf Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(1997: 3). 
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Banks are under an obligation to observe the following CDD measures or 
policies: 
 
(a.) Policy on general preemptive measures 
There are certain general preemptive measures that banks are required to 
observe before engaging in transactions with prospective and regular 
customers. First, banks should be able to draw a fine line between anonymity 
and confidentiality. While the latter represents a standard ethical banking 
principle, the former is often enveloped in illegality. Banks are urged to desist 
from opening accounts for persons who insist on anonymity.
400
 Customers 
often prefer numbered accounts, with an account number or a code name 
which is used in subsequent documentations to substitute the real name of the 
beneficial owner, who would be known to the bank. This notwithstanding, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Wolfsberg 
Group
401
 have proposed that the identity of the customer should be disclosed 
to a sufficient number of the bank’s personnel to ensure compliance with the 
                                                          
400
 Recommendation 5 of the FATF Forty Recommendations. Financial Action Task Force (2004: 4). 
Cf Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 8) and Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2001B: 10). 
401
 The Wolfsberg Group is a conglomerate of global banks that have adopted global standards in order 
to ensure that there is a unified front in the fight against money laundering. The Wolfsberg Group 
consists of Algemene Bank Netherlands and Amsterdam and Rotterdam Bank (also known as ABN 
AMRO); Banco Santander, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi-UFJ, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (also known as 
HSBC), JP Morgan Chase, Société Générale and the Union Bank of Switzerland (also known as 
UBS). Established in the year 2000 at Chateau Wolfsberg in Switzerland, hence its name, the 
Wolfsberg Group of Banks has since issued various AML policy papers. For more information see 
the website <http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/index.html> [accessed on 6 November 2011]. 
See also discussion in paragraph 4.3.2.4.2 below. 
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requisite due diligence procedure.
402
 As regards the essential due diligence 
steps, the Wolfsberg Group has proposed that banks should ascertain the 
purpose for opening the account, the expected account activity, the source of 
funds in relation to the economic activity that generated the net worth,
403
 the 
estimated net worth, the source of funds and references to other sources to 
corroborate other information where available.
404
 
 
(b.) Policy on customer acceptance  
Banks have to develop clear-cut policies on customer acceptance. This 
requires a proper delineation of customer profiles in order to identify those 
customers that pose higher risks than the ordinary customers.
405
 Overall, the 
determining factors include the potential customer’s “background, country of 
origin, public or high profile position, linked accounts, business activities or 
other risk indicators.”406 This information enables the bank to prescribe the 
necessary account opening requirements for the potential customer. Needless 
to say, the same account opening requirements for customers should not 
necessarily be the same as they vary, depending on the risk indicators.  
 
 
                                                          
402
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 8). Cf The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 3). 
403
 A person’s net worth is simply the result derived from deducting one’s liabilities from one’s assets 
(put mathematically: Assets – Libilities = Net Worth). For more details see Madinger (2012: 110). 
404
 The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 3). 
405
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 6). Cf The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 2). 
406
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 6). Cf Recommendation 5 of the FATF Forty 
Recommendations. Financial Action Task Force (2004: 5). 
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(c.) Policy on customer identification 
Recommendation 10 (a.) of the FATF Forty Recommendations provides that 
banks should undertake essential CDD measures, which include “identifying 
the customer and verifying that customer’s identity using reliable, 
independent source documents, data or information.”407 The BCBS has 
significantly expanded on this principle, which is deemed very crucial. For 
customers and those acting on their behalf, the BCBS recommends that 
policies should be documented and enforced in order to ensure proper 
identification.
408
 In this sense, non-resident customers who seek to open 
accounts in foreign jurisdictions should be earmarked as potential threats, as 
it is often difficult to subject themn to the standard vetting procedures.
409
 
 
(d.) Policy on clients and beneficial owners 
The CDD requirements for clients and beneficial owners
410
 must be clearly 
distinguished. Depending on the kind of client a bank has, whether a natural 
person, a corporation, a partnership, a foundation or a trust, recent and 
complete identity papers are mandatory.
411
  
                                                          
407
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 12). Cf The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 2). 
408
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999: 3). Cf Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2001A: 6). 
409
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999: 3). 
410
 Beneficial owners have been defined as natural persons who own or control a customer and/or the 
person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted. It also incorporates persons who exercise 
ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement. Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 
12). 
411
 For a natural person, official identity papers may constitute sufficient proof; for corporations, 
partnerships, foundations, the bank will receive documentary evidence of the organisation and its 
existence. The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 2). 
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However, in the world of large-scale money laundering, the key players are 
often the smurfs who engage in transactions for the benefit of an instigating 
party. Therefore, with the policy on identifying beneficial owners, banks are 
not only required to consider first-party customers such as their clients, but 
also other parties who stand to benefit from the transcation between the bank 
and its client. This rationale is succinctly stated in Recommendation 10(b) of 
the FATF Forty Recommendations, which urges banks to take all necessary 
measures to ascertain the identity of the beneficial owners of the account.
412
 
Given that beneficial owners could be natural persons, legal entities, trust and 
unincorporated associations, a more stringent kind of CDD is required.
413
 
Furthermore, Recommendation 22 states that the CDD measures are 
applicable to the following groups: casinos when they engage in transactions 
that are equal to or above the applicable designated threshold;
414
 real estate 
agents who are engaged in transactions for their clients concerning the buying 
and selling of real estates;
415
 dealers in precious metals and stones who 
engage in cash transactions with their clients equal to or above the applicable 
                                                          
412
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 12). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 4).  
413
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). For example, with regard to natural persons, when the 
account is opened in the name of an individual, the private banker must establish whether such 
person is acting on his/her own behalf, and where there is doubt, the bank will need to establish the 
capacity in which the account holder is acting. As regards legal entities and unincorporated 
associations, the bank is obliged to understand the structure of the company and its control system 
as well as to identify the identity of the legal person or corporation and to obtain sufficient proof 
that the person acting on its behalf is so authorized. Also for trusts, it is prudent for banks to 
determine the source of the funds, those with control over it, and persons with the power to remove 
trustees. The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 2) and the Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). Cf 
Financial Action Task Force (2003: 4) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999: 3).  
414
 Recommendation 22(a), Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). 
415
 Recommendation 22(b), Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). 
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designated threshold;
416
 lawyers, notaries, and other independent legal 
professionals and accountants who carry out transactions for their clients;
417
 
trust and company service providers, when they carry out certain transactions 
for a client.
418
 Thus, there is no room for assumptions, and such measures 
should apply to every transaction, regardless of the regularity of the customer, 
or the pattern of transaction. Other than beneficial owners, it is equally 
important for CDD to be conducted in respect of other persons, such as 
money managers or intermediaries who hold accounts for the benefit of their 
clients.
419
  
 
(e.) Policy on obtaining outside information 
Recommendation 10(d.) of the FATF Forty Recommendations suggests that 
banks should always take the necessary steps to obtain all required 
information from outside sources, such as third parties, depending on the 
                                                          
416
 Recommendation 22(c), Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). 
417
 Recommendation 22(d), Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). Such transactions might include 
the buying and selling of real estates; management of bank, savings or securities accounts; 
management of bank, savings or securities accounts; creation, operation or management of legal 
persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities and organisation of 
contributions for the creation, operation or management of companies. Cf Financial Action Task 
Force (2003: 7). 
418
 Recommendation 22(e.), Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 7). For trust and company service 
providers the following transactions could be performed on behalf of the respective clients: acting 
as a formation agent of legal persons; acting as a trustee of an express trust or arranging for another 
person to act as such; acting as a director or secretary of a company, partner of a partnership, or a 
similar position in relation to other legal persons, o arranging for another to act as such; acting a s a 
nominee shareholder for another person or arranging for another person to act as such, and 
providing a registered office; business address or accommodation, correspondence or administrative 
address for a company, a partnership or any other legal person or arrangement. Cf Financial Action 
Task Force (2003: 16; 7). 
419
 The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 3). However, as a caveat, it is suggested that no due diligence would 
be required for holders of a power of attorney. The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 3). 
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nature of the relevant transaction.
420
 This CDD measure is a closed-list 
provision, which seeks to ensure that a bank is not confined to the truth or 
untruth of whatever information is provided by a customer. Conversely, this 
provision enables enforcing authorities to put relevant parties under an 
obligation to supply such information, as long as such request is made in 
good faith and the information requested is within the confines of the 
proposed transaction, and not in violation of any vested rights of the bank’s 
potential client.
421
 
 
(f.) Policy on conducting CDD on a regular basis 
According to Recommendation 10 (d.) of the FATF Forty Recommendations, 
banks have a duty to conduct ongoing due diligence on the scrutiny of 
transactions taken and on the business relationship throughout the course of 
the relationship. This is done to ensure that the institution’s knowledge of the 
customer, the business and risk profile, and source of funds are consistent 
with the subsequent transactions.
422
 However, this does not imply that the 
initial CDD measures should be conducted repeatedly for every subsequent 
transaction with the customer. Where a full CDD was performed at the start 
of business with the customer, the financial institution is expected to rely on 
                                                          
420
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 14). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 4). 
421
 The rights referred to include one’s right to privacy, and the confidentiality of personal information. 
A balancing exercise should normally be carried out by the relevant authority to ensure that a 
justifiable basis exists for which such request is made and, concomitantly, supplied. 
422
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 14). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 4) and the 
Wolfsberg Group (2003: 2). 
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the identification and verification steps, unless reasons exist that disprove the 
veracity of that information.
423
  
The BCBS suggests that banks should develop clear standards on the kind of 
records to be kept on customer identification and individual transactions, as 
well as their retention period.
424
 The Wolfsberg Group adds to this rationale 
by indicating the applicability of the risk-based approach to the process. As 
recommended, the degree of on-going observance of CDD measures should 
depend on the respective categories of customers, and those posing a higher 
risk would naturally necessitate a higher degree of due diligence.
425
  This is 
essential in order for a bank to conduct CDD effectively on a regular basis.
426
 
Conducting on-going CDD helps in discerning deviations and abnormalities 
in customer operations. It also highlights possible loopholes at the initial 
stage when the bank verifies the customer’s identity and the nature of the 
transaction.
427
 
                                                          
423
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 14). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 4) and the 
Wolfsberg Group (2003: 2). 
424
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999: 5). Cf Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2001B: 7). 
425
 The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 4). Cf The Wolfsberg Group (2003: 3). See discussion in paragraph 
4.2.2.1.5 below. 
426
 It is suggested that all identification papers should be retained for at least five years after an account 
is opened, and all financial transactions should be retained for at least five years after the 
transaction has taken place. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 7). Cf 
Recommendation 10(d), Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 14). Cf Financial Action Task Force 
(2003: 7). 
427
 Some indicators that might form grounds for reasonable suspicion include transactions that do not 
make economic or commercial sense, or transactions that involve large amounts of cash deposits 
which are inconsistent with the normal or expected transactions, with due consideration being given 
to potential risk variables. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 13). Cf Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (1999: 6) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1997: 
12). 
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Knowledge of when CDD should be performed is very crucial. However, this 
differs from understanding the kind of CDD required. As a general rule, CDD 
should be applied on a risk-sensitive basis,
428
 but this is not to say that it is 
not expected at certain stages in the client-bank relationship. The following 
examples are instances where CDD measures are expected to be applied: 
 
(i.)  At the start of business relations 
When beginning transactions with customers, by virtue of Recommendation 
10 (i), it is incumbent on financial institutions not only to verify the identity 
of the customer in question, but also the party benefitting from the transcation 
(also known as the beneficial owner) as well.
429
 This is part of the expansive 
nature of the FATF Recommendations, as an affront to the myth that financial 
institutions need only focus on their respective customers. However, the 
question to be answered is the meaning of the phrase - ‘start of business 
relations.’ A clear answer to this would depend on the circumstances of the 
relevant case and the operational practices of the relevant bank. The FATF 
suggests that financial institutions should conduct the CDD “as soon as 
reasonably practicable,”430 bearing in mind that the money laundering risks 
should be effectively managed and the normal course of business is not 
interrupted as a result.
431
  
 
                                                          
428
 This is discussed further in paragraph 4.2.3.1.5 below. 
429
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 14). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 5). 
430
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 5). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 14). 
431
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 5). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 14). 
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(ii.) For occasional transactions 
According to Recommendation 10 (ii), and as regards ‘occasional 
customers,’432 financial institutions should be required to conduct CDD when 
carrying out the following occasional transactions: (a.) Transactions that are 
above a designated threshold, which, as also recommended, should be US 
$15, 000 (or €15, 000).433 This situation foresees instances where the 
transaction involves a single operation or several operations that appear to be 
linked; (b) Transactions involving wire transfers in circumstances foreseen in 
the Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VII to the FATF IX 
Special Recommendation;
434
 and under Recommendation 10 (ii) performing 
transactions at financial institutions, a designated threshold of US $15 000 or 
€15 000 per transaction is recommended.435 
 
 
                                                          
432
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 14). It is unclear what is meant by the term ‘occasional 
customers,’ but this precludes regular customers of the relevant financial institution and customers 
with a clearly defined and consistent business relationship with the bank. Cf Financial Action Task 
Force (2003: 5). 
433
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 14). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 18) and 
Wolfsberg Group (2003: 2). 
434
 Financial Action Task Force (2001A: 2) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 17). Special 
Recommendation VII (SR VII) is aimed at preventing criminals, and, specifically, terrorists from 
having unrestricted access to wired transfers to moving illicit funds. As provided in the 
Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VII: Wire Transfers, in order to alleviate the 
possibility of criminal use of wire transfers, it ensures that the information on the originator of wire 
transfers is available to law enforcers, financial intelligence units and beneficiary financial 
institutions. See Financial Action Task Force (2001A: 16). In addition, Special Recommendation 
VII seeks to ensure that all wire transfers are traceable and it also seeks to minimise thresholds in 
order to prevent driving transactions underground. Financial Action Task Force (2001A: 18) and 
Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 17). 
435
 Financial Action Task Force (2003:18) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). As a caveat, 
transactions would be deemed to exceed the stated threshold where the transaction exceeding the 
amount is carried out in a single operation or where there are several transactions that appear to be 
linked. 
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(iii.) General suspicion 
According to Recommendation 10(iii.), CDD measures should also be 
adopted where financial institutions have a general suspicion that there are 
money laundering or terrorist activities being carried out, and where such 
circumstances exist, financial institutions are required to take further steps, 
such as identifying and verifying “the identity of the customer and the 
beneficial owner, whether permanent or occasional, and irrespective of any 
exemption or any designated threshold that might otherwise apply.”436 Read 
with the FATF’s Recommendation 20, financial institutions should be 
required by law or regulation to file a suspicious transaction report (STR) to 
the necessary financial intelligence unit (‘FIU’), where there is a reasonable 
suspicion of money laundering and terrorist activities.
437
 To guarantee the 
efficacy of this provision, and as required in Recommendation 21, financial 
institutions, particularly their employees, such as directors and other officers, 
are prohibited from disclosing that an STR has been filed to an FIU.
438
 This is 
primarily meant to prevent ‘tipping off.’ Where customers are tipped off, this 
circumvents the work of law enforcers because it compromises future efforts 
to investigate and retrieve the illegal funds.
439
 Hence, given that conducting 
                                                          
436
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 19). 
437
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 8) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). Cf the 
Egmont Group (2004E: 2) and Muller (2007: 87). The idea of an FIU is the brain-child of The 
Egmont Group, which is an informal body of government receiving agencies that share a common 
goal of providing a forum to enhance mutual cooperation and to share useful information in 
detecting and combating money laundering. Muller (2007: 87). The Egmont Group was established 
in Brussels, Belgium, in June 1995. For discussion on the meaning of an FIU, see paragraph 
4.2.2.2.3 below. Cf the Egmont Group (2004B: 2) and Muller (2007: 88). 
438
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). 
439
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 19). 
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CDD measures is a very sensitive process, which could topple the overall 
AML process if criminal customers are aware, financial institutions, at the 
risk of such tipping off, are advised not to conduct any CDD, but only to file 
a STR to the relevant FIU.
440
 This is an exception to the general rule, as it is 
the only instance where CDD measures are not encouraged.  
Financial institutions and their employees are no doubt put in a difficult 
situation because of their obligation to report a reasonable suspicion to an 
FIU. This is further compounded by the fact that there might be some legal 
constraints, such as the existence of a valid contract, which would prevent 
such an official from divulging information. But such a situation is foreseen 
in Recommendation 21(a.), which proposes that financial institutions and 
their employees should be “protected by legal provisions from any kind of 
civil or criminal liability for breach of any restriction on disclosure of 
information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or 
administrative provision.”441 As a crucial caveat, the STR should be filed in 
good faith to the FIU, and the whistleblower is not required to know or 
understand fully the relevant underlying criminal activity (i.e. the predicate 
offence) or whether or not such criminal activity actually occurred.
442
  
 
 
 
                                                          
440
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 19). 
441
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 8). 
442
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 8). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19) 
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(iv.) Inaccuracy of customer information 
Recommendation 10 (iv.) also foresees a scenario where a financial 
institution already possesses inaccurate customer information.
443
 In other 
words, where a financial institution fails to conduct proper CDD at the start of 
business relations, all hope is not lost, for Recommendation 10 (iv.) says that 
a CDD should still be performed. This means that the bank would have the 
option of terminating the contractual relationship with the customer or simply 
just proceeding with the filing of an STR to the relevant FIU. Again, the 
caution against tipping off the customer needs to be heeded.
444
 
 
4.2.2.1.2 CDD for correspondent banks 
Financial institutions have an obligation to observe CDD towards other 
financial institutions with which they have a correspondent relationship. 
Correspondent banking is a situation where one bank (the ‘correspondent 
bank’) conducts business with or provides banking services for another bank 
(the ‘respondent bank’), which the latter is not otherwise able to offer 
directly.
445
 The rationale that underlies this is the expansive approach to the 
prevention of money laundering that the current AML legal regime requires, 
                                                          
443
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 14). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 4). 
444
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 19). 
445
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 12). However, it is noted that the principle of 
correspondent banking is not limited to banks alone but also to broker-dealers, mutual funds, unit 
trusts, investment services firms, hedge funds, introducing brokers, money service businesses, 
pension funds, credit card providers, commercial credit card companies, household fiancé 
companies, mortgage banks, building societies and leasing companies. The Wolfsberg Group 
(2002: 1). 
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given that banks are now required to be scrupulous in all transactions, 
whether in relation to customers directly or fellow financial institutions. 
In principle, the general CDD measures set out in Recommendation 10 of the 
FATF Forty Recommendations should be applied equally to respondent 
banks in a correspondent relationship with a corresponding bank. However, 
given the uniqueness of this relationship, Recommendation 13 raises the bar 
by prescribing additional measures to be observed. It states that financial 
institutions should take reasonable steps in order to ascertain the respondent 
bank’s AML controls, and they should gather adequate information about the 
respondent institution in order to understand fully the nature of its business, 
the reputation of the institution, the quality of supervision and whether such 
an institution has been subject to a money laundering investigation or 
regulatory action.
446
 Moreover, it is necessary to know who owns and the 
respondent bank. Banks should also be wary of the possibility that the 
respondent bank might be a ‘downstream correspondent clearer.’447 In 
particular, banks should refuse to engage in relations with shell banks. The 
Wolfsberg Group defines a shell bank as: 
                                                          
446
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 16). Cf Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 
12) and Financial Action Task Force (2003: 6). In this context, a regulatory action implies an action 
that is imposed on a bank for failing to comply with a relevant regulatoy law. 
 The form of CDD measures to be conducted on respondent banks include ascertaining the bank’s 
domicile and organisation; client ownership and executive management; the respondent bank’s 
business; its products and services offered; its regulatory status and history; its existing AML 
controls. See The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 3). 
447
 A downstream correspondent clearer is a respondent bank that receives correspondent banking 
services from an institution while it provides corresponding banking services to other financial 
institutions. This relationship often portends a lot of troubles, necessitating strict AML laws. 
Wolfsberg Group (2002: 4). 
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a)  A bank that does not conduct business at a fixed address in a jurisdiction 
in which the shell bank is authorised to engage in banking activities;  
b)  A bank that does not employ one or more individuals on a full-time 
business at this fixed address; 
c)  A bank that does not maintain operating records at this address; and 
d)  A bank that is not subject to inspection by the banking authority that 
licensed it to conduct banking activities.
448
 
As a cautionary procedure, a representative of the correspondent bank should 
endeavour to visit the respondent bank at their premises within a reasonable 
period after establishing a relationship with it in order to confirm that it is not 
a shell bank.
449
 Also, financial institutions are obliged to obtain the prior 
approval of senior management before establishing new correspondent 
relationships. They must document the respective responsibilities of each 
institution and must be able to perform the required CDD measures on 
customers that have direct access to accounts of the correspondent bank, 
otherwise known as ‘payable through accounts.’450 The latter presents the risk 
                                                          
448
 The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 3). Cf Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 12).  It 
should be added that the only exception to the rule that banks that meet these requirements are shell 
banks are banks that are regulated affiliates, which are banks that are owned, directly or indirectly 
by a financial institution that is licensed in a jurisdiction that has not been deemed as uncooperative 
by the FATF and which is subject to the banking authority of that jurisdiction. The Wolfsberg 
Group (2002: 3). 
449
 The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 3). 
450
 See Recommendation 13(e.), Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 13). Cf Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2001A: 12) and Financial Action Task Force (2003: 6).  
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that third parties might use correspondent accounts to transact business on 
their own behalf.
451
 
 
4.2.2.1.3 CDD for mutual funds and pooled investment vehicles 
There are money laundering risks associated with mutual funds and pooled 
investment vehicles (otherwise called ‘PV’ or ‘PVs’). PVs is a collective term 
used to refer to hedge funds, private equity funds, unit investment trusts and 
funds-of-funds, and they can assume legal forms such as corporations, trusts, 
partnerships and contracts.
452
 PVs are often overlooked as not posing money 
laundering threats due to the fact that they usually have measures and controls 
which serve as a barricade for money laundering purposes. They are also 
ignored as a potential threat because they are commonly used for long-term 
investment purposes with high turnovers that make short-term investment - 
which money laundering schemes tend to fit – very unusual.453 
As part of basic CDD measures to be undertaken, PVs should be able to 
identify and verify the identity of the investor and the beneficial owner, 
understand the purpose of the investment and conduct ongoing due diligence 
                                                          
451
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 12). Where there is such a risk, it is advised that 
such a case should no longer be deemed as correspondent banking but an ‘introduced business’ 
scenario which is usually a tripartite relationship involving an outside party (i.e. third party) who 
instigates the business relationship. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision strongly 
recommends that such third parties be subjected to stringent CDD measures, as is the case with 
regular bank customers. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 9). 
452
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 1). Other than the legal forms they share, PVs are also characterized 
by their varying investment objectives, the jurisdictions in which they are organized, the level of 
regulation to which they are subject, the type of investor they solicit, and the way in which their 
units or interests and shares are distributed. The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 1). 
453
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 1). In addition, a PV is likely not to be involved in money laundering 
activities because assets that flow into PVs are sourced from financial institutions which are 
regulated for AML purposes. The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 2). Cf Lilley (2003: 34). 
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on their investors as well as scrutinise their transactions.
454
 The policies on 
identification of banking customers and policies on beneficial ownership 
apply equally to PVs.  
However, not all PVs have a direct relationship with their investors. Some 
investors could use intermediaries to funnel their investments to PVs, hence, 
establishing an indirect link with the investors, but a direct one with the 
intermediaries. PVs in such indirect relationships with investors thus create 
more risks of money laundering. Therefore, it is prudent to always consider 
existent regulatory supervision to which intermediaries are made subject, as 
this would determine the level of CDD measures that should be applicable.
455
 
Generally speaking, where intermediaries are found to be regulated, there 
might not be a need to adopt measures which might require the PVs to 
conduct CDD on the customers of such intermediaries. Logically, the 
contrary would hold for unregulated intermediaries.
456
 
 
4.2.2.1.4 CDD for wire transfers 
Wire transfers, otherwise called funds transfer, refer to “any transaction 
carried out on behalf of an originator person (both natural and legal) through 
a financial institution, known as the ‘ordering financial institution’ (italics my 
own), by electronic means with a view to making an amount of money 
available to a beneficiary at another financial institution, known as the 
                                                          
454
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 3). The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 4).  
455
 Intermediaries could either be regulated or unregulated. Regulated intermediaries are those that are 
subject to the AML provisions or local law. The contrary holds for unregulated intermediaries. 
456
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 12). 
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‘beneficiary institution’ (italics my own).”457 In addition, there might be 
intermediary financial institutions that process wire transfers between the 
ordering financial institution and the beneficiary financial institution. Also, 
wire transfers can be done either domestically (where the ordering financial 
institution and the beneficiary financial institution are in the same 
jurisdiction) or internationally (where the ordering financial institution and 
the beneficiary institution are in different institutions). The risk that inheres in 
the phenomenon of wire transfers is that information on the originator
458
 of 
such wire transfers always eludes law enforcement or prosecution authorities, 
financial intelligence units, financial institutions and beneficiary financial 
institutions.
459
 
As a starting point, financial institutions are required to set a threshold for all 
wire transfer transactions.
460
 For international wire transfers that exceed the 
set threshold, the information accompanying the wire transfer should always 
contain the name of the originator, the account number, where there is one, or 
a reference number in the absence of an account number, as well as the 
                                                          
457
 Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 16) and Recommendation 16, Financial Action Task Force 
(2012A: 17). Cf the Wolfsberg Group (2007: 1). 
458
 An originator of wire transfers can either be an account holder, or where there is none, the party 
who gives an order with the financial institution to make the transfer. An originator can either be a 
natural person or legal person. 
459
 Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 16) and Recommendation 16, Financial Action Task Force 
(2012A: 17). 
460
 Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 17) and Recommendation 16, Financial Action Task Force 
(2012A: 17). For international transfers, the FATF stipulates, however, that a threshold of USD 
$1000 or €1000 should be used as the maximum basis. As a general rule, for transactions falling 
below this threshold, ordering financial institutions would not be required to provide the originator 
information for identification or verification purposes, even though such information can be 
requested where there is a pressing need for such. Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 17) and 
Recommendation 16, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 17). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
167 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
address of the originator.
461
 Realizing that international wire transfers are 
more prone to use by money launderers, there has been a clarion call for 
transparency in the wire transfer system, which has always seemed opaque. In 
spite of its opaqueness, there is a well standardized payment system known as 
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) 
tries to enable information on the originator and the beneficiary to be always 
included.
462
  
The same requirement holds for domestic wire transfers, except that a 
threshold is generally not required. Also, the requisite originator information 
might not need to accompany the wire transfer where such information can be 
made available to the beneficiary financial institution and appropriate 
authorities by other means, in which case an account number or a reference 
number would suffice in order to ensure the possibility of tracing the account 
back to the originator.
463
 Given the possibility that financial institutions might 
be lethargic in their cooperation with other financial institutions, a maximum 
period of three business days is prescribed within which an ordering financial 
institution must make originator information available. Thus, ordering 
                                                          
461
 Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 18) and Recommendation 16, Financial Action Task Force 
(2012A: 17). There is a caveat to the requirement of an address, which is that a national identity 
number, customer identification number or date and place of birth could be provided as a substitute 
for an actual address. Also, where there are several individual transfers from a single originator sent 
in a bundle or batch file to a beneficiary in another jurisdiction, full originator information would 
not be required, so long as the originator’s account number or unique reference number is included, 
as well as the batch file containing the full originator information. Financial Action Task Force 
(2004B: 18) and Recommendation 16, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 17). 
462
 The Wolfsberg Group (2007: 1). The Wolfsberg Group considers it prudent and expedient for all 
financial institutions to be a member of SWIFT, which could facilitate easier regulations. The 
Wolfsberg Group (2007: 1). 
463
 Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 18) and Recommendation 16, Financial Action Task Force 
(2012A: 17). 
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financial institutions have the obligation to ensure that wire transfers contain 
complete originator information.
464
 Intermediary financial institutions, on the 
other hand, have an obligation to ensure that all originator information 
accompanying a wire transfer is retained with the relevant transfer. Also, 
unless not practically possible, intermediary financial institutions have an 
obligation to ensure that a record of originator information received by the 
ordering financial institution is kept for a period of five years after the 
transfer.
465
 
However, there are certain cases where the aforementioned measures on the 
CDD for wire transfers would not apply. This includes cases where a 
transaction is carried out using a credit or debit card,
466
 and where the 
financial institutions involved in the transfer as ordering and beneficiary 
institutions are one and the same entity, acting on their own behalf.
467
 
In addition to the above measures, financial institutions are enjoined to 
observe four crucial standards when dealing with wire transfers in general. 
These include (i) an obligation not to delete or alter information in payment 
messages or orders for the purpose of avoiding detection of that information 
by any other financial institution in the process of payment; (ii) the obligation 
not to use any particular payment messages for the purpose of avoiding 
                                                          
464
 Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 18) and Recommendation 16, Financial Action Task Force 
(2012A: 17). 
465
 Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 19) and Recommendation 16, Financial Action Task Force 
(2012A: 17). Cf the Wolfsberg Group (2007: 1). 
466
 Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 18) and Recommendation 16, Financial Action Task Force 
(2012A: 17).  
467
 Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 18) and Recommendation 16, Financial Action Task Force 
(2012A: 17). Cf the Wolfsberg Group (2007: 2). 
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detection of information by any other financial institution in the payment 
process; (iii) the obligation to cooperate in line with applicable laws with 
other financial institutions in the payment process when requested to provide 
information about the parties involved; and (iv) the obligation to urge their 
respective correspondent banks to observe these principles.
468
 
 
4.2.2.1.5 CDD and the risk-based approach 
As an overarching principle, the FATF recommends that the CDD measures 
should be applied on a risk-sensitive basis, taking into account the nature of 
money laundering, and, or terrorist activities, depending on the relevant 
context.
469
 Thus, in cases where a high risk exists, financial institutions are 
required to perform enhanced due diligence, whilst, on the other hand, where 
there is low risk, simplified or reduced CDD measures should be adopted.
470
 
This method of assessment is known as the risk-based approach. It is one that 
is largely convened by the Wolfsberg Group, which asserts that institutions 
should follow a reasonably designed risk-based approach by identifying the 
criteria to measure potential money laundering risks, with every case to be 
judged on its own merits.
471
  
                                                          
468
 The Wolfsberg Group (2007: 2). Cf Pieth & Aiolfi (2003: 6). 
469
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 63). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 8). 
470
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 63) and Financial Action Task Force (2003: 8).  
471
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 2). Cf Pieth (2007: 93). 
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More often than not, for the purpose of making a well-informed risk analysis, 
three risk criteria are always involved, and they are country risk, customer 
risk and service risk.
472
 
  
(i.) Country risk 
When determining what constitutes country risk, some factors have to be 
taken into account, which might help to establish the existence or 
nonexistence of a potential money laundering risk. Examples are where 
countries are subject to United Nations-issued embargoes, sanctions or 
similar measures;
473
 where countries are recognized by reliable sources as 
having significant levels of criminal activities such as terrorist activities and 
corruption,
474
 or as being generally uncooperative in the global fight against 
money laundering. 
  
(ii.) Customer risk 
The methodology behind determining customer risk is somewhat blurred as it 
is entirely up to each institution to assess whether a customer poses a higher 
                                                          
472
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 2). 
473
 As a necessary addition, where some countries are subject to such sanctions which are not 
universally recognized, such countries may be given credence by the financial institution as a result 
of the standing of the issuer and the nature of the measures. The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 4). 
474
 Transparency International is an organisation that plays a major role in this regard, as it spearheads 
the global anti-corruption campaign. Also noteworthy is the regulatory practices of the FATF which 
formerly used to classify countries in the black-list of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 
(NCCTs). However, the FATF has substituted this approach for another which monitors the 
progress and compliance of each country with present AML standards through its FATF Styled 
Regional Bodies (FSRBS). The work of other supra-national or institutional bodies such as the 
World Bank, The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
International Monetary Fund and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units are also 
essential to making a similar determination. 
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risk, using its own criteria. The Wolfsberg Group generally identifies the 
following categories of customers having potentially high money laundering 
risks: weapons or armament manufacturers and dealers;
475
 money service 
businesses such as currency exchange services, casinos and gambling houses; 
charities and international non-profit organisations that are largely 
unregulated; dealers in high-value precious metals such as jewellery, 
diamonds and precious stones; accounts for the so-called ‘gatekeepers,’ such 
as lawyers, accountants and other professionals who hold accounts for 
undisclosed persons; the use of undisclosed intermediaries in the bank-
customer relationship; and customers deemed to be Politically Exposed 
Persons (PEPs).
476
  With respect to PEPs, the FATF also emphasizes the 
importance of following a risk-based system. Recommendation 12 of the 
FATF Forty Recommendations states that financial institutions should obtain 
senior management approval prior to establishing business relations with the 
PEPs, and should take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth 
and source of funds, and they must also conduct an enhanced ongoing 
monitoring of the business relationship with them.
477
  
Another important type of customer in respect of which banks are urged to 
adopt the risk-based approach is the respondent bank, in a correspondent 
banking relationship, which serves as a client to the correspondent bank. As 
                                                          
475
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 5). Cf Pieth (2007: 95). 
476
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 6). Cf Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 3). 
Politically exposed persons are described as persons who have been entrusted with prominent 
public functions in a foreign country at a senior level, such as Heads of States of counteries, senior 
government, judicial or military officials. Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 12) and Financial 
Action Task Force (2012A: 16). 
477
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 16). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 6). 
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part of the risk indicators to be considered, the respondent bank’s domicile or 
jurisdiction, its ownership and management structure and its business and 
customer base should be scrutinised.
478
 
As a general recommendation, higher CDD standards should also be applied 
to persons (legal and non-legal) who have funds that are sourced from other 
jurisdictions that are known to have inadequate AML laws, as well as to 
persons (legal or non-legal) who are known to engage in certain business 
activities known to be susceptible to money laundering.
479
 
 
(iii.) Service risk 
The third common risk criterion identified by the Wolfsberg Group is service 
risk. This simply means that financial institutions must assess the services 
offer in order to identify those services which might pose a higher risk of 
money laundering in the overall money laundering risks posed.
480
 This is 
crucial, given the competitive nature of banks today, which drives them to 
adopt certain innovative services not necessarily offered by other financial 
institutions, but which pose a high risk for money laundering. Some of these 
services include international correspondent banking services, services 
involving banknotes, and precious metal trading and delivery, as well as 
international private banking services.
481
 The latter is particularly dangerous, 
                                                          
478
 The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 2). 
479
 The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 4). 
480
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 6). Cf Pieth (2007: 96). 
481
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 6). 
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as it often uses accounts involving a large measure of confidentiality,
482
 
which can be opened by both legal and non-legal entities. 
 
4.2.2.1.5.1 Specific risks criteria for PVs 
There are specific risk criteria for PVs. First, PVs are obliged to consider the 
type of investors with which they deal, as some may be more regulated than 
others. Thus, for example, the same CDD measures that apply to financial 
institutions that are investors should not be different to those applicable to 
complex and more transparent investors such as trusts and foundations.
483
 
Also, other than the applicable rationale of country risk, which generally 
requires that the AML laws of domestic institutions be considered, with PVs, 
one has to consider that multiple investors from foreign jurisdictions would 
create a greater risk than investors from the same jurisdiction.
484
 Moreso, the 
individual characteristic of the relevant PV and the amounts of any 
investments are equally important in the general assessment of risk.
485
 
 
4.2.2.1.5.2 Risk variables and further measures 
In addition to the three categories of risk discussed above, there are certain 
risk variables that institutions should consider which might further help to 
assess the risks posed by the customer or transaction, depending on the 
                                                          
482
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 7). This type of service necessitates a great deal 
of internal control, as it should be open to review by compliance officers and auditors, as well as the 
involvement of a bank official who is not necessarily part of the private banking relationship. See 
paragraph 25 of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 7). 
483
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 4). 
484
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 4). Cf Pieth (2007: 99). 
485
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 4). Cf Pieth (2007: 94). 
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particular case at hand, and eventually determine the kind or level of CDD 
measures to be taken. Amongst these are: the level of assets to be deposited 
by the particular customer or the size of the transaction involved; the level of 
regulation or oversight of the relevant AML legal regime to which the 
customer is subject; the regularity and length of the business relationship 
between the customer or client and the financial institution and the client’s 
familiarity with the existent jurisdiction and its relevant laws and regulations; 
and a client’s use of certain intermediary corporate vehicles that are fictitious 
or phantom-like, whose operations are not entirely transparent to the financial 
institution.
486
 
After financial institutions have assessed the inherent risks posed by 
customers or transactions, immediate, albeit reasonable, actions would be 
required where the customer or transaction poses a high risk of money 
laundering. Some of the necessary actions required from the financial 
institution are, firstly, that in such a situation, there should be an increased 
awareness by the institution of higher risk situations for similar transactions 
falling within the business lines across the institution.
487
 Secondly, the 
financial institution needs to increase its CDD measures or its KYC 
policies.
488
 A necessary consequence is that the financial institution should 
not easily approve the relevant transactions or establish the requested 
                                                          
486
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 3). 
487
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 4). 
488
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 4). Cf Pieth (2007: 98). 
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business relationship with the customer.
489
 Lastly, an increased monitoring of 
transactions, ongoing controls, and review of relationships are essential steps 
required of the relevant financial institution.
490
 The aforementioned measures 
are not necessarily relevant for a particular risk criterion, but are applicable to 
all three risk criteria, such as country risk, customer risk, and service risk. 
Each institution has the discretion to attach whatever weight it wants to the 
three risk criteria. 
Financial institutions are also expected to conduct training and development 
exercises on a regular basis in order to keep employees abreast of their role in 
the fight against money laundering. Recommendation 18 of the FATF Forty 
Recommendation requires financial institutions to develop programmes 
against money laundering and terrorist financing. They must also have an on-
going employee training programme, internal policies, compliant 
management systems,
491
 efficient screening procedures for prospective 
employees, as well as a functioning audit system.
492
  Such programmes 
should bear in mind the level of money laundering risk inherent within the 
relevant jurisidiction and the size of the relevant financial institution.
493
 
 
                                                          
489
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 4). 
490
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 4). Cf Pieth (2007: 100). 
491
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 18). In order to ensure this, it is recommended that a 
compliance officer be appointed at the management level to oversee the proper compliance 
management programmes. 
492
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 18). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 8). 
493
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 18). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 22). The role of 
training in the prevention of money laundering activities is also accentuated by the Wolfsberg 
Group, which asserts the need for employees of financial institutions to be aware of the legal and 
regulatory environment in which they operate. See the Wolfsberg Group (2006: 6). 
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4.2.2.1.5.3 High measure CDDs versus simple measure CDDs 
An effective risk-based system requires a judicious study of every case in 
order to ascertain the right type of CDD measure to be applied. Thus, other 
than the cases involving high-risk customers identified above, equal 
consideration should be given to cases that would require simplified CDD 
measures as well. 
In general, simplified CDD measures apply to financial institutions which are 
themselves customers of another bank, as they too are equally required to 
observe the same AML standards observed by the service-providing financial 
institution.
494
 Simplified CDD measures would also apply to public 
companies that are subject to regulatory disclosure requirements and to 
government departments and enterprises.
495
 Such measures apply to certain 
kinds of transactions such as life insurance policies,
496
 insurance policies for 
pension schemes, or a typical pension scheme providing benefits to 
employees.
497
 These measures also apply regardless of the fact that the 
customer might be from another jurisdiction. However, this is subject to the 
knowledge that such other jurisdiction has well-grounded AML policies.
498
 
Ultimately, the yard-stick remains the suspicion of money laundering or 
                                                          
494
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 21) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 63). Cf Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 9). 
495
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 21). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 63) 
496
 This would apply where the annual premium is no more than US $1000 or €1000 or a single 
premium does not exceed US $2500 or €2500. Financial Action Task Force (2003: 21) and 
Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 63). 
497
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 21). Cf Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 9). 
498
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 21). 
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where a higher risk scenario applies, and applicability of simplified CDD 
measures would be an irrelevant discussion, as in the case of the former. 
 
4.2.2.2 Reporting 
Other than having well-entrenched CDD measures as part of the institutional 
and policy framework of every financial institution, another obligation 
prescribed by the current AML legal regime is the duty to report suspicious 
activities. Several questions have to be answered, such as who should report 
to whom, when and on what grounds. 
 
4.2.2.2.1 Grounds for reporting 
Recommendation 20 of the FATF Forty Recommendations states that where a 
financial institution suspects that funds are derived from criminal activity, or 
related to terrorist financing, a report must be made immediately to the 
relevant financial intelligence unit (FIU).
499
 Therefore, suspicion that funds 
relate to criminal activity or its relatedness to terrorist financing is a ground 
upon which reporting should be done. One important issue to be determined 
is whether the traditional notion of a crime is sufficient to constitute a 
criminal activity. This conjures up the topic of predicate crimes for money 
laundering. Countries are urged to criminalize money laundering on the basis 
of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
                                                          
499
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 8) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). Cf the 
Egmont Group (2004E: 2), the Egmont Group (2004B: 2) and Muller (2007: 88). 
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and Psychotropic Substances, 1988
500
 (the ‘Vienna Convention’) and the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000
501
 
(the ‘Palermo Convention’), and the  Council of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime 
and on the Financing of Terrorism (the ‘Warsaw Convention’)502  to include 
“all serious offences, with a view to including the widest range of predicate 
offences.”503 Thus, by definition, predicate offences include the following: 
a)  All offences (i.e. the general approach); or 
b)  A threshold linked to a category of serious offences, or to a penalty of 
imprisonment applicable to the predicate offence, or a list of predicate 
offences, or a combination of these approaches (i.e. the threshold 
approach).
504
 
As regards the general approach, at a minimum, countries are expected to 
adopt those offences falling under the general canopy of serious offences in 
their local jurisdictions.
505
 Given the fact that the threshold approach could be 
                                                          
500
 The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 7
th
 of 
December 1987, and it came into force on 11 November 1988. 
501
 The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 15 November 
2000, and came into force on 29 September 2003. 
502
 Adopted by the Council of Europe on 16 May 2005, and came into force on 1 December 2009. 
503
 See Recommendation 3 of the FATF Forty Recommendations and paragraph 2 of the Interpretative 
Note to Recommendation 3, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 34). Cf Financial Action Task 
Force (2003: 3). This principle further resounds in Article 2 of the Palermo Convention. Cf Gill and 
Taylor (2004: 589). 
504
 Recommendation 3 of the FATF Forty Recommendations and paragraph 3 of the Interpretative 
Note to Recommendation 3, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 34). Cf Financial Action Task 
Force (2003: 3). 
505
 Subject to interpretation, this approach could be problematic. It touches on one of the most 
enigmatic problems that the current AML regime is encountering, namely the jurisdictional barriers 
caused by the lack of universal uniformity of predicate offences. In order to circumvent a 
foreseeable problem where an offence constitutes a predicate offence in one country but not in 
another, it is also recommended that predicate offences for money laundering should extend to 
offences that are committed in another country which are not deemed predicate offences in that 
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evasive, as it is left to the determination of any set threshold, the FATF 
recommends that ‘serious offences’ should include those offences that are 
punishable by a maximum penalty of more than a year’s imprisonment, or, 
alternatively, those countries having a minimum threshold system with a 
penalty of more than six months imprisonment.
506
 Also, in ascertaining the 
requisite elements of the relevant predicate offence, particularly the mental 
element, the FATF urges countries to ensure that the knowledge and intent 
requirement needed to prove the offence can be inferred from the relevant 
factual circumstances.
507
 In founding liability for the predicate offences for 
money laundering, juristic persons are not absolved of possible criminal, civil 
or administrative liability.
508
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
country, but constitute predicate offences in the other country, had the offence occurred there. The 
latter country in this instance would generally be a country requesting jurisdiction over the crime, 
often by virtue of the fact that the perpetrator or the victim is its national. See Financial Action Task 
Force (2003: 3) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 34). This provision is well ensconced in 
Article 2(c) of the Palermo Convention. As a caveat, where the predicate offence is committed in 
another jurisdiction, this provision adds further that the relevant conduct must, at the very least, 
constitute a criminal offence in the territory of the state where it was committed. Cf Bassiouni and 
Gualtieri (2000: 138), Reuter and Truman (2004: 15) and Pillai & Julian (2008: 14). 
506
 Recommendation 3 of the FATF Forty Recommendations and paragraph 3 of the Interpretative 
Note to Recommendation 3, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 34). Cf Financial Action Task 
Force (2003: 3). Regardless of the kind of approach existent in the respective country, the FATF 
has prescribed a designated category of offences that every country has to adopt. These include the 
following: Participation in an organized criminal group and racketeering; terrorism, including 
terrorist financing; trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling; sexual exploitation, 
including sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation  of children; illicit trafficking in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; illicit arms trafficking; illicit trafficking in stolen and 
other goods; corruption and bribery; fraud; counterfeiting currency; counterfeiting and piracy 
products; environmental crime; murder, grievous bodily injury; kidnapping, illegal restraint and 
hostage-taking; robbery or theft; smuggling; extortion; forgery; piracy, and insider trading and 
market manipulation. Financial Action Task Force (2003: 15). Cf Article 9(4) of the Warsaw 
Convention. 
507
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 22) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 34). This 
provision is set forth in Article 3(3) of the Vienna Convention and Article 2(f) of the Palermo 
Convention. 
508
 However, it is important to note that these forms of liability are not entirely exclusive to each other. 
Thus, a legal person’s parallel criminal, civil and administrative liability can be found at the same 
time, and such liability would be without prejudice to any possible liability of natural persons. 
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Therefore, depending on the circumstances of the relevant case, what 
constitutes a ground upon which reporting is mandatory is a reasonable 
suspicion that the transaction relates to any form of predicate offence for 
money laundering. As a cautionary note, given the practice that money 
launderers often try to boycott a financial institution’s duty to report by often 
stating that their transactions relate to tax matters, financial institutions still 
have the obligation to report regardless of the relatedness of a transaction to 
matters of taxation.
509
 It should be noted that the duty to report suspicious 
activities also covers transactions relating to correspondent banks
510
 and 
PVs.
511
  
Also, another ground upon which reporting should be made is when financial 
and non-financial institutions engage in domestic and international 
transactions that exceed the prescribed threshold.
512
 As compared to the other 
ground that requires a risk-sensitive approach in ascertaining whether a 
transaction relates to a criminal activity, this ground is more straightforward 
and easily ascertainable, and one can easily determine when it is surpassed. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Financial Action Task Force (2003: 22) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 34). These 
provisions are succinctly stated in Article 10 of the Palermo Convention. Cf Pieth (2002: 23). 
509
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 22) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 34). 
510
 The Wolfsberg Group (2002: 5). 
511
 The Wolfsberg Group (2006: 8). 
512
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 9). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 79). According to 
the FATF, the designated thresholds for transactions are as follows: For financial institutions 
dealing with occasional transactions, the threshold is $/€ 15 000; for Casinos, including internet 
casinos, the threshold is $/€ 3 000, and for dealers in precious metals and stones engaged in any 
cash transactions, the threshold is $/€ 15 000. Financial Action Task Force (2003: 18). Cf Financial 
Action Task Force (2012A: 79). 
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4.2.2.2.3 The obligation to report 
Unlike the CDD standards that are tailor-made for financial institutions, there 
is a much wider approach adopted as regards the duty to report. By virtue of 
Recommendation 22(d) of the FATF Forty Recommendations, the FATF also 
places a duty to report suspicious transactions on non-financial institutions 
such as lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and 
accountants who act for a real estate transactions; management of client 
money and other assets including securities; managing of bank, savings and 
securities accounts; creating, operating or managing of legal persons or 
arrangements; buying and selling of business entities; and organizing 
contributions for the creation, operation or management of companies.
513
 
However, as a caveat, the obligation upon these professionals to report 
suspicious transactions does not supersede the relevant duty upon such 
professional to observe professional secrecy or privilege.
514
  
In order to further solidify this requisite duty to report, and according to the 
safeguard clauses of the FATF’s Recommendation 21, it is expedient to have 
in place legal, regulatory or administrative provisions to protect whoever files 
a suspicious transaction report (STR) to the FIU in good faith, in order to 
shield them from any possible criminal and civil liability that could result 
                                                          
513
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 7) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 34). 
514
 Every case should be judged on its own merit, and it is up to each jurisdiction to determine the kind 
of matters falling under professional privilege. In principle, for lawyers, legal privilege covers the 
information received from or obtained through a client either in performing the task of representing 
or defending the client in judicial, administrative, arbitrative or mediation proceedings, or in the 
course of ascertaining the legal opinion of that client. Financial Action Task Force (2003: 23) and 
Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 34). Cf Thanki (2011: 301). 
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from such conduct.
515
 Moreover, the one who files an STR to the relevant 
FIU is prohibited by law from disclosing such fact to third parties.
516
 
The obligation to file STRs applies also to other non-financial entities or 
institutions, such as dealers in precious metals and precious stones (when they 
engage in a cash transaction with a client that is equal to, or exceeds the 
applicable designated threshold) as well as to trust and company service 
provider, when in acting on behalf of a client(s), performs one or more of the 
following functions: 
a)  Acts as an agent of legal persons;  
b)   Acts as (or arranges for another person to act as) a director or secretary of  
accompany, a partner of a partnership, or a similar position in relation to 
other legal persons;  
c)  Provides a registered office; business address or accommodation, 
correspondence or administrative address for a company, a partnership or 
any other legal person or arrangement;  
d)  Acts as (or arranges for another person to act as) a trustee of an express 
trust; and  
e)  Acts as (or arranges for another person to act as) a nominee shareholder 
for another person.
517
 
 
 
                                                          
515
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 8) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 34). 
516
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 8) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 34). 
517
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 16) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 34). Cf Muller 
(2007B: 88). 
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4.2.2.2.3 To whom reporting should be made 
According to the FATF’s Recommendation 20 and 23, STRs should be filed 
with the relevant FIU. An FIU is a “central, national agency responsible for 
receiving (and as permitted, requesting), analyzing and disseminating to the 
competent authorities, disclosures of financial information: (i) concerning 
suspected proceeds of crime and potential financing of terrorism, or (ii) 
required by national legislation or regulation, in order to combat money 
laundering and terrorism financing.”518 Simply put, an FIU obtains an STR, 
processes and discloses it to the relevant government authority as part of the 
general national AML strategy. FIUs are thus able to ensure a rapid exchange 
of information between law enforcement agencies, financial institutions and 
prosecutorial authorities, while simultaneously protecting the interests of 
innocent persons contained in their data. Thus, an FIU is necessary in every 
jurisdiction, where it should serve as a focal point for the exchange of 
financial intelligence on money laundering and terrorism in order to foster 
international cooperation between governments to combat money laundering. 
FIUs take on different models, depending on the relevant jurisdiction. Some 
are established alongside existing law enforcement systems,
519
 while others 
are created as a single office that receives and analyzes the financial 
                                                          
518
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19; 20) and The Egmont Group (2004B: 4). Cf Muller 
(2007B: 89). For critique of this definition, see Forget and Hocevar (2004: 44). 
519
 This model is known as the Judicial, Law Enforcement, or Hybrid model. See Muller (2007B: 90) 
and Forget and Hocevar (2004: 44). 
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information, after which the resulting information is sent to the competent 
authorities.
520
  
As regards their functions, FIUs are mandated to receive financial disclosures 
of STRs filed by both financial institutions and non-financial institutions. In 
very unique instances, apart from the STR filed, some FIUs query the 
financial information supplied by financial and non-financial institutions.
521
 
The most important function of an FIU is to analyze the information it 
renders, for the kind of analysis conducted always determines what action 
that the FIU will take. Several FIUs have developed analytical software to aid 
them in following trends in money laundering. These are useful to law 
enforcement agencies.
522
  
FIUs further have a disseminative function. This means that they are obliged 
to disseminate the financial disclosure that they have obtained. The Egmont 
Group
523
 has recommended that FIUs should share the relevant information 
with domestic authorities, after which they are required to share it with the 
other FIUs.
524
 Caution is advised when disseminating information, and unless 
                                                          
520
 This model is known as the Administrative or Hybrid model. See Muller (2007B: 90) and Forget 
and Hocevar (2004: 44). 
521
 Such situations are quite rare, as it generally depends on the nature or model of the FIU and the 
nature of the STR report that is filed. FIUs, however, cannot exercise this discretion arbitrarily. The 
Egmont Group (2004B: 3). Cf Forget and Hocevar (2004: 28). 
522
 The Egmont Group (2004B: 4). Cf Forget and Hocevar (2004: 28). 
523
 The Egmont Group is an informal body of government receiving agencies that share a common goal 
of providing a forum to enhance mutual cooperation and to share useful information in detecting 
and combating money laundering. See discussion in paragraph 4.3.2.4.4 below. 
524
 The Egmont Group (2004B: 4).  
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the relevant information obtained by an FIU is publicly available, such 
information should be treated as strictly confidential and sensitive.
525
 
 
4.2.2.3 Regulation and supervision 
Another important aspect of the prevention pillar is the concept of regulation 
and prevention. Adequate oversight is crucial in order to ensure the 
sustainability of the present AML mechanisms. The approach here requires a 
constant analysis of the present safeguards in order to block existing 
loopholes in the system which money launderers would readily exploit for 
their illicit purposes. The current AML policy on regulation and supervision 
targets ordinary money laundering vehicles, which are financial and non-
financial institutions, and, particularly, their control structure. 
The FATF’s Recommendation 26 urges countries to take the necessary legal 
or regulatory steps to ensure that criminals or their associates are not holders 
or beneficial owners of a controlling interest or holding management function 
in a financial institution.
526
 As opposed to a system of regular review of 
licensing of financial institutions, the FATF emphasizes the appropriateness 
of controlling shareholders in financial institutions with a view to ascertaining 
their relevance for money laundering purposes.
527
 To this end, countries are 
                                                          
525
 The Egmont Group (2004B: 5). 
526
 Fiancial Action Task Force (2012A: 23). 
527
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 23) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 23).  
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required to adopt comprehensive guidelines in applying national AML 
measures.
528
 
Given that non-financial institutions are more prone to becoming effective 
money laundering vehicles, as they are not as well-defined as financial 
institutions, there are certain strict regulatory and supervisory measures which 
are recommended for them. For example, casinos should be licensed, and 
they should have in place effective controls in order to prevent criminals and 
their associates from being operators, or being the beneficial owners or from 
holding a management function of the casino.
529
 The same applies to other 
categories of designated non-financial businesses and professions such as real 
estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones; lawyers, notaries and 
accountants, as well as trust and company service providers.
530
 
 
4.2.2.4 Deterrent measures 
There are several other deterrent measures that should be entrenched 
domestically in order to ensure the prevention of money laundering activities. 
According to the FATF’s Recommendation 35, at a minimum, countries are 
required to ensure that effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions, 
which could be of a criminal, civil or administrative nature, are available in 
order to deal with natural or juristic persons who fail to comply with the basic 
                                                          
528
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 23) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 23). 
529
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 10) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 23). 
530
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 10) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 23). 
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FATF AML standards.
531
 Thus, each country should have adequate AML 
laws, particularly as regards the CDD measures and reporting requirements 
that dictate appropriate sanctions against non-compliant persons or entities. 
Also, to compliment the discussion on shell banks above,
532
 countries should 
be expected to exercise prudence by refusing to engage in relationships with 
shell banks, either by way of establishing them, or by entering into a 
correspondent banking relationship with them. 
 
4.2.3 Pillar 2: Enforcement 
The enforcement pillar of the current AML legal regime tackles the root of 
the money laundering dilemma. As opposed to the essence of the prevention 
pillar, the enforcement aspect embodies more proactive measures against 
money laundering. This pillar entails several important phases such as 
identifying the predicate offences underlying the crime of money laundering; 
investigating and prosecuting, as well as confiscating, or, preferably termed, 
recovering the assets.
533
 The ensuing discussion does not re-visit the notion pf 
predicate offences, as this has been discussed above.
534
 The discussion now 
focuses on the other elements. 
 
 
                                                          
531
 Financial Action Task Force (2003: 9) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 26). Cf Mulig and 
Smith (2004: 24) and Levi and Reuter (2006: 301). 
532
 Paragraph 4.2.2.1.2 supra.   
533
 See Reuter and Truman (2004: 47), where these are distinguished succinctly.  
534
 See paragraph 4.2.2.2.1 supra. 
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4.2.3.1 The principle of mutual legal assistance: a binding chord 
The term ‘mutual legal assistance’ refers to the general cooperation needed 
between states, either express or implied, which is necessary in the fight 
against money laundering. The principle of mutual legal assistance is the 
spine of the current AML legal regime and the vehicle that drives it. Together 
with the provisions of the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, this principle is 
also well-enunciated under the Warsaw Convention. International cooperation 
remains crucial in order to combat the transnational crime of money 
laundering effectively. This applies especially to the enforcement pillar of the 
AML legal regime. Mutual legal assistance is crucial to ensuring the 
effectiveness of investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in 
money laundering cases. There should be reciprocity between the requesting 
country and requested country.
535
 Mutual legal assistance may be required on 
an ongoing basis – from the investigation stage to the conviction stage. The 
kind of assistance required can be wide-ranging, depending on the 
circumstances of the case at hand.
536
  
                                                          
535
 In principle, as a minimum requirement, the FATF recommends that the countries should 
implement the Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention, the 1999 United Nations International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (which was adopted on 9 December 
1999, and entered into force on 2 April 2002), the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (adopted on 8 November 
1990, and entered into force on 1 September 1993), and the 2002 Inter-American Convention 
against Terrorism (adopted on 6 March 2002, and entered into force on 7 October 2003). See 
Recommendation 37, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 29). Cf Financial Action Task Force 
(2003: 12). 
536
 Mutual legal assistance can be sought for various reasons that may include, but not limited to taking 
evidence or statements from persons; effecting service of judicial documents; executing searches, 
seizures and freezing; examining objects and sites; facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons 
in the requesting country, providing information, evidentiary items and expert evaluations; 
identifying or tracing proceeds of crime, property, instrumentalities’ or other things for evidentiary 
purposes, and providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, including 
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One of the recurring themes of mutual legal assistance is the concept of 
disclosure. Whenever a country has some information that could assist the 
authorities of another country in criminal proceedings on money laundering, 
that country has an obligation to disclose such information to the other 
country, irrespective of whether the latter country has made a request for such 
information or not.
537
 Also, depending on the nature of the relevant request, 
disclosure might also mean that the requested country would have to supply 
certain documents such as copies of government records or information 
which might not be confidential in nature.
538
 
The principle of mutual legal assistance also envisages the scenario where the 
need exists for persons to be transferred from one country to another in order 
to provide assistance in on-going proceedings involving the offence of money 
laundering. The country in which such proceedings are being held may 
request the presence of a person who is being detained or serving a sentence 
in the territory of another (the requested country) for several purposes, such 
as identification, testifying, obtaining evidence for investigations, 
prosecutions or judicial proceedings.
539
 Upon transfer, and unless it is agreed 
                                                                                                                                                                         
government, bank, financial, corporate or business records. Article 18 (3) of the Palermo 
Convention. Cf Article 7(2) of the Vienna Convention and Article 7 of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. 
537
 Article 18(4) of the Palermo Convention. As a caveat, it should be added that inquiries and criminal 
proceedings in the country providing such information would be unaffected as a result of 
transmitting such information. See Article 18(5) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 15(1)-(4) 
Warsaw Convention. 
538
 Article 18(29) of the Palermo Convention. 
539
 Article 18(10) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7 (18) of the Vienna Convention. However, 
the free and informed consent of the person for whom transfer is sought is requested, and both 
countries must be in agreement as regards every term and condition relating to the transfer. Article 
18(10)(a)(b) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7(18) of the Vienna Convention and Article 
15(1)-(4) of the Warsaw Convention. 
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upon otherwise, the country to which a person is transferred is obliged to 
keep the person in custody,
540
 and is equally obliged to return the person to 
the custody of the requested country from winch the person was 
transferred.
541
 The latter would not require an extradition proceeding in 
effecting the person’s return.542 For the period that the transferred person is 
within the territory of the requesting country, the time served in that country’s 
territory is credited to him/her for the service rendered. For example, if the 
transferred individual was serving a sentence in the requested country prior to 
his/her transfer, the individual shall receive credit for service for the sentence 
being served in the territory of the requested country. The rendered service 
could be deemed an extension of sentence served or, alternatively, it could be 
deemed as a separate service that could be awarded to his credit. Also, unless 
otherwise agreed, the person transferred from the requested country should 
not be prosecuted, detained, or punished in the territory of the requesting 
country for acts crimes, offences, or convections prior to such person’s 
departure from the territory of the requested country.
543
  
Where the person transferred is a witness or an expert witness in respect of 
crimes and offences committed prior to his/her transfer from the territory of 
the requested country, such a person would be immune from being 
                                                          
540
 Article 18(11)(a) of the Palermo Convention. 
541
 Article 18(11)(b) of the Palermo Convention. 
542
 Article 18(11)(c) of the Palermo Convention. 
543
 Article 18(12) of the Palermo Convention.  
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prosecuted, detained, and punished for such crimes or offences while he/she 
is in the territory of the requesting country.
544
 
 
4.2.3.1.1 Grounds upon which mutual legal assistance may be refused 
The principle of mutual legal assistance embodies the concept of dual 
criminality, which serves as a bar to mutual legal assistance. Dual criminality 
means that the underlying crime or predicate offence for money laundering 
should be recognized in both countries (i.e. the requesting and requested 
countries). The concept of dual criminality represents the exception that 
underscores the blanket obligation to render mutual legal assistance. 
Although mutual legal assistance can be refused on this basis, within the 
context of rendering any other possible assistance to the requesting country, 
the requested country is not excused from providing any such assistance, 
provided it is within its capacity to do so.
545
 Overall, it becomes a matter of 
discretion and the existence or non-existence of the political will on the part 
of the requested country.  
Interestingly, the Vienna Convention does not explicitly use the term ‘dual 
criminality’. However, an implied reading of the principle comes by way of 
the provisions of Article 15(c) and (d) of the Convention, which provides that 
the mutual legal assistance should be refused where the authorities of the 
requested country would be prohibited by its domestic law from carrying out 
                                                          
544
 Article 18(27) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7(18) of the Vienna Convention. 
545
 Article 18(9) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7 (15) (c) and (d) of the Vienna Convention 
where it is elaborated further.  
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the required action had it been under its jurisdiction,
546
 or if such request is 
contrary to the legal system of the requested country.
547
 Although the 
Palermo Convention also has similar provisions,
548
 these provisions only 
reiterate the underlying rationale that underscores the concept of dual 
criminality.
549
 
In principle, countries may not refuse mutual legal assistance for reasons 
falling outside the scope of the above. However, it is imperative that the 
requested country provide reasons for any refusal to render mutual legal 
assistance.
550
 It must also consult with the requesting country in order to 
consider the option of rendering the assistance subject to such terms and 
conditions as it may propose.
551
 Also, bank secrecy is not a ground upon 
which one country can refuse mutual legal assistance to another.
552
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
546
 Article 7 (15) (c) of the Vienna Convention. This does not deviate far from the concept of dual 
criminality, as it can be justified by the underlying rationale. Simply put, a lack of criminality of the 
action in the domestic law of the requested country factors as an impediment to the ability of the 
authorities of the requested country from carrying out the requested action. 
547
 Article 7 (15) (d) of the Vienna Convention. The concept of dual criminality also applies here 
because the legal system of the requested country might be one that does not entail the criminality 
of the relevant offence for which extradition might be refused.  
548
 Article 18 (23) (c) and (d) of the Palermo Convention.  
549
 Certain other reasons may justify the refusal of mutual legal assistance, for example, if the request 
might likely prejudice the sovereignty, security or the general insterests of the country, or if the 
request runs contrary to general principles of mutual legal assistance. See Article 18(21) (a) and (b) 
of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7 (15) (c) and (d) of the Vienna Convention. 
550
 Artilce 18(23) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7 (16) of the Vienna Convention. 
551
 Article 18(26) of the Palermo Convention.  
552
 Article 18(8) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Recommendation 40, and Financial Action Task Force 
(2012A: 29). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 13).  
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4.2.3.1.2 Formalities 
Reasonableness and exigency are required for the handling of any request for 
mutual legal assistance.
553
 The requested country should execute the request 
as soon as possible, and should be able to inform the requesting country of 
the status and progress of the request.
554
 The following are basic elements and 
essential characteristics of a request for mutual legal assistance: 
a)   The request must be made in writing;555 
b) The request has to be made in a language that is acceptable to the   
requested country;
556
 
c) The identity of the state and its relevant authority making the request 
must be revealed;
557
 
d) The subject-matter or nature of the investigation, prosecution and 
judicial proceeding to which the request relates must be stated 
clearly;
558
 
e) The request must state that the investigation shows a prima facie 
evidence, pointing to the existence of a material element of the alleged 
crime of money laundering within the territory of the requested 
country; 
f)  The name and functions of the authority conducting the investigation, 
prosecutions or judicial proceeding should be stated;
559
 
                                                          
553
 See Recommendation 38, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 29). Cf Financial Action Task 
Force (2003: 13). 
554
 Article 18(24) of the Palermo Convention. 
555
 Article 18(14) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7 (9) of the Vienna Convention. 
556
 Article 18(14) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7 (9) of the Vienna Convention. 
557
 Article 18(15)(a) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7 (10)(a) of the Vienna Convention. 
558
 Article 18(15)(b) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7 (10)(b) of the Vienna Convention. 
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g)  A concise summary of the relevant facts must be provided;560  
h) The type of assistance sought must be stated clearly, as well as details 
of any precise procedure that the requesting country requires from the 
requested country;
561
 
i) The identity, location and nationality of any concerned individual 
must be provided,
562
 and 
j) The purpose for which the mutual legal assistance is sought should be 
stated for example, the mutual legal assistance could be required for 
seeking evidence, requesting information or requiring action.
563
 
 
Depending on the nature of the relevant request for mutual legal assistance, 
the requested country may require other information in addition to what is 
outlined above, in order to facilitate an effective execution of the request. 
Also, given that a request for mutual legal assistance has to be properly 
addressed, one must also determine to whom such a request must be 
addressed. To this end, countries are obliged to establish central authorities to 
facilitate requests for mutual legal assistance, which should facilitate the 
proper execution and transmission of requests received.
564
 Whatever 
                                                                                                                                                                         
559
 Article 18(15)(c) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7 (10)(c) of the Vienna Convention. This 
should be read with point (iii.) above, though a more precise requirement. 
560
 Artilce18(15)(c) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7 (10)(b) of the Vienna Convention. This 
would not be required for requests relating to service of judicial documents. 
561
 Article 18(15)(d) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7 (10)(d) of the Vienna Convention. 
562
 Article 18(15)(e) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7 (10)(e) of the Vienna Convention. 
563
 Article 18(15)(f) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7 (10)(f) of the Vienna Convention. 
564
 Article 18 (13) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7(8) of the Vienna Convention. The FATF 
lays a more practical approach by suggesting that, amongst a host of ist other duties, FIUs should be 
the central authority to which requests for mutual legal assistance should be addressed. See 
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information is transmitted to the requesting country must not be used 
arbitrarily but discretely, for the original purpose intended.
565
 Where the 
information will be needed for another purpose, the prior consent of the 
requested country is required.
566
 
In addition, the request for mutual legal assistance borders on the very salient 
principle of state sovereignty, which is an important principle of international 
law. Countries have the incumbent responsibility to respect the existing laws 
and principles of others countries, and should not willy-nilly circumvent such 
laws in order to satisfy private interests. Therefore, the requested country 
need not step out of the jurisdictional bounds when executing a request for 
mutual legal assistance. Such a request must be executed in accordance with 
its domestic law.
567
  
The initiation of requests for mutual legal assistance might be costly. 
However, ordinary costs should be borne by the requested country.
568
 
Depending on the implications of the relevant case, the manner in which any 
extraordinary costs will be borne, may be determined in the request for 
mutual legal assistance or a separate agreement.
569
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Recommendation 37, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 29). Cf Financial Action Task Force 
(2003: 12). 
565
 Article 18(18) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7(13) of the Viennna Convention. 
566
 Article 18(18) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7(13) of the Viennna Convention. 
567
 Article 18(17) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7(3) of the Vienna Convention. 
568
 Article 18(28) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7(19) of the Vienna Convention. 
569
 Article 18(28) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 7(19) of the Vienna Convention. 
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4.2.3.2 Investigation and prosecution of money laundering 
The principles of mutual legal assistance are of particular relevance to the 
investigation and prosecution of money laundering. How could law 
enforcement agents possibly begin to untie the knot and fathom the evasive 
trail of money launderers? Where should they start? These are questions with 
which law enforcers and prosecutors always face. The quality of the 
investigation conducted for alleged money laundering cases, depending on 
the nature of the investigative techniques adopted, determines the success of 
the outcome of the case. In other words, the effective enforcement of AML 
laws does not stop with the provenance of numerous principles and 
guidelines, but with the role of key actors such as investigators and 
prosecutors, who must prove that the proceeds of the crime exist. The 
Warsaw Convention particularly highlights the significance of the mutual 
legal assistance with respect to investigations. Other than the general 
obligation upon states parties to assist one another,
570
 the importance of 
mutual legal assistance especially for requests for information on bank 
accounts and transactions,
571
 for the monitoring of banking transactions
572
 
and for spontaneous information
573
 is also emphasized for the investigations 
on money laundering operations, conducted by the relevant authorities. 
                                                          
570
 Article 16 of the Warsaw Convention. 
571
 Articles 17 and 18 of the Warsaw Convention. 
572
 Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention. 
573
 Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention. 
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Money launderers are characterized by three main traits: their behaviour, their 
finances and their business.
574
 It is the task of investigators to gather any, and 
all relevant data revolving around these traits, for this helps in understanding 
not just the criminal, but the crime itself.
575
 The overall investigative 
framework includes the following seven primary steps:
576
 (i) The initial 
information stage, where law enforcement officers have acquired information 
on money laundering operations, either from financial sources such as 
through suspicious transaction reports (STRs) or informants, or through the 
specified unlawful activity (SUA) sources such as witnesses and informants; 
(ii) the basis for the investigation, in terms of which assets or transactions are 
traced or linked to the SUA; (iii) case organisation, which involves 
developing an investigative plan, and general administration and 
organisation; (iv) evidence collection; (v) evidence analysis; (vi) presentation 
which occurs at the trial stage where the money laundering offence is often 
prosecuted along with the underlying criminal activity, and (vii) the forfeiture 
stage of the process.
577
 
Given that prosecutors rely on the outcomes of investigations, such outcomes 
must show that a given transaction is not genuine.
578
 The process of proving 
the existence of money laundering could entail assembling extensive data 
                                                          
574
 Put otherwise, they are known by what they like to do (i.e. their behaviour), what they can afford to 
do (i.e. their finances) and their business (i.e. the financial vehicles they have access to). Turner 
(2011: 169). 
575
 Cf Article 7 of the Warsaw Convention. 
576
 Madinger (2012: 303). 
577
 See paragraph 4.2.4.4 below. 
578
 Turner (2011: 161). Cf Madinger (2012: 297). 
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from different sources or ascertaining the source of the recipient of funds.
579
 
Several accounting tools are used to collate the data.
580
 The point of collating 
relevant data is to identify inherent inconsistencies through an analytical 
assessment model. Other than relevant data, investigators are required to set 
their sight on other individuals who might be in a position to either prove or 
disprove the suspect’s statements and documentations. These associated 
parties may range from family members to fellow business partners or 
abstract parties.
581
 
However, the overall investigative task is limited by stringent privacy laws. 
Gone are the days when one could simply gain access to data by simply 
unlocking an office cabinet.  Nowadays, with the advancement of technology, 
electronic storage is the standard norm. Ever since its advent in the early 
1990s, when internet banking started gaining popularity, the government’s 
ability to obtain electronic data has become painstakingly difficult.
582
 This 
                                                          
579
 The very divergent sources of data which investigators often have to scour include the following: 
Certain documents captured by virtue of a search warrant used for the investigation of the 
underlying crime, which may have substantive corroborative evidence, or, for the actual money 
laundering process; certain other documents such as brokerage records, financial records, telephone 
records, open loans, etc; databases of law enforcement which might include suspicious transaction 
reports (STRs), currency transaction reports (CTRs), and currency or monetary instrument report 
(CMIR); databases records from the financial sector such as the suspect’s personal account details, 
loan accounts, and past account history; certain court filings, such as criminal, civil, and bankruptcy 
records, together with business entities involved, as well as other public records such as official 
permits and press articles. Turner (2011: 160). Cf Madinger (2012: 84, 311), and Evans (2000: 
208). 
580
 Investigators could make use of different accounting tools such as comparative net worth analysis, 
income and expense comparison, and bank deposit analysis. These tools are used for the same 
purpose, which is to ‘compare the claimed activity with the visible record and evaluate value of the 
missing data, if any.’ Tuner (2011: 161). Cf Madinger (2012: 317). 
581
 Madinger (2012: 318). Cf Turner (2011: 169). 
582
 At some point the United States government proposed that the idea of online banking should 
incorporate a feature known as the Clipper chip, which is an 80-bit encryption system meant to 
ensure that the government would be able to decrypt data if needed. This was, however, met with 
great opposition from the general public and banking sector. Presently, online banking uses a 
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problem is further compounded by the advent and increasing use made of 
electronic payment systems. These systems are the gateway to a very elusive 
world where data cannot be always traced nor collated successfully.
583
 This is 
one facet of cyberlaundering, and one of many investigative problems that 
come with it. 
In order for a prosecution’s case to be admissible in court, the relevant state 
or territory must determine which jurisdiction is to try the case. Amongst 
several principles of jurisdiction that exists in international law,
584
 given the 
nature of the money laundering offence, the subjective territoriality principle 
is the most suitable, as it is based on the rationale that a nation can exercise 
jurisdiction over a money laundering offence where the property, person, 
conduct or effects of the conduct fall within its territory.
585
 A state may claim 
such jurisdiction regardless of where the predicate offence might have taken 
place.
586
 Also, given that money laundering is in no way a result offence but a 
                                                                                                                                                                         
protocol known as the Transport Layer Security (TLS) which does not grant any leeway for third 
party access. Turner (2011: 161). 
583
 See Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.2. 
584
 The main principles of jurisdiction include the nationality principle, in terms of which a nation can 
prescribe laws with regard to its nationals either inside, or outside its territory; the objective 
territoriality principle which guarantees jurisdiction because the action had actual or intended 
effects on the state’s territory without the action occurring in that state; the universality principle 
which ascribes the notion that any state should assert jurisdiction on the basis that crimes are so 
serious and threatening to international peace, human rights and integrity that they affect all states 
and all people, and the passive personality principle, according to which jurisdiction can be 
established on the basis of the fact that state’s nationals are part of the victims of the relevant crime. 
Stessen (2000: 199). Cf Koh (2006: 57). 
585
 The subjective territoriality principle of jurisdiction is an American term, and a similar concept 
exists in Europe which is known as the ‘ubiquity theory’. Stessen (2000: 198). Cf Koh (2006: 57) 
and Oxman (1987: 277). 
586
 Article 6(2) of the Vienna Convention, and Article 6(2) of the Palermo Convention. An important 
caveat to this principle is the concept of dual criminality which might serve as a bar to founding 
jurisdiction. Essentially, where a predicate offence is an offence in one country but not in another, 
the former country cannot punish the offence or offences based on the money laundering offence. 
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conduct offence, for it is the conduct that incurs criminal liability, the offence 
of money laundering is deemed to have taken place as soon as a constituent 
element of the crime is present within that country or territory.
587
 
The prosecution of money laundering itself depends on the nature of the 
money laundering offence. Other than prosecuting money laundering as a 
separate offence, very often, money laundering is charged with the underlying 
predicate offence, which often makes it easier for the prosecutor to prove the 
alleged money laundering offence. The prosecution can also prove that the 
accused committed the predicate offence of the alleged money laundering 
offence (i.e. money laundering of ‘own proceeds’), or all that needs to be 
proved is that the accused committed the money laundering offence.
588
 The 
latter applies where money laundering is the only chargeable offence. In 
principle, the accused person does not have to be convicted of the predicate 
offence to the relevant money laundering offence. Thus, the prosecution need 
not prove  the conviction, but only the three major elements, namely that a 
transaction involving property took place; that the property is the proceeds of 
crime; and that the accused has knowledge of the fact that the property 
derives from a crime, or, at the very least, has that suspicion.
589
 In the end, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
This is because it would be tantamount to governing into another sovereign states’ territory and 
jurisdiction, which is contrary to the principle of international law. 
587
 Consequently, the crime of money laundering can create multi-jurisdictional claims over the same 
money laundering scheme, as it is not focused on whether the crime has an effect or result in that 
territory, but on whether an essential part of the conduct took place there. 
588
 Basel Institute on Governance: Assets recovery Knowledge Centre (2007) ‘Anti-Money 
Laundering’ available at <http://www.assetrecovery.org/kc/node/82bce589-7805-11dd-9c9d-d9fcb4 
08dfee.3> [accessed on 5 February 2012]. Cf Stessen (2000: 67). 
589
 Basel Institute on Governance: Assets recovery Knowledge Centre (2007) ‘Anti-Money 
Laundering’ an internet article available at <http://www.assetrecovery.org/kc/node/82bce589-7805-
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there must be a domestic AML law upon which the prosecution can ground 
and found its case. Such legislation is not only essential to the disclosure of 
information needed by the prosecution, but also needed as a complementary 
tool to the relevant domestic criminal procedural laws. 
It goes without saying that the successful investigation and prosecution of a 
transnational crime such as money laundering depends on international 
cooperation. This fact remains a recurring theme which shows the importance 
of an effective mutual legal assistance. 
 
4.2.3.4 Assets recovery 
Assets recovery
590
 comes to play after the deed has been done – where money 
has been laundered successfully – and the need arises to find a remedy to the 
situation. Within the framework of the global AML legal regime, given its 
complexity, the subject of assets recovery comes across as a Herculean task, 
being always an uphill climb for law enforcers.
591
 Tracing stolen assets is 
                                                                                                                                                                         
11dd-9c9d-d9fcb408dfee.3> [accessed on 5 February 2012]. These different elements are crucial to 
this study, and they will be analyzed in detail in relation to cyberlaundering in the following chapter 
(Chapter 5). Cf Article 9(5) of the Warsaw Convention. 
590
 The term ‘assets recovery’ is often understood in the plural as also including assets confiscation or 
assets forfeiture. Assets recovery is a common feature of the two broad but often intertwined areas 
of money laundering and corruption. As regards the latter, Chapter V of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (which was adopted in terms of the General Assembly Resolution 
58/4 of 31 October 2003 and enforced on 15 December 2005) is entirely dedicated to the subject. 
However, given that corruption is itself a predicate crime for money laundering, the ensuing 
discussion on assets recovery, although relative to corruption, is not exclusive to it, but generic 
within the confines of money laundering.  
591
 In spite of its apparent difficulty, history unveils an underlying optimism to the process. For 
example, by the year 2005, Nigeria had recovered a total of $1.2 billion that had been stolen by its 
former military dictator, General Sani Abacha. The country was able to recover the stolen funds by 
requesting assistance from multiple jurisdictions such as Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Jersey, and 
by designating the Abacha family a criminal organisation, in order to circumvent the need for a 
conviction. Ivory (2008: 1) and Pieth (2008: 5). Cf Theleskaf and Pereira (2011: 14) and Smith, 
Pieth and Jorge (2007: 1). 
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very much akin to finding a needle in a haystack, especially when these assets 
have been commingled with legitimate funds that have become properly 
integrated into the legitimate world of commerce. The ensuing discussion 
assesses the basic principles of assets recovery as entailed in international 
laws and policies.
592
 
As a general rule, countries have an overall mandate to confiscate proceeds of 
predicate crimes or property equivalent to the value of such proceeds, or 
instrumentalities used in, or destined for use in the commission of predicate 
crimes.
593
 In order to do this, countries are under an obligation to adopt 
measures which include enacting national laws that ensure the identification, 
tracing,
594
 freezing/seizure
595
 (hereinafter known as the assets recovery 
                                                          
592
 From a sociological perspective, the issue of assets recovery rests on a very poignant reason.  
According to the World Bank, an estimate of the cross-border flow of illegal funds is at an 
estimated $1.6 trillion, half of which is derived from developing economies. The United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime / The World Bank (2007: 9). 
593
 Article 12(1)(a) and (b) of the Palermo Convention and Article 23 of the Warsaw Convention. Cf 
Article 5(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention. 
594
 Tracing of stolen assets refers to the causal element which must be established between the relevant 
asset and the relevant criminal activity. This spells much difficulty for law enforcement authorities 
because usually, they are engrafted into an unfathomable maze of diabolically layered funds. 
However, very rarely, authorities are saved the trouble of trailing every path that leads to the loot, 
because evidence might exist that leads directly to the relevant asset. For example, Ferdinand 
Marcos, the former authoritarian president of the Philippines, had looted billions of dollars from the 
nations coffers whilst in power from 1965 to 1986, and when this was investigated, authorities were 
led easily to the funds because of his bank records that were easily accessible at his presidential 
villa. Asian Development Bank / Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2007: 
83). Cf Pieth (2008: 23). Aside from this fact, the cat and mouse system that the process involves, 
through the STRs that are often filed with financial intelligence units (FIUs), certain necessary 
connections can also be uncovered. 
595
 Freezing or seizure of stolen assets becomes essential after identification in order to prevent the 
criminal from further hiding such assets. Beneficiaries of stolen assets would, in most cases, try to 
make such assets unreachable or untouchable. This is why the notion of confidentiality is key to the 
concept of assets recovery. This is because criminals who become aware of the operation of 
authorities who know of the stolen assets are likely to keep moving such assets. Central to this 
subject is the role of financial institutions, which are key actors in the process. The case of Tommy 
Suharto, the former President of Indonesia, is an example. In 2002, Suherto’s bank, Banque 
Nationale de Paris (BNP) Paribas, refused to transfer funds that were beneficially controlled by 
Suharto, due to the fact the bank had reasoble suspicion of the illegal origins of such funds. King, P 
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measures) of stolen assets.
596
 However, before assets recovery measures can 
be initiated, there should be an enabling law on the part of countries that 
authorizes their relevant authorities to perform such tasks.
597
 Different 
governmental bodies or agencies are often tasked to perform such duties.
598
  
The assets recovery measures will apply to all stolen assets regardless of the 
fact that they might be: 
a) Proceeds of crime that have been transformed or converted, in part or in 
full, into other property, the value of which is the same as that of such 
proceeds;
599
 
b) Proceeds of crime that have been intermingled with property acquired 
from legitimate sources, which shall be liable to confiscation up to the 
assessed value of the intermingled proceeds;
600
 
c) Income or other benefits derived from proceeds of crime, or from 
property into which proceeds of crime have been transformed or 
                                                                                                                                                                         
(an undated website document) ‘Corruption Ruins Everything: Gridlock over Suharto’s Legacy in 
Indonesia (Part 1)’ The Asia-Pacific focus: Japan focus available at <http://www.japanfocus.org/-
Peter-King/2679> [accessed on 12 December 2011]. Cf Pieth (2008: 49). 
596
 Article 12(2) of the Palermo Convention and Article 5(2) of the Vienna Convention. Cf Financial 
Action Task Force (2003: 4) and Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 28). 
597
 Article 12(6) and Article 5(3) of the Palermo and Vienna Conventions respectively. Cf Article 23-
25 of the Warsaw Convention. 
598
 For example, in the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) are specially tasked for this purpose. In the United Kingdom, the Assets recovery 
Agency (ARA) has this mandate. Also, in South Africa, Nigeria and Colombia, the Office of 
Serious Economic Offences (OSEO), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), 
and the Administrative Securities Department (ASD) are the respective relevant bodies. In its recent 
report on tracing stolen assets, the Basel Institute on Governance highlighted the significance of 
information technology, which could help authorities to a great extent with the tracing of stolen 
assets. See Mulukutlah and Rüegg (2009: 71). 
599
 Article 12(3) of the Palermo Convention.  
600
 Article 12(4) of the Palermo Convention. 
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converted, or from property with which proceeds of crime has been 
intermingled, or 
d) Property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in the commission of 
the relevant predicate offences.
601
 
As a general rule, the rights of bona fide third parties to the categories of 
assets above are unaffected,
602
 and, in a criminal trial, the onus to prove the 
lawful origin of the property is on the accused.
603
 
As a golden thread that runs through the entire money laundering discourse, 
the concept of mutual legal assistance
604
 is a constant. The Palermo and 
Vienna Conventions both require countries to cooperate in the confiscation of 
stolen assets. Cooperation often entails exchange of relevant information, 
and, in certain instances, the extradition of the suspect.
605
 In general terms, 
when a country with jurisdiction to prosecute the crime of money laundering 
(the requesting country) makes a request for confiscation to another country 
within whose territory the criminal has placed the stolen assets (the requested 
country), the latter is obliged to request its authorities to obtain an order of 
                                                          
601
 Article (12)(1)(b) and Article 5(2) of the Palermo and Vienna Conventions respectively. Cf Article 
23 of the Warsaw Convention. This provision is extremely broad, as it encompasses what might 
otherwise be termed ‘tools’ of the crime. This tool of the crime refers to what has been used to 
commit the crime. The phrase can be interpreted widely or narrowly, depending on the facts and 
circumstances of the relevant case, and the relevant laws governing the local jurisdiction.  
602
 Article 12(8) and Article 5(8) of the Palermo and Vienna Conventions respectively.  
603
 Article 12(7) and Article 5(7) of the Palermo and Vienna Conventions respectively. However, this 
provision remains subject to the principles of the relevant domestic legal system. For the greater 
part, the nature of the legal recovery mechanism that is adopted also plays a major role. 
604
 Broadly, within the context of money laundering, the concept of mutual legal assistance refers to 
the multilateral and international cooperation expected from countries in the global fight against 
money laundering.  
605
 See Article 16 and 18 of the Palermo Convention, as well as the Article 7 of the Vienna 
Convention. 
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confiscation or, alternatively, to give effect to such an order.
606
 It is important 
for the relevant request to be clear and to be accompanied by the relevant 
information. The request should be written in the national language of the 
requested country.
607
 Depending on the relevant case, the requested country 
may have to give effect to such a request by adopting the relevant assets 
recovery measures. 
 
4.2.3.4.1 Methods of confiscation 
There are several avenues through which a court judgment can be obtained to 
freeze or to confiscate the proceeds of crime or property. These are criminal 
proceedings (in personam), civil proceedings (in personam), civil 
proceedings against property (in rem), and civil actions for damages in a 
criminal court (accion civil resarcitoria). 
 
a) Criminal proceedings 
Criminal confiscation as an avenue refers to the confiscation of assets based 
on the conviction of the accused for the crime of money laundering 
(otherwise called Conviction-Based Asset Forfeiture or ‘CBF’).608 The fact 
that this form of confiscation relates to the person tells why it is referred to as 
                                                          
606
 See Article 13(1) of the Palermo Convention, and Article 7 (3) of the Vienna Convention. In this 
instance, it should be noted that a request based on mutual legal assistance is often based or 
governed by an existing treaty between both countries (e.g. the Palermo Convention or the Vienna 
Convention), or any form of mutual agreement that might exist between them. 
607
 See discussions in paragraph 4.2.3.1 above. 
608
 Pieth (2008: 66). Cf Theleskaf (20011: 38). 
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in personam.
609
 In order to ensure an effective criminal confiscation, the 
confiscation must be based on an enforceable confiscation order. Within the 
overall context of international assets recovery, as a fundamental rule, a legal 
basis must exist between countries to justify the act of confiscation. Bilateral 
or multilateral agreements concluded between countries form such a legal 
basis, which serves the desired purpose. For example, by virtue of Article 
13(2) of the Palermo Convention, in the absence of any other agreement, 
signatories to the Palermo Convention may use the Convention itself as a 
legal basis to enforce confiscation orders that have been obtained in a foreign 
jurisdiction.
610
 Hence, signatory countries cannot absolve themselves from 
this obligation on the basis that there is no arrangement or agreement with the 
requesting country. 
In addition, criminal confiscation contains the principle of dual criminality. 
As it relates to money laundering, the principle means that the relevant 
predicate offence must be recognized as a crime by both the requesting and 
requested countries.
611
 
 
b) Civil proceedings in personam 
Another possible method of confiscation is by way of civil proceedings (in 
personam). Where the proceeds of crime or property are situated in foreign 
jurisdictions, a civil action can be initiated in foreign courts.  Within a local 
                                                          
609
 The Latin term ‘in personam’ means ‘of relation to the person’ in English. 
610
 Similarly, as regards the UNCAC, Article 54(1)(A) of the Convention contains a similar provision. 
611
 See Article 18(9) of the Palermo Convention. Although not stated expressly in the Vienna 
Convention, a close reading of Article 7(150)(d) expresses the underlying principle. 
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jurisdiction, private persons and juristic persons can use this avenue as well in 
order to recover stolen assets.
612
 This method is a better alternative due to the 
fact that a criminal conviction might be impossible to obtain, whereas in the 
case of civil action the absence of the defendant would not halt 
proceedings.
613
 Also, the fact that the burden of proof required in a civil 
proceeding is proof on balance of probabilities makes it more advantageous, 
as opposed to criminal proceedings where proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
required. In practice, there is no hindrance to instituting civil proceedings 
together with criminal proceedings, as the latter often complement the 
former.
614
 
 
c) Civil proceedings in rem 
Another very viable method of confiscation is to institute civil proceedings 
against property (in rem), as opposed to instituting the action against the 
person (in personnam). Assets can be recovered directly via this means, 
which is also known as Non-Conviction Based Asset Forfeiture (NCBF). 
Thus, a civil or criminal conviction against a person is not necessary to 
                                                          
612
 Pieth (2008: 76).  
613
 In the case of The Federal Republic of Nigeria v Joshua Chibi Dariye [2007] EWHC 708 (Ch) in 
which the Federal Republic of Nigeria instituted civil proceedings in the English Courts for the 
recovery of stolen assets by its former state governor, Joshua Dariye, the Court noted that serving a 
notice to the lawyer of a defendant who is not present, would suffice to justifying the continuance 
of proceedings. Cf Maton, J (an untitled internet article) ‘Recovery of Assets Case Study: The 
Dariye Proceedings in the United Kingdom’ Available at the Assets recovery Knowledge Centre 
<http://www.assetrecovery.org/kc/resources/org.apache.wicket.Application/repo?nid=62ba6a53-
c5fb-11dd-b3f1-fd61180437d9> [accessed on 14 December 2011]. 
614
 Pieth (2008: 80). For such overlap, see the discussion in point (d.) of the same discussion below. 
However, this is not to say that, with civil proceedings in personam, it would not be possible to 
freeze assets in order to prevent dispersal; circumvent bank secrecy; to order seizure or search 
orders, or issue the so-called gag orders to third parties in order to prevent breach of confidential 
information. 
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confiscate the proceeds of crime or property. What is required, however, is to 
prove that the property in question was involved in a criminal activity; hence, 
guilt is assigned to such property.
615
 This is often reflected in the citation of 
cases such as the “United States of America v. $124,700 in U.S. Currency.”616 
In such a case the owner of the property bears the onus of proving that the 
property in question was not involved in the crime.
617
 
 
d) Civil actions for damages  
This is an action that is common in civil law jurisdictions. It is a hybrid 
between CBF and NCBF. It takes place within the criminal court, and it 
cannot be initiated unless a concurrent criminal investigation is underway, 
otherwise referred to as accion civil resarcitoria. In essence, it is a civil 
proceeding in a criminal court. The purpose is primarily to find redress for 
victims of the criminal offence, as it recognizes damages with monetary 
compensation.
618
 In the case of international assets recovery, the recoverable 
damage would be the proceeds of crime or the property. An interesting 
feature of this option is that the civil action is not dependent on the criminal 
conviction of the individual. Thus, when the criminal process reaches the trial 
stage, the civil action continues separately, which often leads to the forfeiture 
of the property. 
                                                          
615
 Greenberg, Samuel, Grant and Gray (2009: 33). Cf Pieth (2008: 80). 
616
 United States of America v. $124,700 in U.S. Currency, 05-3295 (8th Cir. 2006). The case concerns 
civil proceedings in rem against the amount of $124,700. Civil proceedings in rem against third 
parties are common in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, to name a few. 
617
 Greenberg, Samuel, Grant and Gray (2009: 59).   
618
 Larguire (1965: 687). Cf Pieth (2008: 89). 
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4.2.3.4.2 Repatriation 
The question of repatriation often crops up after the proceeds of crime have 
been confiscated. It is important to tread softly in this case. Countries usually 
have guiding laws or administrative procedures with which to deal with such 
a case. However, should there be none, as a general rule, countries are under 
obligation to return such assets to the requesting country. The underlying 
rationale for this principle is to ameliorate the consequences of the criminal 
act by compensating the victims of the crime or returning the proceeds or 
property to their legitimate owners.
619
 In unique instances, there might be 
supplementary agreements or arrangements between the relevant countries, 
which allow the requested country to share in the confiscated assets or utilize 
the funds in its fight against money laundering.
620
 Within the broad 
framework of repatriation, the claim of legitimate third parties has to be taken 
into account. 
In general, assets recovery is one aspect of the global AML legal regime, and 
one that requires continuous capacity development and training efforts, 
especially when there is a need to pursue assets in countries lacking the 
adequate institutional framework for assets recovery.
621
 Such continuous 
efforts help to solidify the compliance, prevention and enforcement pillars 
upon which the current AML legal regime rests. 
                                                          
619
 Article 14(2) of the Palermo Convention and Article 8 of the Vienna Convention, respectively. 
620
 The World Bank plays a crucial role here as a neutral third party that ensures that the assets are 
channelled into development efforts and needful sectors such as education and health. 
621
 Currently, several international organisations have diverted attention to addressing this challenge. 
Some of these are the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); the World Bank (with 
its StAR initiative) and the International Centre for Assets recovery (a Centre for Assets recovery at 
the Basel Institute on Governance in Basel, Switzerland). 
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4.2.4 Pillar 3: Compliance 
Unlike in the past, the present AML legal regime places a heavy emphasis on 
the notion of compliance. It is one thing to have in place a myriad of AML 
laws and policies, but another to ensure that they are put into effect. This 
study identifies the issue of compliance as the principal third pillar of the 
modern AML legal regime, without which the other two pillars would be 
merely theoretical. Compliance represents the binding chord connecting all 
pillars. Parties who have a duty to comply are today paying a hefty price for 
failing to comply with these laws.
622
 The importance of this rationale is 
stressed extensively in international norms and policies. In its 
Recommendations, the FATF identifies certain measures to facilitate 
compliance with established laws and standards. This involves a proactive 
involvement of various state actors, such as effective Financial Intelligence 
Units
623
 (FIUs); adequately empowered law enforcement bodies and 
competent authorities, which means being properly endowed with the 
requisite financial, human and technical resources;
624
 competent supervisors 
who can ensure that the relevant organisation and institutions are able to 
                                                          
622
 It was cited in a recent report that since 2008, banks in Europe and the United States have signed 
deferred prosecution agreements, and paid more than US $1.2 billion dollars in penalties for alleged 
violation of anti-money laundering policies. Mollenkamp, Grow and Wolf (2012) ‘Exclusive: 
Senate Investigating HSBC for Money Laundering’ <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/25/us-
hsbc-probe-idUSTRE80O1FH20120125 > [accessed on 12 January 2012]. 
623
 Recommendations 29 and 30, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 24). Cf Financial Action Task 
Force (2003: 10). 
624
 Recommendations 2, 30, 31, 33, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 11; 24; 25 and 26). Cf 
Financial Action Task Force (2003: 11). 
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comply with the set laws and standards,
625
 as well as establishing set 
measures to ensure that legal professionals are not exploited for laundering 
purposes.
626
 
Although the issue of compliance is peculiar to the aforementioned parties, it 
is one that really does echoes generally. There is an obligation to comply and 
to ensure compliance. Thus, this obligation is two-fold: on the one hand is the 
targeted group, which are persons and entities with the duty to comply with 
set AML laws and policies, such as financial institutions,
 
their clients and 
beneficial owners;
627
 mutual funds and pooled investment vehicles such as 
hedge funds, private equity funds, unit investment trusts, corporations, trusts 
and partnerships,
628
 and other designated non financial businesses such as 
lawyers, notaries, accountants, dealers in precious metals and stones, and real 
estate agents.
629
 On the other hand, there are the so-called guardians that are 
meant to ensure compliance, such as governments and their respective 
agencies.  Apart from the individualised efforts on the part of governments to 
ensure compliance, which mostly boils down to the existence of non-
existence of political will, or lack of adequate means, several international 
                                                          
625
 Recommendations 27, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 23). Cf Financial Action Task Force 
(2003: 11). 
626
 Recommendations 24 and 25, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 21; 22). Cf Financial Action 
Task Force (2003: 11). 
627
 See discussion in paragraph 4.2.3.1.1 below. 
628
 See discussion in paragraph 4.2.3.1.3 below. 
629
 See discussion in paragraph 4.2.3.1.1 (d) below. 
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agencies, institutions and organisations have also made attempts at ensuring 
effective compliance.
630
 
As it pertains to cyberlaundering, the two distinct arms of compliance are 
better understood in subsequent discussions in the chapter that follows.
631
 
 
PART II 
4.3 THE ACL LEGAL REGIME: A SURVEY OF EXISTING 
RELEVANT LAWS, POLICIES AND INITIATIVES 
4.3.1 General 
Cyberlaundering is current and adapts to technological advancement. This 
compounds the already complex problem of money laundering.
632
 It is 
important to reiterate that the notion of cyberlaundering grows out of the 
traditional concept of money laundering, which is why an understanding of 
the current legal regime against money laundering is crucial for the proper 
comprehension of the existing legal regime against cyberlaundering. This part 
of the study is therefore an extension of the previous part. This section studies 
the legal strategies currently in place to combat cyberlaundering. However, a 
concrete and well-structured legal regime has yet to be established to combat 
cyberlaundering. This does not mean that the current AML legal regime is 
completely ineffective against cyberlaundering; it is only inadequate. This 
section identifies some attempts against cyberlaundering made at both the 
                                                          
630
 Amongst others, in the forefront are the World Bank, the Basel Institute on Governance, the FATF 
and the FATF-Styled Regional Bodies, the Egmont Group and the Wolfsberg Group of Banks. 
631
 See Chapter 5, paragraph 5.6. 
632
 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the concept of cyberlaundering.  
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national and international levels. The section also focuses on one key aspect 
of the compliance pillar of money laundering, which has to do with parties 
(i.e. ‘guardians’) bearing the obligation to ensure compliance with AML laws 
– which in this case would be anti-cyberlaundering (ACL) laws. 
 
4.3.2 Present international legal framework against cyberlaundering 
4.3.2.1 General 
Cyberlaundering is still a very evasive phenomenon which, until now, has not 
been properly conceptualized. This is one of the principal challenges facing 
its regulation and control, for it is a phenomenon which has proven extremely 
difficult to grasp, let alone one with which to come to grips. In fact, at present 
there is no international ACL legal regime. This section tries to unravel and 
explore some related issues that justify the rationale behind this study’s 
attempt to establish an appropriate ACL legal framework. It will look at the 
relatedness of the current ACL legal regime to the AML legal regime, and at 
the link between international cybercrime laws and cyberlaundering. This 
section also discusses how much of cyberlaundering is known internationally, 
and what attempts have been made to remedy it. 
 
4.3.2.2 The relationship between the AML and ACL legal regimes 
The relationship between the current AML and ACL legal regimes is 
traceable to the roots of both concepts. It has been said that cyberlaundering 
is not a separate crime from money laundering, irrespective of its deep 
 
 
 
 
 
 
214 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
rootedness in cybercrime.
633
 Thus, proceeding from the standpoint that 
cyberlaundering is indeed money laundering that appears in another form, it 
goes without saying that the legal basis governing money laundering is the 
same as that for cyberlaundering. Upon close consideration, it also becomes 
apparent that an analysis of the present legal regime or construct for money 
laundering is tantamount to that of cyberlaundering. However, there is a 
caveat to this rationale, being that the current legal framework for money 
laundering is not sufficient to gauge and contain the dilemma of 
cyberlaundering. This is because there are presently no AML laws that 
directly cater for the problem. The fact that the present AML laws are 
inadequate, distinguishes the present AML legal regime from the ACL legal 
regime which this study proposes. The latter builds on the former, and in 
essence, justifies the rationale for this study.
634
  
 
4.3.2.3 Cyberlaundering and the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime 
Given that there are currently no laws, rules or regulations governing 
cyberlaundering in the international sphere,
635
 the question is whether 
                                                          
633
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.3.  
634
 The following chapters set out the legal ramification and legal construction for the prosecution of 
cyberlaundering. They also outline possible solutions to the problem. By so doing, this study 
attempts to establish a concrete ACL regime for the problem. 
635
 One might find some laws that touch on some aspects of cyberlaundering, such as electronic 
payment systems, for example. For instance, as regards electronic payment systems, there is the 
Council of Europe Directive 2009/110/EC on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of 
the business of electronic money institutions, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 16 
September 2009 and which came into force on 30 October 2009. This is discussed further in 
Chapter 5, paragraph 5.5.2.3.2. 
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cyberlaundering can be regulated under the first and only international 
cybercrime convention - the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime
636
 
(the ‘Budapest Convention’).  The Convention came about as a response to 
the disharmony of cybercrime laws across various jurisdictions in Europe. 
This was an obstacle to the international prosecution of cybercrime offences 
across European countries.  The Budapest Convention aims to harmonize 
national cybercrime laws and to improve investigative techniques, with the 
principal objective of fostering cooperation amongst states parties.
637
 
The Budapest Convention does not expressly define cybercrime. This is due 
to the fact that the Convention tries to foster harmony in cybercrime laws by 
abstaining from prescribing a definition, and not propounding one which 
might be restrictive in nature. Rather, the Convention sets out measures to be 
taken at the national level to combat cybercrime.
638
 It describes certain types 
of conduct which national authorities should criminalize, such as offences 
against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and 
systems;
639
 offences related to the infringement of copyright and related 
                                                          
636
 The Convention was drawn up by the Council of Europe in Strasburg, with participation of the 
Council of Europe, observer states Japan, Canada and China. The Convention was adopted by the 
Committee of the Ministers of the Council of Europe at its 109th session on 8 November 2001. On 
23 November 2003, it was open for signature in Budapest, and on 1 July 2004, it came into force. 
As at 26 September 2012, the Convention had been ratified by 37 states parties. For more 
information see the Treaties Office of the Council of Europe at <http://conventions.coe.int/> 
[accessed on 26 September 2012]. 
637
 On 7 November 2002, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers adopted an additional 
protocol to the Convention (Additional Protocol to the Convention) which came into force on 1 
March 2006. In addition to the cybercrime offences set out in the Convention, the Protocol 
criminalises the dissemination of xenophobic or racist materials through computer systems. 
638
 In addition to the conducts to be criminalized, measures are also put forth for ancillary or incidental 
liability. See Title 5 (Article 11 to 13) of the Convention. 
639
 See Title 1 (Articles 2 to 6) of the Convention. 
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rights;
640
 computer-related offences such as computer-related forgery and 
fraud,
641
 and content-related offences such as offences related to child 
pornography.
642
 The Convention says nothing about the conduct of 
cyberlaundering.
643
 This is evidence that cyberlaundering does not fit solely 
into the frame of cybercrime. 
However, this should not be construed to mean that the Convention bears no 
relation to the concept of cyberlaundering. In fact, it does. Viewed from the 
ambit of predicate offences, all categories of offences listed under the 
Convention can be predicate offences for cyberlaundering, together with a list 
of other serious offences.
644
 The technological dimension that 
cyberlaundering has with other kinds cybercrimes makes it much easier for 
these cybercrimes to become predicate offences for it, as it is only logical for 
illicit funds derived from the internet to be laundered through it. Many 
cyberlaundering activities fly under the radar simply because the concept of 
cyberlaundering is still not understood by investigators, and when other 
comprehensible cyber criminal activities are involved, as is often the case, 
                                                          
640
 See Title 4 (Article 10) of the Convention. 
641
 See Title 2 (Article 7 and 8) of the Convention. 
642
 See Title 3 (Article 9) of the Convention. 
643
 The conduct of cyberlaundering manifests through its basic elements, which are the presence of a 
computer, an activity and illegal funds (i.e. actus reus elements) together with knowledge of the 
illegality of the funds, and its associative intention (i.e. mens rea element). See Chapter 3, 
paragraph 3.2.4. 
644
 Chapter 6 below, which deals with the prosecution of cyberlaundering, dwells extensively on 
explaining this link. For a detailed discussion on predicate offences of money laundering, see 
Chapter 2, paragrapph 2.2.1 above. 
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investigators and prosecutors only focus on those cybercrimes, ignoring the 
elusive manifestations of cyberlaundering.
645
 
Another upshot of the Budapest Convention is that it does not have universal 
application. Although being a European Convention which most European 
countries have ratified, only very few other non-European countries are 
parties to it.
646
  The fact that the Convention is the only major international 
instrument, which itself does not have a global reach, shows the gross 
inadequacy of laws, and as regards cyberlaundering, it shows the need to 
found a concrete ACL legal regime.  
 
4.3.2.4 Present attempts to regulate cyberlaundering through international 
policies 
There have been certain efforts undertaken by certain non-governmental 
organizations and international private sector entities to understand the 
concept of cyberlaundering. These take the form of policies and 
recommendations. Yet, a pedantic interpretation of these laws, policies and 
recommendations, would not amount to a ‘legal framework’ per se, given that 
they lean more to the side of soft laws, as opposed to hard laws.
647
 However, 
as alluded to earlier,
648
 most of these laws, practices and recommendations 
(i.e. soft laws) have become legally recognized standards which have been 
                                                          
645
 Cf discussion in Chapter 6, paragraph 6.5.  
646
 These include Canada, Japan, South Africa and the US. 
647
 Within the ambit of international law, hard law is a binding legal instrument that gives rights to and 
imposes obligations on parties upon which it is binding. Cassese (2005: 160). Cf Evans (2010: 71) 
and Shaw (2003: 67). 
648
 See paragraph 4.2.1 above. 
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transplanted into the domestic legal systems of most countries. Given the 
interwoven nature of both the AML and ACL legal regimes, and the latter 
being practically not yet existent, it is thus important to consider the present 
attempts made at combating cyberlaundering in the international sphere. 
Although the conceptual phrasing - ‘cyberlaundering’ - is not found in these 
soft laws, reference is made to some of its operations and manifestations. 
Much of these attempts have been undertaken by inter-governmental 
organisations and private state actors such as the Wolfsberg Group, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, the FATF, the World Bank, the Egmont 
Group, and, for the enforcement ambit, the International Police Organisation 
(‘Interpol’). 
 
4.3.2.4.1 The FATF 
In Recommendation 15 of its Recommendations (‘International Standards on 
Combatting Money Laundering and The Financing of Terrorism and 
Proliferation’), the FATF preempts the danger of cyberlaundering. It cautions 
financial institutions to pay special attention to money laundering threats that 
may arise from new and developing technologies which might favour 
anonymity.
649
 The FATF also warns that these new technologies can be used 
for money laundering schemes, and it highlights those risks associated with 
non-face-to-face business transactions.
650
 With the increasing manifestation 
of these threats, the FATF has tried to follow these trends closely. This 
                                                          
649
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 17). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 8). 
650
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 17). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 8). 
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resulted in its 2006 New Payment Method Report
651
 and its 2010 Report on 
Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods.
652
 From several case 
studies conducted, the latter report identifies the laundering capabilities of 
New Payment Systems (NPSs), such as prepaid cards and internet payment 
systems. Some these case studies indicate how illicit funds, of both high and 
low values, are being laundered using NPSs.
653
 The FATF elucidates the fact 
that certain key features of modern technology have helped to foster the 
attractiveness of NPSs for money laundering purposes. One of these is the 
anonymity of the internet. Others are the high utility of funds, as well the 
global access via automatic teller machines (ATMs).
654
 Given its currency, 
there is presently no uniformity across jurisdictions on the classifications and 
regulatory measures for such NPSs. In addition, Special Recommendation 
VII (SR VII) of the FATF’s Special Recommendations on Terrorist 
Financing
655
  sets out measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist 
financing possibilities by way of wire transfers, which is incidental to the 
problem of online banking. These challenges, loopholes and proposals put 
forward by the FATF are discussed under solutions to the cyberlaundering 
problem in Chapter 5 of this study. 
 
 
                                                          
651
 Financial Action Task Force (2006: 2). 
652
 Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 3). 
653
 Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 7). 
654
 Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 7). These are salient features of money laundering that are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this research. 
655
 Financial Action Task Force (2004B: 31). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2001A: 23). 
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4.3.2.4.2 The Wolfsberg Group 
In October 2011, the Wolfsberg Group issued a guidance paper on the risks of 
prepaid and stored value cards.
656
 This comes with the advent of 
cyberlaundering, and the steady migration from a paper-based payment 
system to the now predominant electronic payment system. The latter is 
largely monopolized by the non-bank service providers (NBSPs) who do not 
necessarily fit the respected frame of a financial institution that is typically 
controlled and regulated.
657
 NBSPs are often private entities (i.e. companies 
or corporations) that distribute electronic payment instruments such as smart 
cards, prepaid or stored value cards. Although NBSPs are often badly tainted 
for their predisposition to cyberlaundering, some have played more positive 
roles, such as serving as outsourcing agents for financial institutions, by 
providing certain specialist services to financial institutions, or, in their 
capacity as financial service providers, acting as competitors to financial 
institutions.
658
 Given the fact that NBSPs also need to be controlled, the 
Wolfsberg Group follows a risk-based approach in prescribing control 
measures for the use of prepaid and stored value cards. This represents a good 
promise of what should be expected in the near future. 
 
 
                                                          
656
 The principles and recommendations outlined in this guidance paper are discussed further in 
Chapter 5. 
657
 With growing awareness of the dangers they harbour, more and more of these NBSPs are becoming 
regulated. While some may be regulated to a lower standard as banks, some are regulated to the 
same standard, or only regulated for business in a specific country. The Wolfsberg Group (2011: 2). 
658
 The Wolfsberg Group (2011: 2). 
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4.3.2.4.3 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision addresses the issue of 
cyberlaundering from the angle of online banking, which proves problematic 
because for banks that are solely internet-based, without an actual physical 
presence anywhere, customers are not subjected to the same rigid verification 
process that a terrestrial bank would ordinary use for prospective clients.
659
 
With the advent of telephone banking, which is now complementary to online 
banking, the matter is not remedied. Although the possibility exists that an 
independent third party could readily conduct such identification and 
verification, there are still doubts about the veracity and credibility of such 
third party or agency. The proposals made by the Basel Committee are 
analysed critically in Chapter 5 which considers how cyberlaundering can be 
regulated.
660
 
 
4.3.2.4.4 The Egmont Group 
The effort made by the Egmont Group is a more practical one. It is meant to 
empower the FIUs. Given the technological prowess of cyberlaunderers who 
are able to exploit some technological avenues for their illicit operations, and 
in order to foster the work of the FIUs, the Egmont Group took the initiative 
of establishing an Information Technology Working Group (ITWG). In 
October 2010, the ITWG and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) held a 
workshop entitled the IMF-Egmont Group IT Workshop, which assessed best 
                                                          
659
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 9). 
660
 Cf discussion in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.5.2.1.1. 
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practices in IT developments within FIUs. It was held in Brazil, and 15 
countries in Central and Southern America participated.
661
  This was a crucial 
step forward, especially given the fact that FIUs serve as an intelligence 
centre where information on money laundering operations are collated, 
exchanged and processed. With an increase in its technological capabilities, 
cyberlaundering operations would not easily elude FIUs, for they would be 
detected with relative ease.
662
  
 
4.3.2.1.5 The World Bank 
The World Bank, in conjunction with the IMF, has a more radical approach 
towards fighting cyberlaundering. Recently, it introduced an innovative 
program known as the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAPs),
663
 
which is meant as a solution to the problems caused by electronic payment 
systems, particularly as regards the non-bank issuer model and the peer-to-
peer model.
664
 The World Bank identifies threats posed by the use of such 
systems. It has also launched the Global Systems Mapping Project in 
order to monitor the flow or movement of money in complex financial 
systems.
665
 In the long run, this will enable governments and their respective 
                                                          
661
 The Egmont Group (2011: 25). 
662
 On a complementary note, the Egmont Group also pilots certain other IT innovations. An example 
is a recently completed development paper entitled ‘FIU IT System Maturity Model’ (FISMM), 
which is a hightech self-evaluation tool meant to aid the operations of FIUs. Also, there is a system 
called Data Standards Set which allows FIUs to use uniform documents and fields when requesting 
information from other FIUs. The Egmont Group (2011: 25). 
663
 See <http://www.imf.org/about/projects/worldbank> [accessed on 13 August 2010]. 
664
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraphs 3.2.2.3 and 3.2.2.4. Cf Kellerman (2004: 3).  
665
 Kellerman (2004: 16). 
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local authorities to better safeguard their monetary policies from threats such 
as cyberlaundering.
666
 
In addition to these initiatives, the Bank outlines the need for the 
establishment of cyber-threat analysis centres across all financial institutions, 
either in a national or international jurisdiction. Much like the functions of 
FIUs, the cyber-threat analysis centres would enable financial institutions to 
share intelligence on cyber-threats with other financial institutions. While 
studies show that financial institutions already have such system in place, it 
takes uniformity to work, as such cyber-threat centres need to be properly 
networked to work. In essence, all financial institutions must have one such 
cyber-threat centre in order for realize its advantages. In the US, there is a 
similar service known as the Financial Services Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centre (ISAC). The ISAC functions like the proposed cyber-threat 
centre. Although it is an internet-based third party service provider, it gives 
alerts upon detection of threats in banking transactions, and serves as a real 
time information sharing system.
667
 The rationale here is simply to coordinate 
and harmonize cyber entities against cyberlaundering.  The significance of 
cyber forensics should hence not be underestimated, especially within 
financial institutions, given that the ability to detect and preserve the minutest 
electronic evidence is the minimum required in order to contain the problem 
of cyberlaundering adequately.   
 
                                                          
666
 Kellerman (2004: 16). 
667
 Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (2012: 4). Cf Kellerman (2004: 18). 
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4.3.2.4.6 Intenational Police Organisation 
The International Police Organisation (Interpol)
668
 has a mandate to foster 
operational support in the global challenge of fighting crime by ensuring 
cooperation between police from various jurisdictions. This is to ensure the 
enforcement of laws and the prevention crimes.
669
 For the enforcement aspect 
of the global ACL legal regime, Interpol is key. Interpol exhibits 
characteristics of an adequately equipped organisation with the right 
resources to fight cyberlaundering.  
In the fight against cybercrime in the international sphere, Interpol plays a 
key role. It collects, preserve, analyzes, and shares information on cybercrime 
with all its member states.
670
 Interpol has since spearheaded some initiatives 
geared towards this purpose, such as the setting up of the National Central 
Reference Point Network. The latter is a designated network of investigators 
in national cybercrime units, who are meant to be on the alert and to identify 
imminent threats, and to facilitate cybercrime investigations.
671
 Interpol also 
established the Interpol Working Parties on IT Crime, which is a working 
group that continually works on developing strategies on the latest 
cybercrime methods, and it also conducts an International Cybercrime 
                                                          
668
 Interpol is the world’s largest police organisation. It is conmprised of 190 member states. It has its 
General Secretariat in Lyon, France, with other several regional offices around the world. It 
operates 24 hours a day, 365 days in a year. For more about the organisation, see 
<http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/> [accessed on 11 February 2011]. 
669
 Interpol (an undated webpage) ‘About Us’ available at <http://www.interpol.int/about/> [accessed 
on 11 February 2011]. 
670
 See Interpol (an undated website document) ‘Cybercrime’ available at <http://www .interpol 
.int/Crime-areas/Financial-crime/Payment-cards> [accessed on 11 February 2011]. 
671
 See Interpol (an undated website document) ‘Cybercrime’ available at <http://www .interpol 
.int/Crime-areas/Financial-crime/Payment-cards> [accessed on 11 February 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
225 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Conference every two years. This conference creates a forum for the 
exchange of knowledge and expertise in fighting cybercrime.
672
  
In the next chapter, these initiatives are considered more closely as they are 
pertinent to cyberlaundering. 
 
4.3.3 Present national legal framework for cyberlaundering 
4.3.3.1 General 
An international canopy for the ACL legal regime would only be as strong as 
the tent poles erected locally. Apart from a consideration of the present ACL 
legal regime on the international plane, it is also imperative to examine the 
situation at the national level. This section samples four different countries 
through which to juxtapose efforts made locally in the ACL legal campaign. 
These are Germany, the UK, India and the US. These countries are selected 
because of their level of awareness of the crimes of money laundering and 
cybercrime, as well as their vulnerability to it. This section seeks to create an 
understanding of the situation of the ACL legal regime in local jurisdictions 
by analyzing those relevant laws against money laundering and cybercrime 
that might or might not pertain to cyberlaundering. This exercise is crucial in 
order to identify the common issues that exist amongst these countries, given 
that an identification of the basic issues is extremely crucial to proposing a 
solution. To this end, the relevant cybercrime and money laundering laws of 
the aforementioned countries are considered closely.  
                                                          
672
 See Interpol (an undated website document) ‘Cybercrime’ available at <http://www.interpo l.int/ 
Crime-areas/Financial-crime/Payment-cards> [accessed on 11 February 2011]. 
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4.3.3.2 Germany 
Money laundering is an offence regulated under section 261 of the German 
Criminal Code of 1998 (Strafgesetzbuch – StGB),673 the Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) Act of 2008 (Gesetz zur Ergänzung der Bekämpfung der 
Geldwäsche und der Terrorismusfinanzierung - GwBekErgG)
674
 as well as 
the Banking Act of 1998 (Gesetz über das Kreditwesen Kreditwesengesetz - 
KWG).
675
   
Section 261 of the German Criminal Code forms the basis of the country’s 
AML legal regime. Liability for the crime of money laundering can be 
founded if the constituent elements of the crime of money laundering
676
 are 
satisfied, as set forth in the section. The elements contained therein, however, 
are elements of the traditional concept of money laundering which, by way of 
implication, exclude cyberlaundering, given that its constituent elements are 
not the same, even though the latter is embedded in the former.
677
 
Consequently, the concept of cyberlaundering is not contained in the money 
laundering provisions outlined in section 261 of the German Criminal Code. 
                                                          
673
 Other related provisions of the Criminal Code include sections 257, 258, 259, 260, 260(a) and 262. 
 
674
 This law adopts the provisions of the Third European Union Money Laundering Directive - Council 
of Europe: Council Directive 2005/60/EC on the prevention and use of financial systems for the 
purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, which was adopted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly on 26 October 2005 and came into force on 25 November 2005. 
675
 Otherwise known as the ‘Kreditwesengesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 9. September 
1998) (BGBl. I S. 2776).’ 
676
 The elements of the crime of money laundering are discussed in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.4. 
677
 For a detailed discussion on the relationship between money laundering and cyberlaundering, see 
Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.3. 
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The AML Act of 2008 created Germany‘s financial intelligence unit (FIU) 
within the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt - BKA).
678
 The 
Act also provides detailed customer due diligence (CDD) obligations on 
financial institutions, and also requires them to submit suspicious transaction 
reports (STRs) to the competent authorities.
679
 The AML Act does not 
contain provisions regulating cyberlaundering. 
The Banking Act of 1998, however, is relevant to the regulation of 
cyberlaundering. Article 2 of the Act requires prepaid service providers to 
observe KYC principles when conducting business with customers. This 
means that customers, amongst other requirements set out, would need to 
provide proof of their identities to prepaid service providers. Also, under the 
same provision, prepaid service providers are required to conduct thorough 
KYC procedures and file STRs where the prepaid or smart card in question is 
topped with amounts that exceed €100.680 
The German laws dealing with cybercrime include the Freedom of 
Information Act of 2005 (Informationsfreiheitsgesetz) the Federal Data 
Protection Act of 2001
681
 (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz - BDSG) and the 
Telecommunications Act of 2004 (Telekommunikationsgesetz - TKG). A 
regulatory framework for cybercrime is also outlined in the German Criminal 
                                                          
 
678
 Article 5 of the Act.  
    
679
 Article 2 of the Act. 
680
 This provision is necessary due to the buoyant nature of the German economy, which is the largest 
in Europe. Cf footnote 382 above. 
681
 The latter adopts the European Directive on Data Protection, Directive 95/46/EC, adopted and 
enforced by the European Parliament and the Council on 24 October 1995. 
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Code, which governs aspects of cybercrime such as cyberfraud,
682
 data 
tampering;
683
 crimes against the computer,
684
 violation of privacy,
685
 data 
espionage, and phishing.
686
 None of these laws describes the conduct of 
cyberlaundering expressly. At the moment, there are no proactive steps being 
taken against cyberlaundering in Germany. The exception is Article 2 of the 
Banking Act. But the German police continue to fight money laundering and 
cybercrime. 
 
4.3.3.3 United Kingdom 
The UK operates a very strong AML legal regime. Its AML legal regime is 
governed by the Terrorism Act 2000,
687
 the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act of 2001,
688
 the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act 2005,
689
 
the Money Laundering Regulations 2007
690
 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002.
691
 The latter is the primary AML legislation in the UK, and it evidences 
the exceedingly wide nature of the UK AML laws.
692
 The far-reaching nature 
of the UK’s AML laws is its most distinguishing characteristic. For instance, 
                                                          
682
 Section 263(a) of the German Criminal Code. 
683
 Section 303(a) of the German Criminal Code. 
684
 Section 303(b) of the German Criminal Code. 
685
 Sections 202, 202(b) and (c) of the German Criminal Code. 
686
 Sections 202(b), (c) and 206 of the German Criminal Code. 
687
 Chapter 11, Act of 2000. 
688
 Chapter 24, Act of 2001. 
689
 Chapter 15, Act of 2005. 
690
 Act No. 2157 of 2007. 
691
 Chapter 29, Act of 2002. 
692
 The far reaching nature of these AML laws owe to the predominance of the money laundering 
offence in the UK. In 2011, the UK’s AML law enforcement agency known as the Serious 
Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) indicated in its annual report that a total of 247,601 suspicious 
transaction reports were filed within that year alone. See Serious Organized Crime Agency (2011 
10). 
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handling or dealing with the proceeds of a criminal activity, be it represented 
in money or assets,
693
 incurs liability of the accused. However, in spite of the 
wide breadth of these laws, the AML laws of the UK do not cover the notion 
cyberlaundering. Juxtaposed to the UK’s cybercrime laws, are other laws 
meant to fight cybercrime. These are the Computer Misuse Act of 1990,
694
 
the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations of 
2003,
695
 the Police and Justice Act of 2006,
696
 and the Serious Crime Act of 
2007.
697
 The conduct that criminalizes cybercrime does not fit that for 
cyberlaundering.  
In February 2012, the UK renewed its campaign against cybercrime by 
establishing regional cybercrime hubs across the UK. These are meant to help 
in the identification of cyber threats.
698
 Perhaps by having effective detective 
mechanisms, the problem of cyberlaundering will become more visible, 
which is a first step to combating it effectively. 
 
 
 
                                                          
693
 Money laundering in the UK is deemed an ‘acquisitive crime,’ one which merely requires the 
accussed person to have obtained a pecuniray advantage. As gleaned from its AML laws, the money 
laundering offences in the UK are not cofined to the proceeds of serious crimes. There are also no 
monetary limits, and it is not a requirement that there be a money laundering design or purpose to 
an action for it amount to a money laundering offence. See the International Monetary Fund (2011: 
7). Cf Padfield  (2004: 270).  
694
 Chapter 18, Act of 1990. 
695
 Act No. 2426 of 2003. 
696
 Chapter 48, Act of 2006. 
697
 Chapter 27, Act of 2007. 
698
 These units which will help battle online threats were established in Yorkshire and the Humber, the 
Northwest and the East Midlands. See Evans, S (2012) ‘UK launches Regional Cybercrime Hub’ 
available at <http://security.cbronline.com/news/uk-launches-regional-cybercrime-hubs-100212> 
[accessed on 13 February 2012]. 
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4.3.3.4 India 
The AML legal regime in India is governed primarily by the Prevention of 
Money Laundering Act, 2002.
699
 As the title suggests, this Act has provisions 
that reflect the prevention pillar of the present AML legal regime. It lays 
down very stringent CDD measures for financial institutions in particular. 
This law does not contain provisions that regulate cyberlaundering. On the 
other hand, cybercrime in India is regulated in two ways. Criminal activities 
of a traditional nature, such as theft, forgery, fraud, defamation, amongst 
others, are regulated under the Indian Penal Code.
700
 Other types of 
cybercrimes, such as computer-related crimes are dealt with under the 
Information Technology Act 2000.
701
 The latter also addresses the legal 
recognition of electronic documents and legal recognition of digital 
signatures. These laws, too, only cater for crimes under the cybercrime 
family. They exclude cyberlaundering. 
The Indian Income Tax Department is the main AML law enforcement body 
in the country for enforcing AML laws. This department and the Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the Indian Police Service are yet to come to grips 
with this growing phenomenon of cyberlaundering. 
 
 
 
                                                          
699
 Act No. 15 of 2003. 
700
 Act No. 45 of 1860. 
701
 Act No. 21 of 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
231 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
4.3.3.5 United States 
The US is a good example of a local jurisdiction that has highly fortified 
preventive and enforcement strategies against cybercrime and money 
laundering. The reality of cyber criminality in the US prompts its dedication 
to fighting the problem. This speaks to why the US is one of only three non-
European countries that has signed the Budapest Convention, and one of just 
two that has ratified it.
702
 Much of the provisions of the Convention have 
been domesticated into Title 18 of the United States Code,
703
 which is the 
criminal and penal code of the federal government of the US. The latter deals 
with federal crime and procedure. 
The US does not have laws that cater for cyberlaundering explicitly. 
However, the crime of money laundering is a federal offence in the US and is 
regulated under a slew of anti-money laundering laws, such as the Bank 
Secrecy Act,
704
 the Money Laundering Control Act,
705
 and the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing By Providing the Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (‘US PATRIOT 
ACT’).706 These laws are all federal laws. Several states have their own AML 
laws which mirror these federal laws. The aforementioned AML laws are a 
                                                          
702
 The US signed the Budapest Convention on 23 November 200; it ratified it on 29 September 2006, 
and enforced it on 1 January 2007. Japan signed the Convention on 23 November 2001, and ratified 
it on 3 July 2012. As at time of writing, South Africa and Canada are the only other countries that 
have signed the Convention, but are yet to ratify it. 
703
 Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act of 1948, 18 United States Code 645; 683. 
704
 Earlier citation at footnote 3 above. 
705
 Act 18 of 1986, codified in Title 31 United States Code and 31 Code of Federal Regulations. 
706
 US PATRIOT ACT of 2001. The AML provisions in this Act are contained mainly in Title III of 
the Act. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
232 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
clear depiction of the current AML legal regime discussed in Part 1 of this 
paper. But here, too, the laws do not cater for cyberlaundering. 
Also, as regards cybercrime, the US has a federal law entitled Fraud and 
Related Activity in Connection with Computers Act.
707
 This law prohibits the 
unauthorized use of computers to commit crimes such as espionage, 
accessing unauthorized information, accessing non-public government’s 
information by computer, damage to computer, extortionate threats to damage 
a computer, and trafficking in passwords.
708
 Other relevant laws include the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,
709
 the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986,
710
 the National Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996,
711
 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,
712
 the US PATRIOT Act of 
2001, and the Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002.
713
 Nowhere is the 
conduct of cyberlaundering prescribed in any of these laws. In spite of its 
increasingly glaring manifestations,
714
 cyberlaundering is not as yet a legal 
concept under US law. 
However, unlike most other local jurisdictions, the US is unique for the fact 
that it has extremely well-resourced agencies which have the capacity to 
regulate cyberlaundering. These are the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and the Drug 
                                                          
707
 Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers Act 1986, 18 United States Code 1030. 
708
 These categories of cybercrime are detailed extensively in Act. 
709
 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 1984, 18 United States Code 1030. 
710
 Electronic Communications Privacy Act 1986, 18 United States Code 2510. 
711
 National Infrastructure Protection Act 1996, 2 United States Code 3488. 
712
 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998, 17 United States Code 2860 (Public Law 105-304). 
713
 Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002, 18 United States Code 5710. 
714
 See discussion in Chapter 6 below, paragraph 6.5. 
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Enforcement Administration (DEA). Each of them is looked into more 
closely below. 
 
4.3.3.5.1 The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
The FBI is a multi-tasked law enforcement agency in the US. It has highly 
specialized investigative techniques with which to combat high profile 
crimes, such as money laundering and cybercrime. Although cyberlaundering 
activities are known to it, given that the concept is yet to be categorized 
legally under federal law, the FBI’s response to it has been somewhat loathed. 
Certain divisions of the FBI, such as the Internet Fraud Complaint Centre 
(IFCC) and the National White Collar Crime Centre (NWC3) are dedicated to 
unravelling the phenomenon of cyberlaundering.
715
 However, the FBI is yet 
to publish a concrete report on its various investigatory surveys on 
cyberlaundering, as well as its reports on cyberlaundering cases. 
 
4.3.3.5.2 The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is a specialized 
enforcement agency under the US Department of Treasury. It provides 
specialist intelligence on financial crimes, and enforces the set regulatory 
measures set out in the Bank Secrecy Act and the Money Laundering Control 
Act. Thus, the FinCEN monitors the observance of CDD standards required 
                                                          
715
 International Finance Corporation (2009: 3). 
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for most financial institutions in the US, and other concerned parties.
716
 After 
9 September 2011, with the enactment of the US PATRIOT Act, the mandate 
of the FinCEN was broadened to include monitoring terrorist financing 
initiatives related to money laundering activities. Just like the FBI, the 
FinCEN is still trying to come to grips with the phenomenon of 
cyberlaundering. In its Strategic Plan for the Fiscal Years of 2008-2012, there 
is a blueprint for research into ways of combating internet-based money 
laundering activities (i.e. cyberlaundering).
717
 However, the FinCEN is yet to 
issue an actual report on the subject. 
 
4.3.3.5.3 The Drug Enforcement Administration 
The DEA is an enforcement agency tasked with controlling the sale and 
distribution of illegal drugs in the US, as a response to the fact that the US 
has since been a haven for such activities.
 718
 Today, this business also uses 
tools for cyberlaundering. Realizing the many dangers that electronic 
payment systems create, as a composite part of the cyberlaundering concept, 
the DEA has in recent times delegated its focus on this area to its special 
division known as the National Drug Intelligence Centre (NDIC).
719
 
                                                          
716
 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2012) ‘About’ an internet webpage available at <http:// 
www.fincen.org/resource> [accessed on 17 June 2011]. 
717
 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2008B: 4). 
718
 Though a US-based agency, the DEA has 86 offices in over 62 countries, due to the transnational 
nature of the illicit drug trade business. Recent studies show that the illicit drug trade in the US is 
worth around $65 billion. See <http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/money.html> [accessed on 30 
January 2012]. 
719
 See <http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/money.html> [accessed on 30 July 2010]. 
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Given a scenario where a drug dealer is caught with prepaid cards, the 
question arises whether the seizure of such cards would ordinarily hinder the 
business of the suspect, as opposed to the seizure of hard cash. Given the fact 
that a single prepaid card can be accessed by more than one party, this 
becomes a danger, as the electronic funds on the card can still be accessed by 
the accused person’s accomplice.720 With the DEA’s bringing this issue to 
light, a new law was enacted in the State of Nevada called the SB-82,
721
 
which came into effect on 1 July 2009. This law allows law enforcement 
officers to investigate suspicious pre-paid card transactions and cases of fraud 
that occur within the State of Nevada. In order to prevent criminals from 
removing funds from a prepaid card after seizure, with the requisite warrant, 
funds on the prepaid card can be frozen for up to 10 days after such seizure. 
In certain instances, the SB-82 allows authorities to seize without a warrant 
funds loaded onto a pre-paid card.
722
 Although not of a federal character, this 
legislative initiative is a good ACL legal measure that will help in the 
prosecution of cyberlaundering. The viability and legal ramifications of this 
law are considered closely in Chapter 5 of this study. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
720
 This scenario and its legal ramifications are considered more in depthly in Chapter 6 of this study. 
721
 NV Senate Bill 82-75
th
 (BDR 14-266). 
722
 National Drug Intelligence Program (2010: 61). 
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4.4 SUMMARY 
Apart from all its other intricate complexities, cyberlaundering is a 
conceptual problem. There is no current ACL legal regime because a legal 
comprehension of the concept and an understanding of its convoluted legal 
ramifications are presently lacking. Investigators and prosecutors therefore 
cannot identify it properly, which, in turn, means that it cannot be effectively 
prosecuted.  
The present AML legal regime is well-established, with properly entrenched 
international laws and policies that have been transplanted properly into most 
local jurisdictions. However, lawmakers and enforcers constantly negate the 
fact that money laundering is not a static type of crime, for unlike other 
crimes, it continues to evolve. The current AML laws remain behind the ever-
changing nature of cyberlaundering. The laws are therefore unsuited to 
combat cyberlaundering at both the national and international level. This 
problem can be described metaphorically as an old wine in a newly-shaped 
wine bottle, which cannot fit into the old wine cellar. Hence, there is a 
pressing need to ‘reconstruct the wine cellar’ in order to accommodate this 
new phenomenon, failing which cyberlaunderers will remain beyond the 
reach of law enforcers.  
This study also prompts the question as to why the present laws regulating 
money laundering and cybercrime cannot work against cyberlaundering.
723
 
As in the game of dart, these laws only shoot around the base, and not 
                                                          
723
 See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of this rationale. 
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directly at the red dot. A proper regulatory legal framework needs to be 
established, and concrete laws are needed to match this new phenomenon. 
The next two chapters of this study seek to do just that. 
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CHAPTER 5 
REGULATING CYBERLAUNDERING 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Regulation is a critical and highly relevant factor in establishing a legal 
framework to combat cyberlaundering. The need for regulation forms the 
crux of the anti-cyberlaundering (ACL) legal regime. This chapter is 
dedicated to finding appropriate regulatory measures for cyberlaundering.  
As a starting point, it outlines the rationale that underscores the task of 
regulating cyberlaundering, after which it discusses certain issues that pose as 
barriers to its regulation. The chapter looks at how cyberlaundering can be 
combatted by adapting some of the existing apparatus that exists to deal with 
money laundering. This approach is employed for founding the necessary 
pillars for the ACL legal regime, such as the prevention, enforcement and 
compliance pillars. These pillars, which presently make up the current anti-
money laundering (AML) legal regime, can be adapted to suit purposes of the 
needed anti-cyberlaundering (ACL) legal regime. However, in this chapter, 
the regulatory possibilities in relation to the prevention and compliance pillars 
alone are considered. The enforcement pillar, which concerns prosecutorial 
issues related to cyberlaundering, is discussed separately in the next chapter 
of this study,
724
 along with certain technicalities involved in establishing an 
                                                          
724
 See Chapter 6 that follows. 
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ACL legal regime.
725
 In addition to examining the existing AML pillars, 
where applicable, certain anti-cybercrime (ACC) principles are also 
considered as possible solutions. 
 
5.2 RATIONALE FOR REGULATION  
Several questions brew beneath the campaign for a solid ACL legal regime. 
One might ask: Do we really need new laws against cyberlaundering? Are not 
existing laws sufficient to deal with the problem? These questions all point to 
the importance of regulating cyberlaundering, as they call into question the 
need for regulation.  These questions have been answered in part in preceding 
chapters that show that there are currently no national and international legal 
frameworks for combating cyberlaundering.
726
 However, the other part of the 
equation, which stems from the inadequacy of present laws, is the very 
essence of this current study, being an investigation into how present laws 
can be modified to cater for cyberlaundering, failing which new laws become 
necessary. It follows that an adaptive approach is necessary for erecting a 
strong regulatory pillar for the ACL legal regime, together with the task of 
fashioning out new regulatory measures.  
It is important to state at this outset that the regulatory framework against 
cyberlaundering set out in this study does not pertain to laws and law-makers 
alone, but also to single and collaborative efforts of individuals upon whom a 
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 See Chapter 6, paragraph 6.6. 
726
 See detailed discussions in Chapter 4 of this study, dealing with the present national and 
international legal framework for cyberlaundering. 
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duty exists to report suspicious transactions.
727
 This also includes law 
enforcement authorities and other natural as well as juristic persons to which 
the issue relates. Indeed, the AML legal regime is incompatible with the 
concept of cyberlaundering. This is because there is a mismatch between the 
AML laws and the phenomenon of cyberlaundering.
728
 
The rationale of this study is premised on the notion that the regulation of 
cyberlaundering is needed in order to stem its growth, which is not only 
taking a heavy toll on the economy, with rippling effects on both local and 
international commerce,
729
 but which also undermines the global AML legal 
regime. 
                                                          
727
 See the AML principles set out in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.3.2. 3. Recommendation 23 of the Forty 
Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force provides that, other than financial 
institutions, the duty to report is also incumbent on lawyers, notaries, other independent legal 
professionals and accountants who engage in the activities of their clients, such as real estate 
transactions; management of client money and other assets including securities; management of 
bank, savings and securities accounts; creation, operation or management of legal persons or 
arrangements; buying and selling of business entities, and the organisation of contributions for the 
creation, operation or management of companies. See Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 20). Cf 
Financial Action Task Force (2003: 8). Also, the obligation is incumbent upon non-financial 
entities, such as dealers in precious metals or stones, as well as trust and company service providers. 
Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 20). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 16). 
728
 To put this into further perspective, for example, the customer due diligence and reporting standards 
ensconced in the current AML legal regime (see Recommendations 5 to 12 of Forty 
Recommendations plus Nine Special Recommendations, Financial Action Task Force (2004: 12)) 
cannot be adopted wholly for cyberlaundering purposes. Given the reality of terrestrial banking, for 
instance, where customers are required to be present at the place where transactions are conducted, 
the problem is not only whether certain online banks can adhere to these reporting and record-
keeping requirements, but also whether the information provided by the customer or user, which 
they might be required to keep, is true and viable. This further makes it difficult, if not impossible 
to enforce the Know Your Customer (KYC) principle. Cf discussions in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.1 
and Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.2.1. 
729
 When illicit funds are eventually integrated into the legal economy, the entire commercial sector is 
tainted with illegality, meaning that traceability of such funds becomes impossible, and measures 
set in place to maintain the stability of the economy also become undermined. As this forms one of 
the driving factors forcing countries into recession, in the end, the integrity and stability of financial 
institutions and systems are affected negatively; international investment is discouraged and 
international capital flows are distorted. Presumably, over $4 trillion in illicit funds are laundered 
on an annual basis, and, even more frightening, about 5% to 7% of the world’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) is laundered annually [Schott (2006: 12) and Unger (2007:  151)].  In fact, the scale 
has reached such an enormous magnitude that the Financial Action Task Force chooses not to 
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5.3 REGULATORY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
The regulation of cyberlaundering is not without certain issues and concerns 
that hinder its effectiveness and realization. Some of these issues, which will 
be discussed here, include corporate concerns, the fluidity of the 
cyberlaundering problem, enforcement challenges and general regulatory 
problems associated with the roots of cyberlaundering. 
 
5.3.1 Corporate concerns 
The regulation of cyberlaundering demands a traversing of certain corporate 
interests. This is attributable to the fact that most websites that perpetuate 
cyberlaundering operations are actually profit-driven businesses and 
enterprises.
730
  This is evidenced by the preponderance of the e-commerce 
industry and its unprecedented growth over recent years, propelled by the 
exponential increase in the use of electronic payment (e-payment) systems, 
which are, in turn, also fostered by activities of prepaid card companies.
731
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
publish estimates, because the sporadic nature of the problem renders all given estimates fallible 
and, consequently, unreliable. Without the regulation of the current exponential viability of 
cyberlaundering, these figures are set to triple within a short space of time. See Financial Action 
Task Force (2012) ‘Frequently Asked Questions: Money Laundering’ available at <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en _32250379_32235720 _1_1_ 1_1_1,00.html> [accessed on 21 March 
2011]. Also see Schott (2006: 12) and International Monetary Fund (2008: 1). Cf Unger (2007:  
151) and Tanzi (2005: 91) and elaborate discussions in Chapter 1, paragraph 1.4.3 and Chapter 2, 
paragraph 2.2.5. 
730
 Good examples are the websites E-gold Ltd and Megaupload Ltd. Cf discussion in Chapter 6, 
paragraph 6.5. 
731
 E-commerce is steadily gaining dominance within the global financial sector, representing a 
significant part of overall commerce. For example, in the United States (US), e-commerce 
represents about 10.8% of the total economy, jumping from $185 billion dollars in 2008 to $205 
billion dollars in 2009. See Javelin Strategy & Research ‘Online Retail Payments Forecast 2010 – 
2014: Alternative Payments Growth Strong but Credit Card Projected for Comeback’ 03 June 2011 
<https://www.javelinstrategy.com/research/Brochure-171> [accessed on 4 March 2012]. Cf detailed 
discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.3.1. 
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Law enforcement bodies are thus engaged in a power struggle with big 
corporations that thrive on these businesses. Other than websites and prepaid 
card companies, such corporate concerns are echoed by financial institutions 
that also need to also implement new measures against cyberlaundering. 
However, lessons from the past suggest that this task is not an easy one, 
especially on the part of banks.
732
 
Corporate fears can be allayed by setting the two opposing interests on a 
scale: On the one hand is the public interest that government and law 
enforcement authorities seek to protect by putting in place strict ACL 
measures, and on the other hand, is the potential loss of profit that 
corporations might lose by implementing such measures, if such risk exists at 
all. In the end, the fact that the scale is tipped in favour of implementing such 
ACL measures would not really be an issue. The problem is having such laws 
approved in by the legislature, where lawmakers representing diverging 
interests are represented.  Fears escalate when one considers the current 
widespread nature of corporate bribery,
733
 where corporations try to ‘grease 
                                                          
732
 In the early days of the AML legal regime in the United States, with the advent of the Bank Secrecy 
Act of 1970 (PubL 91-508; 841114), most financial institutions opposed the law, due to allegations 
that it undermines their corporate interests. In the case of California Bankers Association v Schultz 
39L ed 2d 812 (1974) n5, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law. Cf previous 
discussion in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.2.1. 
733
 Corporate bribery, also known as corporate graft, is alarmingly commonplace amongst thriving 
corporations today. These corporations continue to use the advantage of their position and influence 
in commerce to derive gains and benefits from government officials, both at home and abroad. For 
example, in the US, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (Title 15, United States Code, Public 
Law 95-213) bars American companies and foreign companies, whose securities are traded in the 
US, from paying bribes to government officials abroad. Recently, about 78 American corporations 
were under investigations for violating the provisions of the Act. The corporations include Alcoa, 
Goldman Sachs, Avon, Pfizer, Hewlett-Packard, and Wal-Mart stores and Kellog Brown & Root 
(also known as KBR). The latter company is the only one currently facing criminal charges under 
the Act. See Leslie, W (2012) ‘Hits and Misses in a War on Bribery’ An internet article dated 10 
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the palms’ of lawmakers to ensure that the laws passed in the end are in their 
‘corporate favour.’ This is the heart of the regulatory issue. It is a steep 
barricade to the regulation of cyberlaundering. 
 
5.3.2 Fluidity of the cyberlaundering process 
As long as the internet exists, the potential of it being used as a weapon for 
criminals will continue to exist. It would be totally wrong to think that the 
demerits of the internet exceed its merits, and most absurd to suggest that the 
internet should be banned or outlawed in order to stop internet criminality. 
This notion is very unrealistic, given how the internet has grown to become 
an essential part of daily living.
734
 Hence, the only logical resolve would be to 
cut the branch (i.e. cyberlaundering) without necessarily rooting out the tree 
(i.e. the internet). But how does one regulate a growing problem without 
reaching to its roots? This is another principal challenge facing the regulation 
of cyberlaundering. Cyberlaundering is a moving a target, changing shape, 
guises and adapting with increasingly new technological features. A good 
example of this is the concept of virtual worlds,
735
 which is probably the most 
dynamic cyberlaundering avenue to date, given its mystifying nature. Where, 
for instance, virtual worlds have become properly regulated, chances are that 
                                                                                                                                                                         
March 2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11 /business /corporate-bribery-war-has-hits-and-a-
few-misses.html?pagewanted=all > [accessed on 4 March 2012]. Internationally, corporate bribery 
is regulated under Articles 21 and 26 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 31 October 2003 and entered into force on 15 
December 2005). 
734
 Cf discussion on the computer element, under the elements of cyberlaundering in Chapter 3, 
paragraph 3.2.4.2. 
735
 Cf discussions on virtual worlds in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.5. 
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cyberlaunderers could sniff out other diabolically innovative avenues for their 
operations. This study nevertheless attempts to grapple with the problem as it 
presently exists, in the belief that the proposed regulatory measures would 
become thresholds for other potential regulatory measures, where other 
cyberlaundering avenues emerge in the future. 
 
5.3.3 Enforcement challenges 
It is commonplace that newly enacted laws take time before they gain 
currency and become established firmly within society. This is so where such 
laws differ radically from existing norms. The efficacy of any law depends 
entirely on whether the right systems exist to enforce such laws effectively. 
Enforcing the law is a challenge when one looks to see what mechanisms 
already exist to enforce such laws. This is not a problem when existing 
enforcement mechanisms work.  
Given that the enforcement mechanisms needed for cyberlaundering are put 
in place by governments, the problem arises where governments and their 
respective authorities are wholly incompetent or incapable of enforcing the 
needed regulatory measures against cyberlaundering because of a lack of 
political will and the resources. When it comes to fighting crime, countries 
have diverging priorities. Based on what was stated in Chapter 4 above,
736
 a 
strong international standard is yet to be forged against cybercrime, as is 
evidenced by the nonexistence of a concrete international treaty or convention 
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 See Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.2.3. 
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on cybercrime. The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime
737
 (the 
Budapest Convention) is worth noting, even though it has a regional effect. 
Countries have such diverging priorities, not because cybercrimes are 
generally more prevalent in some countries than others, but because the shoe 
pinches them from other sides. These countries consider other issues to be 
more pressing, such as crimes that threaten national security.
738
  
Also, some countries lack the capacity. This is the case especially in 
developing countries.  The fact that it is difficult to solicit and obtain the 
requisite cooperation from such countries, makes regulation almost 
unfeasible. Such countries cannot be relied upon to regulate cyberlaundering. 
However, ignorance of the crime of cyberlaundering blinds many to the 
countless dangers it harbours. The massive impact that it has on the economy 
is unfathomable, and this is happening when countries are struggling to 
stabilize their economies. The unfortunate thing is that ignorance of the crime 
blinds one to its effects, for comprehending the effects first demands an 
understanding of the crime. 
 
 
                                                          
737
 The Convention was drawn up by the Council of Europe in Strasburg, with participation of the 
Council of Europe, as well as the observer states Japan, Canada and China. The Convention was 
adopted by the Committee of the Ministers of the Council of Europe at its 109th session on 08 
November 2001. On 23 November 2003, it was open for signature in Budapest, and on 1 July 2004, 
it came into force. As at 9 March 2012, the Convention had been ratified by 32 states parties. In 
tandem with the Convention is the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime: Additional 
Protocol to the Convention adopted by the Council of Europe on 7 November 2002 and came into 
force on 1 March 2006. For more information see the Treaties Office of the Council of Europe at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/> [accessed on 9 February 2012]. Cf discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 
4.3.2.3. 
738
 Smith (2003: 4). Cf Bell (2002: 320). 
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5.3.4 Problems associated with the roots of cyberlaundering 
At the beginning of this study, the issues of money laundering and 
cybercrime were identified and explored as the main roots of 
cyberlaundering.
739
 The discussion also pointed out that these concepts are 
not without their individual regulatory problems.
740
 Given this fact, these 
probems have been transposed onto the notion of cyberlaundering, further 
convoluting the phenomenon and making the issue of its regulation more 
complicated. For example, as regards cybercrime, the field of computer 
forensics has not reached a state of full-fledged development. This fact 
impacts on the overall regulation of cybercrime
741
 which, in turn, impacts on 
the regulation of cyberlaundering, further suppressing potential regulatory 
measures against it. 
Given the concepts of money laundering and cybercrime, as roots of 
cyberlaundering, and building on the premise that these two roots are 
discordant concepts that are each burdened with separate regulatory 
challenges, the principles that will be discussed explain how cyberlaundering 
can be regulated by means of adapting existing measures against money 
laundering and cybercrime. This will be called the ‘adaptive approach’ in the 
discussion below. 
                                                          
739
 See Chapter 2, paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 for detailed discussions on these concepts as the two pillars 
on which the cyberlaundering rests. 
740
 See Chapter 2, paragraphs 2.2.5 and 2.3.4.2. 
741
 American Academy of Forensic Sciences (2011: 14). Cf Reyes, Brittson, O’Shea, and Steele, 
(2007: 33). The other glaring fact is that cybercrime laws are not commonly uniform across major 
countries. This is due partly to the fact that there is currently no one true international legal 
framework umbrella addressing the problem, and the fact that the few that exist are not fully 
incorporated into national laws. Cf discussion in Chapter 6, paragraph 6.6 and Chawki (2003: 49).  
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5.4   AN ADAPTIVE APPROACH TO REGULATING 
CYBERLAUNDERING 
The adaptive approach to regulating cyberlaundering is tied to the central tent 
pole established by the current anti-money laundering (AML) legal regime, 
which is upheld by the compliance, prevention and enforcement pillars.
742
 
Also, as a necessary scaffold required for supporting this tent pole, certain 
anti-cybercrime (ACC) principles are also adapted, particularly for the 
enforcement pillar. This approach is desirous because the loopeholes created 
by cyberlaundering can be filled easily, laying a strong foundation for a 
formidable anti-cyberlaundering (ACL) legal regime. In keeping with the 
adaptive approach, the current ACL legal regime could stand on the existing 
pillars forming the current AML legal regime without faltering. With this in 
mind, the following discussion reflects various measures that are needed to 
adapt the pillars of the current AML legal regime to suit the purposes of a 
developing ACL legal regime. Therefore, possible regulatory measures 
against cyberlaundering through all three pillars of the present AML legal 
regime are assessed below by identifying what can be done in each pillar to 
regulate the problem. As noted earlier, the enforcement pillar, which is the 
third pillar of the current AML legal regime, entailing prosecutorial issues of 
cyberlaundering, is only discussed in the next chapter of this study. The 
prevention and compliance pillars are discussed here. 
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 See Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2. 
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5.5 PREVENTION PILLAR FOR THE ACL LEGAL REGIME 
Prevention represents an important regulatory phase within the broad ACL 
discussion. As part of the adaptive approach employed for the regulation of 
cyberlaundering, with a pragmatic approach, this section sets out ways in 
which cyberlaundering and its growing manifestations can be legally 
curtailed in policy wise. In this section, the ACL prevention pillar is 
discussed under two broad categories: a general approach to cyberlaundering 
regulation, and a target approach to cyberlaundering regulation. While the 
latter is more specific, in that it addresses those thorny issues that continue to 
make cyberlaundering so complicated, the latter deals with regulatory 
measures from a more general perspective. 
 
5.5.1 General preventive measures against cyberlaundering 
There are certain general measures that can be put in place to ensure the 
prevention of cyberlaundering. These are discussed below. 
 
5.5.1.1 Threshold consideration: Premise for regulation 
Cyberlaundering and its relatedness to money laundering and cybercrime 
leads to the fact that some problems associated with both concepts become 
transposed automatically to cyberlaundering. In the same way, the regulatory 
rationale for both concepts should be transposed onto cyberlaundering, where 
applicable. In other words, the inextricable link between cyberlaundering and 
its two root concepts, which are money laundering and cybercrime, should 
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serve as a foundation to regulate it. By constantly taking measures to combat 
the ‘mother crimes,’invariably, cyberlaundering is attacked at the roots, even 
though such measures are not entirely sufficient. Although it is not the 
purpose of this study to explore all the present regulatory mechanisms against 
money laundering and cybercrime, as they are separate fields, the discussion 
now turns to legal measures that are essential to the regulation of 
cyberlaundering from a broad or general perspective. 
 
5.5.1.1.1 Conceptualizing cyberlaundering legally for regulatory purposes 
The first step towards regulating a problem is defining it. This is the primary 
aim of Chapter 3 of this study, which attempts to conceptualize 
cyberlaundering into a legal frame.
743
 The legal conclusion reached was that 
cyberlaundering is essentially money laundering, although the playing field 
(i.e. the internet) where the process takes place is different.
744
 Therefore, a 
person who commits cyberlaundering might be deemed to have committed 
money laundering, although this is hardly the case in practice.
745
 However, 
the same could not be readily said for cybercrime, given that cybercrime itself 
has numerous sub-categories of cybercrimes.
746
 The reason why little is 
known about cyberlaundering, and the reason why the concept has remained 
                                                          
743
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.3. 
744
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.3.3. 
745
 This issue intertwines with the subject of prosecuting cyberlaundering and particularly detection. 
The fact that, currently, authorities are unable to detect cyberlaundering explains why it has not 
been prosecuted as money laundering. This in itself is due to the fact that there is not yet a legal 
framework in place upon which prosecutors can rely to institute criminal proceedings. For further 
details, see discussion in Chapter 6, paragraph 6.5. 
746
 See discussion in Chapter 3, 3.2.4.1. 
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elusive, is simply because policymakers do not understand the problem. This 
is the root problem of cyberlaundering, which demands urgent redress. 
Thus, as a fundamental first step to regulation, this study holds the position 
that cyberlaundering should be expressly included into the definition of 
money laundering. It should also be included into the rubric of cybercrime, 
but as a separate category within it. In other words, cyberlaundering should 
be criminalized as money laundering and cybercrime. This proposal is 
supported further by the fact that the elements of cyberlaundering fit well into 
the elements of the crimes of money laundering and cybercrime.
747
  
This approach has the advantage that the problem would be addressed from 
the two legal sides of money laundering and cybercrime. It implies that the 
present legal measures against both these two subject areas can be harnessed 
against cyberlaundering as well. And where the legal remedies available 
against one of the ‘mother crimes’ prove insufficient for the regulation of 
cyberlaundering, especially with the likelihood that cyberlaundering will 
                                                          
747
 As pointed out in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.4.2, the elements of cyberlaundering include a predicate 
offence, illegal funds, an activity, a computer (actus reus); the knowledge of the illegal funds and 
an associative intention with the illegal funds (mens rea). These elements also constitute the 
elements of the crime of money laundering, save for the requirement of a computer. The object of 
the crime of money laundering is the same as that of cyberlaundering. The object of the crime here 
includes the violation of government or state activities and its management system by causing 
instability in its financial sector. It also includes obstructing the normal activities of the judicial 
investigation of crime, as well as the objective aspect of the performance which entails the disguise 
and concealment of the proceeds of the relevant criminal activity. The purpose of criminalising 
money laundering is, in the first place, to safeguard certain protected interests, such as the health of 
the economy and the judicial process. By criminals succeeding with their money laundering 
operations, these protected interests are violated. For cybercrime, on the other hand, given that the 
minimum requirement here is for the violation of a right or interest to have occurred with the 
instrumentality of information technology or a computer, the ambit is wide enough to accommodate 
the concept of cyberlaundering. See Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.4.2 for more details. 
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evolve into newer forms in the future,
748
 one can always rely on the legal 
remedies available to the other against cyberlaundering. As such, the legal 
frameworks for each of these separate concepts would target the problem, 
with better hopes of curbing it.
749
 
 
5.5.1.1.2 Fighting predicate offences 
The rationale that underlies money laundering is that a crime must have been 
committed from which a criminal derives funds. The purpose of laundering 
the funds is to conceal or disguise the illegal proceeds in order to create a 
veneer of legality. Given the premise that cyberlaundering covers the nature 
of money laundering, just as with money laundering, the crime is predicated 
on an earlier offence committed. In other words, the proceeds in question 
must have been derived from a crime committed previously in order to 
constitute cyberlaundering. Therefore, it follows that combating the 
respective predicate offences is tantamount to fighting cyberlaundering. 
As established previously, with predicate offences, an expansive approach is 
followed, as the norm is to cast the net as wide as possible in order to cater 
                                                          
748
 Cf discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.6. 
749
 Cf Chapter 6, paragraph 6.6 below for discussion on how this can be effected in practice. Where 
cyberlaundering becomes part of the current AML and anti-cybercrime (ACC) legal regimes, in 
consequence, it will fall under the legal regulatory umbrellas of these two legal regimes. 
Interestingly, recently, a proposal was made for the establishment of an International Criminal 
Court or Tribunal for Cyberspace (ICTC) which shall have jurisdiction to hear cybercrime offences, 
and which shall have a structure that is analogous to existing ones, such as the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Schjolberg (2011: 6). If this recommendation ever sees the 
light of day, it would help further as a viable regulatory possibility for cyberlaundering. But the 
starting point remains to have cyberlaundering conceptualized legally as a cybercrime. 
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for all serious offences.
750
 Whilst the notion of ‘serious offences’ applies 
equally to cyberlaundering, it is worth noting that the emergence of 
cyberlaundering also came together with other forms of cyber-related 
offences that complement it. Offences such as cyberfraud, internet piracy, 
copyright infringement, hacking and phishing, amongst a host of several 
others, are increasingly becoming very profitable illegal enterprises and 
means through which illegal proceeds are derived.
751
 Unbeknown to many, 
however, technologically-savvy criminals are also potential cyberlaunderers 
who use the same technology (i.e. cyberspace) to ‘wash’ the illicit funds. In 
the end, through the mastery of their operations, the funds appear to be clean, 
without apparent links to their criminal origins.  
Therefore, closer attention should be paid to fighting cybercrimes in general, 
for they are propagating the exponential growth of cyberlaundering. The 
inextricable link between the notion of cyberlaundering and cyber-criminality 
further supports this submission. This is why this study emphasizes the need 
to fortify the current AML and anti-cybercrime (ACC) legal regimes, which 
are currently geared towards fighting money laundering and cybercrime. For 
example, certain regulatory measures such as the policing of the internet and 
the creation of awareness towards internet criminality through education are 
                                                          
750
 See discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.3.2.1. Cf Article 2 of the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (i.e. the Palermo Convention, adopted by the General 
Council of the United Nations on 15 November 2000 and came into force on 29 September 2003) 
and Financial Action Task Force (2003: 3). 
751
 One part of the commercial spectrum that is most stung by these crimes are private companies and 
organisations. A recent study shows that the cost of these offences for companies results in an 
annual loss of up to $36.5 million per company. ArcSight (2011: 3). 
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crucial as they also help to stem the growth of cyberlaundering, although 
indirectly.
752
 
In this way, by tackling these predicate crimes, a major stronghold of 
cyberlaundering is being rooted out. But, of course, the capacity to do this is 
dependent on certain extraneous considerations, particularly whether efficient 
policies exist to ensure that they are suppressed adequately.
753
 
 
5.5.1.1.3 Awareness towards lax jurisdictions 
As another general approach towards preventing cyberlaundering, more 
attention should be given to certain jurisdictions that have been known to 
have lax AML and ACC laws. In the past, the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) blacklisted countries that did not have adequate AML systems. These 
countries were called Non-Cooperative Country or Territories (NCCTs).
754
 
                                                          
752
 Policing the internet is a crucial strategy for fighting cybercrime. Several countries are doing this. 
For example, in the United States, there is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to name a few (Cf discussion in Chapter 4, 
paragraph 4.3.2.4). On the international plane, there is the International Police Organization 
(Interpol). Interestingly, several non-state actors and non-governmental organisations have also 
ceased the reins in the campaign against cybercrime. For example, in the US, one of such is known 
as CyberAngels Internet Safety Program, which is an eduactional training site on cyber safety. (Cf 
for more details see its website at <http://www.cyberangels.org/> [accessed on 4 April 2012]). In 
the United Kingdom, there is the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), which aims to regulate criminal 
internet content. (Cf for more details see its website at <http://www.iwf.org.uk/> [accessed on 4 
April 2012]). There is also Internet Hotline Providers (INHOPE), which caters for the entire 
continent of Europe, and which serves to deter online child abuse. See its website at 
<http://www.inhope.org/gns/home.aspx> [accessed on 4 April 2012]. For a discussion on several 
other strategies against cybercrime, see Furnell (2002: 269) and McQuade (2006: 457). For the 
varied strategies employed against money laundering see Reuvid (1995A: 175), Reuvid (1995B: 
191) and Jones (1995: 195). Cf Zeldin and Florio (2007: 413). 
753
 This issue is strongly linked to the challenges of enforcing the regulation of cyberlaundering 
expressed earlier. This is because most countries are incapable of fighting cybercrime. See 
paragraph 5.3.3 above. 
754
 Some countries that were often on the NCCTs reports were, namely, Cook Islands, The Dominican 
Republic, Angola, Antigua, Egypt, Grenada, Pakistan, Guatemala, Indonesia, Marshall Islands, 
Myansmar, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Philippines, Russia, St. Vincent, the Grenadines and Ukraine. See 
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Although, the FATF has stopped doing this,
755
 it has replaced the blacklisting 
system with a more stylized initiative, which includes having regional and 
sub-regional FATF-Styled Regional Bodies that monitor the progress of the 
AML systems in countries within a particular region.
756
 Most former NCCTs 
are still subjected to close monitoring. Interestingly, these former NCCTs also 
lack the ability to fight cyber-criminality, making the policing of internet 
operations seem like a farce. Where jurisdictions are ill-equipped to fight 
cybercrime in the same jurisdiction where AML laws are neither very strong 
nor weak, the combination presents an attractive template, and constitutes a 
perfect breeding ground for cyberlaundering operations.  
Even in countries with effective AML regimes, because the internet has made 
the world today a global village, jurisdictional boundaries are blurred and the 
legitimacy of the AML systems in those countries is consequently affected. 
Even  from countries with strong AML legal regimes, such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom, for example, it is possible for criminals to 
run websites that are operated in the former NCCTs. This makes local control 
within the relevant jurisdiction, virtually impossible. Thus, former NCCTs, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Financial Action Task Force (2007A: 3) and Financial Action Task Force (an undated internet 
website) ‘Non-Cooperative Country and Territory’ available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document 
/4/0,2340,en_32250379_32236992_33916420_1_1_1_1,00.html> [accessed on 4 April 2011]. 
755
 In October 2006, the FATF announced that there were no countries on its NCCTs list. See Financial 
Action Task Force (an undated internet website) ‘Non-Cooperative Country and Territory’ available 
at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documen t/4/0,2340,en_32250379 _32236992_3 3916420_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 
1,00.html> [accessed on 4 April 2011]. Cf Financial Action Task Force (2007A: 3). 
756
 Some of the FATF-Styled Bodies include the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), 
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the 
Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), 
the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD) and the 
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), as well as the Eastern 
and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESSAMLG). 
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although now delisted, are still viable avenues for the operations of trans-
border criminal activities, especially where the internet is involved. 
Therefore, because criminals will continue to exploit avenues where they 
believe the likelihood of getting caught is slim, it is important to keep focus 
on such jurisdictions and develop an adequate law enforcement infrastructure 
to continually fight money laundering and cyber criminality. This is a crucial 
starting point in preventing cyberlaundering. 
Together with the need to fit cyberlaundering into the legal frame of money 
laundering and cybercrime, and coupled with the need to fight predicate 
offences, the need for awareness of lax jurisdictions is also an important 
aspect of the general preventive measures against cyberlaundering. An 
approach that is more focused on certain problems of cyberlaundering is 
discussed below. 
 
5.5.2 Target approach to cyberlaundering regulation 
The reason why cyberlaundering is so problematic is because it capitalizes on 
existing loopholes in the AML legal regime, thus widening the scope for 
criminal enterprises as a result of technological innovations. As such, it is 
prudent to grapple with those aspects of cyberlaundering that are being 
exploited for criminal operations. This is necessary to concretize the 
prevention pillar of the ACL legal regime, which is the purpose of this 
section. Given the imminence of the problem, one needs to deal with the very 
thorny issues that make cyberlaundering a seemingly elusive and 
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unfathomable problem. Therefore, other than the general approach discussed 
above, a target approach to cyberlaundering is adopted. This consists in 
promulgating regulatory measures for certain identifiable aspects of 
cyberlaundering such as: online banking which requires new CDD measures; 
the issue of anonymity which can be solved with the right cryptography and 
biometry; aspects of electronic payment systems; and online gaming, which, 
for purposes of this study, encompasses virtual worlds and online gambling. 
 
5.5.2.1 Adopting new CDD measures 
The present AML legal regime is largely one-sided, applying mainly to 
financial institutions and other third parties or intermediaries such as 
correspondent banks, legal persons and other non-financial institutions.
757
 
However, these entities are all of a ‘terrestrial’ nature and do not cater for the 
‘cosmic’ nature of cyberlaundering. The other plausible recourse, in the form 
of ACC laws, does little to help the situation, as there are currently no AML 
measures transposed or merged with the notion of cyber criminality – all of 
which, again, reiterates the purpose of this study. What follows is an 
elaboration of the areas where the CDD measures are needed against 
cyberlaundering. These include adopting new Know Your Customer (KYC) 
principles and creating new wire transfer models as a plausible remedy to the 
                                                          
757
 See discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.2.1. 
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current cyberlaundering techniques of online banking
758
 and online 
auctioneering.
759
 
 
5.5.2.1.1 Modifying the KYC principle 
With regard to CDD measures for banks, and for the typical bank-customer 
relationship, the KYC principle is one that is ingrained in the prevention 
pillar of the current AML legal regime. It represents a vetting process 
conducted by banks which, essentially, requires banks to be fully aware of the 
profile of prospective clients or customers prior to transacting with them,and 
for subsequent future transactions.
760
 The FATF’s Recommendation 20 
requires financial institutions to have a basic knowledge of their transacting 
customers.
761
 In recent times, this principle has been further expanded by the 
Wolfsberg Group.
762
 With its often advocated risk-based approach, which 
requires financial institutions to identify the criteria to measure potential 
money laundering risks with every case scenario, and judged on its own 
merit,
763
 the Wolfsberg Group adds its bit to fortifying the KYC principle. 
Thus, the KYC principle is the precondition laid down for a financial 
institution wishing to transact with prospective customers. Although a 
                                                          
758
 Cf discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.1. 
759
 Cf discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.2. 
760
 See discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.3.1.1. 
761
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 11). Cf Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 
12). 
762
 Cf discussion on the Wolfsberg Group of Banks in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.2.1.1. See also footnote 
401 above. 
763
 The risk-based approach requires banks to look at the inherent risks involved in banking with a 
customer. This entails a more detailed analysis of the customers, their background and their 
respective personal circumstances. Cf discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.1.5. 
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continuous application of this measure to subsequent customer transactions 
might seem unnecessarily monotonous and mundane, the KYC principle 
should be applied throughout the duration of the bank-customer 
relationship.
764
  
The debacle here is simply that the applicability of the KYC principle, as 
stipulated by the current AML legal regime, does not extend to online 
banking
765
 and several other online transactions.
766
 The very essence of the 
problem is the possibility of multiple parties having access to a single online 
bank account, provided that the log-in information is at hand. Hence, as a 
result, the actual identity of the customer or user of the online banking 
services cannot be ascertained. This gets compounded further by reason of the 
fact that most online banks without terrestrial offices welcome all manner of 
applications from prospective customers who wish to open an account online, 
without resorting to the vetting process usually conducted by terrestrial 
financial institutions. As such, the same rigid KYC safeguards that would 
have been conducted for potential customers in the normal course of events 
cannot be similarly performed with respect to a prospective customer of an 
online bank. 
                                                          
764
 Financial Action Task Force (2004: 4). Cf The Wolfsberg Group (2003: 2). 
765
 Cf discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.1. 
766
 Online transactions are non-face-to-face transactions that fall within the broader ambit of higher 
risk scenarios, which, by virtue of Recommendation 5 of the Forty plus Nine Special 
Recommendation of the FATF, calls for enhanced customer due diligence (CDD) measures. This 
has roots in Recommendation 8 of the Forty Recommendations, which provides that financial 
institutions should have policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks associated 
with non-face to face business relationships or transactions. The latter provision should also be read 
with the Basel CDD paper (section 2.2.6) which provides that, before financial institutions accept 
risks, there must be adequate CDD measures to mitigate higher risks. See Financial Action Task 
Force (2004: 4) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 4). 
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The Electronic Banking Group of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) proposed a solution to this quandary in its 2001 report 
on risk management principles.
767
 The report assesses the applicability of the 
KYC principle and certain other due diligence requirements to non-face-to-
face customers. The BCBS proposes that banks should apply the same 
customer identification procedures to non-face-to-face customers as is done 
in the case of face-to-face customers who are subjected to an interview. This 
is expressed below: 
[Financial institutions are advised to mitigate higher risks by ensuring the] 
certification of documents presented; requisition of additional documents to 
complement those which are required for face-to-face transactions; independent 
contact with the customer of the bank; third party introduction, e.g. by an 
introducer [subject to any criteria] or requiring the first payment to be carried out 
through an account in the customer’s name with another bank subject to similar 
customer due diligence standards.
768
  
 
Regardless of the stringent nature of this recommendation, it still does not 
solve the problem. 
As a starting point, and as a result of the above, two categories of financial 
institutions should be identified for the purpose of ensuring that the KYC 
principle can be applied against cyberlaundering. These include, on the one 
hand, financial institutions having both terrestrial and cyberspace presence, 
                                                          
767
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 90). 
768
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 81). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2004: 4). 
Brackettted words are the author’s. 
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and, on the other hand, financial institutions present in cyberspace but 
without a terrestrial presence. 
 
(a.) Financial institutions with a terrestrial presence 
At the time of the BCBS’s report, the first category of financial institutions 
was predominant. Online banks without a terrestrial presence were, at the 
time, almost inconceivable. Hence, its recommendation would perfectly suit 
those online banks that have a terrestrial presence, and it would be logical to 
require potential customers wishing to open an online account at a bank to be 
physically present, at least at the initial phase. This would enable the bank to 
vet the customer, which means having a face-to-face interview with every 
customer. After this process, customers could begin to conduct banking 
transactions online. By so doing, the bank can conduct the necessary 
verifications and thus act in line with the required KYC principle.  
 
(b.) Financial institutions without a terrestrial presence 
For the second category of financial institutions which operate purely in 
cyberspace, without any terrestrial presence, a more circumspective approach 
should be adopted. Given that the KYC principle is premised on the notion of 
contact (i.e. which often requires meeting with prospective customers for 
purposes of verification) and oversight (i.e. the continuous supervision of the 
customer and subsequent transactions performed), online banks should be 
brought under the KYC principle. As such, because of the grave potential for 
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cyberlaundering that these banks create by operating elusively in cyberspace, 
they should be required to have terrestrial office(s) where their prospective 
customers should also be required to report, as a mandatory first step to 
operating an online bank account. Only in this way can the KYC principle be 
satisfied. 
This study recommends that the distinction between financial institutions 
with a terrestrial presence and those without one should be completely erased. 
This will ensure that the internet and its increasing capabilities do not keep 
growing out of the bounds of existing legal frameworks meant to curtail the 
growth of crime. Therefore, online banks without a terrestrial presence should 
be outlawed. Weighed on a scale, having the notion of convenience that these 
banks create as a mitigating argument on the one hand, and having the 
rationale for regulation on the other hand, the abolition of these banks is 
further justified in the absence of proof that these banks and their activities 
cannot be regulated effectively if their existence is kept in cyberspace alone, 
without a terrestrial presence.  
The same rationale should be transposed to online auctioneering as well. As 
discussed previously, the loophole in this case is in the bidding process, in 
which one bidder outbids other bidders excessively, making the bid 
impossible for other bidders to match, until the object of sale is finally sold to 
him or her.
769
 Where the funds in question are illicit in nature, it would have 
                                                          
769
 In this example it is assumed that the cyberlaunderer exploits a perfectly legitimate online auction 
site. Alternatively, the cyberlaunderer could set up his/her own auction site and even bid with 
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been ‘washed’ successfully. Therefore, just as with online banks, online 
auction sites should conduct CDD measures for all prospective bidders in 
order to ascertain their identities, and they should have a record of each one, 
in order to help potential investigators to ‘follow the money’.  
 
5.5.2.1.2 Adopting new wire transfer models 
Wire transfers are synonymous and essential for the workings of online 
banking which, as discussed already,
770
 is one very prominent avenue that 
aids cyberlaundering. The subject requires some investigation with a view to 
ensuring that the gaping lacunae presented are filled.  
Wire transfers refer to the electronic transfer of funds, meaning the equivalent 
value of funds, at the request of a customer from one bank account to a 
beneficiary account, which is usually another bank.
771
 Of several electronic 
messaging systems that exist today for the trans-border transfer of money, the 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) 
system is the most prominent. It is used amongst most banks today for both 
local and international transfer of funds.
772
 Unlike the local wire transfers, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
him/herself, or the cyberlaunderer could have the assistance of smurfs for the operation. See 
discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.2. 
770
 See elaborate discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.1. 
771
 See discussion in Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.4.7. Cf Kochan (2005: 112), Pillai and Julian (2008: 
219) and Reuter and Truman (2004: 34).  
772
 Widely used the world over, the SWIFT electronic messaging service has earned a good reputation 
amongst banks. It is stated in its website that “SWIFT has its headquarters in Belgium and has 
offices in the world's major financial centres and developing markets. SWIFT provides additional 
products and associated services through Arkelis N.V., a wholly owned subsidiary of SWIFT, the 
assets of which were acquired from SunGard in 2010. SWIFT does not hold funds nor does it 
manage accounts on behalf of customers. It also does not store financial information on an on-going 
basis… [It secures the] exchange of proprietary data while ensuring its confidentiality and 
integrity.” See SWIFT ‘Company Information’ available at <http://www. swift.com /about_ swift 
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international wire transfers pose a problem because they have loopeholes that 
are prone to cyberlaundering operations. The US’ Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) has successfully identified the vulnerability of the 
SWIFT system which criminals have since exploited, as stated in the quote 
below: 
When a bank wants to wire a customer’s money to another bank, one of the 
several types of SWIFT messages may be used as instructions for the transfer. 
This message is sent through SWIFT separately from the actual settlement of the 
funds. When a customer’s bank does not have a direct relationship with the 
ultimate receiving bank [especially with international transfers] banks may use 
either cover payments or serial payments to send money through one or more 
intermediate banks. [In terms of cover payments]... two separate SWIFT 
messages [the MT103 and the MT 202] are sent... The MT 202 sent to the 
intermediary bank did not retain originator and beneficiary information [as the 
MT 103].
773
  
 
A summary of the text above is simply that criminals have been able to use 
wire transfers to launder money through intermediary or correspondent banks 
because there has not been a requirement for their identities to be revealed to 
such intermediary banks in the process. This is because the current system 
used by SWIFT allows for their identities to be concealed. The result is that 
the intermediary banks are completely oblivious to the identities of the person 
sending the funds and the receiver.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
/company_information/index.page?lang=en> [accessed on 15 September 2011]. Cf Chapter 2, 
footnote 69. 
773
 Drug Enforcement Administration: National Drug Intelligence Program (2010: 79). Bracketted 
words are the author’s. 
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In line with the recommendation of the DEA and a prior recommendation by 
the BCBS,
774
 a new type of messaging system needs to be introduced in order 
to ensure that intermediary banks are not sidelined or slighted in the overall 
duty to conduct the requisite CDD measures. Pursuant to the need, in 
November 2010, the DEA’s National Drug Intelligence Program introduced a 
new type of SWIFT messaging system known as the MT 202 COV, which 
seeks to address the issue by enabling intermediary banks to retain both 
originator and beneficiary information on virtually all wire transfers that are 
processed between the originator and the beneficiary banks.
775
 As such, 
whether the relevant intermediary bank is local or international, the 
information is captured regardless of the link it might have with the originator 
bank. Hence, where the MT 202 COV is implemented, intermediary banks 
are put on the same pedestal as other financial institutions, and much would 
be required from them as regards their roles, as they also take up the mantle 
of ensuring that adequate CDD measures are adhered to. In this way, they 
would no longer be operating blindly, and criminals would not exploit their 
functions.
776
 
Apart from the US, where the MT 202 COV has been issued as a compulsory 
guideline for financial institutions which now have a compliance 
obligation,
777
 this system does not yet exists in other countries. As a result, 
                                                          
774
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009: 7). Cf Drug Enforcement Administration: 
National Drug Intelligence Program (2010: 79). 
775
 Drug Enforcement Administration: National Drug Intelligence Program (2010: 79). 
776
 Drug Enforcement Administration: National Drug Intelligence Program (2010: 79). 
777
 Soon after the BCBS made its May 2009 recommendation for the transparency in conducting cross-
border funds transfer, the Board of the Federal Reserve System of the US issued a circular with 
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the vulnerability of wire transfers with SWIFT through intermediary banks 
for cyberlaundering operations still remains in other countries today. 
Therefore, it would be useful to adopt the MT 202 COV or its equivalent in 
other countries as well. Given the very broad and far-reaching nature of 
international wire transfers, it is unhelpful if laws are not harmonized, 
especially, when it comes to combating cyberlaundering.  
 
5.5.2.2 Protected biometry and cryptography 
The problem of anonymity, which is an inextricable feature of the internet, is 
one which has fertilized the growth of cyberlaundering. This is because the 
cyberlaunders consider themselves so unidentifiable, that they resort to the 
platform of the internet, which provides the necessary veil.
778
 This section 
discusses certain ways in which the concern of anonymity can be tempered. 
Primarily, with proper biometric and cryptographic infrastructures in place, 
this is possible. Both issues are explored further. 
 
5.5.2.2.1 Employing biometric methods for identification 
Biometry is any observable or measurable parameter of a person.
779
 It entails 
the identification of humans by those features, traits or characteristics unique 
                                                                                                                                                                         
AML regulations calling for the compliance of all US financial institutions conducting cross-border 
funds transfer. Cf Board of the Federal Reserve System (an undated report) ‘Transparency and 
Compliance for US Banking Organisations Conducting Cross-Border Funds Tranfer’ available at 
<http://federalreserve .gov/ boarddocs/srletters/2009/sr0909a1.pdf > [accessed on 12 April 2012], 
and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009: 7). 
778
 For a detailed discussion on the issue of anonymity and its causal relationship to cyberlaundering, 
see Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.2.3. 
779
 Caloyannides (2004:  291). Cf Jolicoeur (1999: 23) and Paar and Pelzl (2010: 9). 
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to them, such as one’s fingerprint, iris, footprint, retinal pattern; face, hand 
and foot geometry, DNA and dental records, amongst several others.
780
 
Scientifically, amongst its many varied uses, biometric information is used 
for identification purposes, as it can be used to readily identify individuals. Its 
relevance for identification purposes comes out prominently with respect to 
online transactions, as it runs parallel to the problem of anonymity, which 
underlies the problem of cyberlaundering. Not knowing the individual behind 
the computer is a recurring theme of the problem, which correlates with the 
very need to ensure that proper identification measures are in place. The 
ability to identify a person who transacts online could very well transcend 
levels of human ability, because what the eye is able to see as physical proof 
often equates to irrefutable proof, as opposed to what technology can 
produce. This is due mainly to the fact that technology is but a human 
creation at the end of the day, which is not invulnerable to human fallibilities 
such as error, alterations, defacements and variations. Having this in mind, in 
devising ways to ensure the identity if an individual, the most plausible 
solutions should always be concocted.  
For all online transactions, better biometric systems need to be put in place as 
safeguards, especially for those transactions that are of a financial nature. 
When online transactions are performed, the status quo at present requires 
persons to provide only a name and password with which to ascertain that the 
                                                          
780
 In its extended form, biometrics also entails behavioural characteristics such as a person’s voice, 
gait, mannerisms, signature dynamics, one’s key stroke dynamics or other act or expression. Cf 
Caloyannides (2004:  291). 
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person attempting to gain access to the account is the individual who owns 
the account. This often comes with fields on a web page which individuals 
are required to populate with the requisite name and password. This system 
can be described as a single-standard approach, as it operates without the use 
of any biometric feature. This study proposes the need to develop a more 
complex system of identification that would establish a more comprehensive 
biometric infrastructure for online transactions.
781
 This always necessitates 
the need for parties to an online transaction to provide two kinds of 
information: on the one hand, specific information that is only known to him 
or her, and, on the other hand, a biometric feature that relates to his or her 
person.
782
 Adopting such a dual-standard verification system is likely to 
guarantee the identity of persons who perform online transactions. This, to a 
certain extent, ameliorates the concern of anonymity. 
 
5.5.2.2.2 Ensuring better encryption methods 
A message or information which is communicated over the internet is not 
‘transported’ around cyberspace in its bare form. It takes the form of 
encryptions. Within the wider field of cryptography,
783
 encryption is the 
process through which information is transformed, using a cipher or 
                                                          
781
 Kellerman (2004: 16). Cf Caloyannides (2004:  293) and Jolicoeur, (1999: 29). 
782
 Kellerman (2004: 16). This biometric system is currently used when one needs to draw money from 
an ATM machine, which requires the ATM card and a password. It is difficult to follow the same 
safeguard with regard to online transactions. Clearly, this aspect is one which merits some 
technological advancement. This should, however, not be beyond grasp, given the dynamic state of 
technology. 
783
 Cryptography is the study of techniques necessary to secure communication in the presence of third 
parties. Cf Beckett (1988: 22) and Paar and Pelzl (2010: 7). 
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algorithm to make it unreadable to all but the one who possesses special 
knowledge of it.
784
 Encryption has always been a means by which secret 
messages are communicated. As it concerns the issue of cyberlaundering, it 
runs parallel to it, given that it fosters the notion of anonymity, which is what 
makes cyberlaundering to thrive. Given the technological mould within which 
encryption is embedded, criminals freely exchange communications over the 
cyberspace, which goes unchecked. The confidence with which this is done 
feeds off the privacy argument which can be raised in defence against persons 
seeking to pry into private communications.
785
 For example, a cyberlaunderer 
is able to send an encrypted code to a smurf within his/her criminal enterprise 
via any platform of electronic communication, such as an email containing 
the details of certain prepaid cards that hold the value of illicit funds. When 
considered closely, the encryption process in this case, the encrypted code 
that is sent involves mainly two public keys: one to ‘lock’ or encrypt the plain 
text, and the other to ‘unlock’ or decrypt the plain text.786 The first key is 
often held by the sender, and the second by the receiver.  
In certain instances, a system is available that can intercept the 
communication. This often appears as a default third party structure generally 
known as a key recovery, or key escrow system, which is set in place to 
                                                          
784
 Caloyannides (2004:  195). Cf Paar and Pelzl (2010: 13). 
785
 Premised upon the fact that the right to privacy, which includes privacy of communication, is a 
fundamental human right in any democratic state, it remains a viable argument that can be raised 
legitimately and illegitimately. In modern times, it has become a veil under which criminals are 
hiding from law enforcement authorities. See Chapter 6, paragraph 6.2.3 for an extensive discussion 
of the privacy arguement and its merits. 
786
 For more information on the meaning of ‘public key’, see LivingInternet ‘Cryptography’ available 
at <http://www.livinginternet.org/file_crypt> [accessed on 16 August 2011]. Cf Caloyannides 
(2004:  293), Curtin (2005: 11) and Paar and Pelzl (2010: 9). 
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intercept public keys and decrypt the relevant information that transpires.
787
 
The key recovery system has the potential of causing data interception. But it 
is not without problems in practice. For example, in the United States (US), 
the National Security Agency came up with what is known as ‘Clipper Chip’ 
- a key recovery system in the form of an 80-bit encryption infrastructure 
meant to ensure that the US government is able to track encryptions and 
decrypt data.
788
 As a result, once a suspicious transaction is sensed, the 
government can decrypt messages in order to find a trail. However, due to the 
public outcry, mainly privacy concerns,
789
 the Clipper Chip was never fully 
adopted.
790
  
This study argues that the key recovery system is one which is inextricably 
interwoven with the fight against cyberlaundering. While the abrasive and 
unscrupulous monitoring of personal communication is not advocated, it is 
believed that, on the basis of reasonable suspicion, the key recovery system 
serves as the necessary caveat to the often unsupervised system of encryption, 
which is now employed by cyberlaunderers. By ensuring that a mechanism is 
in place that can easily tap into criminal communications, not only would 
                                                          
787
 See LivingInternet ‘Cryptography’ available at <http://www.livinginternet.org/file_crypt> [acces- 
sed on 16 August 2011]. Cf Beckett (1988: 42). The key recovery system is also known as the key 
escrow agency system. See Straub (2002: 531). 
788
 Turner (2011: 161). 
789
 Cf footnote 57 above. For a full elemental discussion of the privacy issue, see Chapter 6, paragraph 
6.2.2. 
790
 At present, the US uses a key recovery system protocol known as the Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) which does not grant any leeway for third party access. Cf footnote 56 above and Turner 
(2011: 161). 
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prosecutors have admissible evidence in court,
791
 but also the loophole of 
anonymity is effectively blocked, and cyberlaundering operations are deterred 
to a great extent. Although the key recovery system represents an essential 
deterrent system, where it is absent, law enforcement authorities could always 
resort to obtaining a court order in order to decrypt an encrypted message 
when there is prima facie proof of suspicious transactions occurring. 
 
5.5.2.3 Regulating electronic payment systems 
As discussed previously,
792
 electronic payment systems (e-payment systems) 
are the instruments with which cyberlaundering is bolstered. In the past, the 
trend with the traditional notion of money laundering was for people to leave 
money overseas, or in some unlikely terrestrial location. But with the rise in 
e-payment systems, people are beginning to ‘leave’ money online, without 
such money being ‘connected to a financial institution, which can change 
hands rapidly between digital identities of the same or different person’.793 
This fact points to the issue of anonymity, which rears its head again through 
e-payment systems. E-payments systems circumvent the KYC principle, 
given that the digital identities of e-payment system users are, in many cases, 
unidentifiable. 
The possible ways of regulating e-payment systems will now be discussed. 
The discussion will also look into the establishing of electronic money 
                                                          
791
 See Chapter 6, paragraph 6.2.3 for further discussion on the issue of evidence gathering as it relates 
to the prosecution of cyberlaundering. 
792
 See detailed discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.3. 
793
 Dementis (2010: 10). 
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institutions, stricter controls for smart cards and the possibility of fusing the 
money-trail with the bit-trail. 
 
5.5.2.3.1 Establishing electronic money institutions 
In its 2009 Directive 2009/110/EC,
794
 the European Union (EU) recommends 
that member states should establish a new model of monetary institution that 
caters solely for the growing emergence of e-money, known as ‘electronic 
money institutions’ (otherwise called e-money institutions).795 By definition, 
an e-money institution is one that is authorised under the Directive to issue e-
money.
796
 The rationale behind this recommendation comes in light of the 
reality that the e-money service providers, including their issuers and agents, 
do not exactly fit the definition of ‘financial institutions’ as generally 
understood,
797
 other than those financial institutions already having e-money 
services which they provide. The scope of e-money service providers as 
envisaged under the directive is quite broad. It encompasses all models of e-
                                                          
794
 Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the 
taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions 
amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC. 
795
 Paragraph 1, Preamble to Directive 2009/110/EC. Cf Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 52). 
796
 The EU defines e-money as an “electronically, including magnetically, stored monetary value as 
represented by a claim on the issuer which is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of making 
payment transactions […], and which is accepted by a natural or legal person or legal person other 
than the electronic money issuer.” See Article 2(2), Directive 2009/110/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential 
supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 
2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC. Cf discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.3.1. 
797
 As regards the term ‘financial institutions’, which, as outlined by the FATF, means any person or 
entity who conducts as a business one or more of the following activities or operations for or on 
behalf of a customer (inclusive of private banking). For an elaborate definition of ‘financial 
institions’ see discussion in Chapter 4, under paragraph 4.2.2.1. See Financial Action Task Force 
(2012A: 115). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 16). 
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payment systems
798
 as long as the services provided involve e-money as 
defined in the directive.
799
 Thus, by reason of the delineation and 
categorization, the rationale is that AML measures can be applied effectively 
to these e-money institutions, as a legal framework is established and proper 
supervision can be ensured. As such, persons (i.e. both natural and legal) who 
do not fulfil the prerequisites laid out in the Directive cannot willy-nilly 
become an e-money service provider. Compared to the services provided by 
financial institutions, e-money institutions are limited in the services they 
provide,
800
 which helps further in identifying deviances in the activities 
engaged in and as well as regulating such activities.  
Notably, amongst several salient measures set out in the Directive, the e-
money institutions are not allowed to outsource their functions to agents or 
third parties.
801
 This ensures that the line between regulated and unregulated 
entities is not blurred by the activities of agents who could be unscrupulous in 
their operations. Also, the provisions pertaining to e-money institutions are 
                                                          
798
 This includes the merchant-issuer model, the bank-issuer model, the non-bank issuer model and the 
peer-to-peer model. For further discussion see Chapter 3, paragraph 3.3.2. 
799
 See footnote 66 above. 
800
 The activities of e-money institutions are set out in Article 6 of the Directive. A summary of these 
activities refers:  
(a.) Provision of payment services;  
(b.) The granting of credit related to payment services;  
(c.) The provision of operational services and closely related ancillary services for the issuing of e-
money or the provision of payment services;  
(d.) The operation of payment systems, and 
(e.) The rendering of business activities other than e-money, with regard to the Community and 
national law. 
801
 Article 3(5) of the Directive. The possibility, however, exists where the requirements under Article 
17 of the Directive are met. 
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not applicable to those institutions that are subsidiaries of a holding company 
located outside of the respective state’s territory.802  
As against cyberlaundering, however, this might be difficult to regulate or 
enforce in practice, given the transnational nature of the problem. This creates 
the possibility that cyberlaunderers who run enterprises that fit the definition 
of e-money institutions may be able to continue rendering such services 
abroad under different aliases or using trusted smurfs. In the end, the veil is 
not pierced and the transnational shield for cyberlaunderers remains strong. 
More importantly, for our purposes, the Directive does not exactly set a limit 
on the value stored on the relevant electronic payment instrument. This is left 
for member states to determine.
803
 There is, however, solace in the fact that a 
monetary limit should be determined, as opposed to where several e-money 
service providers do not set a limit deliberately in order to entice customers. 
But the fear that countries might set unreasonable high value thresholds still 
exists. Having an almost ‘capless’ e-payment instrument has the potential of 
fostering cyberlaundering.
804
 This is why a minimum and maximum threshold 
should be set as well to give even more effect to the purposes of the 
Directive.   
Overall, while the notion of e-money institutions as stated in the Directive 
serves as the much needed basis upon which the exponential exploitation of 
e-payment systems for cyberlaundering operations can be curtailed, the 
                                                          
802
 Article 8(1) of the Directive. 
803
 Article 9(1) of the Directive. 
804
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.3.3.2. 
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loophole is only filled from one side. This is because the Directive has only a 
regional scope. Outside of Europe, the notion of e-money intuitions remains 
an alien concept for many other countries, both in concept and practice.
805
 
This study thus proposes that the legal framework for e-money institutions, as 
contained in the Directive, should be adopted into international and national 
laws. Defining the parameters is a corollary to regulation, and establishing e-
payment institutions to operate separately from the traditional notion of 
financial institutions goes a great length in curtailing and containing the 
illegitimate uses of e-payment systems. 
 
5.5.2.3.2 Stricter controls for smart cards 
Further to the prior discussion, a closer look into smart cards is necessary. 
With the steady rise of prepaid or smart cards as a means of payment,
806
 and 
given the fact that this has become a viable method through which 
cyberlaundering takes place,
807
 it only follows that the loopholes in this 
system that sustain illegitimate activities should be eliminated. To rehash a 
                                                          
805
 Even within Europe, the Directive itself is relatively new. The obligation upon member states to 
enact its stipulated measures came into effect on 1 April 2011, and as with the enactment of new 
laws, enforcement challenges that exist within every sovereign institution remain a bane to the 
effectiveness of the Directive. In the United States (US), a new kind of money services business is 
being considered known as ‘provider of prepaid access;’ which does not take the form of e-money 
institutions as set out in the EU, but only seeks to close some gaps in the regulation of e-payment 
systems. Notably, as opposed to the EU directive, the new system adopted by the US excludes 
certain low value prepaid programs. Cf Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 52) and Federal 
Register ‘Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Renewal with Changes to a Currently Approved 
Collection; the Registration of Money Service Businesses (MSB); FinCen Report 107, To 
Incorporate Changes to The MSB Definitions and Add Provisions for Prepaid Access’ (an internet 
web page dated 10 June 2010) available at <https://www.federalregister.gov /articles/2011/10/06 / 
2011-25607/proposed-collection-comment-request-renewal-with-changes-to-a-currently-approved-
collection-the> [accessed on 20 April 2011]. 
806
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.3.3.  
807
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.3.3.2. 
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few salient points: smart cards are problematic because transactions are often 
not followed or monitored, and, as opposed to the traditional notion of a 
financial institution, there is no central reporting system to conduct the 
needed oversight.
808
 The problem is further compounded by reason of the fact 
that merchants who offer smart card services are usually unscrupulous and do 
not engage in the necessary vetting process for new or potential customers.
809
 
This is another side-effect of not having e-money institutions under which 
such merchants would fall, subjecting them to adopting the requisite AML 
systems. 
The problem with smart cards also crops up when one considers the 
applicability of the AML’s rationale on simplified CDD measures. The 
FATF’s Recommendation 10 provides that financial institutions should 
undertake CDD measures.
810
 There is, however, a caveat to this rule that 
permits some flexibility in its application: (1) For certain financial activities 
that are proven low risk, which includes a financial activity that is carried out 
by a person on an occasional basis, the CDD measures may be not be applied, 
and (2) Reduced or simplified CDD measures may be carried out for low risk 
cases.
811
 Therefore, where a particular financial activity is considered low risk 
or performed occasionally, no CDD measures apply, whilst, to the contrary, 
                                                          
808
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.3.3.2.  
809
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.3.3.2. 
810
 Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 14). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 4) and Financial 
Action Task Force (2010D: 55). 
811
 Financial Action Task Force (2007B: 6), Financial Action Task Force (2009C: 3) and Financial 
Action Task Force (2012A: 14). Cf Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 9), Financial 
Action Task Force (2003: 6), Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 56) and discussion in Chapter 4, 
paragraph 4.2.2.1.5. 
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where an activity is not low risk or not performed occasionally, the standard 
CDD measures apply. Accordingly, simplified CDD measures are applicable 
where the financial activity in question is deemed or judged as low risk. The 
problem with this rationale surfaces through the medium of electronic 
payment systems, where transactions involving smart cards are deemed low 
risk in many jurisdictions.
812
 As a result, the majority of these transactions fly 
under the radar, and are not subject to the application of standard CDD 
measures. Also, if not completely exempted, at the discretion of the relevant 
authority conducting a risk assessment, reduced CDD measures may be 
applied to transactions involving smart cards. When it comes to smart cards, 
such classification that determines the applicability or inapplicability of CDD 
measures are not quite as effective due to the fact that smart cards have the 
potential to perform structured transactions, and transactions can be 
structured under a particular designated threshold with numerous smart cards, 
thereby boycotting the applicability of set CDD standards. This is a 
significant loophole, which, again, points to why the present AML system for 
this system needs to be adapted to suit imminent needs.  
Other than the regulatory possibilities through adapting the existing AML 
legal system, prepaid service providers who issue smart cards should be 
subject to the same CDD and KYC measures by which financial institutions 
                                                          
812
 For example, in Australia, transactions with smart cards involving amounts falling below 1000 
Australian Dollars are completely exempt from the application of AML laws [Section 6(2) of the 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act of 2006]. The EU takes a much 
wider approach, as it regards transactions with smart cards as financial activities, regardless of any 
value limit on the smart card. As a result, these transactions fall within the purview of AML laws. 
However, for designated cases of low risk, simplified CDD measures are applied (Article 11 of 
Directive 2009/110/EC). 
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must abide. Just as is evident in Article 2 of the German Banking Act of 1998 
(Gesetz über das Kreditwesen Kreditwesengesetz - KWG), which extends 
CDD measures to prepaid service providers, this measure should be adopted 
accross the board.
813
 
Also, the smart card should be addressed as a sole entity, given its unique 
characteristics and features. Attention should be paid to the existing 
regulatory systems and how a solution should be carved to solve the dilemma. 
Mentioned briefly is how the DEA has influenced the State of Nevada to 
adopt the SB-82 law, which now enables law enforcement authorities to 
investigate suspicious smart card transactions and freeze the stored value in 
these cards when a criminal is caught with them.
814
 This system is key to 
regulating smart cards, and signals why government authorities should take 
up the reins of regulation, where parties and individual proprietors are not 
willing, because of corporate interests. Whilst this study strongly 
recommends the much-needed adoption of the SB-82 law for the regulation 
of smart cards, it is not oblivious to the herculean nature of its practical 
enforcement on a broad scale.
815
 This is why it might be difficult to regulate 
smart cards by limiting their functions and capacities, by, for instance, 
ensuring that there is a cap on the amount that can be loaded onto these smart 
                                                          
813
 Cf discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.3.2. 
814
 See discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.3.5.3. 
815
 This ties in with the discussion on enforcement challenges faced in the regulation of cyberl- 
aundering. See previous discussion in paragraph 5.3.3 above. See discussion in Chapter 3, 
paragraph 3.3.3.2. 
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cards, contrary to what exists currently.
816
 Although one could argue that by 
limiting the functions and capacities of smart cards the very essence of their 
innovation is gradually eroded, weighed against the dangers they harbour, 
especially in their perpetuation of cyberlaundering operations, the latter 
argument would not hold water. Thus, this study recommends strongly that 
the value of smart cards should be restricted to a particular amount, by 
restricting its turnover limits and by limiting the number of smart cards per 
customer.
817
 Though this might seem quite probable in lieu of regulation, 
such measures can still be circumvented in a world of smurfs, where smurfs 
having smart cards registered in their own name can be operate for the benefit 
of the main party who facilitates the crime. Moreover, this is likely to cause 
an uproar amongst merchants of smart card services, as this might conflict 
with their corporate interests.
818
 
 
5.5.2.3.3 Fusing the money-trail with the bit-trail 
The philosophical and sociological aspects of money centres around the 
notion of exchange, which gradually developed as a corollary to human needs 
and wants, becoming what society now accepts as legal tender. The latter 
concept - legal tender - is, by definition, one that is a medium of payment 
allowed by law or recognized by a legal system to be valid for meeting a 
                                                          
816
 For example, for the purpose of enticing customers, a smart card company known as the Freedom 
Eagle Card does not place a limit on the amount of value to be loaded onto the smart card. 
817
 Cf Ping (2004: 50) and Straub (2002: 534). 
818
 See footnote 76. 
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financial obligation.
819
 This concept forms what is known as the money-trail, 
which exists today in the form of paper currency, such as US Dollars, the 
British Pound Sterling, the European Euro, and so on. However, with the 
advent of modernization, which has spawned technology, and which in turn 
has revolutionized and defied old norms and conventions, money now exists 
in the form of the bit-trail. The bit-trail is essentially what has been the thrust 
of this study, which is the e-payment system, or, more specifically, e-money. 
Whether or not the bit-trail follows as a legal tender, just as the money-trail, 
is contentious, depending on the relevant region, state or society and the 
intentions of the parties involved.
820
 The bit-trail, because of its technological 
ambit, is a contrast to the money-trail, not developing along its lines and its 
form, and given its widely varying nature, both mediums of payment continue 
to grow apart. This also explains why the financial regulatory authorities of 
different governments cannot apply their financial laws, which include AML 
laws, directly to the obtuse bit-trail.  
This reality prompts the rationale that this study posits, which is that the 
money-trail should be fused with the bit-trail as a long-term solution for the 
problem of regulating e-payment systems. This would force the bit-trail under 
                                                          
819
 The Royal Mint (2012) ‘Legal Tender Guidelines’ an internet article available at <http://www 
.royalmint.com/aboutus/policies-and-guidelines/legal-tender-guidelines> [accessed on 22 April 
2012]. Cf Ferguson (2009: 17). 
820
 Following the logic of trade by barter, in terms of which parties to a trade agreement can elect any 
object as choice payment for the relevant goods, the same logic holds with e-money. Accordingly, 
as long as both parties have a unified intention on the object of payment, the issue of legality plays 
a minor role. However, for the purposes of control and regulation, the legality and, or, illegality of 
the object of payment becomes important. We have seen above, through the EU Directive 
2009/110/EC, that the issue of e-money now falls within the purview of regulation, and the 
argument holds that e-money now fits the frame of a legal tender, at least as far as the EU is 
concerned. 
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the broad financial regulatory umbrella that currently exists for the money-
trail. Just how feasible this can be, is what is left to determine.  
Historically, this idea seems to have existed, but was never brought into 
practice. In the year 2001, the European Central Bank engaged in discussions 
with certain technological firms in order to embed the Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) microchips in the high-denomination euro notes, at the 
time of the latter’s conception.821 Although at the time, the technology was 
available to bring this to fruition, the project did not materialize. Had it 
materialized, the anonymity feature of the money-trail would have been 
stripped away, and every bank note having the RFID chip would have carried 
its own record. Also, by virtue of the RFID chip embedded in currency notes, 
there is a possibility that the chip number can be used as payment online. By 
having such mixed forms of electronic and physical money, and where the 
money can be used as legal tender in cyber space, governments would have 
been able to permeate the ghostly nature of e-payment systems by merging 
the traditional money-trail with the growing elusive bit-trail. Essentially, 
another way of interpreting this solution is that e-money should be brought 
under the present AML legal regime. 
 
5.5.2.4 Regulating online gaming 
The internet today is littered with all sort of activities to preoccupy one’s 
time. As a kryptonite to many a game addict, there is always the ‘fun 
                                                          
821
 Demetis (2010: 12). Cf Yoshida (2001: 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
281 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
element’ inherent in these activities, which is never lacking, although, 
amongst these millions, there are some who mischievously exploit such 
activities for their nefarious operations. The activities in question here include 
virtual worlds
822
 and online gambling,
823
 which are the main areas for online 
gaming; and a fraction of the millions of people in question are 
cyberlaunderers. Being one of the very problematic aspects of 
cyberlaundering, for which a concrete ACL legal regime is sought, regulatory 
measures for virtual worlds and online banking are explored in depth below. 
 
5.5.2.4.1 Measures against the avenue of virtual worlds 
As discussed previously,
824
 a virtual world is an online gaming platform 
belonging to the family of Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games 
(MMORPGs),
825
 and it allows players to simulate practically all aspects of 
reality on a virtual platform, enhancing interactions through their avatars. Of 
the many dangers that this heralds, the current AML legal infrastructure does 
not extend to virtual worlds. For example, virtual worlds create the possibility 
of tax evasion,
826
 especially with the possibility that in-world money 
exchange services, such as the Second Life’s Xstreet allows for virtual 
                                                          
822
 For prior elaborate discussions on virtual worlds, see Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.5. 
823
 For prior elaborate discussions on online banking, see Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.3. 
824
 See Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.5. 
825
 Cornelius and Hermann (2011: v), and Klimmt (2011: 3). Cf Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.5. 
826
 This principle is constituted in the fact that players, called ‘residents’ in the virtual world, are not 
charged value added tax (VAT) when transacting with fellow residents, but are only charged this 
when conducting transactions with third parties. This rationale can be found in Article 1 of the 
Council Directive of the European Union 2002/38/EC, which was adopted by the European Union 
Council on 7 May 2002 and came into force on 1 July 2003. Cf discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 
3.5.5. 
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currencies to be changed to real-world money.
827
  Also, anonymity is a 
principal feature of virtual worlds, due to the very indistinct nature of human 
representation on such platforms through the use of avatars.
828
 In addition, 
virtual worlds perpetuate the possibility of smurfing or structuring 
transactions; put in the other words, virtual worlds help with the layering of 
illicit funds.
829
 
In light of the discussion in the preceding chapter, where it is established that 
there is currently no legal framework in existence to contain the dilemma of 
the cyberlaundering,
830
 as is the purpose of this study, virtual worlds are 
currently beyond the reach of existing AML legal frameworks. In effect, this 
leaves several pertinent questions unanswered, key of which is how these 
virtual worlds can be regulated to prevent the possibility of their use for 
cyberlaundering. 
Given the above, and for want of laws that should address the problem 
directly, this study posits that internal control of virtual worlds should be 
strengthened, with adequate oversight from outside authorities with a 
designated mandate. As a potentially viable solution, some of these internal 
measures deserve some elaboration. 
The first point of call where internal control is needed are the financial 
institutions in virtual worlds that are wholly unregulated, which is a grave 
oversight, considering the massive combined value of virtual economies that 
                                                          
827
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.5. 
828
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.5. 
829
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.5. 
830
 See discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.3. 
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are currently north of US $18 billion
831
 (in real-money, of course). ‘Virtual 
banks’ should be made subject to the same regulations and control to which 
terrestrial banks are currently subjected, although this is quite challenging in 
reality to expect virtual banks to adhere to record-keeping and reporting 
requirements.
832
 Nevertheless, a reasonable attempt would undeniably be the 
first step in addressing the vulnerability and blocking the awfully gaping 
loophole. Few financial authorities are awakening to this reality, and having 
begun to feel the pinch, AML compliance is now required for certain virtual 
banks. For example, recently, the company behind Entropia Universe, 
MindArk, obtained permission from the Swedish Financial Authority to 
conduct legitimate banking activities in its virtual world.
833
 In effect, proper 
scrutiny is ensured in line with the existing AML system. This also implies 
that the Swedish Financial Authority would conduct supervisory oversight 
over the activities of virtual banks in Entropia Universe, as the designated 
third party with the requisite authority. Companies behind other virtual 
worlds, such as SL, are yet to obtain such a license. If this initiative is made 
uniform across all jurisdictions, and the requisite authorities are able to ensure 
compliance, the threats posed by virtual banks would be lessened 
considerably. 
                                                          
831
 See Drug Enforcement Administration ‘2007 National Money laundering Strategy’ an internet 
article available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/nmls.pdf> [accessed on 29 July 2011] 
.Cf discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.5. 
832
 This links back to the discussion on the intangibility of the internet, which aids cyberlaundering. 
See paragraph 4.2 supra. 
833
 Mindark (2009: 4). One factor that facilitates this is the strict and increasingly rigid nature of the 
Swedish financial system, to which companies, such as MindArk - a Swedish company – are 
subjected. In other jurisdictions, there is no such obligation where several other companies which 
develop virtual worlds are located. 
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Apart from the possibility of legal regulation from outside authorities, one 
needs to also consider the possibility of internal legal regulation. One legal 
issue here is whether the internal rules and regulations of a virtual world carry 
any legal weight, or whether they can be decisive in deterring 
cyberlaundering. As with competitive sports, the rules of the game define the 
particular sport or game. These rules must be obeyed as they apply to all 
players of the game, and they also distinguish the particular sport from other 
sports.
834
 The rules exist to protect the interests of all players, both actively 
and passively.
835
 It follows that the obligation to adhere to these rules, which 
can be said to be soft law,
836
 is only incumbent on the players of the game, 
and does not apply to unrelated third parties. Violating the rules attracts 
sanctions. For the purposes of the ACL campaign, this can be seen in a 
positive light. Where the companies behind these virtual worlds are able to 
incorporate certain AML measures into the rules of the game, such as 
compulsory reporting or identity disclosure, players are forced to comply 
when conducting activities and performing transactions in the virtual 
economy. This could as well mean that dubious activities in virtual worlds 
can be deterred extensively. 
More importantly, for effective regulation, the control measures proposed 
should involve both operators of virtual worlds and law enforcement 
authorities, and both parties must work together. For instance, operators of 
                                                          
834
 Cornelius (2011: 106). Cf Lastoska and Hunter (2004: 134). 
835
 Cornelius (2011: 106). 
836
 The phrase ‘soft law’ is dscussed in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.1. Cf Cassese (2005: 161), Cornelius 
(2011: 106), Evans (2010: 70) and Shaw (2003: 68).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
285 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
virtual worlds should also be compelled to file suspicious transaction reports 
(STRs) to the necessary Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).
837
 However, 
given the problem of corporate interests, as discussed earlier,
838
 and also 
given the likelihood that these rules could be circumvented by clever 
residents, the solution proposed is not without challenges. 
 
5.5.2.4.2 Measures against the avenue of online gambling 
Unlike virtual worlds, the fact that unscrupulous online casinos are 
warehouses for cyberlaunderers is no secret. This is because of the 
clandestine nature of online casinos.
839
 Cyberlaundering is achieved through 
online gambling, by either using an online gambling service which might 
appear legitimate, or by setting up an online gambling website for the purpose 
of having the dirty funds cleaned.
840
  Given that online casinos are invariably 
informal financial institutions that fit the traditional frame of financial 
institutions, save for the wagering cloak under which they operate, one 
wonders why they are not subject to the same scrutiny as traditional financial 
institutions. Following the adaptive approach to regulation, online casinos 
should be brought under the current AML legal regime. This can be done by 
adapting existing local and international AML laws. These laws should 
                                                          
837
 Cf Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 8), the Egmont Group (2004E: 2), Jamali (2009: 48) and 
Muller (2007: 87). The FIU is the brain child of The Egmont Group, which is an informal body of 
government receiving agencies that share a common goal of providing a forum to enhance mutual 
cooperation and to share useful information in detecting and combating money laundering. See 
detailed discussion on the FIU and the Egmont Group in Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.2.2.1.1 and 
4.2.2.2.3. 
838
 See paragraph 5.3.1 above. 
839
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.3. 
840
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.3. Cf Bumeter (2001:2) and Schopper (2002: 310). 
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ensure that online casinos are not only compelled to adhere to entrenched 
AML standards, such as reporting an record-keeping, but that the laws 
themselves should be wholly dedicated to the operations of casinos. What 
should be prevented is a situation where the laws serve only a perfunctory 
role. One way of achieving this is by ensuring uniformity of practice. This 
requires ensuring that the wagering activities of online casinos are not subject 
to variables which can be manoeuvred easily at will, as is the case today, but 
that they have a uniform practice of set guidelines, both for the actual gaming 
activities and the management of the casino. To this end, all online casinos 
should belong to a central associative body compulsorily. This body should 
ensure that casinos are run in line with a well-entrenched manifesto, with 
rules and guidelines that includes the requisite AML measures. This 
associative body could be national or international.
841
 Also, as it should be 
endowed with some measure of autonomy and influence, it must serve the 
interests of online casinos as a whole. This body could be vested with 
supervisory power that woulf help to ensure adequate oversight of online 
casinos. This would deter criminals from creating online casinos at sheer 
whim for the purposes of ‘washing’ ill-derived funds.842  
                                                          
841
 Having an international body or association of online casinos would seem more feasible given the 
transnational nature of the online casino business, even though national branches could be 
established as well. Such an association can be created by an international agreement, such as by a 
treaty or convention. However, given the discussion in paragraph 5.3.4 above on the problems 
associated with the roots of cyberlaundering (i.e. money laundering and cybercrime), part of which 
explains how there is yet to be a truly international legal infrastructure against cybercrime, the 
implementation of the solution proposed becomes a challenge in practice. 
842
 See Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.3, for how the easy creation of online casinos fosters its vulnerability 
to cyberlaundering operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
287 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
The implementation of such a measure would have to take account of the 
challenges identified earlier, such as the possibility that this will encroach on 
well-guarded corporate interests.
843
 Some of these interests include protecting 
the very profitable business of online gambling,
844
 and maintaining the 
clientele. In addition, online casinos registered in off shore in countries with 
very weak AML laws.
845
 As such, this might nip the potential for effective 
regulation.
846
  
 
5.6 COMPLIANCE PILLAR FOR THE ACL LEGAL REGIME 
The compliance pillar advocated in this study proceeds from the standpoint 
that there are established laws to be complied with. Although it is one thing to 
have such laws in place, that alone is not enough.
847
 To ensure compliance, 
one could learn from the FATF, which places a high premium on having 
competent and well-resourced authorities, including effective supervisory 
bodies.
848
 It therefore follows that the notion of compliance is a duty 
                                                          
843
 See discussion in paragraph 5.3.1 above. 
844
 The online gambling business bourgeons currently as a multi-billion dollar industry, with a net-
worth equivalent to the gross domestic products (GDPs) of most developing countries. See Chapter 
3, paragraph 3.5.3 for more details.  
845
 Cf discussions in paragraph 5.3.3 and paragraph 5.5.1.1.2. For example, Antigua, Surinam and the 
Netherland Antilles, as well as some African countries are known territories where most online 
casinos sites are registered.  
846
 The nature of the problem depends largely on the respective jurisdiction and the effectiveness of the 
AML laws in place there. For example, due to imminent dangers, the US has gone as far as banning 
online gambling (albeit only in certain respects) in terms of the Illegal Gambling Business Act 15 of 
1970, U.S.C. and the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act 4 of 2006, U.S.C. With some 
pressure from the FBI, in 2007, Linden Labs took an unprecedented step by banning online 
gambling in Second Life [Jamali (2009: 42)]. Banning online gambling completely might well be 
the last available solution, should the situation spiral out of control. 
847
 Cf discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.2. 
848
 Recommendation 31, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 25) and Recommendations 27, 
Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 23). Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 11). 
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incumbent upon persons having a duty to comply on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, persons who are meant to ensure compliance.
849
 The discussion 
now turns to compliance with regard to cyberlaundering. It focuses on the 
two compliance-bound groups. 
 
5.6.1 Duty to comply 
As indicated previously, within the AML legal framework, the duty to 
comply rests upon financial institutions,
850
 their clients and beneficial 
owners;
851
 mutual funds and pooled investment vehicles such as hedge funds, 
private equity funds, unit investment trusts, corporations, trusts and 
partnerships;
852
 and other designated non-financial businesses such as 
lawyers, notaries, accountants, dealers in precious metals and stones, and real 
estate agents.
853
 For the campaign against cyberlaundering, the duty to 
comply not only includes these parties named above, but also, such duty 
should be placed on the following individuals and entities:  
a) Internet service providers and their proprietors; 
b) Facilitators of e-payment systems, including prepaid card companies, 
electronic currency businesses (i.e. online barter traders)
854
 and their 
                                                          
849
 Cf discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.2. 
850
 Cf Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.2.1, for the adoption and meaning of the term ‘financial institutions’, 
which takes on the meaning outlined by the FATF. Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 16) and 
Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 115). 
851
 Cf Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.1.1. 
852
 Cf Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.1.3. 
853
 Cf Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.1.1. 
854
 Cf discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.3. 
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proprietors (i.e. e-money institutions); their agents, merchants of 
prepaid funds, other e-money service providers, and, more generally, 
c)  All individuals who are benefactors of the internet service provided, 
and who are customers or users of the electronic payment service 
provided. 
The aforementioned parties in all three categories are only one part of the 
compliance equation. Where compliance can be guaranteed from this group, 
then one part of the compliance issue is solved. This can be done by requiring 
the creation of an oversight mechanism, which would ensure that this is 
guaranteed. However, this can only be guaranteed by persons upon whom the 
duty to ensure compliance is incumbent. 
 
5.6.2 Duty to ensure compliance 
The guardians of the present AML legal regime who bear the onus of 
ensuring compliance with set laws and regulations are also indispensible to 
the ACL legal regime, as they should play the same role. Essentially, these 
persons include governments and their relevant authorities and agencies, such 
as investigative and prosecutorial authorities, Financial Intelligence Units 
(FIUs) and other regulatory agencies. However, the peculiarity of 
cyberlaundering crops up here once again, as the avenues exploited for 
cyberlaundering operations do not necessarily fall within the regulatory scope 
within which these authorities normally have oversight. This is due to the fact 
that the cyberlaundering avenues that are being exploited are private-owned 
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enterprises whose operations are not constrained by the work of public 
regulatory authorities.  
Hence, the duty to ensure compliance should be extended to these parties as 
well (i.e. internet service providers, as well as facilitators of electronic 
payment systems and their proprietors). Consequently, this duty should apply 
to operators of online banks, online auction sites, online barter traders, virtual 
worlds and online gambling websites. Adequate internal oversight 
mechanisms should be put in place by these private entities, in order to ensure 
that their websites and products are used for legal purposes only. This can be 
done by having effective administrative infrastructures that allow for 
supervisors and managers to be more aware, vigilant and discrete in their 
respective businesses. This militates against potential cyberlaundering risks. 
This measure also requires the parties having a duty to ensure compliance to 
carry out stringent vetting process, and to conduct customer due diligence 
(CDD) measures which, essentially, necessitates customer verification.
855
  
A third party authority should also be on hand to ensure that the persons upon 
whom a duty lies to ensure compliance are also complying with such a duty. 
Persons or entities with a duty to ensure compliance should also be 
supervised to ensure that their duty to ensure compliance is observed. This 
                                                          
855
 The necessary CDD measures and other preventive measures are discussed under the prevention 
pillar in paragraph 5.4.2 below, given as the goal of this section is to only identify the key actors of 
the compliance pillar and not the functions itself.  
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strategy can be called ‘supervising the supervisor.’ It is one role for which the 
FATF and the regional FATF-Styled Regional Bodies can be credited.
856
 
The compliance pillar is thus the foundation that guarantees and fortifies the 
other two pillars of the ACL legal regime. 
 
5.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter sets out the concrete regulatory measures for cyberlaundering. 
But it takes account of the potential problems along the way that pose a 
threat. An adaptive approach is employed for the regulation of 
cyberlaundering. According to this approach, two of the existing pillars 
holding the current AML legal regime (i.e. prevention and compliance pillars) 
are amended to cater for the cyberlaundering dilemma. In keeping with this 
approach, two broad methods are recognized for the regulation of the 
problem: a general approach which identifies broad measures that could help 
in regulating cyberlaundering, and a target approach, which addresses directly 
                                                          
856
 Cf discussion in paragraph 5.1.1.3 above. This initiative could also work outside of the 
supranational sphere where the FATF and the FATF-Styled Regional Bodies play a major role, by 
ensuring compliance from countries. The initiative should be transposed as well into the national 
sphere. Governments, or government-created entities, should be established to ensure the requisite 
supervision. Thus, national jurisdictions should be tasked with this initiative by ensuring that the 
requisite infrastructures are in place to ensure compliance. For example, in 1998, under the Clinton 
administration in the US, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICAAN) was 
created. The corporation is tasked with the management of Internet Domain Names and Internet 
Protocols (IP) addresses, as well as the fostering of operational stability of the internet. Being a 
broad range of stake holders that include governement representatives, business orgnaizations, 
independent consultants and academics, ICAAN is concernened mainly with the regulation of 
formal or structural aspects of the internet, without giving consideration to website contents or 
activities. ICAAN plays a significant role in identifying websites that are operating without the 
requisite license. Granted that these websites are vehicles for cyberlaundering operations, a 
government infrastructure such as ICAAN would help in the regulation of cyberlaundering. For 
more information on ICAAN, see ICAAN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned names and 
Numbers) ‘About Us’ an undated internet webpage available at <http://www.icann.org/en/about> 
[accessed on 2 May 2012]. Yar (2010: 16). Cf Mueller (1999: 497). 
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the problematic areas of cyberlaundering. The prevention and compliance 
pillars of the ACL legal regime should be built in line with the AML legal 
regime. By adapting the rules and standards of the current AML legal regime 
to cater for cyberlaundering, and in some instances creating new ones, 
invariably, the ACL legal regime is formed. Hence, the ACL legal regime is a 
variant of the current AML legal regime. The main rationale that underscores 
the proposed regulatory framework against the menace of cyberlaundering is 
that a new legal framework needs to be created and existing standards need to 
be adapted. In the long run, the regulatory measures outlined in this study do 
not only add significantly to the ACL legal regime but to the broader fields of 
money laundering and cybercrime as well. 
However, the ACL legal regime cannot rest on the two pillars of prevention 
and compliance alone. Accordingly, the discussion is not complete, because 
the enforcement pillar, which embodies certain prosecutorial issues related to 
cyberlaundering, such as the investigative and jurisdictional issues of 
cyberlaundering, has not been discussed. This crucial issue is dealt with in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PROSECUTING CYBERLAUNDERING 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with the enforcement pillar of the anti-cyberlaundering 
(ACL) legal regime. Much like the preceding chapters of this study that 
attempt to pave an untreaded path in the law and unravel a novel issue 
currently unexplored, this chapter takes the ACL campaign a step further by 
exploring legal ramifications pertaining to the prosecution of 
cyberlaundering. It completes the discussion on the pillars of the ACL legal 
regime, and complements the prevention and compliance pillars discussed in 
the preceding chapter. 
The chapter begins by identifying certain important issues and challenges that 
come with the prosecution of cyberlaundering. Under the enforcement pillar, 
this chapter discusses investigative and jurisdictional issues, borrowing from 
similar principles falling under the current anti-money laundering (AML) 
legal regime.
857
 In establishing the enforcement pillar, this chapter also 
follows the adaptive approach to regulating cyberlaundering, as posited in the 
preceding chapter.
858
 Given that the current AML legal regime does not cater 
for this, the adaptive approach employed here also requires a probe into how 
current anti-cybercrime (ACC) laws can be adopted, as the prosecution of 
cyberlaundering cases does not only require the mind of money laundering 
                                                          
857
 See discussion in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.1, and Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.2.1 and 4.2.4. 
858
 See discussion in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.4. 
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investigators, but also cyber forensic experts who have tactical intelligence on 
hi-tech criminality, such as cyberlaundering demands. This chapter further 
discusses recent case studies that provide evidence of the urgent need for a 
proper ACL prosecutorial policy. Certain technical issues or formalities 
involved in establishing the ACL legal regime complete the discussion on the 
enforcement pillar. 
 
6.2 PATH TO PROSECUTING CYBERLAUNDERING: ISSUES AND 
CHALLENGES 
The issue of prosecution is one of the many distinguishing factors that set 
cyberlaundering apart from the conventional notion of money laundering. 
This is because cyberlaundering has a significant technological ambit to it. Its 
uniqueness can, therefore, not warrant a typical apple to apple comparison in 
the area of prosecution, when compared to the traditional concept of money 
laundering.  Prosecutors using traditional lenses are sure to find nothing. As 
regards its investigation, one needs to rely mostly on the investigative tactics 
applicable to cybercrime for two main reasons: First, in most cases, 
cyberlaundering investigators handle electronic evidence which, for 
detection, requires a cyber forensic mind. Secondly, as is a characteristic of 
cyberlaundering, the playing field is mainly the internet. This is why it is 
important to identify the issues and challenges on the path to the effective 
prosecution of cyberlaundering. Some key obstacles to the effective 
prosecution of cyberlaundering include certain practical and logistic 
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considerations, the problem of obtaining the cooperation of witnesses, the 
privacy argument; the nature of electronic evidence, and its admissibility in 
court. These issues are discussed further below. 
 
6.2.1 Practical and logistic challenges 
Cybercrime is trans-border in nature. This is because the internet, which is the 
playing field, is transnational in nature.
859
 This rationale is equally valid for 
cyberlaundering. When conducting investigations across national borders, 
certain practical problems are sure to crop up that would cause delays and 
expenses. For example, given the time difference between jurisdictions, 
investigators might be forced to arrange teleconferences with people in 
different countries at inconvenient times.
 860
 This would not be an issue if the 
crime were local in nature. 
Also, there is the language barrier. Information obtained from other countries 
might be in a different language, and translation services might be required. 
This is a stumbling block to speedy and efficient prosecution, especially 
where the relevant law enforcement agency lacks the resources. This situation 
is further compounded when witnesses, who speak foreign languages, are 
transported across jurisdictions for purposes of prosecution. This not only 
retards the prosecution, but it also increases the costs of the criminal process. 
On a more poignant note, there is the issue of political will which, where 
lacking, might amount to a failed hope for the prosecution of 
                                                          
859
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.2.4. 
860
 Smith (2003: 4). Cf Australasian Centre for Policing Research (2000: 4). 
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cyberlaundering. The issues of political will and lack of means are recurring 
themes when it comes to broad discussion of the ACL legal regime, and are 
also problems that are common to all pillars of the current AML legal 
regime.
861
  
 
6.2.2 The right to privacy 
Fundamental human rights have always been long-standing tenets of a 
democratic state. One of these is the right to privacy. However, given the 
exigencies of safeguarding security in the public interest, the question that 
arises in this context is this: To what extent should the privacy claim prevail 
when pitted against the right of law enforcement agencies to pry into 
electronic communications for the purpose of safeguarding the public interest 
value of security? If the scales are tipped in favour of privacy, then the right 
to privacy could very well be an obstacle to effective prosecution of 
cyberlaundering, especially during the investigative phase. In finding a right 
balance, some key issues need to be brought to light. These are discussed 
further below. 
 
6.2.2.1 Personal information and new electronic devices  
One’s personal information is often a good starting point for law enforcers 
conducting cyberlaundering investigations. However, one’s presence on the 
internet is known only to the extent that the information is fed into the 
                                                          
861
 For a detailed discussion of these factors, see Chapter 5, paragraph 5.3.3. 
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internet. In this day and age, with the exponential development of technology, 
and the increasing use of electronic devices and social media platforms that 
often require a particular measure of personal information, one’s privacy is 
curtailed to some extent. With increased growth of the so-called data-banks
862
 
and their inter-connections, as well as the memory capacity of electronic 
archives, more personal data can be stored for much longer periods of time.
863
 
Even more, personal data can be gathered without the personal knowledge or 
consent of internet users, due to the fact that small pieces of software, known 
as cookies, can be downloaded onto the relevant computer the moment 
certain web pages are visited. This explains why investigators in the 
prosecution of cybercrime are keen to seize the computer used.
864
 The 
capacities of new electronic devices and the internet render internet users 
vulnerable to the risks associated with their use, chief of which is the 
potential violation of personal privacy. However, what might seem as a 
disadvantage in the use of computer systems, is an advantage for law 
enforcement agencies, due to the fact that the amount of information recorded 
onto a computer system would be of great help to law enforcers and 
investigators who are able to identify victims, thus linking the crime to the 
criminal. Viewed from this perspective, the danger of violating one’s privacy 
is not necessarily a barrier to prosecuting cyberlaundering. 
                                                          
862
 A databank is synonymous with a database, and it implies an electronic repository of information 
classified into different subjects, in order to facilitate the use and quick retrieval of deposited 
information when required. 
863
 Busia (2004: 81). Cf Bailey (2011: 10) and Solove (2011: 55). 
864
 See the discussion in paragraph 6.4.4 below. 
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6.2.2.2 The legal protection of personal data versus investigative needs  
Every country has its own privacy laws to protect personal data. All 
categories of personal data are protected, including electronic traffic data,
865
 
data on location,
866
 video-surveillance and biometric analysis,
867
 and genetic 
data.
868
 These laws are meant to regulate the extent to which one’s privacy is 
protected by indicating permissible and impermissible situations regarding 
access to electronic records and communications. For example, in South 
Africa, the Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act
869
 
stipulates instances when electronic communications may be intercepted.
870
 
Similarly, the Regulation of the Interception of Communication and the 
Provision of Related-Information Act
871
 (RICA) lists analogous provisions. In 
the United States (US), the Right to Financial Privacy Act
872
 (RFPA) and the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act
873
 (ECPA), together, regulate most 
aspects of personal data protection. The RFPA focuses more on the requisite 
prior authorization that law enforcers need to have before obtaining an 
                                                          
865
 Electronic traffic data refers to data on telephonic and electronic traffic, such as information via 
telephonic terminals (i.e. calls on fixed landlines and mobile networks), as well as fax, short 
message service (sms), multimedia message service (mms), and electronic mails (emails). 
866
 As the name suggests, data on location refers to data relating to the location or geographic site of 
the electronic communication device used. 
867
 This refers to personal information that can be accessed from video-surveillance installations, which 
are ideally meant for the protection of persons and property. These tallies with biometric analysis 
which enables law enforcers to assess the geometry of the face, irises. The acquired information can 
then be compared with data previously recorded. Busia (2004: 87). 
868
 Genetic data refers to information that can be derived from an individual by virtue of the person’s 
genome or hereditary information. However, the argument holds that genetic data could incur the 
risk of discrimination and racial profiling. Busia (2004: 88) and Solove (2011: 59). 
869
 Act 25 of 2002. 
870
 See sections 51 and 52 of the Act. 
871
 Act 70 of 2002. See sections 2 to 11. 
872
 Act of 1982, Title 12, U.S.C. Sections 3401-3409. 
873
 Act 18 of 1986, U.S.C. Section 2510(12). 
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individual’s financial records from financial institutions.874 On the other 
hand, the ECPA prohibits internet service providers from dispensing the 
details of one’s electronic communications.875 These laws are found in both 
common law and civil law jurisdictions.
876
 
On the other side of the pendulum is the public interest consideration. As an 
underlying rationale, specialized investigative agencies are the protectors of 
laws and the guardians of freedom. They are empowered to ensure that the 
security of the state and its people is guaranteed, and that society is protected 
from crime. This right is a collective right to which a society, and not just an 
individual, can lay claim. The protected interest in the crime of 
cyberlaundering is a combination of certain public interest values, such as the 
protection of organs of state and their processes and ensuring the stability of 
its financial sector 
In the acquisition of data, there are certain basic principles that serve as a 
guide to investigators. These include the fact that law enforcers are only 
allowed to gather and store information that is pertinent to the relevant 
investigation. Only such data as is required for the investigation may be 
gathered, and the means to achieving the objectives of investigation must be 
proportionate and reasonable.
877
 Whatever falls outside of these bounds 
potentially violates existing privacy laws. Law enforcers must adhere to these 
                                                          
874
 See sections 3401-3409 of the RFPA. 
875
 See sections 2510(12) of the ECPA.  
876
 For example, in Germany, many of these provisions are contained in the Federal Data Protection 
Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz - BDSG) 2001. 
877
 Busia (2004: 83). Cf Nissenbaum (2009: 158), Solove (2007: 105) and Solove (2011: 56). 
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rules.  The issue becomes more intense when the personal data is represented 
in an encrypted format.  In this regard, there is great controversy around a key 
escrow, otherwise called the key recovery system that enables keys required 
to decrypt an encrypted data to be held in escrow
878
 in order to prevent undue 
interference from third parties. It becomes controversial when the authorized 
third party is the state and its law enforcement agencies, as is often the 
case.
879
 The argument is that having the ‘keys’ in the hands of unauthorized 
third parties represents a violation the right to privacy.
880
 Where law 
enforcers are able to make out a prima facie case, as a basis for investigation, 
they would decrypt encrypted information effortlessly. More often than not, 
consent by the relevant parties is not required. 
 
6.2.2.3 Balancing the scale between privacy and public interest values 
What then could be the reasonable basis for conducting investigations without 
circumventing enshrined privacy laws? Does the collective right to the 
security of society outweigh an individual’s right to privacy? How should the 
scale be balanced? Outside of general rules and principles that serve as 
guidelines, these questions are based on merits, depending on the 
circumstances of the particular case. As a starting point, the relevant domestic 
legislation of the relevant jurisdiction should be consulted for guidance. 
                                                          
    878 An enscrow is an agreement reached between two contracting parties and a neutral third party, 
which obligates the third party to deliver an item held in his/her trust to either of the parties when a 
certain condition is fulfilled. 
879
 Scheier (1998: 14). Cf Straub (2002: 530). 
880
 Straub (2002: 530). 
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These laws set the limit to which law enforcers can act in acquiring personal 
data that can be a potential infringement of an individual’s right to privacy. 
These limits have the general attributes of reasonableness and proportionality, 
strict observance of which is incumbent on law enforcers. Thus, every alleged 
infringing action of a law enforcer should be met with the question of 
whether such action is warranted or has a legally justifiable basis. Obviously, 
where such action is warranted, the privacy argument would not hold. 
Conversely, where there is no legal justification for the actions of a law 
enforcer, any public interest legal argument that might be raised would 
inadvertently succumb to an individual’s right to privacy. 
 
6.2.3 Electronic evidence and the question of admissibility 
Due to the nature of the crime of cyberlaundering, and the fact that it has a 
heavy presence on the internet, much of the evidence required as proof in 
court comes as electronic evidence. This has certain legal implications for 
cyberlaundering, especially as regards its prosecution. The discussion below 
deals with electronic evidence in general terms.  
 
6.2.3.1 Nature and characteristics of electronic evidence 
Electronic evidence, or sometimes called digital evidence, refers to any 
probative information that is presented electronically, by virtue of its 
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capability to be stored or transmitted digitally, which can be used at trial.
881
 
Electronic evidence may include, but is not limited to electronic 
communications, such as emails, text messages and chat room 
communications, digital photographs, website content, postings on social 
media, computer generated data,
882
 and computer-stored data.
883
 Akin to real 
evidence, electronic evidence is latent in nature, especially if it is computer-
based. It is often stored on or transmitted by a computer. However, unlike real 
evidence, electronic evidence could be fragile, as it can be altered, destroyed, 
damaged or defaced.
884
 In order for electronic evidence to be accepted at trial, 
a court has to determine that three main requirements are met - relevance, 
authenticity, and originality.
885
 As a fundamental principle of law, the party 
                                                          
881
 Casey (2004: 12). Cf Marcella and Greenfield (2002: 29), and Nelson, Philips, and Stewart (2010: 
102). In some jurisdictions, such as South Africa, the term ‘data message’ is used instead of 
electronic evidence. This is defined in section 4 of South Africa’s Electronic Communications 
Transactions Act 25 of 2002 as meaning any “data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic 
means and includes- (a) voice, where the voice is used in an automated transaction; and (b) a stored 
record.” This definition is consistent with Article 2 of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996. In South Africa, 
within the ambits of the law of evidence, the definition of data message is currently being revised. 
See South African Law Reform Commission ‘The Review of The Law of Evidence - Draft 
discussion paper on the review of the law of evidence’ Committee Paper 02/2012 Project 126, 29 
September 2012. 
882
 Computer-generated data include web logs, call detail records, financial instrument trades (some 
purely machine-generated, some human-based, network event logs, though often associated with 
web logs), telemetry collected by the government (especially for intelligence purposes), online 
gaming data, genetic or gnemone research data, energy research data, location and/or movement 
data, amongst others. See DBMS2: A Monasch Research Publication (2010) ‘Examples of 
Machine-Generated Data’ available at <http://www.dbms2.com/2010/04/08/machine-generated-
data-example/> [accessed on 22 February 2012]. Cf Manning (2010: 140). 
883
 Computer-stored data includes central processing units (CPU) of computers, random access 
memory (RAM) of computers; read only memory (ROM) of computers; tape libraries, optical juke 
boxes, optical discs, flash memory or universal serial bus (USB) devices, floppy discs, zip disks, or 
punched cards, among several others. See Wise Geek (an undated website document) ‘What is data 
storage?’ available at <http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-data-storage.htm> [accessed on 22 
February 2012]. 
884
 Casey (2004: 12). Cf Mason and Schafer (2010: 710) and Nelson, Philips, and Stewart (2010: 106). 
885
 Mason and Schafer (2010: 710), and Nelson, Philips, and Stewart (2010: 106). 
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seeking to introduce electronic evidence bears the onus of proving that all 
three requirements are met. 
The question of relevance is one which requires circumspective 
consideration. This implies that the relevant electronic evidence should be 
capable of proving or disproving one of the legal elements of a case. Two 
factors that determine the relevance of electronic evidence are the materiality 
of the evidence and its probative value.
886
 Within the ambit of the law of 
evidence, relevance is not an inherent characteristic of the related electronic 
evidence, but it exists as a link between the object and the matter or, so-
called, the legal element of the case.
887
 
The authenticity of electronic evidence is also required for its acceptance at 
trial. The associative question in this regard is whether the evidence is 
legitimate. The authenticity of electronic evidence can be proved by: (a) an 
indication to the fact that the evidence has been signed digitally by the person 
who purports to have signed it; (b) that other appropriate security procedures 
or devices have been applied to the evidence as may be required; and (c) by 
any other means or method showing its integrity and reliability.
888
 
                                                          
886
 These factors are often readily ascertainable from the relevant domestic law. For example, in the 
US, Rule 401 of the Federal Rule of Evidence (Act of 1975, Title 28, United States Code) states the 
meaning of relevant evidence to include “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.” This definition embodies the factors of materiality and 
probative value. 
887
 For more details, see the Legal Information Institute (an undated internet report) ‘Rule 401, Test for 
Relevant Evidence’ available at <http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_401 [accessed on 16 
February 2012]. In the highly-regarded US case: United States of America v. Foster 986 F.2d 541 
(D.C. Circuit) (1993), the Court stated that the crucial first step in determining relevancy is to 
“identify the matter properly provable.” 
888
 Mason and Sheldon (2010: 776). Cf Casey (2004: 19). The principle relating to the authentication 
of electronic evidence is one that has received much attention over the years, particularly in the US. 
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The originality requirement is not always as stringent. This is because, in 
certain instances the court can accept a copy or duplicate of an original where 
the original is inaccessible, altered or damaged, and where such duplicate is a 
fair representation of the original. 
 
6.2.3.2 The admissibility of electronic evidence 
The evolution of technology has impacted on the concept of electronic 
evidence which, in turn, has many ramifications, particularly its admissibility 
in court. The fragility of and sensitivity around the concept of electronic 
evidence has the potential of either making or breaking a case against 
cyberlaundering. Some key issues relating to the inadmissibility of electronic 
evidence are further brought to light. 
Electronic evidence lawfully obtained would be readily admissible in court.
889
 
In principle, inadmissible evidence is evidence that is not obtained in 
                                                                                                                                                                         
This legal rationale has grown with court precedence. For example, in the case of United States of 
America v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cicuit).(1976), the court called for a more authentic 
foundation for the authentication of electronic evidence, given its novelty at the time. Later court 
decisions such as the United States of America v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Circuit) (1982) averred 
that electronic evidence should be treated with the same circumspection as any other evidence. In 
the UK, the Association of Chief Police Officers have developed guidelines for the authentication 
of electronic evidence, such as are now used in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. These 
guidelines include the obligation incumbent on police officers not to change data held on a storage 
device which might be used as electronic evidence in court; that where a circumstance exists that 
warrants a person to access original data held on a storage device, such person must have the 
competence to do so, with the capability of giving evidence that explains the relevance and 
implications of such actions; that an audit trail and all processes applied to electronic evidence of a 
computer-based nature should be made and preserved; an independent third party should be capable 
of examining the same processes and achieving the same result, and the relevant supervising law 
enforcement officer has the responsibility of ensuring that the law and these principles are all 
observed. Association of Chief Police Officers (undated website document) ‘Good Practice Guide 
for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence’ Official Release Version 4.0 available at 
<http://www.7safe.com /electronic_evidence/ACPO_guidelines_computer_evidence_v4_web.pdf> 
[accessed on 22 February 2012]. 
889
 Casey (2004: 19) and Casey (2011A: 20). Cf Mason and Schafer (2010: 710). 
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accordance with the law. The law in question here refers to the domestic law 
of the relevant jurisdiction. As with any other kind of evidence for the 
prosecution’s case, a warrant or a court order is required in order to obtain 
electronic evidence, otherwise the evidence is inadmissible in court. 
Another factor that affects the admissibility of electronic evidence is if the 
electronic evidence is, by nature, hearsay. Hearsay evidence is a statement 
that is made by someone other than the declarant, offered in a trial to prove 
the truth of a matter or the legal elements of the case.
890
 It is a general 
principle of law that hearsay evidence is not admissible, although exceptions 
exist in certain cases.
891
 This principle applies equally to electronic evidence. 
As mentioned earlier, electronic evidence is generally admissible. If it is of a 
hearsay nature, automatically, it becomes inadmissible. However, the 
principal challenge comes when the court has to determine whether electronic 
evidence is hearsay or not.
892
 It is a fundamental rule that electronic evidence 
                                                          
890
 Cf Casey (2011C: 57) and Frieden and Murray (2011: 25). 
891
 Such exceptions can be wide-ranging, depending on the jurisdiction concerned. For example, in the 
US, Rule 801(d)(1)(A)-(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975 provides that the prior 
statement of a witness is not hearsay if the person who made the statement is subject to cross-
examination at the trial. Amongst several others, some other exceptions include a statement made 
by a person that conveys his or her sense of the state of an event or condition of something (Rule 
803(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975); a statement made as a result of an excited 
utterance (Rule 803(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975); a statement made for medical 
diagnosis of treatment (Rule 803(4)(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence); public records 
(Rule (803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975); family records (Rule 803(13) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975) and statements in ancient documents (Rule 803(16) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975). In the United Kingdom (UK), there is a distinction 
between statutory exceptions on the one hand (i.e. statements relating to unavailable witnesses, 
business documents and previous consistent or inconsistent statements – contained in Sections 116 
of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003) and common law exceptions on the other hand (for example, 
public information, reputation or family tradition and common enterprise – contained in Section 
118 of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003). 
892
 The US is an example of  how this poses a grave challenge for courts: In the cases of Haag v. 
United States, 485 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Circuit) (2007); United States of America v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535, 
539 (7th Circuit) (2002); United States of America v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1494 (7th Circuit) 
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would not amount to hearsay when the evidence results from a machine 
operation, which merely uses or replicates a human input or programming, 
and is one that has been generated solely by the technical and mechanical 
operations of the relevant computer.
893
 As such, the electronic evidence must 
have been independent of all human interferences, manipulations or control. 
In certain instances where the essential elements of hearsay evidence are not 
met, electronic evidence becomes admissible. In addition, electronic evidence 
is one that is hardly decodable by laymen and it often requires an additional 
action to enhance its interpretation or readability. Consequently, its 
admissibility raises some questions as well. Also, electronic evidence in its 
original form might be difficult to bring to court, due to certain practical 
contingencies. This might cause one to detract from the best evidence rule, 
which is a fundamental common law rule of evidence. The best evidence rule 
presupposes that evidence must only be allowed in court if it is the best 
possible evidence that the case in question allows.
894
 Interpreted strictly 
                                                                                                                                                                         
(1990), the courts held that computer-based electronic evidence is prima facie admissible under 
section 803(6) of the Federal Rule of Evidence. However, a more grounded rationale soon 
developed, which is that electronic evidence results from a process and is consequently not 
averments made by individuals, hence not falling into the category of hearsay evidence. Thus the 
printed result of a computer-based test (United States of America v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230-
31 (4th Circuit) (2007)), a computer based header (United States of America v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 
1138, 1142-43 (10th Circuit) (2005)), and the utterances of a machine (United States of America v. 
Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 506 (3d Circuit) (2003)) do not amount to hearsay evidence. For details 
see United States Department of Justice (an undated website document) ‘Computer Crime’ 
available at <http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/05ssma.html> [accessed on 22 February 2012]. 
Cf Frieden and Murray (2011: 25). 
893
 Alghamdi (2011: 53). Cf Grama (2010: 467) and and Nelson, Philips, ans Stewart (2010: 107). 
894
 The best evidence rule dates back to the English case of Omychund v Barker (1745) 1 Atk, 21, 49; 
26 ER 15, 33, in which Lord Harwicks held that no evidence was admissible unless it was the best 
that the nature of the case will allow. The reasoning was based on the fact that, in the eighteenth 
century, an original document was often reproduced or rewritten by hand, and the principle held 
that if the original was not produced, then there was a high probability that the copy was 
illegitimate for reasons of fraud or error. See Gilbert (2010: 203). 
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within the context of electronic evidence, it means that no ‘extra steps’ or 
alterations of the electronic evidence are permissible. These are questions left 
for national courts to determine.
895
 
 
6.2.3.3 Electronic evidence and cyberlaundering 
From the discussion so far, certain points come to light as regards the 
prosecution of cyberlaundering. First, due to its nature, the evidence required 
to prove a cyberlaundering offence can be quite diverse and broad in its 
ambit, given that a truly unfathomable web of devices can be created. The 
nature and form of electronic evidence required would depend on the kind of 
the cyberlaundering scheme in question, which is the subject of the relevant 
investigation. For example, with respect to cyberlaundering via online 
banking,
896
 certain kinds of evidence other than electronic evidence may be 
required. This is because a terrestrial bank might be involved, which might 
have certain physical materials in its possession that might constitute real 
evidence in court. The same goes for online casinos with a terrestrial presence 
                                                          
895
 In the UK, in the case Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions for the State of Victoria, (1987) 164 
CLR 180, the court held that the copy of a tape recording is admissible electronic evidence. The 
court followed the rationale that the content of the tape recording, and not the tape recording itself, 
is of relevance, and thus it should not matter that a copy is presented as evidence. Also, the court 
stated that this does not mean that the highly revered best evidence rule is not followed. It further 
stressed that the law should be developed in line with modernity and should never be left in a state 
of uncertainty. In the US, Rule 1001(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that if data is 
stored in a computer, any print-out or output readable by sight is an original, as long as it is shown 
to reflect the data accurately. As in the UK, the courts in the US are commonly of the opinion that 
copies or print-outs of electronic data do not circumvent the best evidence rule. For example, in the 
case Aguimatang v. California State Lottery (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 769 [286 Cal.Rptr. 57], the 
court held that a computer print-out does not violate the best evidence rule as it is considered an 
original, if it meets the requirements of relevance and authenticity. 
896
 For an elborate discussion on cyberlaundering through online banking, see chapter 3, paragraph 
3.6.1.  
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as well.
897
 However, for much of the other cyberlaundering methods such as 
virtual worlds and online barter trade, particularly as they involve electronic 
currencies and e-metals, electronic evidence is primarily required. Along with 
fulfilling the characteristics of electronic evidence and its admissibility test, 
the electronic evidence in question must have evidentiary weight in order to 
ensure its reliability in court. Failing this, the case of the prosecutor may fail. 
This harbours danger due to the fact that cyberlaundering is highly complex 
and knotty, and the electronic data and devices that are used as tools of 
operation might be quite fragile. Thus, electronic evidence relating to 
cyberlaundering should be treated delicately, with a great measure of care and 
sensitivity. It also does not help that electronic evidence in general is highly 
susceptible to alterations and damage. Like the typical domino effect, loss of 
data means absence of admissible evidence in court which, potentially, means 
a failed prosecution. This is why the detection and preservation of electronic 
evidence are of paramount importance,
898
 as the following discussion on the 
investigation of cyberlaundering shows. 
 
6.3 INVESTIGATING CYBERLAUNDERING 
The issue of investigation rests at the heart of this study, as it represents a 
significant stronghold of the proposed ACL regime, given that a concrete one 
is, as yet, non-existent. In this section, an attempt is made to erect this pillar, 
                                                          
897
 For an elebaorate discussion on online casinos as a method of cyberlaundering see chapter 3, 
paragraph 3.6.3. 
898
 See paragraphs 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 below. 
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because the issue of investigation is the necessary scaffold to establish the 
platform to uphold and sustain the prosecution of cyberlaundering. 
Whilst conventional criminal investigative techniques are helpful as a starting 
point in the investigation of cyberlaundering, these techniques are not entirely 
sufficient.  This is why this study borrows from the existing investigative 
principles applicable to cybercrime, for the main reason that cyberlaundering 
operates in the ‘cyber realm.’ However, some of the principles of cybercrime 
investigation are not entirely different from conventional criminal 
investigative techniques. As regards cybercrime or digital investigations, no 
one standard approach is adopted, due to certain technical factors such as the 
nature of the relevant communications or computing device, the purpose for 
which the investigation is required, such as criminal, civil, commercial, 
military, and the facts of the case to be investigated.
899
 For this reason, this 
section focuses mainly on existing digital criminal investigative principles, as 
applicable to cyberlaundering. 
This section sets out certain fundamental features of digital investigation, 
which include identifying the role players in the investigative process, the 
different methods of digital investigation, as well as existing scientific 
techniques that are applicable to the investigative process. Afterwards, in this 
section, certain basic elemental factors that are essential to every stage of the 
cyberlaundering investigation are laid out. These include the detection of 
cyberlaundering; the seizure and preservation of electronic evidence; the 
                                                          
899
 Casey and Schatz (2011: 187). 
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analysis of data, reporting and testimony. In addition, the importance of both 
local and international cooperation is emphasized as the stronghold that binds 
the entire investigative process. 
 
 6.3.1 Applicability of conventional money laundering investigative 
techniques 
Conventional techniques employed for investigating money laundering, as 
discussed in the previous chapter,
900
 are premised on the notion that actual 
physical illegal cash lays hidden or concealed somewhere in very clandestine 
avenues. This applies to cyberlaundering, too.  The only difference is the 
element of absence of physical cash.
901
 In the world of cyberlaundering, 
electronic payment systems (‘e-payment systems’) are the bridges that link 
the terrestrial world with the cyber world. In the latter, the notion of ‘illicit 
hard cash’ is replaced with the notion of ‘illicit e-money.’ This is due to the 
fact that physical cash is replaced with several kinds of intangible financial 
exchange instruments, such as smart cards and electronic metals (‘e-
metals’).902 As a result, this makes it difficult for conventional money 
laundering investigators to ‘follow the money.’ Conventional money 
laundering techniques would prove futile to cyberlaundering because the 
latter is made up of an intrinsic technological framework, and the realm 
                                                          
900
 See chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.4.2. Cf Madinger (2012: 301). 
901
 Cf discussions on electronic payment systems in chapter 3, paragraph 3.3. 
 
902
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.3. 
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within which it operates is the internet. This is why digital investigative 
techniques represent the bulk of investigative techniques for cyberlaundering. 
 
6.3.2 Fundamentals of digital investigation 
The investigation of cyberlaundering demands that trusted investigative 
methods are used to ensure that relevant digital data are located, collated, 
analyzed, interpreted, and that evidence that is deduced is reported in a 
reliable, objective and transparent manner.
903
 Seeing that most of the 
evidence to prove the existence of cyberlaundering is digital in nature, digital 
investigative techniques are expedient to the cyberlaundering investigative 
process. In the discussion below, the essential rudiments of digital 
investigation are considered broadly. Afterwards, the key actors in the 
investigative process are identified. The purpose here is to determine 
generally the relevant role players in a cyberlaundering investigation, as 
opposed to discussing all the functions that come with each role. Some 
essential digital investigative methods are also discussed, with a view to 
fitting the investigative issue of cyberlaundering into the right frame. 
 
6.3.2.1 Role players in the investigative process 
The investigative process itself involves certain key role players. These 
include the cybercrime investigator(s) and law enforcement agencies 
                                                          
903
 Casey and Schartz (211: 187). Cf Casey (2011B: xxii). 
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functioning to enforce the law.
 904
 Also included is the legal advisor. This is a 
role often played by the prosecuting attorney, who provides legal advice in 
the investigative process, by giving guidance and direction as it relates to the 
law.
905
 Although they are expected to work together, it is important for each 
of these principal actors to maintain their respective lanes in the investigative 
process and not to interfere with the work of the other. More importantly, 
along with the requisite skills that come with their respective functions, each 
party should have a practical understanding of certain basic legal principles, 
such as privacy and data interception and seizure, amongst several other legal 
concerns that come with the digital investigations. This is important in order 
to avoid jeopardizing the course of the investigation. 
 
6.3.2.2 Concept and methodologies of computer forensics 
The present digital investigative methods employed to investigate 
cybercrimes have roots in basic computer forensics. Computer forensics refer 
to the process of identifying, preserving, analyzing and presenting evidence 
of a digital nature in a legally acceptable manner.
906
 The concept can also be 
understood as the use of scientifically derived and proven methods for the 
preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis, interpretation and 
documentation and presentation of digital evidence for the purpose of 
                                                          
904
 Reyes, O’Shea, Steele, Hansen, Jean and Ralph (2007: 86). 
905
 Reyes, O’Shea, Steele, Hansen, Jean and Ralph (2007: 86). 
906
 McKemmish, R (1999: 14). Cf Abdullah, MT, Mahmod, R, Ab. Gani, AA, Abdullah, MZ and Md. 
Sultan, AB (2008: 215); Arthur and Venter (2006: 3); Borck (2001: 2); Casey and Schatz (2011: 
188); Fernandez, Smith, Garcia and Kar (2005: 315, 316); Garber (2001: 23); Slade (2004: 2) and 
Yasinsac (2003: 16). 
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facilitating and fostering the reconstruction of events deemed criminal, or 
helping to anticipate unauthorised actions shown to be disruptive to planned 
operations.
907
  
Digital investigation, within the broader sphere of criminal investigations, is 
unique for the fact that it is very methodological as it ascribes steps and 
sequences in the investigative process, and is, consequently, characterized by 
delicacy and sensitivity, given the ease with which vital data can be lost or, 
simply, undetected. Essentially, digital investigation includes the following 
linear-sequenced steps: 
 Forensic preparation: This is the essential groundwork that should be done 
before the start of any investigation, and often involves acquiring materials 
and resources that would help in the course of the investigation. 
 Forensic survey: This is the so-called sniffing phase, where one seeks to 
find a potential source for digital evidence within the designated area (i.e. 
the relevant crime scene, the internet, a computer, etc). 
 Forensic examination: This is the stage where the relevant data is extracted 
or sifted from the acquired evidence. 
 Forensic analysis: This refers to the very thrust of the investigation, where 
scientific methodology and critical thinking are applied to the evidence in 
order to address the principal questions at stake. 
                                                          
907
 Palmer (2001: 25). Cf Abdullah, MT, Mahmod, R, Ab. Gani, AA, Abdullah, MZ and Md. Sultan, 
AB (2008: 215) and Arthur and Venter (2006: 3). Certain factors have led to developments in the 
field of computer forensics, such as the growing dependence of law enforcement bodies on 
computing, the now ubiquitous nature of computers and computing, and the concomitant growth in 
new offences such as cyberlaundering. Cf Abdullah, MT, Mahmod, R, Ab. Gani, AA, Abdullah, 
MZ and Md. Sultan, AB (2008: 215) and Arthur and Venter (2006: 3). 
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 Forensic presentation: This is where the result of a forensic analysis is 
presented, which satisfies the purposes of the overall investigation.
908
  
Practice shows that some of these steps are intertwined and not often 
separated neatly.
909
 Aside from the steps above, depending on the given 
scenario, there are several digital investigative methodologies, or ‘process 
models’, that are used for particular case scenarios, which embody the 
essential elements of the aforementioned steps. These include the physical 
model,
910
 the staircase model,
911
 the evidence flow model,
912
 the subphase 
model
913
 and the roles and responsibilities model.
914
 Practitioners (i.e. digital 
                                                          
908
 Casey and Schatz (2011: 190). Cf Mason and Sheldon (2010: 706) and Slade (2004: 5). This 
process is also akin to the investigative techniques for the conventional notion of money laundering. 
See Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.4.2. Cf Madinger (2012: 303). 
909
 Carrier and Spafford (2003: 3) and Slade (2004: 4). 
910
 The physical model form of digital investigation entails a scenario where the digital investigative 
process is related, continually associated or linked to the physical crime scene, thus oddly perceives 
the investigated digital device itself as a crime scene. This model is further sub-grouped into the 
‘readiness group, deployment group, physical crime scene investigation, digital crime scene 
investigation, and presentation.’ Casey and Schatz (2011: 190) and Carrier and Spafford (2003: 1). 
911
 As the name implies, with the staircase model of digital investigation, the investigative process 
symbolizes an ascending sequence of stairs, on which cybercrime investigators, forensic experts 
and the public prosecutor work together to scale each step from bottom to top, in a systematic 
fashion, in order to have a compelling story at the stage of forensic presentation. Generally, the 
steps include incidents alerts and accusations, assessment of worth, incident crime scenes protocols, 
identification or seizure, preservation, recovery, harvesting, reduction, organisation and research; 
analysis, reporting, persuasion and testimony, with the encompassing feature of case management 
for each step of the way. Casey and Schatz (2011: 193). Casey and Palmer (2004: 5). 
912
 The evidence flow model of digital investigation is primarily geared towards describing the flow of 
information in digital investigation from the moment investigators become aware of the crime, until 
the investigation concludes. This model is akin to the staircase model, save for a significant 
deviation, being that it goes beyond the given steps by adding certain features, such as the 
authorization, notification, proof/defense, and transportation of evidence. Casey and Schatz (2011: 
191) and Ó Ciardhuáin (2004: 3). 
913
 The sub-phase model borrows from other models in a multitier fashion, and adds different sub-
phases to the respective step or phase of the digital investigation. For example, the main steps used 
in this model are preparation, incident response, data collection, data analysis, findings presentation 
and incident closure, and the corresponding sub-phases are mainly to survey, extract, and examine 
with the aim of reducing the amount of data to analyze; assessing the skill level of suspects; 
recovering deleted files; find relevant hidden data, determining the chronology of file activity; 
recovering relevant ASCII data; recovering relevant non-ASCII data; ascertaining non-email 
activity history; and recovering relevant emails and attachments. Casey and Schatz (2011: 195) and 
Beebe and Clarke (2005: 149). 
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investigators and other role players in the investigative process) have used 
these models on a case-subjective basis, and a single model is not always 
used in a blanket fashion. The rigidity that comes with each of these 
approaches certainly has unsettling results, and is thus not without 
criticism.
915
 A key consequence of the close-knit form of these methods is 
how they tend to exclude certain basic legal elements that are crucial to a 
digital crime, and as they fall within the perimeters of cyberlaundering, such 
concerns cannot be overlooked. Some of the left-overs, or identifiable legal 
issues at stake here can be seen from the start to the end of investigation, and 
are thus crucial to every stage of the investigative process, as outlined above. 
These include the incident alert, the requisite authorization, certain threshold 
considerations, transportation and preservation of the evidence; verification 
and case management.
916
 These issues, accompanied by any of the applicable 
investigative models, establish the legitimacy of the entire investigative 
process.
917
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
914
 Otherwise known as the FORZA model, this model is suited for cases that require complex digital 
investigation. It focuses not only on technical issues that follow digital investigation, but also on 
certain key legal and managerial issues. It defines eight principal roles (i.e. the case leader, system 
owner, legal advisor, security/system architect, digital forensic specialists, forensic 
investigator/system administrator, forensic investigator/forensic analysts and the legal prosecutor) 
and provides six key questions that each role player must answer in an investigation (i.e. who, what, 
how, when, where and why). However, in this model, the process within each role is not outlined. 
Thus, it is imperative to reference other models, explaining why the model operates entirely as a 
higher level of abstraction. Casey and Schatz (2011: 196) and Ieong (2006: 4). 
915
 Casey and Schatz (2011: 197). Cf Casey and Palmer (2004: 4). 
916
 Casey and Schatz (2011:200). Cf Arthur and Venter (2006: 6). 
917
 For more details see paragraph 6.4.4.3 below. 
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6.3.2.3 Scientific techniques and digital investigations 
Digital investigations should not be characterized by overwhelming 
sophistication and complexity, but rather by simplicity and flexibility. These 
are qualities that would enable investigators to adapt easily to any given 
situation. A scientific approach is not as rigorous as one might think. The 
approach ensures that investigators have the desired level of meticulousness 
for cyberlaundering investigations. As opposed to having a blanket cover on 
the whole investigative process, the scientific approach should be applied to 
every stage of the cyberlaundering investigation. Thus, coupled with the 
stages of digital investigation identified above, the following scientific 
principles should be applied to each given step:
918
 
 Observation: This refers to the occurrence of one or more events that 
would trigger the start of investigation, or an incident alert; 
 Hypothesis: On the basis of the incident that occurs, the investigator forms 
a theory or prognosis of what he thinks might have occurred, or what 
might have caused such occurrence; 
 Prediction: On the basis of the hypothesis, the investigator then predicts 
and tries to locate the cause of the incident or occurrence, by making a 
concrete and logical determination; 
 Experimentation/Testing: What follows is a thorough analysis of the 
available evidence to find the predicted element, cause, or factor. The 
hypothesis must be tested for possible alternative explanations. If the 
                                                          
918
 Casey and Schatz (2011: 204). Cf Arthur and Venter (2006: 10). 
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original hypothesis is correct, other alternative explanations are excluded 
automatically (a process otherwise termed falsification); and 
 Conclusion: The conclusion is formed after the result. It may support the 
hypothesis, contradict the hypothesis, or indicate the inadequacy of 
findings to generate a conclusion. 
Because these principles serve as a standard thought process that should be 
applied to each stage of the investigation, they are also vital to the analysis of 
how cyberlaundering should be investigated. 
 
6.3.3 Employing digital investigative elements for cyberlaundering: A 
practical assessment 
As a general principle of criminal investigations, the goal of conducting an 
investigation is to uncover the truth. This applies to cyberlaundering as well. 
The truth that is sought in this case is proof that the requisite elements of a 
cyberlaundering offence exist in a given conduct, or from a set of material 
facts. Hence, the purpose of conducting a cyberlaundering investigation is to 
show that a computer was used to perform a transaction, or a relationship, 
involving property or benefit, whether tangible or intangible, which is derived 
from a criminal activity. Broken down into its constituent elements, the result 
of the required investigation must prove the existence of a predicate offence, 
an activity, a computer and illegal funds (i.e. the actus reus elements), all of 
which are bound together by the requisite mens rea elements of the crime, 
such as knowledge of the crime and the corresponding associative 
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intention.
919
 In what follows, a distinct investigative method for 
cyberlaundering is described by adopting certain key elements of digital 
investigation such as the steps involved in digital investigations and the 
scientific sequence of investigation. However, cyberlaundering does not fit 
entirely into the conventional scheme of digital criminal investigation, given 
that it differs from other kinds of cybercrime. This is due to one material fact 
- the ‘victim’ element involved - which, in the case of cyberlaundering, is the 
state
920
 and not individuals, as is the case with most types of cybercrimes. 
Hence, this tilts the focus of the investigation slightly, causing more attention 
to be given to the elements of the offence and the perpetrator, and not so 
much to the victim, whom most cybercrime investigators often try to identify, 
especially when trying to detect the crime. In order to aid this analysis, a 
hypothetical scenario of cyberlaundering, using the avenues of virtual worlds 
is given below.
921
 
 
Cyberlaundering and investigation: A hypothetical scenario 
Jack Sparrow is a drug dealer living in South Africa. He makes 
roughly US$2 million annually from his unlawful enterprise. He 
learns about virtual worlds from a friend, who is a game addict, 
and informs him of the possibility of using such novel method to 
wash his funds. Jack Sparrow thereupon joins Second Life (SL) as 
                                                          
919
 See Chapter 3, paragraphs 3.2.1 and 3.2.3. 
920
 The state is a victim of a money laundering offence because the interests that are protected by 
criminalising money laundering are the economy of the state and effectiveness of the judicial 
process. Cf Unger (2007: 149) and Tanzi (2005: 91). This rationale is the same with 
cyberlaundering, which shares the same protected interests. Cf discussion in paragraph 6.4.2.1.3 
below, and the discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.3.3. 
921
 Cf Chapter 3, paragraph 3.6.6. 
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a resident. He buys a virtual land on which he later builds a big 
multi-purpose entertainment company called ‘The Lounge.’ The 
Lounge offers all sorts of social activities, ranging from night 
clubs to a diner and a coffee shop. Jack Sparrow arranges things 
in such a way that visiting The Lounge is by invitation only.  
John Doe is an acquaintance of Jack Sparrow, who often served 
as a middle man in his drug dealing enterprise. Jack Sparrow 
employs John Doe as a smurf, together with several other 
individuals living across different continents in the world. For a 
commission, Jack Sparrow requires the smurfs to become 
residents on SL in order to clean his funds. Jack Sparrow buys 
several smart cards which he tops with varying value from his 
illegal funds, after which he sends them electronically to all the 
smurfs. Jack Sparrow further invites the smurfs to The Lounge on 
an exclusive basis. Also, Jack Sparrow charges the smurfs a 
membership fee, which is equivalent in value to the amount or 
value on each smart card in their possession. The money is paid to 
Jack Sparrow in Linden dollar (L$) – the legal tender used as 
currency in SL. Thereafter, Jack Sparrow converts some of the 
monies back to real world money through an automatic teller 
machine (ATM), and further trades with the other smurfs with the 
remainder, after which, again, he converts the proceeds derived 
into real-world money. 
 
6.3.3.1 Threshold considerations 
Before commencing a cyberlaundering investigation, certain factors should 
be considered. It is expedient for these factors to be applied at every stage of 
the investigation, as they are recurring themes in the entire investigative 
exercise. They include the scientific process, case management and the 
applicability of a statute of limitation. 
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6.3.3.1.1 Adopting the scientific approach  
As shown above, the scientific approach is a thought process which utilizes a 
deductive analysis technique, in order to arrive at a clear, logical and 
irrefutable conclusion. By working through every stage - observing the 
relevant facts, forming a hypothesis, making a prediction based on such 
hypothesis, experimenting and testing the hypothesis for truth or correctness, 
and deducing a reasonable conclusion as a result - logic is guaranteed and 
irrational results can be avoided. More importantly, this approach should be 
applied at every stage of the investigative process. Given the complexity that 
characterizes digital investigations, especially in the case of cyberlaundering, 
having such a thought process would help to unravel seemingly 
incomprehensible cases and stages of the investigation. This is a recurring 
theme and a golden thread that runs through the discussion that follows. At 
every stage of the cyberlaundering investigative process discussed further, 
this logic is applied to the hypothetical case scenario given above, and a 
deductive analysis is formed at each stage of the investigative process. 
 
6.3.3.1.2 Case management 
Case management is another recurring theme in the entire investigative 
process, as it plays a very vital role. It is crucial to every stage of the 
investigation, and due to the sensitive and fragile nature of digital 
investigation, an effective case management ensures that relevant information 
or data resulting from each step of the process is captured, secured, 
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documented and woven together, in order to create a comprehensible and 
compelling picture of events relating to an offense or incident.
922
 Case 
management also facilitates information sharing, where all role players 
provide weekly or daily status updates in order to consolidate and archive 
updated information and the workings of the entire investigative process. 
Thus, case management functions as a binding chord for the entire 
investigative process, without which crucial information may be rendered 
fluid and, consequently, become undiscovered. 
 
6.3.3.1.3 Statute of limitation 
The prosecution of cyberlaundering should commence on a lawful basis, and 
one major hindrance to prosecution is where the crime in question has 
prescribed. This is particularly interesting for the subject of money laundering 
which involves two distinct offences – the money laundering offence and the 
predicate offence upon which the former is based. This rationale thus applies 
to both offences, and a money laundering offence cannot be prosecuted where 
the requisite predicate offence has prescribed. For money laundering 
offences, in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, 2000
923
 (‘Palermo Convention’), and the United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
                                                          
922
 Casey and Schatz (2011: 201). Cf Casey and Palmer (2004: 6). 
923
 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 November 2000 and came into force 
on 29 September 2003. 
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1988
924
 (the ‘Vienna Convention’), it is left to the discretion of local 
jurisdictions to prescribe “a long statute of limitations period within which to 
commence proceedings for any offence covered under the Convention[s].”925 
Thus, in line with this provision, a determination of a statute of limitation is 
left to the discretion of local jurisdictions. For example, in the US, a five-year 
criminal statute of limitations applies to all money laundering offences.
926
 
This rationale applies to cyberlaundering as well. Seeing that the entire 
discussion is premised on a hypothesis, and because a concrete local and 
international ACL regime is currently lacking, no such time period is 
prescribed for cyberlaundering. For all intents and purposes, the 
cyberlaundering offence considered in the following discussion is not deemed 
to have prescribed. 
 
6.3.3.2 Detection 
What should trigger a cyberlaundering investigation? This is the primary 
question that should kick-start the investigative process for cyberlaundering. 
Concomitantly, it also indicates an equally important rationale that is 
glaringly lacking in the process models of digital investigation because the 
‘incident alert’ aspect of digital investigation is lacking in these process 
models.
927
 As applicable to cyberlaundering, it is important to ascertain an 
                                                          
924
 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 7 December 1987, and came into force 
on 11 November 1988. 
925
 Articles 11(5) and 3(8) of the Palermo and Vienna Conventions, respectively. 
926
 Sections 1956 and 1957, Title 18 of the United States Code. 
927
 Casey and Schatz (2011: 200). Cf paragraph 6.3.2.2 above. 
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incident alert. This is necessary in order to set in motion the investigative 
process. 
As stated earlier, unlike conventional cybercrimes, where there are 
identifiable victims that could easily report an incident, a crime or the 
suspected commission of a crime, there are no such victims in the case of 
cyberlaundering because the state is the victim of the crime. In this regard, 
one has to resort to the conventional money laundering system through which 
law enforcers gain knowledge of laundering operations. Thus, the role of 
Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) should not be undermined,
928
 nor the role 
of certain individuals who are duty-bound to report suspicious activities.
929
 
Depending on the system of the relevant local jurisdiction, the FIU could act 
as a law enforcement body or it could simply channel the information to the 
relevant criminal justice authority. The obligation to report the suspicion of 
cyberlaundering activities depends largely on the method of cyberlaundering 
operation in focus, and such reporting should be made only on the basis of a 
                                                          
928
 See discussion on the obligation to report to Financial Intelligence Units in Chapter 4, paragraph 
4.2.3.2.3. Cf Recommendations 20, Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 19). Cf Financial Action 
Task Force (2003: 8). 
929
 See the anti-money laundering (AML) principles set out in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.3.2.3. 
Recommendations 22 and 23 of the Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force 
provide that, other than financial institutions, the duty to report is also incumbent on lawyers, 
notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants who engage in the activities of their 
clients, such as real estate transactions; management of client money and other assets including 
securities; management of bank, savings and securities accounts; creation, operation or management 
of legal persons or arrangements; buying and selling of business entities, and the organisation of 
contributions for the creation, operation or management of companies. See Financial Action Task 
Force (2012A: 20), Cf Financial Action Task Force (2003: 8).  Also, the obligation is incumbent 
upon non-financial entities, such as dealers in precious metals or stones, as well as trust and 
company service providers. See Financial Action Task Force (2012A: 20). Cf Financial Action 
Task Force (2003: 16). 
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reasonable suspicion.
930
 For example, financial institutions are in the best 
position to report suspicious activities that involve cyberlaundering through 
the online banking system. Their ability to report, however, is premised on 
their capacity to identify or detect cyberlaundering operations, as it is clear 
that cyberlaundering, via online banking, is quite different from the mere 
performance of structured transactions in terrestrial banks.
931
 This shows why 
capacity building and skills development are vital to this embryonic stage of 
the ACL regime.  
The importance of detection is also important to the area of electronic 
payment systems (i.e. e-payment systems), which is the main tool used for 
cyberlaundering operations. The question is how law enforcement authorities 
can detect suspicious transactions where such transactions have not been 
reported. Most electronic transactions have certain digital signatures which 
entail “the identification of the user, location of the teller machine where it 
was used with the amount of transaction it holds, and the date/time stamp.”932 
It is usually a hassle for authorities to monitor every digital signature closely 
for suspicious transactions. For this reason, oversights are almost sure to 
occur. Practice shows that some financial institutions and companies are now 
cognizant of this fact. Certain pre-paid card companies now use the services 
of some independent detection agencies to monitor the prepaid card 
                                                          
930
 For a detailed discussion on what amounts to ‘reasonable suspicion,’ see discussion in Chapter 4, 
paragraph 4.2.3.2.1. The concept of reasonable suspicion is incumbent on the existence of a 
predicate offence for cyberlaundering, as one of its constituent elements. See discussion in 
paragraph 6.4.3.2 below. 
931
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.6.2. 
932
 See Jamali (2009: 43). 
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transactions by their customers. One such company is Red Plc, which offers 
the PRISM Merchant system
933
  and which boasts the successful detection of 
fraud and money laundering schemes. PRISM’s operations are explained as 
follows: 
PRISM Merchant combines powerful neural network risk models with a 
flexible rules-based system for implementing expert merchant risk 
management strategies. PRISM’s neural models utilize data feeds from your 
merchant processing system to score transactions from individual merchants. 
The models take into account a wide range of merchant information, including 
higher-than-normal incidence of charge-backs, variations in transaction 
volumes, numerous same-card transactions, average ticket amounts that exceed 
the norm for the merchant’s line of business, large number of keyed-in 
transactions, and significant increases in average ticket items for a credit 
sale.
934
 
 
Although the success of this system cannot yet be ascertained, this clearly 
shows that the issue of detection is gaining currency. It also shows that 
national security is becoming privatised by the mere fact that the detection of 
cyberlaundering is delegated or outsourced to private entities. Nevertheless, 
this should not detract from the fact that the responsibility to report suspicious 
transactions lies with law enforcement authorities and the persons mentioned 
when they have reasonable suspicion. 
                                                          
933
 For more information see Red Plc (an undated website document) ‘PRISM Merchant System’ 
available at <http://www.redplc.com/about/> [accessed on 16 February 2012]. 
934
 Red Plc (an undated website document) ‘PRISM Merchant System’ available at <http://www.red 
plc.com/about/> [accessed on 16 February 2012]. 
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In the hypothetical scenario given above, the activities of Jack Sparrow and 
John Doe could only be detected by way of the internal regulatory mechanism 
put in place by the gaming website, SL. By tracing and monitoring closely the 
activities of every resident in the virtual world, the company would be in the 
best position to report such suspicious activities. However, the likelihood of 
this is slim, given the always overshadowing raison d'être of corporate 
concerns, because such profit-driven enterprises would first like to safeguard 
their own interests before public policy considerations.
935
 
Overall, given that the state, as an institution, is made up of individuals who 
are its composite members, the interests of the state equate to the interest of 
the public. Thus, in safeguarding this interest, everybody, as opposed to a 
designated few, should bear the burden of raising an alarm on 
cyberlaundering activities. Intuitions or suspicions premised on 
reasonableness that are derived from ongoing monitoring of high-risk areas 
should be reported timeously. For example, in the hypothetical scenario 
above, a fellow SL resident with knowledge, or reasonable suspicion, of the 
illegal activity could take the initiative and report to the relevant FIU of law 
enforcement agency. 
 
6.3.3.3 Survey 
At this stage investigators should be ready to recognize and identify potential 
sources of digital evidence. This is crucial in order to ascertain what kind of 
                                                          
935
 This is but one of several challenges to the effective regulation of cyberlaundering. Cf discussion in 
Chapter 5, paragraph 5.3.1. 
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evidence to preserve. To carry out this exercise, investigators should be able 
to identify the actus reus elements of the crime of cyberlaundering. At the 
survey stage, the actus reus elements alone can be judged, because the 
investigators cannot have all relevant information to ascertain the equally 
requisite mens rea,
936
 although a presumption of such is important as part of 
the overall reasonable suspicion required. On the basis of such reasonable 
suspicion, the need to obtain authorization is justified in order to proceed with 
the investigation. 
 
6.3.3.3.1 Establishing the actus reus elements of cyberlaundering 
In light of all relevant facts, and based on the report given, investigators 
should be able to deduce the actus reus elements of the crime of 
cyberlaundering. From the set of hypothetical facts, these are identifiable as 
follows: 
(i.) Predicate offence: The predicate offence in question is drug dealing, 
which is generally criminalized in terms of local and international law.  
Where the crime is not committed in the place where the 
cyberlaundering prosecution is sought, the predicate offence has to be 
criminalized in the country where prosecution is sought, as well as in the 
country where the crime was committed. This satisfies the dual 
criminality requirement.
937
 Also, the predicate offence should not have 
                                                          
936
 Ascertaining the presence of mens rea comes at the analysis stage. See paragraph 6.3.3.7 below. 
937
 See Article 6(2)(c) of the Palermo Convention and Article 7(15)(c) of the Vienna Convention. Cf 
discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.3.1.1. 
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prescribed, or be barred by the relevant statute of limitations at the time 
the cyberlaundering operation had occurred. Important to note as well is 
the fact that Jack Sparrow and John Doe need not have been convicted 
of such predicate offence.
938
 
(ii.) Illegal funds: The next element of cyberlaundering that emerges clearly 
from the set of facts is the presence of illegal funds – US$2 million in 
this case, which is derived from the predicate offence. This element is 
often easily identifiable, because all that has to be proven is the link 
between the funds and the predicate offence. 
(iii.) An activity: The activity element could be rather broad in nature. It 
primarily means what the accused did with the illegal funds or how he 
tried to conceal the origin of such funds.
939
 This element depicts how 
cyberlaundering deviates from the conventional concept of money 
laundering because, with the latter, the relevant activity happens in the 
terrestrial world. For example, the money launderer would purchase a 
house, a car or a painting. As is seen from the given scenario, the illicit 
funds are diverted into the ‘cyber world’. In this case, Jack Sparrow 
layers the illegal proceeds by funnelling them into SL, using his army 
                                                          
938
 The Palermo and Vienna Conventions do not have express provisions in this regard. It is, however, 
stated in Articles 3(4) and 3(5) of the Council of Europe Directive 2005/50/EC on the prevention 
and use of financial systems for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, adopted 
by the European Parliament and the Council of Europe of the European Union on 26 October 2005, 
which came into force on 25 November 2005. Cf Basel Institute on Governance: Assets recovery 
Knowledge Centre (2007) ‘Anti-Money Laundering’ available at <http://www.assetrecovery.org 
/kc/node/82bce589-7805-11dd-9c9d-d9fcb408dfee.3> [accessed on 5 February 2012]. These 
different elements are crucial to this study, and they would be analyzed in detail in relation to 
cyberlaundering in the following chapter (Chapter 5). 
939
 Cf detailed discussion on the concept of ‘an activity’ in Chapter 3 above at paragraph 3.2.4.2. 
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of smurfs, John Doe included. Given the compounded and extremely 
complex nature of the activity element, an understanding of which 
often eludes many, cyberlaunderers are able to waltz freely, without 
being detected. The activity is often so well simulated that, ordinarily, 
every semblance of illegality evades the eye. This is no doubt a 
challenge posed to investigators. Also, to comprehend properly the 
relevant activity - or ‘activities’, in which cyberlaunderers engage, 
investigators need to be properly acquainted with the nature of such 
activity. For example, an investigator who is ignorant about the concept 
of virtual worlds would be simply unable to detect the cyberlaundering 
operations in which Jack Sparrow and John Doe have engaged. 
Therefore, the activity element is one that requires investigators to be 
versed in the cyberlaundering schemes that exist with not just virtual 
worlds, but also several other new technologies that are vulnerable to 
cyberlaundering operations.
940
 
(iv.) A computer: This is the key technological element of the crime, and it is 
intertwined with the activity element. Both should be understood 
together, because the idea of a computer adds flesh to the notion of 
activity involved. The computer, which also encompasses the concept 
of the internet, is the means through which the activity is conducted.
941
 
In this case, the focus is on SL, which is an internet gaming company 
                                                          
940
 For a detailed discussion on the key vulnerable avenues for cyberlaundering, see Chapter 3 above at 
paragraph 3.6. 
941
 See detailed discussion in Chapter 3 above at paragraph 3.2.4.2. 
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that serves as the platform upon which cyberlaundering operations are 
conducted. 
 
6.3.3.3.2 Authorization 
The need for investigators and law enforcement bodies to acquire a warrant or 
authorization forms an essential part of the survey phase of investigation. 
This is crucial in order to proceed with the investigation, because 
authorization is required for the search and seizure of digital evidence. 
Prudence dictates that it is best to err on the side of caution by acquiring the 
requisite authorization at an early stage of the investigation in order to 
forestall any loophole that will undermine the investigation. Acting on 
reasonable suspicion, the investigator or law enforcement officer can seek the 
requisite authorization, which is usually a court order issued by a judge or 
magistrate within the relevant jurisdiction.
942
 Depending on the facts of the 
specific case, legal advice should be sought at this stage of the investigation 
to ensure that the necessary nuances of the law are considered, especially as 
regards the authorization process. Therefore, in the given hypothetical 
scenario, it would be prudent for the relevant law enforcement authority to 
obtain a search warrant soon after reasonably suspecting the commission of 
the crime, and after having also made sure that the constituent elements of the 
crime are met. 
 
                                                          
942
 For a discussion on how the relevant jurisdiction can be determined, see paragraph 6.5 below. 
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6.3.3.4 Seizure and confiscation of potential evidence 
Once investigators or law enforcement officers have the requisite 
authorization, the next step is to proceed to with the seizure and confiscation 
of the potential evidence. Depending on the circumstances of each case, the 
potential evidence in question would most likely be instruments, tools or 
assets related to the activity in which the cyberlaunderers have engaged.
943
 
The legal basis that underlies the duty of law enforcement bodies to act exists 
in the relevant legal instruments. At the international level, examples of such 
legal instruments are the Vienna and Palermo Conventions;
944
 as well as the 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of 
Terrorism,
945
 (the Warsaw Convention) which most countries have ratified. 
From the given scenario, several things could be seized as potential evidence, 
such as the smart cards which have been loaded with the illicit funds, and the 
electronic financial records, if any, that indicate how Jack Sparrow has 
structured payments into these cards. With smart cards, however, the issue is 
tricky. One must remember that the funds on certain smart cards can be 
accessed by more than one party. Consequently, the fact that a smart card has 
been seized does not mean that the funds on it have also been seized. This is 
due to the fact that an accomplice or a person in cahoots with the accused 
                                                          
943
 Cf Walden (2010: 607). 
944
 See Article 12(1)(a) and (b) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 5(1)(a) of the Vienna 
Convention. Cf. see discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.4.4. 
945
 Article 3 of the Convention which was adopted by the Council of Europe on 16 May 2005, and 
which came into force on 1 December 2009. 
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could very well have the funds on the card transferred or removed from the 
smart card.
946
 Thus, additional steps must be taken to ensure that the funds on 
the card are frozen as well. Given that most smart card companies, after retail, 
are often ‘detached’ from the smart card as well as the activities and 
transactions conducted with the smart card, unlike several terrestrial banks 
and their respective customers’ accounts, the possibility of freezing creates 
difficulty. First, there must be a legal basis for freezing at the national level 
because the provisions in existing AML laws such as the Vienna, Palermo 
and Warsaw Conventions do not provide for this scenario.
947
 
Also, perhaps the most important potential evidence is Jack Sparrow’s 
account or profile on the internet platform itself (SL) which, like other 
potential evidence, such as hard drives, emails stored on the web server and 
mobile devices, to name a few, can be seized. Jack Sparrow’s profile on SL 
will have sufficient details or history of his activities, which can form a thread 
to allow law enforcement piece together the underlying scheme. This can, 
however, be done only with the cooperation of SL as the principal internet 
service provider. Although the issue of privacy is one that might serve as 
reasonable defence against the ability of law enforcement to search and seize 
                                                          
946
 Cf see discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.3.6.3. 
947
 Article 12(1)(a) and (b) of the Palermo Convention. Cf Article 5(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention 
which does not entail this scenario. Nor is there an applicable provision in the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime (otherwise known as the Budapest Convention) which was adopted by 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 08 November 2001 and came into force on 
1 July 2004. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.3.6.3, a similar law that should 
apply is the SB-82 (NV Senate Bill 82-75
th
, BDR 14-266, which came into effect on 1 July 2009) of 
the American state of Nevada, which permits law enforcement agencies to investigate suspicious 
activities involving smart cards and freeze funds for up to 10 days after such seizure. 
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any possible evidence, the authority of a search warrant should, ideally, trump 
any of such concerns, whether raised by SL or Jack Sparrow. 
 
6.3.3.5 Preservation 
The notion of preservation of digital evidence is equally important, and it is 
also a vital stage in the digital investigative process. Necessary steps must be 
taken to ensure that potential evidence is captured in its current state, and 
more importantly, that the integrity of the potential evidence is preserved. 
The aim of this stage of the investigation is to ensure that the evidence 
obtained is accurate, reliable, professionally acceptable, and irrefutable.
948
  
For this purpose, the role of the forensic expert is indispensible. In practice, 
the preservation process involves the care in transportation of the potential 
evidence from the crime scene to the forensic laboratory, or between 
laboratories,
949
 and the use of duplicate copies of all sources of data.
950
 This 
allows investigators to have two categories of exhibits: the first, being the 
original one, is catalogued and stored in an environmentally controlled 
location, and in an unmodified state. The second one is the duplicate of the 
original material, which is created and scrutinized as the investigation 
progresses.
951
 For our purposes, such precautionary steps should be applied to 
the smart cards, the web server of SL which has Jack Sparrow’s account and 
profile, and possible communication devices, such as his email account and 
                                                          
948
 Casey and Schatz (2011: 210). 
949
 Reyes, O’Shea, Steele, Hansen, Jean and Ralph (2007: 56). Cf Casey and Schatz (2011: 200). 
950
 Casey and Schatz (2011: 210). Cf Reyes, O’Shea, Steele, Hansen, Jean and Ralph (2007: 56). 
951
 Casey and Schatz (2011: 210). Cf Bell (2002: 321) and Mason and Scheldon (2010: 707). 
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mobile devices. Potential evidence obtained from any of these, or from any 
other identifiable source, is essential in order to put together the pieces of the 
puzzle. 
 
6.3.3.6 Examination 
The examination stage of digital investigation involves extracting and 
viewing information from the evidence, and making it available for 
analysis.
952
 This stage of the investigation requires a great deal of 
meticulousness. It involves resource-intensive and very protracted steps in 
order to avail useful results in a timely manner. In line with a rationale that 
underscores the physical process model of digital investigation,
953
 at this 
stage of the investigation, it is important to treat each source of digital 
investigation as an individual crime scene, and to apply the scientific method. 
This is a more inclusive and practical approach to forensic examination. It 
means that each step of the digital investigation (i.e. preparation, survey, 
examination, analysis and reporting) should be applied to every source of 
evidence. However, for the examination stage itself, three broad levels of 
forensic examination are often followed in the examination process, in order 
to foster collective examination, and to prevent an isolated individual 
examination of individual data:  
                                                          
952
 Casey and Schatz (2011: 212). 
953
 See discussion on the process models in paragraph 6.3.2.2 above. Cf Carrier and Spafford (2003: 3), 
Casey and Schatz (2011: 212) and Slade (2004: 4). 
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a) The first includes the survey/triage level of forensic inspection. This 
consists of a targeted review of all data available to identify which 
ones contain the most useful evidence and which might require 
additional processing;  
b) The second is the level of preliminary forensic examination and in-
depth forensic inspection. This implies the examination of data 
identified at the survey/triage stage, which might contain the most 
useful evidence which will help investigators to conduct interviews 
and developing leads; and  
c)  The third level is the in-depth forensic examination, which is a more 
comprehensive examination stage which follows from the 
preliminary forensic examination stage. This level allows for a more 
complete understanding of the offence.
954
  
Applying these steps to the given scenario, forensic experts will be able to sift 
very crucial data from the available data (i.e. smart cards, Jack Sparrow’s 
account and profile on SL’s web server, etc) that has been seized and 
preserved. This will help the prosecutor’s case. Several tactics and sub-
processes can also be employed during this examination phase, such as 
recovery,
955
 harvesting;
956
 organisation and search,
957
 and reduction, which 
                                                          
954
 Casey, Ferraro and Nguyen (2009: 1354). Cf Casey and Schatz (2011: 212). 
955
 Data recovery means where deleted, hidden, lost or damaged data is extracted from available 
sources, regardless of its relevance to the case at hand. Casey and Schatz (2011: 214). 
956
 Data harvesting refers to how the investigator can harvest data for later analysis. However, an 
important feature of this process is that, unlike the data recovery process, only relevant data is 
harvested. Thus it requires a more logical application of thought. Casey and Schatz (2011: 215). 
957
 Organisation and search involves the grouping of derived data in units in order to accelerate later 
analysis. As such, relevant data may be grouped, tagged, or clearly separated in order to allow law 
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often involves reducing the relevant dataset for the analysis stage of the 
investigation,
958
 as the occasion might warrant. 
 
6.3.3.7 Analysis 
Of all other stages, the analysis stage of digital investigation is the most 
definitive and one which demands intense critical thinking. The scientific 
method of thought is of particular relevance to this stage. The analysis 
requires a clear and proper dissection of certain internal attributes of the data. 
Technically, it requires a probe into certain key component parts of the data 
such as the specific binary audio and video format of the data items, or the 
text and narrative, which is the meaning of the data. The salient 
characteristics derived from these items are then pieced together and set out 
clearly in order to establish necessary links as well as the origin of the item, 
which would give a clear determination of the location of the perpetrator.
959
 
This stage is one which tries to make sense of the entire scenario by 
assembling the necessary data in order to form a clear picture and have a 
proper understanding of the story. In essence, the analysis stage revolves 
around certain basic questions such as who, what, where, when, how and 
why.
960
  
                                                                                                                                                                         
enforcement to find the relevant data during the analysis stage. Cf Casey and Schatz (2011: 214). Cf 
Cohen (2009: 413). 
958
 Like separating the wheat from the chaff, reduction focuses on the overall structure of the object, 
and not the content. It looks at the smallest set of digital investigation having the highest potential 
of containing greatest potential for containing data of probative value. Casey and Schatz (2011: 
214). Cf Cohen (2009: 413). 
959
 Casey and Schatz (2011: 217). Cf Mason and Scheldon (2010: 714). 
960
 Casey and Schatz (2011: 216). Cf Cohen (2009: 413). 
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In light of the given hypothetical scenario, the respective questions pertain to 
the relevant data that has been seized, preserved and examined, such as the 
smart cards, Jack Sparrow’s account and profile on SL’s web server, and 
hence the questions: What is the incident? If it is cyberlaundering, who is 
involved in the alleged cyberlaundering operation? Where did the incident 
occur? When did the incident occur? How was the operation carried out? And 
why was the operation carried out? At the survey stage, the first five 
questions are answered, as such questions involve the actus reus elements of 
the crime, which has been established.
961
  
At this stage of the investigation the mens rea element should be reasonably 
deduced from the set of facts, as it forms a clear, logical and complete 
picture. The mens rea element of cyberlaundering encapsulates two 
inseparable requirements: knowledge of the illegality of the funds and an 
associative intention with the illegal funds, which are applied further to the 
given hypothetical scenario. 
 
6.3.3.7.1 Knowledge of the illegality of the funds 
 Actual knowledge, and not negligence, of the illegality of the funds is 
required to establish criminality for cyberlaundering.
962
  This exercise is also 
crucial in the investigative process because whatever reasonable deductions 
are made from available data must constitute proof beyond a reasonable 
                                                          
961
 The statute of limitation discussion in paragraph 6.4.3.1 answers the statute of limitations question 
sufficiently. 
962
 Cf Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.4.2.2. 
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doubt, in order to allow the prosecutor to found a good case in court. Thus, 
knowledge of the illegal funds is a fundamental element of the crime, being a 
conditio sine qua non for the crime. From the given hypothetical scenario, in 
order to aid the assessment, certain extraneous factors or indicators could also 
help to establish the requisite knowledge. For example, where one of the 
smurfs employed by Jack Sparrow is apprehended, such a person could testify 
for the prosecution in order to help sustain the knowledge argument. An 
investigation could be conducted into the finances of Jack Sparrow, which 
could sufficiently show that he never made a tax declaration on the funds in 
question, or that he failed to make an accurate declaration, and that there are 
other possible discrepancies in his finances.
963
 
 
6.3.3.7.2 Associative intention with the illegal funds:  
The crux of money laundering inheres in the actual laundering operation, 
which is a basic rationale also shared with cyberlaundering. The layering 
phase of cyberlaundering, in which the criminal seeks to disguise the origin 
of the funds by devising several diabolically clever schemes,
964
 is a process 
that lies at the heart of a typical cyberlaundering operation. The intention that 
serves as the reason behind such operation is the ‘associative intention’ that 
investigators have to prove. The associative intention runs parallel with the 
activity element of the requisite actus reus discussed earlier,
965
 as it serves as 
                                                          
963
 Cf Madinger (2012: 107). 
964
 For an elaborate discussion, see Chapter 3, paragraph 3.4.2. 
965
 See paragraph 6.3.4.3(a)(iii) above. 
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the ‘reason behind the act’, pointing to why an accused would engage in such 
an activity in the first place. Hence, the associative intention may also refer to 
the purpose for which the funds are held, such as to hide the funds from law 
enforcement bodies, to conceal or disguise their nature, location, source, 
origin of the illegal funds, as well as to avoid the legal obligation to report the 
transaction.
966
   
Unlike the other form of men rea discussed above, extraneous factors need 
not be considered to prove the existence of an accused person’s associative 
intention with the illegal funds. Rather, the associative intention can be 
proved by simply sorting through available data. This requires more inward 
looking, and at the analysis stage of the investigation, this is one thread that 
investigators would have to find. Finding this thread requires investigators to 
make the necessary links and connections from the acquired, preserved and 
examined data in order to establish the associative intention element. From 
the given hypothetical scenario, the smart cards given by Jack Sparrow to his 
smurfs, if seized, may be used. The fact that there are multiple smart cards 
containing equal financial value may indicate a structured transaction. In 
addition, the clandestine nature of ‘The Lounge’, Jack Sparrow’s business 
enterprise on SL, and the fact that his smurfs are the only exclusive members, 
is indicative of the fact that an intention exists to evade law enforcement and 
to disguise the origin of the funds. In sum, investigators can reach the logical 
conclusion that Jack Sparrow has used SL for the laundering of his illegal 
                                                          
966
 For more elaboration, see Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.4.2.2 (b). 
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funds because the website platform is barely regulated, and Jack Sparrow has 
exploited that avenue because it is the most unlikely area that law 
enforcement agencies would consider when trying to track or trace the illegal 
funds in question. 
 
6.3.3.8 Reporting and testimony 
The conclusive phase of every investigative process is reporting and 
testimony. A report is compiled which includes reference to the protocols 
followed, methods used to seize, document, gather, preserve, recover, 
reconstruct, organize and search key evidence.
967
  
The report should embody an analysis leading to all conclusions and thorough 
descriptions of the supporting evidence and analysis.
968
 For the sake of 
objectivity, the report could also contain alternative theories that might lead 
to other plausible conclusions, but which cannot be followed because they 
contradict each other, and this might help further to prove the validity of the 
main conclusion set out. 
Legally speaking, for the prosecutor’s case to prevail against Jack Sparrow 
and his army of smurfs, the content of the report must be weighed on legal 
scales to ascertain whether the conclusion would be compelling in court, and 
given the fundamental principle that an accused person in a criminal case is 
presumed innocent until proven guilty, whether the report compiled will 
constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In further support of the 
                                                          
967
 Casey and Scahtz (2011: 219). Cf Walden (2010: 608). 
968
 Cf Walden (2010: 610). 
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prosecutor’s case, forensic experts can testify as expert witnesses at court on 
some technical elements of cyberlaundering, or on any other material element 
of the case. 
 
6.3.4 Mutual legal assistance for cyberlaundering investigations 
The extensive AML law principles of mutual legal assistance, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, all apply in tandem to cyberlaundering.
969
 This is 
especially the case with regard to the investigation of cyberlaundering. Given 
the transnational reach of cyber-related crimes such as cyberlaundering, 
international cooperation helps to prosecute the case successfully. Without 
such cooperation, cyberlaundering operations will take place with impunity. 
One point, however, that needs restating is the need for harmonization of laws 
across jurisdictions. This would help to cover potential loopholes that may 
arise, given the fact that states have diverging laws for the regulation of 
cyberlaundering.
970
 Where laws are not harmonized, criminals are able to 
recognize and exploit potential differences that may exist. 
Also, with mutual legal assistance assured, it goes without saying that the 
possibility of assets recovery
971
 is further cemented, and the principles 
discussed earlier kick in automatically.
972
 
                                                          
969
 See an elaborate discussion of the principles of mutual legal assistance in Chapter 4, paragraph 
4.2.4.1. 
970
 Cf Angers (2004:50) and Pocar (2004: 36) and discussion in paragraph 6.6 below. 
971
 Cf elaborate discussion on assets recovery in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.3.1.4. 
972
 The author is of the view that the principles of assets recovery of the current AML legal regime, as 
discussed earlier, apply in the same way mutatis mutandis to cyberlaundering. As such, the 
discussion on assets recovery is not repeated in this chapter. See Chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.3.1.4. 
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Given that the trans-border nature of cyberlaundering demands cooperation 
and not friction, one issue that could affect international cooperation is, 
however, the unavoidable issue of jurisdiction, which is discussed below. 
 
6.4 ESTABLISHING JURISDICTION FOR CYBERLAUNDERING 
A key legal issue within the wide spectrum of the ACL legal regime is that of 
jurisdiction. By definition, jurisdiction implies the right, authority, and power 
to apply the law.
973
 Traditionally, the concept of jurisdiction encompasses 
three major distinct concepts: jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to 
adjudicate and jurisdiction to enforce, which are horizontal forms compared 
to the vertical forms of jurisdiction.
974
   
Jurisdiction to prescribe refers to the right of any sovereign state to make its 
law applicable to things, persons, their activities, relations or their status, and 
their interests in things. A state can exercise such right by enacting 
legislation, or by passing an executive act or order, or by promulgating an 
administrative rule, or by a determination made by its court.
975
  
                                                          
973
 Etymologically, jurisdiction has Anglo-French and Latin origins, and when interpreted syllabically, 
it means to speak the law (i.e. iuris – meaning ‘law’; dicare – meaning ‘speak’). See Merriam-
Webster Dictionary (an undated website document) ‘Juirsdiction’ available at <http:// www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jurisdiction> [accessed on 22 February 2012]. 
974
 Certain factors determine jurisdiction locally. This is dependent on the structure of the relevant 
jurisdiction (i.e. federal government system, unilateral system, provincial, etc). Vertically, 
jurisdiction in the local sphere is categorized into subject-matter jurisdiction, which allows a local 
court to establish jurisdiction for the crime because of its related subject matter; in personam 
jurisdiction whereby jurisdiction is established with respect to the capacity of the person (often 
either as a perpetrator or victim); and in rem jurisdiction, which pertains to a thing or property. Cf 
Cater and Weiner (2011: 728); Henkin, Damrosch, Murphy, and Smit (2009: 1048); Oxman (1987: 
277) and Brenner and Koops (2004: 29). 
975
 Section 401(a), Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law 
Institute (1987: 330). Cf Brenner and Koop (2004: 5) and Buergenthal and Murphy (2002: 217). 
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Jurisdiction to adjudicate refers to the right and authority that a sovereign 
entity has to subject individuals to the process of its adjudicative bodies such 
as courts and administrative tribunals in order to determine whether a 
sovereign (national) law has been violated.
976
 This form of jurisdiction also 
means the power of a court or a legal body to hear a case, or to administer 
justice within a particular area of responsibility.
977
   
Jurisdiction to enforce refers to the right and authority of a sovereign body to 
compel compliance with its laws, or to punish non-compliance thereof, 
whether through judicial means such as the courts, administrative or 
executive means. The law is enforced via certain law enforcement agencies 
such the police, or by using non-judicial actions.
978
  
This section focuses on the jurisdiction to prescribe. The ensuing discussion 
revolves around this form because it is the principal first step, without which 
the other two forms of jurisdiction are left undetermined. The legal rationale 
that underlies the concept of jurisdiction is the principle of forum non 
conveniens, which is a doctrine of conflict of laws, according to which a court 
may refuse jurisdiction over a matter because a more appropriate forum exists 
for the matter.
979
  
How can jurisdiction be founded for cyberlaundering? Where evidence exists 
that incriminates a person as an alleged cyberlaunderer, it becomes crucial to 
                                                          
976
 Section 401(a), Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law 
Institute (1987: 332). Cf Brenner and Koop (2004: 5) and Buergenthal and Murphy (2002: 220). 
977
 See US Legal (an undated website document) ‘Jurisdiction’ available at <http://civilprocedure. 
uslegal.com/jurisdiction/> [accessed on 22 February 2012]. Cf Twitchell (1988: 610). 
978
 American Law Institute (1987: 330). Cf Brenner and Koops (2004: 5), Buergenthal and Murphy 
(2002: 218) and Koops and Robinson (2011: 178). 
979
 Dorward (1998: 142). Cf Stein (1985: 782). 
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ascertain where the accused person should be prosecuted. Given the broad 
scope of jurisdiction, it is worth noting its different categorizations. 
Jurisdiction could be of a national or an international nature. When the crime 
of cyberlaundering has a national scope, that is, when all the relevant 
elements of the offence can be found within a particular sovereign territory, 
the jurisdictional principles of the relevant local jurisdiction would apply 
automatically. Jurisdiction only becomes problematic when it involves more 
than one country. Again, it is worth reiterating that cyberlaundering, as a 
legal concept, is not yet properly conceptualized in both national and 
international laws. Invariably, this affects subsequent deliberations on a 
court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the offence, and any authority’s jurisdiction 
to enforce court orders. By reason of the fact that the trans-border nature of 
the internet has shrunk the size of the world significantly into a single vast 
space, seamlessly blurring all jurisdictional borders between countries, as 
well as the transnational nature of the money laundering and cybercrime 
offences, which informs this study, the study focuses more on the issue of 
jurisdiction on the international plane.  
As a necessary conduit in the prosecution process, in this section, the very 
pertinent issue of jurisdiction is investigated. The purpose is to find a solution 
to cyberlaundering. The issue of jurisdiction in cyberlaundering cases is 
discussed upon the legal basis that holds the concept of cyberlaundering, 
which is its deep roots in two distinct, but broad categories of crime – money 
laundering and cybercrime. The principles of jurisdiction in relation to these 
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two categories are juxtaposed in order to find the right legal basis upon which 
jurisdiction can be established for cyberlaundering. To this end, an analogy is 
given below that forms part of an analysis of how jurisdiction can be found 
for cyberlaundering. The scientific approach of deductive analysis used for 
the discussion of cyberlaundering investigations is also adopted for this 
purpose. Afterwards, deducing from these discussions, certain set guidelines 
for founding jurisdiction for cyberlaundering are suggested. 
 
Cyberlaundering and jurisdiction: A hypothetical scenario 
Jack Sparrow, together with his friend, John Doe, are German 
citizens. They sell household furniture for a living in Berlin, 
Germany, where they are resident. Their shop is called ‘Comfort 
Zone.’ They recently found a way to sell their furniture to 
customers outside Berlin, using the internet. As a result, they 
created the website called ‘www.comfortzonefurnitures.com,’ 
where customers can view their stock and make orders. Jack 
Sparrow and John Doe accept credit cards, smart cards such as 
PayPal, and online barter trade instruments such as e-gold 
currencies and bitcoins, as means of payment, after which they 
deliver the furniture. With time, their business via the internet 
started to boom, and profits made up 90% of their monthly total 
gross. They both decided to close their terrestrial shop in order to 
focus on selling furniture solely online. Jack Sparrow and John 
Doe at some point started to have criminal instincts, which led 
them to swindle and defraud many customers, by either rendering 
defective performance or by not making deliveries at all. In order 
to evade being traced, they established another website registered 
in Antigua and closed the one registered in Germany. However, 
they successfully linked the new website with the old one, 
retaining the same web address in order not to lose their customers. 
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Now, fully in the business of swindling customers by virtue of 
their illicit business, Jack Sparrow and John Doe began making 
much more profit, with which they used to establish several other 
fraudulent websites, such as a fake online banking, lottery, file-
sharing and online casino websites, which they both co-managed.  
One Jim Watson in Australia bought furniture on 
www.comfortzone furtniture.com. He paid by credit card, but 
never received any furniture. He reported the case to the local 
police in Melbourne. The police forwarded the case to the 
prosecuting authorities in Melbourne. After a thorough 
investigation, the illegality of Jack Sparrow and John Doe’s 
business came to light, and besides charging them as co-
perpetrators with the crime of cyberfraud, the prosecutor also 
wants to charge them with cyberlaundering on the basis that their 
conduct meets the elements of the crime. In the meantime, the 
prosecutor has requested the assistance of the German criminal 
justice authorities (Strafjustizbehörden) to freeze Jack Sparrow and 
John Doe’s mansions, luxury cars and bank accounts in Germany. 
 
6.4.1 Applicability of money laundering principles of jurisdiction  
As discussed earlier,
980
 amongst the other principles of jurisdiction, such as 
the nationality principle,
981
 the objective territoriality principle,
982
 the 
universality principle
983
, and the passive personality principle,
984
 the 
                                                          
980
 See chapter 4, paragraph 4.2.4.2. 
981
 The nationality principle presupposes that countries would have jurisdiction over their nationals 
who have committed crimes outside their territories. This principle is supported by Article 4(b)(i) of 
the Vienna Convention, and Article 15(2)(b) of the Palermo Convention. 
982
 The objective territoriality principle implies that a country would have jurisdiction because the 
action had an actual or intended effect on the country’s territory without the necessary occurrence 
of the action in that territory. An indirect reading of this principle can be gleaned from Article 
4(a)(i) of the Vienna Convention, and Articles 15(1)(a), (b)(i) and (ii) of the Palermo Convention. 
983
 The universality principle of jurisdiction means that any state would be able to claim jurisdiction on 
the basis that the alleged offence is of such a serious nature that it threatens the international peace, 
human rights and integrity that they affect all states and all people. This principle is grounded in 
customary international law. See discussion at paragraph 6.4.3.3 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
347 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
subjective territoriality principle
985
 of jurisdiction is most preferred for the 
crime of money laundering. The subjective territoriality principle holds that a 
country can exercise jurisdiction over a money laundering offence where the 
related property or asset, the accused person, or the laundering oper ations are 
within its territory.
986
 This holds true regardless of where the predicate 
offence might have occurred.
987
 This rationale is further buttressed by the fact 
that money laundering is not a result offence but a conduct offence, for it is 
the conduct that incurs criminal liability. Therefore, the offence of money 
laundering is deemed to have taken place as soon as a constituent element of 
the crime is present within the relevant jurisdiction.
988
 
Cyberlaundering, on the other hand, typically involves the laundering of 
illegal proceeds through a computer. However, the rationale that underscores 
the subjective territoriality principle cannot be adopted directly for 
cyberlaundering. This is due to one significant fact, namely that the 
subjective territoriality principle is not concerned with the effects of the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
984
 The passive personality principle of jurisdiction holds that jurisdiction can be established on the 
basis of the fact that the national of a states party is a victim of the alleged offence. This principle is 
supported by Article 15(2)(a) of the Palermo Convention. 
985
 The subjective territoriality principle of jurisdiction is an American terminology, and a similar 
concept exists in Europe as the ‘ubiquity theory’. Stessen (2000: 198). Cf Koh (2006: 57) and 
Oxman (1987: 278). 
986
 Stessen (2000: 198). Cf Oxman (1987: 277). Arguably, this principle is contained in Article 4(a)(i) 
of the Vienna Convention, and Articles 15(1)(a), (b)(i) and (ii) of the Palermo Convention. 
987
 Article 6(2) of the Vienna Convention, and Article 6(2) of the Palermo Convention. An important 
caveat to this principle is the concept of dual criminality which might serve as a bar to founding 
jurisdiction. Essentially, where a predicate offence is an offence in one country, but not in another, 
the former country cannot punish the offence or offences based on said offence (i.e. money 
laundering) as it is tantamount to governing into another sovereign states’ territory and jurisdiction, 
which defies the principle of  international law. 
988
 Essentially, the crime of money laundering has the potential to create multi-jurisdictional claims, as 
it is not focused on whether the crime has an effect or result in that territory, but on whether an 
essential part of the conduct took place there. 
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crime, which is a feature of the objective territoriality principle. One should 
bear in mind that cyberlaundering, by its nature, could be truly ubiquitous, 
making it extremely difficult to have it couched under a single concept of 
jurisdiction.  
Thus, in line with the hypothetical scenario sketched above, the prosecution 
authorities in Melbourne would be unable to found jurisdiction under the 
subjective territoriality principle for the following reasons: (i) The accused 
person is not within its jurisdiction; (ii) The website is not registered within 
its jurisdiction; and (iii) The frozen assets are not within its jurisdiction. If 
any of the above factors were present, and if a mutual treaty between both 
countries existed, a legal argument could be made out for the extradition of 
Jack Sparrow and John Doe to Melbourne. However, the issue of extradition 
opens up a whole new scenario entirely.
989
 
                                                          
989
 The issue of extradition is unsettling in the international arena, for political reasons. In principle, 
jurisdiction itself serves as a strong barrier to extradition. Many times, other barriers, such as a lack 
of dual criminality of the offence, the political nature of the alleged crime, the death penalty, or the 
threat of torture tend to subdue a request for extradition. For example, due to differences in the 
French and US human rights laws, it took years, and with strong pressure from the international 
community, before the President of France, Jacque Chirac, gave in, in 2002, to the extradition 
request of the US to have Ira Eihon (famously dubbed ‘the Unicorn killer’) extradited. He was an 
American who killed his wife and locked her up in the closet for 20 years. More recently, in July 
2010, the extradition request made by the US to Switzerland, for famed international filmmaker, 
Roman Polanski, who is charged in the US with sexual assault allegedly committed in the US in 
1978, was refused, on what the US considers immaterial grounds. New York Times (2010) ‘Swiss 
Reject US Request to Extradite Polanski’ available at <http://www.nytimes.com /2010/07 /13/ 
movies/13polanski.html?src=mv> [accessed 24 February 2012].  
 Also, in certain cases where the barriers to extradition are lowered, as evident in the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW), to which the principle of dual criminality does not apply, the issue of 
extradition is still not without political concerns. The EAW issued by the Swedish authorities 
against Julian Assange on grounds of having committed sexual assault is a good example. The 
matter is embroidered with political concerns, which slows down the entire process of extradition. 
For more details see the case of Julian Paul Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012] 
UKSC 22. Also see Rundle, G (2010) ‘Did he or didn’t he?’ available at 
<http://www.theage.com.au/national/did-he-or-didnt-he-the-murky-politics-of-sex-and-consent-
20101211-18tie.html> [accessed on 15 July 2012]. 
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6.4.2 Applicability of cybercrime principles of jurisdiction 
The relevant principles of jurisdiction in relation to cybercrime are contained 
in Article 22 of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime
990
 (the 
Budapest Convention). Specifically, Article 22(1)(a) of the Convention states 
that jurisdiction shall be established for the cybercrime offences listed in the 
Convention when committed in the territory of the states parties to the 
Convention. Also, Article 22(1)(d) of the Convention provides that 
jurisdiction shall be established for the cybercrime offences listed in the 
Convention if committed by one of the nationals of a state party, if the 
offence is punishable under the jurisdiction within which the crime was 
completed, or if it is committed outside any state’s territorial jurisdiction. 
These articles embed both the territoriality and nationality principles of 
jurisdiction respectively. Both principles are peculiar to cybercrime, given the 
ramifications that come with the concept. The implication for 
cyberlaundering is least favourable. The territoriality and nationality 
principles are considered in greater detail, along with the universality 
principle of jurisdiction, which is another possible claim to found jurisdiction, 
and which is also relevant to this study. These principles are discussed in line 
                                                          
990
 The Convention was drawn up by the Council of Europe in Strasburg, with participation of the 
Council of Europe, observer states Japan, Canada and China. The Convention was adopted by the 
Committee of the Ministers of the Council of Europe at its 109th session on 08 November 2001. On 
23 November 2003, it was open for signature in Budapest, and on 1 July 2004, it came into force. 
As at 9 March 2012, the Convention had been ratified by 32 states parties. In tandem with the 
Convention is the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime: Additional Protocol to the 
Convention adopted by the Council of Europe on 7 November 2002 and came into force on 1 
March 2006. For more information see the Treaties Office of the Council of Europe at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/> [accessed on 9 February 2012]. Cf discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 
4.3.2.3. 
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with some practical examples of how several countries have interpreted them, 
and, for our purposes, how they can be transposed for the purposes of 
establishing  jurisdiction in cyberlaundering matters. 
 
6.4.2.1 The territoriality principle 
Perhaps the most interesting observation of the enshrined principle of 
territoriality, as outlined in Article 22(1)(a) of the Budapest Convention, is 
that it provides for the territoriality principle, without distinguishing between 
the subjective and objective principles of jurisdiction. When applied directly 
to cyberlaundering, this potentially causes different interpretations because of 
the elements of the offence of money laundering embodied in it. When 
exactly would cyberlaundering be committed ‘in the territory’ of a country?  
one might ask. The territoriality principle of jurisdiction with respect to 
cybercrimes is often an issue left to local courts to decide. For example, in the 
US, the minimum contact principle is followed, with which to ascertain 
territorial jurisdiction for cybercrimes, as enunciated in the landmark case of 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington 326 US 310 (1945). In this case, the 
Court had to determine the level of connection that must exist between a 
corporation that is non-resident within a state, and the relevant state, in order 
for that corporation to be sued within the relevant state. The Court ruled that 
one can only be subject to judgment in personam if such a person is not 
present within the relevant territory of the forum, but if it can be rightfully 
ascertained that he or she has had, at least, certain minimum contacts with the 
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territory, in order not to defy basic principles of fair play and substantial 
justice.
991
  
However, this rationale proves to be substantially vague when fitted into the 
cyberlaundering frame, as it is difficult to ascertain what constitutes a 
minimum contact, especially in light of the hypothetical scenario given 
earlier. Should the required ‘minimum contact’ relate to the criminal or the 
crime? And what exactly would amount to a ‘minimum contact’? 
Fundamentally, when one juxtaposes the territoriality principles of 
jurisdiction with the notion of cyberlaundering, it conjures up certain factors 
that serve as determinants, which may or may not indicate the applicability of 
the territoriality principle. These include the location of the acts, the 
computer, the person, and the effect(s). 
 
6.4.2.1.1 Location of the act 
 This implies that a state party can claim jurisdiction on the basis of 
territoriality where the act or omission (i.e. conduct) of the crime in question 
was committed on its territory. As far as cybercrime is concerned, several 
states have tried to adopt the very broad principle of territoriality for 
cybercrimes. An interesting example is Tasmania. Article 257F(2)(a) of the 
Tasmanian Criminal Code Act of 1924 provides that jurisdiction would be 
established where a significant part of the conduct relating to, or constituting 
the doing of the act, takes place in or within the Tasmanian territory. Several 
                                                          
991
 See page 326 of the judgment. 
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states of the US, too, have similar positions. For example, in Arkansas, North 
Carolina and Connecticut, if the transmission that constitutes the offence 
either originates or is received in a state, that state can found jurisdiction on 
the basis of the territoriality principle.
992
 In Europe, on the other hand, most 
countries establish jurisdiction when the act is committed within their 
respective territories, without regard to the nature of the type of cybercrime 
concerned. For example, in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, 
jurisdiction can be established over persons who have committed offences 
within their respective territories.
993
 The territoriality principle of jurisdiction 
in relation to the location of the act, as contained in the domestic anti-
cybercrime laws of these countries, have an overarching approach. This 
approach, which appears to be borrowed from Article 22(1)(a) of the 
Budapest Convention, to which these countries are parties, is blurry and 
ambiguous. Impliedly, the determination of the location of the act is a 
question that is left open. 
It has been said that cyberlaundering is ubiquitous in nature and, as such, it is 
not an easy task to ascertain the place where a particular act is committed. 
Consequently, due to its nature, cyberlaundering has the potential of founding 
jurisdiction almost everywhere the conduct is carried out, just as is the case 
with the traditional concept of money laundering. Thus, given the 
                                                          
992
 See sections 5-27-606 of the Annex to the Arkansas Criminal Code of 2003, sections 14-453-.2 of 
the North Carolina General Statute of 2002, and sections 53(a)-261 of the Annex to the Connecticut 
General Statute of 2004. 
993
 See article 2 of the Dutch Criminal Code (Strafwetboek) of 1994; article 3 of the Belgian Criminal 
Code (Strafwetboek belgie) of 2012 and section 3 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) 
of 1998. Cf South African legislation: Section 90 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
No. 22 of 2002. 
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hypothetical scenario above, it follows that Jack Sparrow and John Doe 
committed the conduct of cyberlaundering in Germany, as they performed the 
laundering within the German jurisdiction, even though Jim Watson is not 
within that territory. The conduct in this sense relates more to the person than 
to the actual workings of cyberlaundering. As such, like the objective 
territoriality principle of money laundering discussed earlier, Melbourne 
would still be unable to found jurisdiction for the cyberlaundering offence 
committed by Jack Sparrow and John Doe. 
  
6.4.2.1.2 Location of the computer 
Another possibility that lies under the territoriality principle of jurisdiction as 
regards cybercrime, is the location of the computer that is instrumental in the 
commission of the crime. This would mean that jurisdiction can be founded 
on the basis of territoriality, if the computer used is within the territory of the 
country seeking to found jurisdiction, or if some part of the conduct impacts 
on a computer that is located within the relevant state.
994
 Certain countries in 
Asia, such as Malaysia and Singapore, require not only that the computer, but 
that also its program and data to be located within its jurisdiction at the 
relevant time.
995
 This also applies where satellites are used as instruments for 
crime. As they orbit around the world, and are not situated in a designated 
territorial space, it is plausible for the ground station of the satellite to count 
                                                          
994
 Brenner and Koops (2004: 16). Cf Koops and Robinson (2011: 179). 
995
 See article 11(3) of the Singapore Computer Misuse Act of 1993, and article 9(2) of the Computer 
Crimes Act of 1997. 
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as the computer for the purposes of founding jurisdiction.
996
 Even considering 
the fact that satellites are registered in different jurisdictions, and are deemed 
to have the ‘nationality’ of the country in which they are registered, a 
potential jurisdictional conflict may arise where the ground station of the 
satellite is located in a different location from the jurisdiction where it has 
‘nationality.’ 
Generally, the issue of jurisdiction is dependent largely on the nature of 
certain types of cybercrime. The basis upon which the location of a computer 
can be used as link to a crime is determined by the nature of the particular 
cybercrime, which is, in turn, ascertained by the relevant elements 
constituting the crime. This might pose a challenge, given that computers 
could have complex structures and workings, because of their networked or 
interconnected nature. The matter is further complicated when several 
networked or interconnected computers are located in more than one 
jurisdiction. The complication grows and reaches a higher level of abstraction 
for offences committed using websites. For example, some content-related 
cybercrime offences such as offences related to child pornography and hate 
speech involve, principally, two distinct facilitators, namely, the web 
server
997
 and the content provider.
998
 In principle, for content-related 
                                                          
996
 Brenner and Koops (2004: 16). Cf Koops and Robinson (2011: 180). 
997
 A web server refers to computer hardware, or computer software, such as a computer application 
that delivers accessible content through the internet. The web server is often used to host websites, 
amongst other functions such as enabling gaming activities, storing of data, as well as for 
conducting several internet enterprises. See Web Developers Note (an undated website document) 
‘What is web server - A computer of a program’ available at <http://www.webdevelopersnotes. 
com/basics/what_is_web_server.php> [accessed on 1 March 2012].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
355 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
offences, liability for the crime is not associated with the web server alone, 
but also with the content provider, if they are not one entity. Again, the 
difficulty arises when the web server and the content provider are not located 
within the same jurisdiction.  
This is very hard to tell for cyberlaundering, depending on the nature of the 
relevant cyberlaundering operation. For our purposes, the web server and the 
content provider are located within the same jurisdiction, which is Germany, 
and it, Germany, could easily claim jurisdiction for the conduct of Jack 
Sparrow and John Doe. Thus, Melbourne is yet unable to found jurisdiction. 
Equally, Antigua could claim jurisdiction because the web server is registered 
there. For other methods of cyberlaundering, such as online banking
999
 and 
virtual worlds,
1000
 it is highly possible for the web server to be separate from 
the content provider, which harbours the danger that they might have 
different locations. This would be the case, for example, where Jack Sparrow 
ran a gaming website from Germany (i.e. having the web server based in 
Berlin), and employed the services of Company X in Angola, a renowned 
content provider for online gaming websites. Just as with Antigua, where the 
necessary links are established, Company X could, at the very least, be 
                                                                                                                                                                         
998
 A content provider is an enterprise that develops content for electronic commerce websites. It 
studies and incorporates a search engine optimized technology to help customers find content, and it 
tends to attract the attention of website users. The fact that all website owners (i.e. having the web 
servers) do not always create their own content tells why a content provider’s business is lucrative, 
given as most of such website owners often lack the skill. See eHow (an undated internet article) 
‘What is an Internet Content Provider’ available at <http://www.ehow.com/ about_6695350_ 
internet-content-provider_.html> [accessed on 2 March 2012]. 
999
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.6.1. 
1000
 See discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.6.6. 
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regarded as an accessory to the crime, if it has the requisite mens rea, 
amongst other elements of the crime.
1001
 
 
6.4.2.1.3 Location of the victim 
Whereas the victims of most cybercrimes are easily identifiable, this is not 
necessarily the case with cyberlaundering. One may therefore ask: Who is the 
victim of cyberlaundering?  Much like money laundering, the same principles 
apply here. The protected interest of the offence of money laundering is the 
economy of the relevant state, and, arguably, the global economy, because, 
viewed conversely, the crime seeks to destabilize the global economy, 
causing disruption in commerce, while obstructing justice and undermining 
operations of law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the state is the victim of 
the cyberlaundering offence. 
In light of the hypothetical scenario, it is wrong to presume that Jim Watson 
is the victim of the cyberlaundering offence(s) committed by Jack Sparrow 
and John Doe. Jim Watson is the victim of cyberfraud, and not 
cyberlaundering. Again, the Melbourne authorities would not be able to assert 
territorial jurisdiction on this basis. On the contrary, Germany and Antigua, as 
victim states, can found jurisdiction based on this principle.  
 
 
                                                          
1001
 As a further example, this principle also reflects largely with virtual worlds, and the act will be said 
to have been committed in the territory where the web server and content provider of the virtual 
world website are located within the territory of the country seeking jurisdiction. 
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6.4.2.1.4 Location of the effect 
This rationale purports that territorial jurisdiction can be established for any 
cybercrime if the effect(s) of the crime are felt by the country asserting 
jurisdiction. The effects of cybercrime can be indeed varied, and this issue 
links with the previous discussion. The effect of the crime can only be 
ascertained to the extent to which it impacts on the victim(s). For most kinds 
of cybercrime where the victims can be identified easily, for example where 
someone causes a virus attack on computers, clearly, the persons who own 
the computers are the victims, and are the ones affected by the crime. For 
example, in the UK, jurisdiction would be founded irrespective of whether 
the computer, the program or the data are located within the country’s 
jurisdiction, so long as the effect is felt within its jurisdiction.
1002
 The word 
‘effect’ in this context can mean anything, as it is quite broad. However, one 
salient feature that should serve as a common denominator or determinant of 
the ‘effect’ in question is harmfulness – that is, such effect should be 
harmful.
1003
 Similarly, for cyberlaundering, the effect of the crime is felt by 
the state due to the fact that it is its, the State’s, protected interest that is 
violated. Therefore, in light of our scenario, once again, Germany is the only 
state that can assert jurisdiction due to the fact that the laundering operations 
were carried out and completed within its jurisdiction. The argument is that 
                                                          
1002
 See article 5(2)(b) of the Computer Misuse Act of 1990, Chapter 18. Cf a similar provision exists 
in article 257F(2)(b) of the Tasmanian Criminal Code Act of 1924. 
1003
 This principle is supported in the case United States of America v. Nippon Paper Industries Co. Ltd 
109 F. 3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) where the court elucidated the matter in depth, stating that a state can 
readily proscribe conduct outside its territory, where such conduct has a substantial effect within its 
territory, so long as the standards of reasonableness are met. 
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the effect is felt within its jurisdiction because the illegal proceeds have been 
integrated into its economy, thus posing a danger to it. 
 
6.4.2.2 The nationality principle 
Another important principle that is embedded in the Budapest Convention is 
the nationality principle. Article 22(1)(d) of the Convention requires a 
member state to the Convention to establish jurisdiction when the offence is 
committed by one of its nationals, where the offence is committed outside the 
territory of the state. It is also important to juxtapose this principle against the 
concept of cyberlaundering in order to determine its applicability and 
suitability to the concept.  
Generally, the nationality principle always comes second in the ranking order, 
after the territoriality principle, given the fact that in practice the nationality 
principle is always applied as an exception to the territoriality principle. For 
example, in some countries in Europe, such as Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and the UK, there is a general jurisdictional clause that exists, which 
allows jurisdiction to be founded over a crime that is committed by a national 
of the respective states, if the act is punishable where it was committed.
1004
 
Dual criminality, which implies that the conduct must have been criminalized 
                                                          
1004
 See sections 7(2)(1) of the Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code of 1998); article 5(1)(2) of the 
Wetboek van Strafrecht (Dutch Criminal Code of 1994); article 11 of the Wet houdende de 
voorafgaande title van het Wetboek van Strafvordering (Belgian Criminal Code of 2012) and the 
sections 4 and 5 of the Computer Misuse Act of 1990, Chapter 18. Cf South African legislation: 
Section 90 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act No. 22 of 2002. 
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in both states, is often a requirement.
1005
 The key element here is to ascertain 
whether the perpetrator is a national of the state asserting jurisdiction, which 
often requires proof of the perpetrator’s citizenship. However, other than the 
nationality of the perpetrator, some countries also have laws that found 
jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality of the victim.
1006
 But insofar as it 
pertains to cyberlaundering, this is comparable to the discussion on the 
territoriality principle above concerning the location of the victim. Bearing in 
mind that the concept of ‘victim’ in this case is the same (i.e. the state), the 
same rationale is applicable.  
Thus, in line with this principle, given that Jack Sparrow and John Doe are 
Germans, and not Australians, nor Antiguans, Germany alone can claim 
jurisdiction on this basis for their cyberlaundering operations. 
 
6.4.2.3 The universality principle 
An interesting issue at stake is that of universal jurisdiction. This is an 
international principle of jurisdiction that is enshrined in customary 
international law, in terms of which any state can claim jurisdiction over a 
crime where the crime violates the interests of the international 
                                                          
1005
 This principle is embedded in Article 18(9) of the Palermo Convention and Article 7 (15) (c) and 
(d) of the Vienna Convention. 
1006
 This is typically the case with Germany and Belgium. See sections 7(2)(1) of the Strafgesetzbuch 
(German Criminal Code of 1998), and article 11 of the Wet houdende de voorafgaande title van het 
Wetboek van Strafvordering (Belgian Criminal Code of 2012). Certain states in the US such as 
Michigan also have similar provisions. See section 762.2(1)(d) of the Michigan Compiled Laws, 
Act of 2004. 
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community.
1007
 This principle is premised on the philosophy that certain basic 
social norms are erga omnes, which is to say that there are rights and duties 
owed to the international community at large. Therefore, a violation of these 
norms warrants prosecution by the international community.
1008
 The principle 
of universal jurisdiction is rather peculiar because it implies that any country 
can claim jurisdiction regardless of where the crime was committed, and 
regardless of the nationality of the victim or perpetrator, as well as any other 
protective interests a country might have. Due to its sweeping scope, it is 
controversial and must be applied with great deal of sensitivity in the 
international arena. The principle is adopted for only selected crimes, and 
depending on the country, only very few types of cybercrimes fall within its 
ambit.
1009
 The principle is generally ranked last in the scale of jurisdictional 
principles, and is often deemed as the last resort amidst the other principles of 
jurisdiction. Although the Budapest Convention does not cite it as a 
jurisdictional ground for the cybercrimes listed under the Convention, the 
principle is significant to the ACL campaign. 
Within the broader discourse of the AML legal regime, amongst several other 
reasons, universal jurisdiction is important because it helps to prevent a case 
                                                          
1007
 Cryer, Frieman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (2010: 50). Cf Bassiouni (2004: 36) and Werle (2009: 
57). 
1008
 This principle was propounded further in the case before the International Court of Justice:  
Belgium v Spain (Second Phase) ICJ Rep 1970 3 at paragraph 33. 
1009
 For example, in the Netherlands, cybercrimes do not fall under the universal jurisdiction clause 
(article 4 of the Wetboek van Strafrecht (Dutch Criminal Code of 1994). Conversely, countries such 
as Germany and Belgium can claim universal jurisdiction for prosecuting the cybercrime of child 
pornography - article 184(3) of the Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code of 1998) and article 
10ter(1) of the Wet houdende de voorafgaande van het Wetboek van Strafvordering (Belgian 
Criminal Code of 2012). Cf commentaries by Brenner and Kooper (2004: 28). 
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where money launderers take advantage of the inherent discrepancies in 
different legal systems for their illicit activities, otherwise known as 
jurisdictional arbitrage. This raises an interesting question: Given the 
transnational nature of money laundering that impact on the world economy, 
why is it currently impossible to assert jurisdiction over cyberlaundering on 
the basis of universal jurisdiction? A succinct answer is simply that a solid 
ACL regime is currently lacking. Coupled with this dilemma, an awareness of 
the problem is equally lacking, let alone the fact that in practice many 
countries choose not to assert universal jurisdictional over certain crimes. 
Without a strong international consensus on how to combat cyberlaundering, 
the principle of universal jurisdiction is ineffective. But universal jurisdiction 
is bound to become a topical matter once cyberlaundering becomes 
conceptualized internationally.  
Interestingly, a federal law of the US envisages the scenario where universal 
jurisdiction can be claimed over a crime that impacts on the international 
economy or foreign commerce. Sections 1030(e)(2)(B) of Title 18 of the 
United States Code provides that the US government can exercise jurisdiction 
over criminal activity that affects interstate or foreign commerce. As such, 
given that the protected interest of cyberlaundering is both local and 
international commerce, as with money laundering, it can be argued that the 
principle of universal jurisdiction is embedded in the national law of the 
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US.
1010
 However, given that cyberlaundering, as a legal concept, is not yet 
grounded in the legal system of the US, this raises concerns of legality 
because jurisdiction cannot be founded for a non-existent crime. 
Applying the principle of universal jurisdiction to our hypothetical scenario, 
Australia, and in particular, the authorities in Melbourne, Germany, Antigua 
and any other country that can prove the minimum basis of this principle, can 
claim jurisdiction over the crime of cyberlaundering committed by Jack 
Sparrow and John Doe, because their illicit activities can be considered as 
acts that impact negatively on global commerce. 
 
6.4.3 Guidelines for establishing cyberlaundering jurisdiction 
When faced with a scenario or case of cyberlaundering, that is, where from 
the facts of a case, the elements of cyberlaundering are clearly identifiable, 
there are three steps that merit consideration in order to adjudge the issue of 
jurisdiction properly. These steps are premised on the standard of 
reasonableness, which should be the yardstick with which all cases should be 
measured in accordance with their relevant respective facts. They are 
necessary to establish jurisdiction for cyberlaundering. These steps are 
discussed below. 
 
                                                          
1010
 Section 1030 (e)(2)(b) of the United States Code also embeds another principle of international 
jurisdiction known as the principle of protection. This principle allows a state to exercise 
jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed outside of its borders, where such allegedly committed 
crimes threaten its security and basic functions. Nichols (1997: 305). Cf Brenner and Koop (2004: 
26). The protective principle is not included in the Budapest Convention and is not discussed 
separately due to the fact that it would be a reiteration of the universality principle with which it is 
synonymous. 
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6.4.3.1 Determining the cyberlaundering conduct 
The first step in establishing jurisdiction for cyberlaundering is first to 
determine the cyberlaundering conduct. This is crucial at the outset, as it is 
important to delineate clearly the relevant conduct in order not to confuse the 
activity of cyberlaundering with the underlying predicate offence. From our 
hypothetical scenario, it is important to examine first the relevant conduct of 
the accused persons. Jack Sparrow and John Doe committed cyber fraud (i.e. 
the predicate offence), because they intentionally defrauded customers 
through their website business, and laundered the illicit proceeds through the 
same means in order to evade law enforcement (i.e. cyberlaundering).  
 
6.4.3.2 Determining the cyberlaundering avenue 
The next step is to identify the platform or means used. Cyberlaundering is 
always perpetuated or propelled through a particular avenue, or through 
multiple avenues, as the case may be. Given our scenario, the relevant avenue 
is the website ‘www.comfortzonefurniture.com’ which was operated by Jack 
Sparrow and John Doe. This website was operated not just to defraud 
customers, but also, to launder their illicit proceeds. The illicit proceeds were 
laundered by them funnelling the illicit funds towards the maintenance and 
development of the website and their other websites. In fact, for 
cyberlaundering to be performed on a full-blown scale, one would expect 
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multiple avenues to be used for the ‘washing’ of illicit funds.1011 The 
‘washing’ of illicit proceeds, in the cyberlaundering sense of the word can be 
indeed blurry. Illicit funds that are properly ‘washed’ detract law enforcement 
bodies from tracing and finding such funds, because an essential trail is 
obscured. As such, it is imperative to ascertain clearly ‘how’ the illicit funds 
are laundered, because this would indicate ‘where’ the act was committed and 
would help to establish a proper ground for exercising jurisdiction. 
 
6.4.3.3. Determining the applicable jurisdictional principle 
After establishing the avenue(s) used for the relevant cyberlaundering 
operation, it becomes easy to establish the correct principle of jurisdiction, 
and to apply it to the existing facts. To do this, one has to delve into existing 
laws, because any principle of jurisdiction must be founded on legal grounds. 
It is important, again, to reiterate that cyberlaundering is not yet 
conceptualized legally, both on the national and international plane, which 
points to the purposes and importance of this study. For purposes of 
jurisdiction, the general principles applicable to combating cybercrime are 
more suited to the concept of cyberlaundering, and such principles should be 
considered in making such an assessment. In practice, the territoriality 
principle ranks first in line, the nationality principle second, with other 
                                                          
1011
 For example, a criminal mastermind who knows his way around the internet could very well 
combine multiple avenues in order to launder his funds. The avenues of online banking, online 
gambling, virtual worlds, and online barter trading are but only few examples of such avenues. See 
discussion in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
365 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
possible claims such as the universality principle following after.
1012
 It is 
quite possible for more than one jurisdictional principle to apply to a 
cyberlaundering situation. For example, given our scenario, Germany and 
Antigua can both claim jurisdiction for the prosecution of Jack Sparrow and 
John Doe on the grounds of territoriality, and specifically, the location of the 
computer and the victim.
1013
  
However, to avoid the possibility that the accused persons are prosecuted 
more than once for their offences, in line with the principle double jeopardy, 
which is a safeguard, a test premised on reasonableness must be conducted to 
ascertain where the accused persons should be prosecuted. This often 
involves striking a fine balance between the interests of justice on the one 
hand, and on the other, some logistic considerations, such as convenience.
1014
 
But the applicable standards are dependent on the criminal procedural laws of 
the relevant country. An international convention that provides for this 
scenario would most certainly erase all doubts and uncertainties surrounding 
conflicting jurisdictional claims. Thus, in line with the fundamental rationales 
underlying the jurisdiction to prescribe, the jurisdiction to adjudicate and the 
jurisdiction to enforce,
1015
 once the crime of cyberlaundering is properly 
proscribed in national and international laws, a much clearer framework 
would have been set in place that would determine the relevant court of law 
                                                          
1012
 American Law Institute (1987: 383). Cf Brenner and Kooper (2004: 28). 
1013
 See discussion in pages 33 and 36 above. 
1014
 Cf Aas (2007: 130), Bermann (2003: 106,183 and 226) and Siegel and Borchers (2005: 136). 
1015
 See discussion in paragraph 6.6.1 above. Cf Cater and Weiner (2011: 728), Henkin, Damrosch, 
Murphy, and Smit (2009: 1048); and Oxman (1987: 277). 
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having jurisdiction to hear the matter, and the relevant authority with the 
jurisdiction to enforce judgment. 
In the given the scenario, Germany can found jurisdiction on multiple 
grounds, such as territoriality and nationality, and thus has a stronger claim. 
Also, supporting Germany’s possible claim to prosecute are convenience and 
cost effectiveness, given that the accused individuals are within its territory. It 
would not, therefore, be logical for them to be extradited to Antigua, because 
Germany can make the same and more claims that Antigua could make. This 
is not to say, however, that Australia is entirely without recourse. Where it is 
able to found jurisdiction to prosecute Jack Sparrow and John Doe on the 
predicate offence of cyberfraud, on the basis of territoriality (i.e. location of 
the victim within its territory), coupled with the argument of convenience, it 
could also found jurisdiction simultaneously for cyberlaundering on the basis 
of universal jurisdiction. 
Overall, as regards matters on international prosecution, it should be borne in 
mind that aside from having clear-cut principles, things are not always crystal 
clear, nor do they portray fully the essence of the black-letter law. At times, 
clearly set principles are blurred by political undertones that serve as a barrier 
to prosecution.
1016
 
 
 
                                                          
1016
  Cf discussion in footnote 989 above. 
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6.5 THE NEED FOR AN ACL PROSECUTORIAL FRAMEWORK: 
EXAMPLE OF REAL CASES 
As the discussion thus far has shown, there is a dire need to establish an ACL 
prosecutorial framework.  This fact is further augmented by the existence of 
real cases and scenarios. Current laws do not mirror the reality of 
cyberlaundering, and this makes one wonder whether laws are truly as 
dynamic as they are made out to be. Several cyberlaundering cases go 
undetected, uninvestigated, and consequently, unprosecuted because an ACL 
legal regime does not exist. There are several cases that evidence this fact. 
Some of these, such as United States of America v. E-Gold Ltd, Douglas 
Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson,
1017
 and the pending case 
against the founder of Megaupload Ltd, Kim Dotcom, are now discussed.  
 
6.5.1 United States of America v. E-Gold Ltd, Douglas Jackson, Barry K. 
Downey, and Reid A. Jackson 
The case against E-gold Ltd in the United States (US), which resulted in the 
court case of United States of America v. E-Gold Ltd, Douglas Jackson, 
Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson, might well be the first glaring 
depiction of the prosecutorial challenges surrounding cyberlaundering. The 
facts and significance to the ACL legal framework are elaborated upon 
further. 
 
                                                          
1017
  United States of America v. E-Gold Ltd, Douglas Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson, 
521 F.3d 411, 417 (D.C. Circuit) (2008). 
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6.5.1.1 Facts 
E-gold Ltd is a value remittance company that is operated by Gold and Silver 
Reserve Inc, registered in Nevis in Saint Kitts and Nevis.  The company 
allows for the instant transfer of e-gold ownership between its registered 
users.
1018
 E-gold is represented in the form of a digital gold currency.
1019
 
Established in 1996, the company witnessed great success as its total number 
of e-gold accounts grew from 1 million in November 2003 to 5 million in 
2008.
1020
 However, its success was tainted with illegality when accusations of 
fraud and money laundering began to emerge.
1021
 In May 2006, the US 
government indicted E-gold Ltd, along with Gold & Silver Reserve Inc, as 
well as the founders of E-gold, who are Douglas Jackson, Barry K. Downey, 
and Reid A. Jackson, on six counts of having violated the provisions of the 
United States Code (U.S.C.) and the District of Colombia Code (D.C. Code). 
The charges included conspiracy to launder monetary instruments (section 
1956, Title 18 U.S.C), conspiracy (section 371, Title 18 U.S.C.), operation of 
unlicensed money transmitting business (section 1960, Title 18 U.S.C.), 
money transmitting without a license (section 1002, Title 26 D.C. Code), 
aiding and abetting and causing an act to be done (section 2, Title 18 U.S.C), 
                                                          
1018
 See discussion on E-gold Ltd above in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.4.4. 
1019
 Digital gold currency is a form of electronic money based on ounces of gold weighed digitally. For 
a detailed discussion on electronic payment system, see Chapter 3, paragraph 3.3.3. 
1020
 See the website of Gold and Silver reserve Inc at <http:www.https://www.e-gold.com /unsecure 
/pgpkey.htm> [accessed on 13 February 2012]. 
1021
 Prior to this time, several other e-gold currency companies had come to compete with E-gold Ltd 
such as OS-Gold, Standard Reserve and INTGold, but none recorded the measures of success 
recorded by E-Gold Ltd. Most of these other companies have been under scrutiny for money 
laundering and for being a facade of a sheer Ponzi Scheme. Cf Hallam-Baker (2008: 343). 
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and criminal forfeiture (section 982(a)(1), Title 18 U.S.C.).
1022
 The 
indictment further cited E-Gold Ltd as an unlicensed money transmitting 
agency that “moves illegal funds for wit.”1023 Faced with fines to the tune of 
$3.7 million, the accused entered guilty pleas to conspiracy to engage in 
money laundering and conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money 
transmitting business. In the resulting case, United States of America v. E-
Gold Ltd, Douglas Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson,
1024
 the 
Court ruled against E-gold Ltd, stating that “a business can clearly engage in 
money transmitting without limiting its transaction to cash or currency, and 
would commit a crime if it did so without being licensed.”1025 As result of 
their guilty pleas, most of the charges against them were dropped, and their 
sentence was reduced.
1026
 
  
6.5.1.2 How cyberlaundering comes into play 
The prosecutors could not pin the choate crime of money laundering onto the 
accused persons, as their conduct did not meet the key element of the 
                                                          
1022
 The indictment can be found at website of the US Department of Justice at 
<http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/Press%20Releases/DC%20egold%20indictment.pdf> 
[accessed on 13 February 2012]. 
1023
 ‘The United States District Court for The District of Colombia, Holding a Criminal Term, Grand 
Jury Sworn in on May 11 2006, United States of America v. E-gold, Ltd Gold and Silver Reserve, 
INC, Douglas L. Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson as Defendants (Criminal No. 07-
109): Indictment’ page 3, available at <http://www.justice .gov/criminal/ ceos/Press%20 Releases 
/DC%20egold%20indictment.pdf> [accessed on 13 February 2012]. 
1024
  United States of America v. E-Gold Ltd, Douglas Jackson, Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson, 
521 F.3d 411, 417 (D.C. Circuit) (2008). 
1025
 See page 413 of the judgement. 
1026
 Together with the sentence of 300 hours of community service for each of the non-juristic entity 
defendants, they each paid minimal amounts of fines between $300 and $200. 
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crime.
1027
 As such, the conduct could not be linked directly to them, because 
they simply operated the website which was the avenue for laundering 
money. This is why the prosecutor could only make out a case against them 
for conspiracy to engage in money laundering and conspiracy to operate an 
unlicensed money transmitting business. As stated earlier,
1028
 
cyberlaundering is an extension of money laundering, and the liability for the 
crime of cyberlaundering equates to money laundering, as the two are not 
separate offences.  
This case highlights an important fact, which is how prosecutors are unable to 
establish the offence of money laundering ordinarily when the offence 
manifests in the form of cyberlaundering. Pitted against the elements of 
cyberlaundering,
1029
 the conduct of the accused persons amounts to 
cyberlaundering in light of the following: 
(i.) The accused persons operated an unlicensed money transmitting business 
that violated section 1960, Title 18 U.S.C. This is an offence that 
sufficiently constitutes a predicate offence for cyberlaundering; 
(ii.) As they operated the website, they profited from it. This fact justifies the 
existence of illegal funds, which is the other essential element of 
cyberlaundering; 
                                                          
1027
As discussed in Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.4.1, the elements of the crime of money laundering 
include the disguise and concealment of the proceeds of the relevant criminal activity, along with 
the violation of government or state activities and its management system by causing instability in 
its financial sector, and obstructing the normal activities of the justice and the investigation of 
crime, (i.e. the actus reus of the crime). Together with this, the requisite mens rea elements must 
also exist on the part of the accused in the form of knowledge and intention of the conduct 
described. 
1028
 See Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.4. 
1029
 See Chapter 3, paragraph 3.2.4.2 where the elements of cyberlaundering are discussed at length. 
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(iii.) The illegal funds were laundered through a computer. The fact that the 
funds were represented in different forms, such as for the upkeep of the 
website, or for the purchase of personal assets online, can be deemed a 
combination of both placement and layering phases of cyberlaundering. 
The laundering cycle is completed as well, because the illegal funds have 
been eventually integrated into the commercial world; and 
(iv.) As for the mens rea elements of cyberlaundering, it is clear also that the 
accused persons had (i) knowledge of the fact that the funds were derived 
from crime and (ii) an associative intention to conceal the origin or 
source of the illegal funds. This is due to the fact that the perpetrators 
knew that E-gold Ltd was unlicensed for its operations, but continued 
with its activities, deriving revenue from it, thus avoiding to register it. 
The challenges that come with cyberlaundering as regards the question of 
jurisdiction, as discussed earlier, do not apply here because the 
cyberlaundering operation in this case was local and not trans-border in 
nature. The crime of having an unlicensed website is applicable only to the 
US as a sovereign state having the right to prescribe the law. Had the 
prosecutor attempted to prosecute the accused persons for cyberlaundering, 
where there are other jurisdictions involved other than the US, jurisdictional 
concerns would certainly arise because the US alone would not have been the 
only country with the right to claim jurisdiction over the offence.   
As is a fundamental theory of law, the principle of nullum crimen, nulla 
poena sine praevia lege poenali dictates that there can be no crime and no 
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punishment without a prior penal law.
1030
 This is the principle of legality, 
which applies to cyberlaundering as well. However, given the fact that no 
ACL legal framework exists yet, the above-mentioned elements of 
cyberlaundering require legal justification. This further justifies the need to 
establish a legal framework for cyberlaundering. This shows how the lack of 
an ACL legal framework frustrates prosecutors, forcing them to resort to 
desperate actions. In this case, the prosecutor was forced to toil through a 
labyrinth of existing laws in order to found liability for several offences. 
Without hitting the mark, all of these offences point only to the existence of 
the more behemoth crime of cyberlaundering. 
 
6.5.2 The pending case against Megaupload Ltd 
A more recent example is the pending case against Megaupload Ltd, which, 
unlike E-gold Ltd, has yet to be heard in court. The facts of the case and its 
relevance to the ACL legal regime are now described. 
 
6.5.2.1 Facts 
Megaupload Ltd operated the website called ‘www.Megaupload.com,’ 
together with its other similar websites,
1031
 which render several web services 
such as image hosting, video hosting, music hosting, and the hosting of 
pornographic content. It also provides file-sharing services. Megaupload Ltd 
                                                          
1030
 For a detailed elemental discussion of the principle particularly on the international plane, see Kreß 
(2010: 2). Cf Cassese (2005: 438), Lamb (2004: 23), Tomuschat (2006: 835) and Werle (2009: 36). 
1031
 Some of these other websites include <www.megavideo.com>, <www.megapix.com>, <www.m 
egalive .com>, and <www.megabox.com.>. 
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has its headquarters in Hong Kong. It was founded in March 2005 by Kim 
Dotcom (born Kim Schmitz), a German-Finnish computer programmer and 
business man. The Megaupload website grew to become the 13th most 
popular website on the internet, with an annual revenue of about US$175 
million and an average of 50 million visitors per day.
1032
 
On 5 January 2012, Kim Dotcom, Fin Batato, Julius Bencko, Sven 
Echternach, Mathias Ortmann, Andrus Nomm, and Bram van der Kolk, all of 
whom are stakeholders in Megaupload, were charged with violating the 
provisions of Title 18 of the U.S.C. The crimes with which they were charged 
include conspiracy to commit racketeering (section 1962(d), Title 18 U.S.C.), 
conspiracy to commit copyright infringment (section 371, Title 18 U.S.C.), 
conspiracy to commit money laundering (section 1956(h), Title 18, U.S.C.), 
criminal copyright infringement by distributing a copyright work being 
prepared for commercial distribution on a computer network, and aiding and 
abetting of criminal copyright infringement, (section 2,2319 Title 18, U.S.C.; 
section 506, Title 17 U.S.C.), and criminal copyright infringment by 
electronic means and aiding and abetting of criminal copyright infringement 
(section 2,2319 Title 18, U.S.C; section 506 Title 17 U.S.C.).
1033
 On 19 
                                                          
1032
 These facts are all contained in an indictment charge against the defendants: ‘In the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, United States of America v. 
Kim Dotcom, Megaupload Ltd, Vestor Ltd, Fin Batato, Julius Bencko, Sven Echternach, Mathias 
Ortmann, Andrus Nomm, and Bram van der Kolk as Defendants (Criminal No. 1:12CR3): 
Indictment, dated 5 Januaray 2012’ page 3, available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000 
1424052970204616504577171180266957116.html> [accessed on 13 February 2012]. 
1033
 ‘In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 
United States of America v. Kim Dotcom, Megaupload Ltd, Vestor Ltd, Fin Batato, Julius Bencko, 
Sven Echternach, Mathias Ortmann, Andrus Nomm, and Bram van der Kolk as Defendants 
(Criminal No. 1:12CR3): Indictment, dated 5 Januaray 2012’ page 1, available at <http:// online . 
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January 2012, the United States Department of Justice seized and closed the 
website, Megaupload.com, for purposes of prosecuting the accused persons. 
At the same time, about 330 million Hong Kong dollars in assets of 
Megaupload Ltd were frozen by the Customs and Exercise Department of 
Hong Kong.
1034
 The arrest followed a long-running investigation against 
Megaupload, which had involved police and security intelligence in Hong 
Kong, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
United States (US). The accused persons were arrested on 20 January 2012 in 
New Zealand and kept in the custody of the New Zealand police. At the time 
of writing, the case is still pending and the accused persons have been 
remanded in pre-trial police custody. 
 
6.5.2.2 How cyberlaundering comes into play 
This case is another clear example of the need to establish clear-cut ACL 
laws that would aid the prosecution of cyberlaundering. Although the facts 
are not the same as those in E-gold Ltd, the same principle applies. Just as 
with E-gold Ltd, the accused persons are charged only with the predicate 
offences which they are accused of having committed. This is due to the fact 
that there are no ACL laws in place which would serve as the legal basis for 
prosecutors to act. Thus, prosecutors are hindered from building a proper case 
of cyberlaundering against the accused persons, even though the elements of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204616504577171180266957116.html> [accessed on 13 
February 2012]. 
1034
 RTHK (2011) ‘HK seizes $330 in Megaupload raids’ available at <http://m.rthk.hk/news/201 
20121/813246.htm [accessed on 16 February 2012]. 
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cyberlaundering exist clearly from the facts. Premised on the fundamental 
principle of money laundering that a conviction on a predicate offence is not 
a prerequisite for a conviction for money laundering, it is quite easy to pursue 
a cyberlaundering case against the accused persons, proceeding from this 
standpoint.
1035
 As shown below, the elements of cyberlaundering can be 
identified from the facts.  
(i.) The defendants ran websites that violate laws, such as the U.S.C and the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
1036
 This is a predicate offence for 
cyberlaundering; 
(ii.) The fact that the accused persons have profited from their conduct makes 
the funds in question illegal in nature;  
(iii.) Also, the fact that the illegal funds have been laundered with a computer 
satisfies another element of cyberlaundering, given the likelihood that the 
accused invested the proceeds into developing other subsidiary websites. 
The nature of the business blurs any distinction between placement, 
layering and integration of the illegal funds. This is due to the fact that 
the illegal funds derived from the unlawful conduct fostered the conduct 
itself. The funds were used for several purposes, such as promoting and 
operating the Megaupload website, as well as establishing other websites. 
In the long run, the illegal funds were integrated into the lawful economic 
cycle, of which the business world forms a part; and 
                                                          
1035
 Cf Articles 3(4) and 3(5) of the Council of Europe Directive 2005/50/EC. 
1036
 Act 28 of 1998, Title 17, United States Code. 
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(iv.) The mens rea elements of cyberlaundering are also present. The parties 
had (i.) knowledge of the illegality of the funds and (ii.) the associative 
intention to disguise its illegality by proceeding with the illegal 
conduct.
1037
  
This case raises very important and interesting issues of jurisdiction for 
cyberlaundering, in view of the fact that the accused persons are Germans and 
Finnish nationals who reside in New Zealand and some in Germany, with 
their website registered in Hong Kong and other websites in the US.  
There are several other similar cases where the prosecutor could build a case 
of cyberlaundering against the accused, but because of the present 
deficiencies in the law, this is impossible.
1038
 A brief examination of these 
                                                          
1037
 Inference can be drawn from the fact that the defendants had a knowledge of the illegality of their 
conduct due to the fact that, in a prior civil action case against Megauplaod – Perfect 10, INC v. 
Megaupload, Kim Schmitz Case No. 11cv0191 - IEG (BLM) (2011) – the court found that the 
defendant (Megaupload) had directly infringed on the copyright right of the plaintiff. This should 
have  been a good basis upon which Megaupload should have desisted from the conduct. 
1038
  For example, on 17 January 2012, with the efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 
the United States, two Russian citizens, Vladimir Zdorovenin and Kirill Zdorovenin, were 
extradited from Switzerland to the US. They were charged in the US with committing cybercrime 
offences such as  the theft of victims’ personal identification information, including credit card 
numbers, by means of computer programs that were surreptitiously lodged in the victims’ 
computers and that recorded the information as it was entered. The accused persons also allegedly 
purchased stolen credit card numbers from other individuals, and used the stolen credit card 
information to make ‘legitimate’ purchases of goods from numerous internet businesses that they 
operated (i.e. layering). Apparently, the purchases were fraudulent and were meant to deceive 
banks, credit card service providers, credit card holders, among others, thereby enabling the accused 
persons to steal the money they funneled to their websites. In essence, via the internet, the accused 
persons successfully laundered the loot derived from the commission of other cybercrimes. 
Interestingly, the accused persons were not charged with money laundering, because the elements 
of the crime are not present. However, the elements of the crime of cyberlaundering are present, 
and, as such, prosecution of this would have been possible, where laws exist to that effect. For more 
information see Federal Bureau of Investigation ‘Manhattan US Attorney and FBI Assistant 
Director in Charge Announce Extradition of Russian Citizen to Face Charges for International 
Cyber Crimes’ Press Release (17 January 2012) available at <http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-
releases/2012/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-and-fbi-assistant-director-in-charge-announce-extradition-of-
russian-citizen-to-face-charges-for-international-cyber-crimes> [accessed on 11 February 2012]. 
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cases underscores the need to establish a prosecutorial framework for 
cyberlaundering. 
 
6.6 FORMALITIES INVOLVED IN ESTABLISHING THE ACL 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The ACL legal framework that this study has attempted to establish rests on 
the prevention, compliance and enforcement pillars, as discussed in this 
chapter and the previous one.  However, it is important to consider certain 
technical issues, or formalities, that would further fortify and entrench the 
proposed ACL legal framework. 
First, the ACL measures suggested in this study should be incorporated 
carefully into local legislation in order to ensure that the laws have national 
legal validity. It is one thing to have laws and measures in place, but another 
thing to have them implemented. For this reason, this study advocates 
strongly for the adoption and harmonization of the ACL principles across 
countries. Given the fact that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, if 
the requisite ACL laws are disharmonious across jurisdictions, or where some 
countries have them and others do not, loopholes in the ACL legal framework 
are created, which cyberlaunderers will exploit quickly. One such loopholes 
caused by having disharmonious laws is the fact that it creates the possibility 
for criminals to settle out of court or, even worse, not to be caught at all. This 
undesirable scenario should be avoided. 
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Therefore, in order to allay these fears, it is important to guard against this 
possibility by taking two fundamental initiatives: (i) There should be an 
international ACL legal agreement to which countries are obliged to accede; 
and (ii) The agreement should contain provisions that require states to 
incorporate the provisions of the covenant into their respective national laws.  
In line with these initiatives, the Vienna, Palermo and Warsaw Conventions 
should be amended to accommodate the ACL laws, or, alternatively, a 
separate ACL agreement altogether should be established.  The fact that law 
is expected to be dynamic in nature only further supports these initiatives.  
Also, in line with the proposed regulatory initiative to conceptualize 
cyberlaundering fully under cybercrime as well as money laundering,
1039
 the 
ACL legal framework will also need to be incorporated into anti-cybercrime 
(ACC) laws.  
Although it is preferable to have a supra-regional ACL legal agreement, the 
aforementioned steps can also be achieved by having an ACL agreement that 
caters for a specific region. This can be achieved by adapting regional 
covenants against money laundering and cybercrime, or creating new ones, as 
the case may be. Given that the Budapest Convention is the only international 
agreement on cybercrime to which certain countries outside of the European 
Union, such as the United States, Canada, South Africa and Japan,
1040
 have 
                                                          
1039
 See discussion in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.5.1.1.1. 
1040
 However, of all these signatories to the Convention, the US and Japan alone have ratified and 
brought it into force. The US ratified the Convention on 29 September 2006 and the enforced it on 1 
January 2007. Japan signed the Convention on 23 November 2001, and ratified it on 3 July 2012.Cf 
discussion in Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.3.5. 
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acceded, the Convention should be amended to reflect the ACL provisions as 
well. In keeping with this position, the ACL legal framework will transcend 
the theoretical sphere, and shall be reality. 
 
6.7 SUMMARY 
In addition to the prevention and compliance pillars of the ACL legal regime 
discussed in the preceding chapter, this chapter has sought to establish the 
enforcement pillar for the ACL legal regime. This has been done by exploring 
pertinent legal issues around the prosecution of cyberlaundering. In view of 
the fact that the path to prosecuting cyberlaundering is not without 
challenges, this chapter attempts to overcome these challenges by proposing 
effective legal measures for the investigation of cyberlaundering and how 
jurisdiction can be established for it. 
Sadly, the lack of an effective ACL prosecutorial framework continues to fuel 
cyberlaundering activities, as examples of real cases have shown. 
Cyberlaundering remains outside the reach of the current AML and ACC 
legal regimes. Without giving the proposed ACL measures legal validity 
through incorporation into national and international laws, the manifestations 
of cyberlaundering activities will only continue to grow. Realizing that any 
strong standing edifice today was but a plan drawn out at some point in the 
past, for the future ACL legal regime, one hopes that this study represents the 
requisite blueprint. 
The next chapter concludes this study with some recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 GENERAL 
This study has concerned itself with the problem of cyberlaundering and how 
to combat it. Like other technological advancements, a problem of the 
magnitude of cyberlaundering characterizes these modern times. What is 
alarming about cyberlaundering is that it continues to elude understanding. 
This is partly because it is not subject to any regulatory framework. There is 
also no clear-cut method on how to go about prosecuting cases of 
cyberlaundering. Despite its increasing prevalence, cyberlaundering has not 
prompted intervention on the side of the authorities concerned, 
notwithstanding its damaging effects on the economy, both nationally and 
internationally. Existing laws, without being adapted, are ill-suited for use 
against cyberlaundering.  
 
7.2 THE TRIPPLE-PILLAR COMBAT STRATEGY 
This study has sought to understand what cyberlaundering is, how it works, 
and how it began. Furthermore, the hard laws and the soft laws pertaining to 
cyberlaundering were evaluated to see whether they could be harnessed to 
come to grips with cyberlaundering. This appraisal resulted in the 
proposal/recommendation that an anti-cyberlaundering (ACL) legal regime 
be constituted of three main pillars: prevention; compliance; and 
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enforcement. The prevention pillar encompasses measures to prevent 
cyberlaundering. The compliance pillar identifies parties who should comply 
on the one hand, and those who should ensure compliance on the other hand. 
And the enforcement pillar establishes a prosecutorial framework against 
cyberlaundering. 
But it is not enough to enact laws and to promulgate rules and regulations, for 
these, too, become obsolete with time, especially given the brisk pace at 
which technology transfigures itself. 
The fact of the matter is that, to keep abreast of the cyberlaunderer, every 
effort needs to be made by the criminal justice authorities to escalate 
awareness of cyberlaundering amongst regulatory and oversight bodies. Such 
an awareness campaign will need to be reinforced with both rigorous research 
into the area of cyberlaundering and institutional capacity building. Each of 
these three recommended initiatives is briefly explained below. 
 
7.2.1 Increased awareness amongst regulatory authorities 
As identified in this study, certain individuals and entities have a key role to 
play in founding the ACL legal regime. In particular, for the proposed 
compliance pillar of the ACL legal regime, certain persons bear the 
responsibility of ensuring the duty to comply, while certain other parties bear 
the duty to ensure compliance.
1041
 It is unfortunate, however, that persons 
upon whom it is incumbent to ensure compliance are unaware of the problem. 
                                                          
1041
 Cf detailed discussion of this principle in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.6. 
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This pertains mainly to governments and their respective relevant authorities 
and agencies, such as the investigative and prosecutorial authorities, the 
Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and other regulatory agencies.
1042
 
Presently, the problem of cyberlaundering is alien to these regulatory 
entities.
1043
 This is an enigma and a barricade to its regulation. As a result, the 
problem of cyberlaundering continues to go undetected and unregulated. 
As a necessary first step, the designated regulatory authorities need to be 
made aware of what cyberlaundering is and what havoc it wreaks.
1044
 Even 
more, there should be increased awareness at the international level. In 
pursuance of the proposal that both the current anti-money laundering (AML) 
and anti-cybercrime (ACC) legal regimes be adapted to accommodate the 
concept of cyberlaundering,
1045
 the respective key institutions of these two 
regimes that individually fight money laundering and cybercrime need also be 
made aware of the problem. For example, Interpol,
1046
 which has championed 
recent international ACC campaigns, needs to rally and facilitate awareness 
amongst states members. Interpol’s role is especially important to the 
enforcement pillar of the anti-cyberlaundering (ACL) legal regime proposed 
in this study, particularly in relation to the investigation of cyberlaundering. 
                                                          
1042
 Cf discussion in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.6.2. 
1043
 Further proof of this is evident in the fact that prosecutors are not able to find the trail of cyber 
laundering in various crimes they investigate, which blatantly bear the cyberlaundering elements. 
Cf discussion in Chapter 6, paragraph 6.5. 
1044
 Cf discussion on the effects of cyberlaundering in Chapter 1, paragraph 1.2.1. 
1045
 Cf discussion in Chapter 6, paragraph 6.6. 
1046
 For discussion on Interpol in relation to cyberlaundering, see Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.2.4.6. 
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As pointed out already, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is not 
entirely oblivious of the predicament.
1047
 Through its numerous policy 
papers, it has identified some of the many dangers of cyberlaundering, such 
as new payment systems (e-payment systems, as discussed in this study) and 
online gambling.
1048
 However, it has not identified cyberlaundering as a legal 
concept, and has not recognized its full legal ramifications. In line with 
another solution proposed in this study for the legal conceptualization of 
cyberlaundering,
1049
 and given the powerful influence that the FATF has in 
ensuring state compliance with AML laws, this study strongly recommends 
that the FATF should play a lead role in the legal conceptualization of 
cyberlaundering and its adaption into the current AML legal regime. This can 
be accomplished by issuing FATF policy paper(s) on cyberlaundering as a 
legal concept and its looming legal ramifications, with a strong 
recommendation to states to incorporate its recommendations in their 
respective national AML laws.  
When the FATF recently revised and emboldened its Forty 
Recommendations in February 2012, now embodied as the “International 
Standards on Combating Money Laundering and The Financing of Terrorism 
and Proliferation,”1050 the subject of cyberlaundering was still not given the 
                                                          
1047
 For discussion on the FATF in relation to the phenomenon of cyberlaundering, see discussion in 
Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.2.4.1.4. 
1048
 Cf Financial Action Task Force (2006: 2) and Financial Action Task Force (2010D: 3).  
1049
 Cf discussion in Chapter 5, paragraph 5.5.1.1.1. 
1050
 See Financial Action Task Force (2012A) ‘International Standards on Combatting Money 
Laundering and The Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation’ available at <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%20 
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needed attention. The FATF needs to consider, as a matter of pressing 
priority, amending its Recommendations so as to prevail on states to 
implement an ACL legal regime. The FATF’s international standards have 
since been the template upon which the current AML legal regime rests. As 
such, in line with the adaptive approach proposed in this study, they form the 
right starting point from which to begin forging the prevention, compliance 
and enforcement pillars of the ACL legal regime. 
Furthermore, the lead role expected of the FATF is one that should be shared 
by the Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (BCBS).
1051
 As with the 
FATF, the BCBS has also identified one of several dangerous avenues of 
cyberlaundering, which is online banking.
1052
  Through its widely reputable 
policy papers, it could place the issue of cyberlaundering in the foreground, 
playing up the need for countries to enact or implement remedial and 
preventive measures. This is especially pertinent to the prevention pillar of 
the ACL legal regime. Similarly, the Egmont Group
1053
 can create awareness 
on its part by raising consciousness and dispensing information through its 
FIUs,
1054
 which are situated strategically in countries all over the world.  
The Egmont Group, the FATF and the BCBS are key players in the ACL 
campaign because their work is crucial to the compliance pillar of the ACL 
                                                                                                                                                                         
(approved%20February%202012)%20reprint%20May%202012%20web%20version.pdf> 
[accessed on 7 June 2012]. 
1051
 For discussion on the BCBS in relation to cyberlaundering, see Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.2.4.3. 
1052
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A: 9). Cf discussion in paragraph 4.3.2.4.3. 
1053
 For discussion on the Egmont Group in relation to cyberlaundering, see Chapter 4, paragraph 
4.3.2.4.4. 
1054
 For ways in which the FIUs help with the detection and eventual prevention of cyberlaundering, 
see discussion in Chapter 6, paragraph 6.3.3.2. 
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legal regime. This is due to the fact that they make up the other limb of the 
compliance pillar, as they have a duty to ensure compliance. By conjuring 
and creating awareness at an international level, these efforts will trickle 
down to the national level, as in a spiral or domino effect, which would help 
in instilling the needed awareness amongst states. Awareness will certainly 
help to kick-start the creation and workings of effective supervisory and 
monitoring systems.  
 
7.2.2 Continuous research 
Research into the mechanics and legal ramifications of cyberlaundering is key 
to finding how best to combat it. As cyberlaundering evolves from the 
traditional notion of money laundering, and given the way in which it has 
adapted or shape-shifted into seemingly unfathomable technological schemes, 
one would be wrong in thinking that the current cyberlaundering techniques 
have attained the zenith of their mastery. Not so, for cyberlaundering is a 
rapidly mutating craft which can only be hobbled by using up-to-date tools. 
This is why the role of research is an indispensable tool to come to grips with 
the problem. It is required in order for lawmakers and criminal justice 
authorities to be on par, if not a step ahead of the machinations and the 
convoluted schemes of cyberlaunderers. More importantly, the idea is to 
develop a fund of knowledge and skill that is needed to inform the 
substantive and procedural measures that are required to deal with 
cyberlaundering. 
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7.2.3 Capacity building 
Capacity building for the ACL legal regime does not only mean ensuring 
barricades are currently in place against cyberlaundering, but developing new 
ones against the growing threat of the problem. The road ahead becomes a 
daunting one when and where there is no capacity to establish and to enforce 
an ACL legal regime. Human and institutional capacity should be developed 
to tackle cyberlaundering comprehensively. Given its novelty and shifting 
nature, training and developmental initiatives on the issue of cyberlaundering 
are essential to fighting it. To this end, symposiums, seminars and round-table 
colloquiums on the issue of cyberlaundering need to be held. Experts need to 
be brought in from the different cyberlaundering-related disciplines to rub 
minds on the issue. What springs to mind here are specialists in computer 
science, information technology, AML law and ACC law. Also, because the 
concept of cyberlaundering is home to each of these different disciplines, the 
issue should be debated in the respective forums or conferences of each 
discipline. This would not only help in creating the much needed awareness 
of the problem, but also current trends can be tracked, and potential 
regulatory possibilities to counteract the problem can be conceived. 
In addition, this study also recommends that capacity be built in the area of 
formal education. The academic disciplines of computer science, cybercrime, 
information technology, and money laundering should augment their 
syllabuses to include the issue of cyberlaundering. Where the subject of 
cyberlaundering is inculcated into study modules, invariably, students are 
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groomed at an early stage, and potential or capacity for the future ACL legal 
regime is forged. 
 
7.3 EPILOGUE 
Famed French writer of the 1920s, Marcel Labordere, wrote that “man will 
never be able to know what money is no more than he will be able to know 
what God is... [M]oney is not the infinite but the indefinite, an astounding 
complex of all sorts of psychological as well as material reactions.”1055 As a 
result of the economic renaissance that swept the earlier part of the 21
st
 
century, the concept of money and its varied sociological implications came 
under a different light. With giant economies of the world today teetering on 
the edge of recession that is most reminiscent of the Great Depression, and 
with some having succumbed already, the sociological phenomenon of 
money, which shapes human behaviour, is one that needs revisiting, as an 
understanding of this phenomenon equates to an understanding of a particular 
form of human behaviour. This, invariably, underscores the essence of money 
laundering, as a planet within this universe, for human greed and the 
insatiable depths of the human mind are philosophical and sociological 
explanations of money laundering. And given the new breed it has spawned, 
called cyberlaundering, the same explanation also holds for the latter. 
Cyberlaundering is a confluence of human wit and malignity, and a sheer 
representation of the kind of evil inherent in the human mind’s stream of 
                                                          
1055
 Pollitzer (2001: 1). Cf Presley (1979: 809). 
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consciousness.
1056
 As personal and corporate greed continues to drive the 
current financial sector, the subject of money laundering and its 
cyberlaundering representation is brought to the fore. Unequivocally, the 
continued growth of global economic instability being witnessed today is in 
no small way due to the vast scale of undetected laundering operations carried 
out covertly through the internet. The economic interest that the current AML 
legal regime seeks to protect continues to fall prey to those against whom the 
prosecution is needed. This serves as a stark reminder of the pressing need to 
revert to the drawing board. 
If this study serves an ultimate purpose, it is to prompt action, for the journey 
has only just begun. Continued laxity carries with it greater costs than what 
just meets the eye today. One cannot afford to lag behind, or be deterred by 
the legal challenges that come with cyberlaundering. With the right pillars of 
the ACL legal regime in place, cyberlaundering, in its monstrosity, would no 
longer seem insurmountable. 
 
[Word count with footnotes: 109, 362] 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1056
 In hindsight, this is also reminiscent of the strong words of Mark Antony’s character in William 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar: ‘the evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft interred within 
their bones.’ Shakespeare (1994: 42). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
389 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
International instruments 
Agreement on the Swiss Bank Code of Conduct with Regard to the Exercise 
of Due Diligence (28 January 1998), available at <http://www.swiss banking 
.org/en/home/> [accessed on 11 January 2011]. 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime adopted by the Council of 
Europe on 8 November 2001 and came into force on 1 July 2004. 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime: Additional Protocol to the 
Convention adopted by the Council of Europe on 7 November 2002 and came 
into force on 1 March 2006. 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, adopted by the Council of Europe 
on 8 November 1990, and entered into force on 1 September 1993. 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, 
adopted by the Council of Europe on 16 May 2005, and came into force on 1 
December 2009. 
Council of Europe: Council Directive 2002/38/EC on the value added tax 
arrangements applicable to radio and television broadcasting services and 
certain electronically supplied services, adopted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly on 07 May 2002 and came into force on 01 July 2003. 
Council of Europe: Council Directive 2002/58/EC on the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications 
sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws 
adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 12 July 2002 and came into force 
on 31 July 2002. 
Council of Europe: Council Directive 2005/60/EC on the prevention and use 
of financial systems for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 26 October 2005 and 
came into force on 25 November 2005. 
Council of Europe: Council Directive 2009/110/EC on the taking up, pursuit 
and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions, 
adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 16 September 2009 and came into 
force on 30 October 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
390 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Council of Europe: Council Directive 2009/136/EC on universal service and 
users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, 
adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 25 November 2009 and came into 
force on 18 December 2009. 
Council of Europe: Measures Against the Transfer and Safekeeping of Funds of 
Criminal Origin: Recommendation No R (80) and Explanatory Memorandum, 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 27 June 
1980. 
European Council: Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA on attacks 
against information systems adopted by the European Parliament on 24 
February 2005. 
European Union Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 adopted by the European 
Parliament on 26 October 2005 and came into force on 15 December 2005. 
European Union Telecommunications Reform Package COM (2007) 697 and 
COD/2007/0247. 
Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, adopted by the General 
Assembly of the Organisation of American States on 6 March 2002, and 
entered into force on 7 October 2003. 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce 1996. 
United Nations Convention against Corruption adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 31 October 2003 and entered into force 
on 15 December 2005. 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on 7 December 1987, and entered into force on 11 November 
1988. 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime which 
was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 November 
2000, and entered into force on 29 September 2003. 
United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 
December 1999, and entered into force on 10 April 2002. 
United States-Switzerland Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 27 UST 2019, 
TIAS 8302, signed on 23 May 1973 and entered into force on 23 January 
1977. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
391 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Official reports 
 
Asian Development Bank / Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (2007) ‘Mutual Legal Assistance, Extradition, and Recovery of 
Proceeds of Corruption In Asia and the Pacific Region’ available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/47/37900503.pdf> [accessed on 12 
December 2011]. 
Association of Chief Police Officers (an undated website document) ‘Good 
Practice Guide for Computer-Based Electronic Evidence’ Official Release 
Version 4.0 available at <http://www.7safe.com/ electronic_evidence/ACPO_ 
guidelines_computer_evidence_v4_web.pdf> [accessed on 22 February 
2012]. 
Australian Centre for Policing Research (2000) ‘The Virtual Horizon: 
Meeting the Law Enforcement Challenges’ available at <http://www 
.joelschwarz.com/SpeechTestDocs/VirtualHorizonAustralia.pdf> [accessed 
on 19 February 2011]. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988) ‘Prevention of Criminal 
Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, Statement 
of Principles’ available at <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.pdf> [accessed 
on 25 October 2011]. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1997) ‘Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision’ available at <http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbs30a.pdf> [accessed on 25 October 2011]. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) ‘Core Principles 
Methodology’ available at <http://www.bis.org/publ/bsbs61.pdf> [accessed 
on 25 October 2011]. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001A) ‘Customer Due Diligence 
for Banks’ available at <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.pdf> [accessed on 
25 October 2011]. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001B) ‘Statement of Principles 
on the Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purposes of 
Money Laundering’ available at <http://www.bis.org> [accessed on 18 
February 2011]. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) ‘Due Diligence and 
Transparency regarding Cover Payment Messages related to Cross-Border 
Wire Transfers’ available at <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitorin g/ 
moneyval/web_ressources/Guid_basel2009.pdf> [accessed on 25 October 
2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
392 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Board of the Federal Reserve System (an undated report) ‘Transparency and 
Compliance for US Banking Organisations Conducting Cross-Border Funds 
Tranfer’ available at <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters 
/2009/sr0909a1.pdf> [accessed on 12 April 2012]. 
Drug Enforcement Administration: National Drug Intelligence Program 
(2010) ‘National Drug Threat Assessment 2010,’ available at <http://www 
.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/3866ip.pdf> [accessed on 31 March 2012]. 
Egmont Group (2004A) ‘Best Practices for the Exchange of Information 
Between Financial Intelligence Units’ available at <http://www.egmont 
group.org/bestpractices.pdf> [accessed on 30 November 2011]. 
Egmont Group (2004B) ‘Interpretative Note Concerning the Egmont 
Definition of a Financial Intelligence Unit’ available at <http://www.egmont 
group.org/library/download/8> [accessed on 30 November 2011]. 
Egmont Group (2004C) ‘Principles of Information Exchange’ available at 
<http://www.egmontgroup.org/princ_info_exchange.pdf> [accessed on 30 
November 2011]. 
Egmont Group (2004D) ‘Procedure for Being Recognised’ available at 
<http://www.egmontgroup.org/procedure_for_being_recognised.pdf> 
[accessed on 30 November 2011]. 
Egmont Group (2004E) ‘Statement of Purpose’ available at <http://www 
.egmontgroup.org/statement_of_purpose.pdf> [accessed on 30 November 
2011]. 
Egmont Group (2011) ‘Annual Report 2010-2011: FIUs in Action’ available 
at <http://www.egmontgroup.org/library/annual-reports> [accessed on 08 
February 2012]. 
Financial Action Task Force (1997) ‘1996-1997 Report on Money 
Laundering Typologies’ available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ dataoecd/ 
31/29/34043795.pdf> [accessed on 5 February 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2001A) ‘FATF IX Special Recommendations’ 
available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf> 
[accessed on 20 October 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2001B) ‘Report on Money Laundering 
Typologies’ available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/reports/money_ 
laundering_typologies/> [accessed on 31 January 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2002A) ‘FATF Annual Report for 2001-2002’ 
available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/43/53/34949558.pdf> [ 
accessed on 5 February 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
393 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Financial Action Task Force (2002B) ‘Report on Money Laundering 
Capabilities 2002-2003’ available at <http://www.oecd.org /dataoecd /m 
28/18/2494366.pdf> [accessed on 14 September 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2002C) ‘The Review of the Forty 
Recommendations: Consultation Paper’ available at <http://www. 
antiguagaming.gov.ag/Money%20Laundering/FATF%2040%20Review.pdf> 
[accessed on 22 May 2010]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2003) ‘The Forty Recommendations plus Nine 
Special Recommendation’ available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org /document 
/98/786123/> [accessed on 15 April 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2004A) ‘Mandate Renewed For 8 years’ 
available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/09102/> [accessed on 2 
January 2011].  
Financial Action Task Force (2004B) ‘Revised Interpretative Notes on 
Special Recommendation VII: Wire Transfers’ available at <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/datoecd/revised_notes/> [accessed on 08 February 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2006) ‘Report on New Payment Methods’ 
available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/30/47/37627240.pdf> 
[accessed on 30 August 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2007A) ‘Annual Review of Non-Cooperative 
Countries and Territories 2006-2007: Eighth NCCT Review’ available at 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/14/11/39552632.pdf> [accessed on 14 
September 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2007B) ‘Guidance on the Risk-Based approach 
to combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: High Level 
Principles and Procedures’ available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org 
/dataoecd/4/591.pdf> [accessed on 7 February 2012]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2008) ‘Report on Casinos’ available at 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/5/61/41584370.pdf> [accessed on 21 
January 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2009A) ‘FATF Statement-25 February 2009’ 
available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/18/28/42242615.pdf> 
[accessed on 14 September 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2009B) ‘Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming 
Sector’ available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org /media/fatf/documents 
/reports/Vulnerabilities%20of%20Casinos%20and%20Gaming%20Sector. 
pdf>[accessed on 30 March 2012]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
394 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Financial Action Task Force (2009C) ‘Risk-Based Approach: Guidance for 
Money Service Businesses’ available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org /dataoecd 
/4/5002883.pdf> [accessed on 7 February 2012]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2010A) ‘Global Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment’ available at <http://www.fatf-
gafi.com/documents/51/> [accessed on 10 February 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2010B) ‘Money Laundering and the 
Vulnerability of Free Trade Zones’ available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org 
/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html>  [accessed on 
31 January 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2010C) ‘Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing: Vulnerabilities of Commercial Websites and Internet Payment 
Systems’ available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org./resource_file678/> [accessed 
on 8 January 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2010D) ‘Money Laundering Using New 
Payment Methods’ available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org /dataoecd /4/56/ 
46705859.pdf> [accessed on 7 February 2012]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2010E) ‘Mututal Evaluation Report: Anti-
Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism - Germany’ 
available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports /mer/ 
MER%20Germany%20full.pdf> [accessed on 26 September 2012]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2012A) ‘International Standards on Combatting 
Money Laundering and The Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation’ 
available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/ recommend 
ations pdfs/FATF%20 Recommendations %20(approved % 20 February 
%202012)%20reprint%20May%202012%20web%20version.pdf> [accessed 
on 07 June 2012]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2012B) ‘Financial Action Task Force Mandate 
(2012-2020)’ available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org /media/fatf /documents 
/FINAL%20FATF%20MANDATE%202012-2020.pdf> [accessed on 05 
May 2012]. 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2006) ‘The Role of Domestic Shell 
Companies in Financial Crimes and Money Laundering: Limited Liability 
Companies’ available at <http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/LLC 
Assessment_FINAL.pdf> [accessed on 22May 2011]. 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (an undated report) ‘Money in 
Cyberspace’ available at <http://www.fincen.org/resource-money in cyber 
space /1212> [accessed on 17 June 2010]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
395 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2008A) ‘Annual Report 2008’ 
available at <http://www.fincen.us.gov/> [accessed 20 May 2011]. 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2008B) ‘Strategic Plan for the 
Fiscal Years of 2008-2012’ available at <http:// www.fincen .gov/ 
about_fincen /wwd/> [accessed on 9 August 2011]. 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2009) ‘Annual Report: Fiscal Year 
of 2009’ available at <http://www .fincen.gov/news_room /rp/files/ 
YEreport/FY2009/annualreport.html> [accessed on the 22 June 2010]. 
Financial Service Information sharing and Analysis Centre (2012) ‘Survey on 
Information Security Program Organisation’ available at <http://www. fsisac 
.com/files/public/db/p335.pdf> [accessed on 7 February 2012].  
House of Lords: European Union Select Committee (2009) ‘Money 
Laundering and Financing of Terrorism’ available at <http:// www. 
parliament.uk/business/committees/committee-archives/> [accessed on 11 
February 2011]. 
Human Rights Watch (2011) ‘World Report’ available at <http://www 
.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011> [accessed on 24 July 2011]. 
International Centre for Assets recovery, Basel Institute on Governance 
(2009) ‘Tracing Stolen Assets: A Practitioner’s Handbook’ available at 
<http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/publications/books/asset-
tracing_web-version.pdf> [accessed on 7 December 2011]. 
Internet Crime Complaint Centre (2010) ‘2010 Internet Crime Report’ 
available at <http://www.ic3.gov/report_2010> accessed on 31 March 2011. 
International Finance Corporation (2009) ‘Annual Reports’ available at 
<http://www.cait.gov.kw/> [accessed on 30 July 2010]. 
International Intellectual Property Association (2011) ‘Statement of 
theInternational Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA): The Copyright 
Industries Celebrate ‘World Intellectual Property Day 2011’ and Call Upon 
Governments to Redouble Their Efforts to Combat Global Piracy’ available 
at <http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPA2011WorldIPDayStatement042611.pdf [ 
accessed on 9 September 2011]. 
International Monetary Fund (2000) ‘Offshore Financial Centers: IMF 
Background Paper’ available at <http:www.fsfoum.org> [accessed on 22 
April 2011]. 
International Monetary Fund (2008) ‘Quarterly Reports’ available at 
<http://www.imf.org/quarterly-reports/> [accessed on 8 September 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
396 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
International Monetary Fund (2011) ‘United Kingdom: Anti-Money 
Laundering /The Combating the Financing of Terrorism Technical Note’ 
available at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11231.pdf> 
[accessed on 7 December 2011]. 
International Telecommunications Union (2009) ‘Understanding Cybercrime: 
A Guide for Developing Countries’ available at <http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/itu-understanding-cybercrime-guide.pdf> [accessed 
14 February 2012]. 
Kellerman, T (2004) ‘Money Laundering in Cyberspace’ 11(15) The World 
Bank Financial Sector Working Paper 1. 
KPMG International (2010) ‘Online gaming: A gamble or a sure bet?’ 
available at <http://www.kpmg.com /GI/en/Issues AndInsights /Articles 
Publications/Documents/Online-Gaming-A-Gamble-or-a-Sure-Bet.pdf> 
[accessed on 03 September 2011]. 
Legal Information Institute (an undated internet report) ‘Rule 401, Test for 
Relevant Evidence’ available at <http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule _ 
401 [accessed on 16 February 2012]. 
MindArk: Entropia Universe (2009) ‘Virtual World Developer MindArk 
Granted Real World Banking License’ available at <http:// www. 
mindark.com/press/press-releases /documents/ Virtual_ World_ Developer _ 
MindArk_Granted_Real_World_Banking_License.pdf> [accessed on 31 
April 2012]. 
National Drug Intelligence Program (2010) ‘National Drug Threat 
Assessment 2010’ available at <http:// www.justice .gov/ndic/ pubs38/38661 
/3866ip.pdf> [accessed on 31 January 2011]. 
Lehdonvirta, V, and Ernkvist, M (2011) ‘Converting the Virtual Economy 
into Development Potential: Knowledge Map of the Virtual Economy’ 
Washington, DC; infoDev / World Bank available at <http: //www .infodev. 
org/publications> [accessed on 04 September 2011]. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2001) ‘Basic 
Facts about Money Laundering’ available at <http://www.oecd.org/fatf> 
[accessed on 12 February 2011]. 
Payments Council (2010) ‘Payments Council: The Way We Pay 2010, The 
UK's Payment Revolution’ available at <http: //www .paymentscouncil. 
org.uk//files/payments_council/the_way_we_pay_2010_final.pdf> [accessed 
on 30 August 2011].  
Payment News (2010) ‘MasterCard Releases Prepaid Market Sizing Report’ 
12 July 2010 available at <http://www.paymentsnews.com/2010/07/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
397 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
mastercard-releases-prepaid-market-sizing-report.html> [accessed on 30 
August 2011]. 
Serious Organized Crime Agency (2011) ‘Suspicious Activity Report 
Regime: Annual Report 2011’ available at <http://www.soca.gov.uk/about-
soca/library/cat_view/82-library> [accessed on 31 January 2012]. 
Schott, PA (2006) ‘Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and the 
Combating of the Financing of Terrorism: Second Edition and Supplement on 
Recommendation IX Report by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund’ available at <http:// zunia.org/ uploads/media /knowledge 
/Reference_Guide_AMLCFT_2ndSupplement1.pdf> [accessed on 21 March 
2012]. 
South African Reserve Bank (2008) ‘Guidance Note 6/2008, Issued in Terms 
of Section 6(5) of the Banks Act, 1990: Cell-phone banking, Pretoria, South 
Africa’ available at <http ://www.reservebank .co.za/internet /Publication 
.nsf/LADV/18B4D18670F4E8EC422574520032B728/$File/G6+of+2008.pdf
> [accessed on 21 October 2012]. 
United Nations of Office on Drugs and Crime / The World Bank (2007) 
‘Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities and 
Action Plan’ available at <http://siteresources .worldbank.org/NEWS/ 
Resources/Star-rep-full.pdf> [accessed on 7 December 2011]. 
United States General Accounting Office (2001) ‘Report to the Chairman, 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental 
Affairs - Anti-Money Laundering: Efforts in the Securities Industry’ available 
at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02111.pdf> [accessed on 21 May 2011].  
United States Government Accounting Office (2009) ‘Internet Gambling, An 
Overview of the Issues: GAO-03-89’ available at <http://www.gao.gov 
/new.item/do389.pdf> [accessed on 21 July, 2011]. 
World Bank (2008) ‘Integrity in mobile phone financial services’ Working 
paper Nr. 146, Washington, 2008 available at <http://www.siteresources. 
worldbank.org/INTAML/Resources/WP146_Web.pdf> [accessed on 12 
September 2011]. 
Wolfsberg Group (2003) ‘Wolfsberg Statement on Monitoring Screening and 
Searching’ available at <http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/pdf/ Wolf 
sberg_Monitoring_Screening_Searching_Paper_(2003).pdf> [accessed on 25 
October 2011]. 
Wolfsberg Group (2006) ‘Wolfsberg Statement: Guidance on Risk Based 
Approach for Managing Money Laundering Risks’ available at <http://www 
.wolfsberg-rinciples.com/pdf/Wolfsberg_RBA_Guidance_(2006).pdf> 
[accessed on 25 October 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
398 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Wolfsberg Group (2002) ‘The Wolfsberg Global Anti-Money Laundering 
Guidelines for Private Banking’ available at <http://www.wolfsberg-
principles.com/pdf/Wolfsberg_AML_Guidelines_for_PB_(2002).pdf 
[accessed on 25 October 2011]. 
Wolfsberg Group (2007) ‘Wolfsberg Group, Clearing House Statement on 
Payment Message Standards’ available at <http://www.wolfsberg-
principles.com/pdf/Wolfsberg_NYCH_Statement_on_Payment_Message_Sta
ndards_(2007).pdf> [accessed on 25 October 2011]. 
Wolfsberg Group (2006) ‘Wolfsberg Statement – Anti-Money Laundering 
Guidance for Mutual Funds and Other Pooled Investment Vehicles’ available 
at <http://www.wolfsberg-principles .com/pdf/ Wolfsberg_PV_Guidance_ 
(2006).pdf  [accessed on 25 October 2011]. 
Wolfsberg Group (2011) ‘Wolfsberg guidance on Prepaid and Stored Value 
Cards’ available at <http://www.wolfsberg-principles .com/pdf/Wolfsberg _ 
Guidance_on_Prepaid_and_Stored_Value_Cards_Oct_14,_2011.pdf> 
[accessed on 25 October 2011]. 
Wolfsberg Group (2002) ‘The Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles 
for Correspondent Banking’ available at <http://www.wolfsberg-principles 
.com/pdf/Wolfsberg_Notification_Correspondent_Bank_Customers(2007).pd
f> [accessed on 25 October 2011]. 
World Summit on the Information Society (2003) ‘Declaration of Principles’ 
(WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E) avaliable at <http://www .itu.int/wsis 
/docs/Geneva /official/dop.html> [accessed on 25 October 2011]. 
 
Domestic laws 
Australia 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act of 2006. 
Belgium 
Belgian Criminal Code (Wet houdende de voorafgaande title van het Wetboek 
van Strafvordering) 2012. 
Canada 
Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (S.C. 
2000, c. 17). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
399 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Germany 
Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Act of 2008 (Gesetz zur Ergänzung der 
Bekämpfung der Geldwäsche und der Terrorismusfinanzierung - 
GwBekErgG). 
Banking Act of 1998 (Kreditwesengesetz in der Fassung der Bekannt mach 
ung vom 9. September 1998 - BGBl. I S. 2776; Gesetz über das Kreditwesen 
Kreditwesengesetz – KWG). 
Federal Data Protection Act of 2001 (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz - BDSG). 
Freedom of Information Act of 2005 (Informationsfreiheitsgesetz). 
German Criminal Code of 1998 (Strafgesetzbuch - StGB). 
Telecommunications Act of 2004 (Telekommunikationsgesetz - TKG). 
India 
Information Technology Act No. 21 of 2000. 
Indian Penal Code Act No. 45 of 1860. 
The Prevention of Money Laundering Control Act No. 15 of 2003. 
Malaysia 
Computer Crimes Act of 1997. 
Netherlands 
Dutch Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht) of 1994. 
Nigeria 
Nigerian Criminal Code Act 21 of 1972. 
Singapore 
Singapore Computer Misuse Act of 1993. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
400 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
South Africa 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 22 of 2002. 
National Gambling Act 7 of 2004. 
Regulation of the Interception of Communication and the Provision of 
Related-Information Act 70 of 2002. 
Tasmania 
Tasmanian Criminal Code Act of 1924. 
United Kingdom 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001, Chapter 24. 
Computer Misuse Act of 1990, Chapter 18. 
Digital Economy Act 2010 (Chapter 24). 
Drug Trafficking Offences Act of 1986 (Chapter 32). 
Money Laundering Regulations Act No. 2157 of 2007. 
Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1997 (Number 807). 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989 (Chapter 4). 
Proceeds of Crime Act of 2002, Chapter 29. 
Serious Organized Crime and Police Act of 2005 Chapter 15. 
Terrorism Act of 2000, Chapter 11. 
 
United States of America 
Federal Laws 
Banking Act of 1933 (Public Law Number: 73-66). 
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 31 United States Code 1051 (Public law number 
99-570). 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 1984, 18 United States Code 1030. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
401 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act of 1948, 18 United States Code 645; 683. 
Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002, 18 United States Code 5710. 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998, 17 United States Code 2860 (Public 
Law 105-304). 
District of Colombia Code [D.C. Code]. 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act 1986, 18 United States Code 2510. 
Federal Rules of Evidence Act of 1975, Title 28, United States Code. 
Federal Wire Act 87 of 1961. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Title15 United States Code, Public 
Law 95-213. 
Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers Act 1986, 18 
United States Code 1030. 
National Infrastructure Protection Act 1996, 2 United States Code 3488. 
NV Senate Bill 82-75
th
 (BDR 14-266), adopted on 1 July 2009 by the House 
of Senate, Nevada, United States. 
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 United States Code 1956; 1957 
(Public law number 99-570). 
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1982, Title 12, United States Code. 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing By Providing the 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 
2001(Public law number 107-56). 
United States Code [U.S.C]. 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 115, Stat. 272 of 2001. 
 
State laws 
Arkansas Criminal Code (Annex) of 2003.  
Connecticut General Statute (Annex) of 2004. 
North Carolina General Statute of 2002.  
Michigan Compiled Laws, Act of 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
402 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
SB-82 (NV Senate Bill 82-75
th
, BDR 14-266) of Nevada, which came into 
effect on 1 July 2009. 
 
Court cases 
International Court of Justice 
Belgium v Spain (Second Phase) ICJ Rep 1970 3. 
Nigeria 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria v Joshua Chibi Dariye [2007] EWHC 708 
(Ch). 
United Kingdom 
Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions for the State of Victoria, (1987) 164 
CLR 180. 
Julian Paul Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012] UKSC 22. 
United States of America 
Aguimatang v. California State Lottery (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 769 [286 
Cal.Rptr. 57] 
California Bankers Association v. Schultz 39L ed 2d 812 (1974) n5. 
Haag v. United States, 485 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Circuit) (2007). 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington 326 US 310 (1945). 
Perfect 10, INC v. Megaupload, Kim Schmitz 11cv0191 - IEG (BLM) (2011). 
United States of America v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1494 (7th Circuit) 
(1990). 
United States of America v. E-Gold Ltd, Douglas Jackson, Barry K. Downey, 
and Reid A. Jackson, 521 F.3d 411, 417 (D.C. Circuit) (2008). 
United States of America v. Foster, 986 F.2d 541 (D.C. Circuit) (1993). 
United States of America v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Circuit) (2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
403 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
United States of America v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (10th Circuit) 
(2005). 
United States of America v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 506 (3rd Circuit) 
(2003). 
United States of America v. Nippon Paper Industries Co. Ltd 109 F. 3d 1, 7 
(1st Circuit) (1997). 
United States of America v. Scheinberg et al 336 (10th Circuit) (2011). 
United States of America v. Scholle 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Circuit) (1976). 
United States of America v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Circuit) (1982). 
United States of America v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230-31 (4th Circuit) 
(2007). 
United States of America v. $124,700 in U.S. Currency, 05-3295 (8th Circuit) 
(2006). 
United States of America v. $4,255, 625, 39 551 F Supp 314 (1982). 
 
Indictment orders 
“The United States District Court for The District of Colombia, Holding a 
Criminal Term, Grand Jury Sworn in on May 11 2006, United States of 
America v. E-gold, Ltd Gold and Silver Reserve, INC, Douglas L. Jackson, 
Barry K. Downey, and Reid A. Jackson as Defendants (Criminal No. 07-
109): Indictment“page 3, available at <http:// www .justice.gov /criminal 
/ceos/Press%20Releases/DC%20egold%20indictment.pdf> [accessed on 13 
February 2012]. 
“In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 
Alexandria Division, United States of America v. Kim Dotcom, Megaupload 
Ltd, Vestor Ltd, Fin Batato, Julius Bencko, Sven Echternach, Mathias 
Ortmann, Andrus Nomm, and Bram van der Kolk as Defendants (Criminal 
No. 1:12CR3): Indictment, dated 5 Januaray 2012“ at <http ://online. wsj.com 
/article/SB10001424052970204616504577171180266957116.html> 
[accessed on 13 February 2012]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
404 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
Books 
Aas, KF (2007) Globalization and Crime TJ International Ltd: Cornwall. 
American Law Institute (1987) Restatement of the Law (Third) Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States (2nd volume) American Law Institute: 
Philadelphia. 
Alghamdi, AM (2011) The Law of E-Commerce: E-Contracts, E-Business 
AuthorHouse: Bloomington. 
Bailey, M (2011) Complete guide to Internet Privacy, Anonymity and 
Security Nerrel: New York. 
Beare, ME (2005) Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, 
Money Laundering and Corruption University of Toronto Press: Toronto. 
Beckett, B (1988) Introduction to Cryptography Blackwell Scientific 
Publications: London. 
Bermann, G (2003) Transnational Litigation Thomson West: Minnesota. 
Blunden, B (2001) The Money Launderers, how they do it, and how to catch 
them at it... Management Books: Gloucestershire. 
Boni, W and Kovavcich, GL (2000) Netspionage: The Global Threat to 
Information Butterworth-Heinemann: Woburn. 
Brenner, S (2007) Law in an Era of Smart Technology Oxford University 
Press: Oxford. 
Buergenthal, T and Murphy, SD (2002) Public International Law in a 
nutshell West Group: Minnesota. 
Caloyannides, MA (2004) Privacy Protection and Computer Forensics (2nd 
edition) Arctech House: Massachusetts. 
Cassese, A (2005) International Law (2nd edition) Oxford University Press: 
Hampshire. 
Casey, E (2004) Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic Science, 
Computers and the Internet (2nd edition) Academic Press: London. 
Casey, E (2011A) Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic Science, 
Computers and the Internet (2nd edition) Academic Press: London. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
405 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Cater, BE and Weiner, AS (2011) International Law (6
th
 edition) Aspen 
Publishers: New York. 
Clough, J (2010) Principles of Cybercrime Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Cornelius, K and Hermann, D (eds) (2011) Virtual Worlds and Criminality 
Springer: Heidelberg. 
Cohen, F (2009) Digital forensic evidence examination Fred Cohen & 
Associates: Livermore. 
Cryer, R, Friman, H, Robinson, D, and Wilmshurst, E (2010) An Introduction 
to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2
nd
 edition) Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
Curtin, M (2005) Brute Force: Cracking the Data Encryption Standard 
Springer: New York. 
Curtis, G (2011) The Law of Cybercrimes and Their Investigations CRC 
Press: Washington. 
Demetis, DS (2010) Technology and Anti-Money Laundering: A Systems 
Theory and Risk-Based Approach Edward Edgar Publishing Ltd: 
Cheltenham. 
Fafinski, S (2009) Computer Misuse: Response, regulation and the 
law Willan: Cullompton. 
Ferguson, N (2009) The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World 
Penguin Press: London. 
Forget, L and Hocevar, VS, (2004) Financial Intelligence Units: An 
Overview International Monetary Fund Publication Services: Washington 
DC. 
 Fukuyama, F (1995) Trust: The Social Virtues Hamish Hamilton: London. 
Furnell, S (2002) Cybercrime: Vandalizing the Information Society. Addison-
Wesley: London. 
Geva, B (1992) The Law of Electronic Funds Transfers Matthew Bender & 
Company: New York. 
Gilbert, G (2010) The law of evidence. By a late learned judge. The third 
edition, corrected; and many new references added. With a complete table to 
the whole. Gale, ECCO: London. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
406 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Gilmore, W (1995) Dirty Money: The Evolution of Money Laundering 
Counter-Measures Council of Europe Press: Strasburg. 
Grabosky, P and Smith, R (1998) Crime in the Digital Age, Controlling 
Telecommunications and Cyberspace Illegalities The Federation Press: 
Sydney 
Gragido, W and Pirc, K (2011) Cybercrime and Espionage: An Analysis of 
Subversive Multi-Vector Threats Elsevier, Inc: Burlington. 
Grama, JL (2010) Legal Issues in Information Security Jones and Berlett 
Learning, LLC: Sudbury. 
Greenberg, TS, Samuel, LM, Grant, W, and Grey, L, (2009) Stolen Assets 
recovery: A Good Prasctice Guide for Non-Conviction-Based Asset 
Forfeiture International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The 
World Bank: Washington DC. 
Hallam-Baker, P (2008) The Dotcrime Manifesto: How to Stop Internet 
Crime Addison-Wesley: Massachusetts. 
Henkin, L, Damrosch, LF, Murphy, SD, and Smit, H (2009) International 
Law: Case and Material (6
th
 edition) West: New York. 
Higgins, GE (2010) Cybercrime: An Introduction to an Emerging 
Phenomenon McGraw-Hill: Columbus. 
Hinterseer, K (2002) Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money 
Laundering in a Comparative Legal Context. Kluwer Law International: The 
Hague. 
Hopton, D (2009) Money laundering: A concise guide for all businesses (2
nd
 
ed) Gower Publications: London.   
Jolicoeur, P (1999) Introduction to Biometry Springer: London. 
Kochan, N (2006) The Washing Machine: How Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing Soil Us Duckworth Overlook: London. 
Koh, J (2006) Suppressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 
Springer: New York. 
Koops, B and Brenner, SW (2006) Cybercrime and Jurisdiction: A global 
survey (Information Technology and Law Series) T.M.C Asser Press: The 
Hague. 
Kshetri, N (2010) The Global Cybercrime Industry: Economic, Institutional 
and Strategic Perspectives Springer: Heidelberg. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
407 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Lankhorst, F and Nelen H (2003) Dilemmas Facing Lega Proffessional and 
Notaries in their Professional Relationship with Criminal Clients, Falcone 
Project, Vrije University Press: Amsterdam. 
Lassila, D et al (2011) Electronic Funds Transfer Matthew Bender & 
Company: New York. 
Lilley, P (2006) Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth About Global Money 
Laundering, International Crime and Terrorism (3
rd
 ed) Kogan Page: 
London.  
Madinger, J and Zalopany, SA (1999) Money Laundering: A Guide for 
Criminal Investigators (1st edition) CRS Press: Florida. 
Madinger, J (2012) Money Laundering: A Guide for Criminal Investigators 
(3
rd
 edition) CRC Press: Boca Raton.  
Marcella, AJ and Greenfields, RS (2002) Cyber Forensics: A field manual for 
collecting examining and preserving evidence of computer crimes CRC Press: 
Boca Raton. 
McKemmish, R (1999) What is forensic computing? Trends and issues in 
crime and criminal justice (Vol. 118). Australian Institute of Criminology: 
Canberra. 
McQuade, SC (2006) Understanding and Managing Cybercrime. Person 
Education: Boston. 
Molander, RC, Mussington, DA, Wilson, PA (1998) Cyberpayments and 
Money Laundering: Problems and Promise RAND: Santa Monica. 
Molly, D and Parker, CS (2010) Understanding Computers: Today and 
Tomorrow Cengage Learning Inc: Boston. 
Moore, R (2011) Cybercrime, Second Edition: Investigating High-
Technology Computer Crime Elsevier Inc: Oxford. 
Murphy, SD (2006) Principles of International Law Thomas West: 
Minnesota. 
Mussington, DA, Wilson, PA, Molander, RC (1998) Exploring Money 
Laundering Vulnerabilities through Emerging Cyberspace Technologies: A 
Carribean-Based Exercise RAND: Santa Monica. 
Naím, M (2005) Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are 
Hijacking the Global Economy Anchor books: New York. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
408 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Nelson, B, Philips, A, and Steuart, C (2010) Guide to Computer Forensics 
and Investigations (3rd edition) Course Technology, Cengage Learning: 
Boston. 
Newman, GR and Clarke, RV (2003) Superhighway Robbery: Preventing e-
commerce crime Willan Publishing: Devon. 
Nissenbaum, H (2009) Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy and the 
Integrity of Social Life Stanford University Press: Stanford. 
Paar, C and Pelzl, J (2010) Understanding Cryptography: A textbook for 
students and practitioners Springer: Heidelberg. 
Parker, D (1976) Crime by Computer Charles Scribner’s Suns: New York. 
Pieth, M, (ed.) (2002) Financing of Terrorism: Following the Money Kluwer 
Academic Publishers: Amsterdam. 
Pieth, M and Aiolfi, G (eds.) (2004) A Comparative Guide to Anti-Money 
Laundering, A Critical Analysis of Systems in Singapore, Switzerland, the UK 
and the USA Edward Elgar Publishers: Northhampton. 
Pillai, K and Julian, A (2008) Prevention of Money Laundering Legal and 
Financial Issues The Indian Law Institute: New Delhi. 
Reichel, P (ed) (2005) Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice Sage: 
Los Angeles. 
Reuter, P and Truman, EM (2004) Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight against 
Money Laundering Peterson Institute for International Economics: 
Washington DC. 
Reyes, A, Brittson, A, O’Shea, K, and Steele, J (2007) Cyber Crime 
Investigations: Bridging the Gaps between Security Professionals, Law 
Enforcement, and Prosecutors Syngress: Massachusetts.  
Richards, JR (2006) Transnational criminal organisations, cybercrime, and 
money laundering: a handbook for law enforcement officers, auditors, and 
financial investigators CRC Press: Boca Raton. 
Rider, B (1999) The Price of Laundering Dirty Money Jesus College, 
University of Cambridge: Cambridge. 
Robinson, J (1998) The Laundry Men: Inside the World’s Third Largest 
Business. London Pocket Books: London. 
Rohrbach, S (2011) Virtual Chaos: Our Vulnerability to Cyber-Crime and 
How to Prevent It AuthorMike Ink: Wilbraham. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
409 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Ryan, J (2010) A History of the Internet and the Digital Future. Reaktion 
Books Ltd: London.  
Savona, E (2000) Responding to Money Laundering: International 
Perspectives Taylor and Francis: Amsterdam. 
Schell, BH and Martin, C (2004) Cyber crime: A Reference Handbook 
Contemporary World Issues Series: Santa Barbara. 
Schott, PA (2006) Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and the 
Combating of the Financing of Terrorism The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development / World Bank/ International Money Fund: 
Washington DC. 
Shakespeare, W (1994) Julius Caesar Heinemann: Auckland. 
Shaw, MN (2003) International Law Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Shams, H (2004) Legal Globalization: Money Laundering Law & Order 
Cases British Institute of International and Comparative Law: Surrey. 
Shelly, GB and Vermaat, ME (2010) Discovering Computers 2011: Living in 
a Digital World, Brief Cengage Learning Inc: Boston. 
Siegel, DD & Borchers, PJ (2005) Conflicts: In a nutshell (3rd edition) 
Thomson West: Minnesota. 
Slade, RM (2004) Software Forensics: Collecting Evidence from the Scene of 
a Digital Crime. McGraw Hill: New York. 
Snyman, CR (2002) Criminal Law (4
th
 edition) Butterworths: Durban. 
Solove, DJ (2007) The Future of Reputation, Gossip, Rumor on the Internet 
Vail-Ballou Press: New Hampshire. 
Solove, DJ (2011) Nothing to hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and 
Security Yale University Press: New Haven and London. 
Stessens, G (2000) Money Laundering: A New International Law 
Enforcement Model Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Taylor, RW, Caeti, T. J., Loper, K., Fritsch, E. J., and Liederbach, J. (2006) 
Digital crime and digital terrorism Prentice Hall: New Jersey. 
Thanki, B (ed.) (2011) The Law of Privilege (2
nd
 edition) Oxford University 
Press: New York. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
410 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Theleskaf, D (ed.) and Pereira, PG (ed.) (2011) Non-State Actors in Assets 
recovery Peter Lang: Bern. 
Turner, JE (2011) Money Laundering Prevention: Deterring, Detecting and 
Resolving Financial Fraud John Wiley and Sons: New Jersey. 
Von Hayek, F (1978) Denationalisation of Money – The Argument Refined 
Institute of Economic Affairs: London. 
Walden, I (2007) Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. 
Wall, DS (2007) Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the 
Information Age (PCSS-Polity Crime and Society) Polity Press: Cambridge. 
Werle, G (2009) Principles of International Criminal Law (2nd edition) 
T.M.C Asser Press: The Hague. 
 
Chapters from books 
Angers, L (2004) ‘Combatting Cyber-Crime: National Legislation as a Pre-
Requisite to International Cooperation’ in Savona, EU (ed) Crime and 
Technology: New Frontiers for Regulations, Law Enforcement and Research, 
Springer: The Hague. 
Arthur, KK & Venter, HS, (2006) ‘An Investigation into Computer Forensic 
Tools“ in Kumar, R and Jain, B (eds) Cyber Forensics: Tools and Practice. 
The ICFAI University Press: Hyderabad. 
Bassiouni, MC (2004) ‘The History of Universal Jurisdiction and its pace in 
International Law’ in Macedo, S Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and 
the Prosecution of Serious Crimes under International Law (Pennysylavia 
Studies in Human Rights) University of Pennsylavia Press: Philadelphia.  
Bassiouni, MC and Gualtieri, DS (2000) ‘International and National 
Responses to the Globalization of Money Laundering’ in Savona, E (ed.) 
Responding to Money Laundering: International Perspectives Taylor and 
Francis: Amsterdam. 
Busia, G (2004) ‘Privacy and Investigative Needs: Progressing From 
Incompatible to Complementary Positions’ in Savona, EU (ed) Crime and 
Technology: New Frontiers for Regulation, Law Enforcement and Research 
Springer: Dordrecht. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
411 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Casey, E (2011B) ‘Introduction’ in Casey, E (ed) Digital Evidence and 
Computer Crime: Forensic Science, Computer and the Internet (3rd edition) 
Academic Press: London. 
Casey, E (2011C) ‘Digital Evidence in the Courtroom’ in Casey, E (ed) 
Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic Science, Computer and the 
Internet (3rd edition) Academic Press: London. 
Casey, E and Palmer, G (2004) ‘The Investigative Process’ in Casey, E 
(2004) Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic Science, Computers 
and the Internet (2nd edition) Academic Press: London. 
Casey, E and Schatz, B (2011) ‘Conducting Digital Investigations’ in Casey, 
E (ed) Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic Science, Computer 
and the Internet (3rd edition) Academic Press: London. 
Claus, K (2010) ‘Nullum poena nulla poena sine lege’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum 
(ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia for Public International Law Oxford 
University Press: Cologne. 
Cornelius, K (2011) ‘Responsibility under Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds’ 
in Cornelius, K and Hermann, D (eds) Virtual Worlds and Criminality 
Springer: Heidelberg. 
Evans, JL ‘Investigating and Prosecuting the Proceeds of Crime: A Common 
Law Experience’ in Savona, E (ed.) (2000) Responding to Money 
Laundering: International Perspectives Taylor and Francis: Amsterdam. 
Frost, M (2007) ‘Anti-Money Laundering Regulation and Trusts’ in Muller, 
WH (ed.) Kalin, CH (ed.), Goldsworth, JG (ed.) Anti-Money Laundering: 
International Law and Practice John Wiley & Sons, Ltd: West Sussex. 
Jones, M (1995) ‘Improved Auditing Practice’ in Reuvid, J (ed) The 
Regulation and Prevention of Economic Crime Internationally. Kogan Page: 
London. 
Klimmt, C (2011) ‘Virtual Worlds as a Regulatory Challenge: A User 
Perspective’ in Cornelius, K and Hermann, D (eds) Virtual Worlds and 
Criminality Springer: Heidelberg. 
Koops, BJ and Robinson, T (2011) ‘Cybercrime Law: A European 
Perspective’ in Casey, E (ed) Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: 
Forensic Science, Computer and the Internet (3rd edition) Academic Press, 
Elsevier Inc.: London. 
Lamb, S (2002) ‘Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege in International 
Criminal Law’ in Cassese, A, Gaeta, P and Jones, JRWD (eds) The Rome 
 
 
 
 
 
 
412 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Oxford 
University Press: London. 
Lodder, AR (2011) ‘Conflict Resolution in Virtual Worlds: General 
Characteristics and the 2009 Dutch Convictions on Virtual Theft’ in 
Cornelius, K and Hermann, D (eds) Virtual Worlds and Criminality Springer: 
Heidelberg. 
Laue, C (2011) ‘Crime Potential of Metaverses’ in Cornelius, K and 
Hermann, D (eds) (2011) Virtual Worlds and Criminality Springer: 
Heidelberg. 
Mason, S and Schafer, B (2010) ‘The characteristics of digital evidence’ in 
Mason, S (ed) (2010) Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery and 
Admissibility (2nd edition) Lexis Nexis Butterworths: London. 
Mason, S and Sheldon, A (2010) ‘Proof: Investigations, Collection and 
Examination of Digital Evidence’ in Mason, S (ed) (2010) Electronic 
Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery and Admissibility (2nd edition) Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths: London. 
Marshall, CE, Robinson, TH and Kwak, D (2005) ‘Computer Crime in Brave 
New World’ in Reichel, P Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice 
Sage: Los Angeles. 
Muller, WH (2007A) ‘Anti-Money Laundering – A short history’ in Muller, 
WH (ed.) Kalin, CH (ed.), Goldsworth, JG (ed.) Anti-Money Laundering: 
International Law and Practice John Wiley & Sons, Ltd: West Sussex. 
Muller, WH (2007B) ‘The Egmont Group’ in Muller, WH (ed.) Kalin, CH 
(ed.), Goldsworth, JG (ed.) Anti-Money Laundering: International Law and 
Practice John Wiley & Sons, Ltd: West Sussex. 
Mulukutla, H and Ruegg, M (2009) ‘The Importance of Information 
Technology in Tracing Stolen Assets’ in Basel Institute of Governance 
Tracing Stolen Assets: A Practitioner’s Handbook Basel Institute of 
Governance: Basel. 
Oxman, BH (1987) ‘Jurisdiction of States’ in Berhnardt, R (ed) Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law (1st edition) North-Holland: Amsterdam. 
Padfield, N (2004) ‘Country Report: Anti-Money Laundering Rules in the 
United Kingdom’ in Pieth, M and Aiolfi, G (eds) A comparative guide to 
monmey laundering: a critical analysis of the systems in Singapore, 
Switzerland, the UK and the USA E. Elgar Publications: Northampton. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
413 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Pieth, M (2007) ‘The Wolfsberg Process’ in Muller, WH (ed.) Kalin, CH 
(ed.), Goldsworth, JG (ed.) Anti-Money Laundering: International Law and 
Practice John Wiley & Sons, Ltd: West Sussex. 
Pieth, M (2008) ‘Recovering Stolen Assets – A New Issue’ in Pieth, M, (ed.) 
(2008) Recovering Stolen Assets Peter Lang: Bern. 
Pocar, F (2004) ‘New Challenges for International Rules against Cybercrime’ 
in Savona, E (ed) Crime and Technology: New Frontiers for Regulation, Law 
Enforcement and Research Springer: Dordrecht. 
Reuvid, J (1995A) ‘The Focus on Money Laundering’ in Reuvid, J (ed) The 
Regulation and Prevention of Economic Crime Internationally. Kogan Page: 
London. 
Reuvid, J (1995B) ‘Teeth for regulators and International Standards of 
Practice’ in Reuvid, J (ed) The Regulation and Prevention of Economic 
Crime Internationally. Kogan Page: London. 
Robertson, P (1999) ‘Internet Payments’ in Brindle, M and Cox, R (eds) Law 
of Bank Payments Sweet and Maxwell: London. 
Savona, EU and Migone, M (2004) ‘The Fox and the Hunters: How IC 
Technologies change the Crime Race’ in Savona, EU (ed) Crime and 
Technology: New Frontiers for Regulations, law Enforcement and Research 
Springer: Dordrecht. 
Tanzi, V (2005) ‘Macroeconomic Implications of Money Laundering’ in 
Savona, EU (ed) Responding to Money Laundering: International 
Perspectives Harwood Academic Publishers: The Netherlands. 
Unger, B (2007) ‘The Impact of Money Laundering’ in Masciandaro, D, 
Takats, E and Unger, B Black Finance: The Economics of Money Laundering 
Edward Elgar Publishing: Massachusetts. 
Walden, I (2010) ‘Computer Forensics and the Presentation of Evidence in 
Criminal Cases’ in Jewkes, Y and Yar, M Handbook of Internet Crime Willan 
Publishing: Devon. 
Yar, M (2010) ‘The Private Pricing of Internet Crime’ in Yar, M and Jewkes, 
Y (eds) Handbook of Internet Crime Willan Publishing: Devon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
414 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Journal articles 
Abdullah, MT, Mahmod, R, Ab. Gani, AA, Abdullah, MZ and Md. Sultan, 
AB (2008) ‘Advances in Computer Forensics’ 8(2) International Journal of 
Computing Science and Networking Security, 215. 
Alexander, K (2001) ‘The International Anti-Money-Laundering Regime: 
The Role of the Financial Action Task Force’ 4(3) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, 231. 
Alford, DE (1993) ‘Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden on 
Financial Institutions’ 19 North Carolina Journal of International Law & 
Commercial Regulation, 143. 
Amedeo, A, Bagella, M and Busato, F (2008) ‘Money Laundering in a Two 
Sector Model: Using Theory for Measurement’ 6(8) CEIS Tor Vergata 
Research Paper Series, 128. 
Atta-Asamoah, A (2009) ‘Understanding the West African Cyber crime 
process’ 18(4) African Security Review: Organised Crime Trends in Africa, 
107. 
Beebe, NL, and Clarke, JG (2005) ‘A hierarchical, objectives-based 
framework for the digital investigations process’ 2(2) Digital Investigation, 
146. 
Bell, RE (2002) ‘The Prosecution of Computer Crime’ 9(4) Journal of 
Financial Crime, 308. 
Bishop, J. (2009) ‘Enhancing the understanding of genres of web-based 
communities: The role of the ecological cognition framework’ 5(1) 
International Journal of Web-Based Communities, 4.  
Brenner, SW and Koops, B (2004) ‘Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction’ 
4(1) Journal of High Technology Law, 1. 
Brenner, S (2004) ‘Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?’ 4(1) California 
Criminal Law Review, 1. 
Carrier, BD, and Spafford, EH (2003) 2(2) ‘Getting physical with the digital 
investigation process’ International Journal of Digital Evidence, 1. 
Casey, E, Ferraro, M, & Nguyen, L (2009) ‘Investigation delayed is justice 
denied: Proposals for expediting forensic examinations of digital evidence’ 
54(6) Journal of Forensic Science, 1353. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
415 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Chawki, M (2010) ‘Anonymity in Cyberspace: Finding the balance between 
privacy and security’ 9(3) International Journal of Technology Transfer and 
Commercialisation, 183. 
Chaudary, K et al (2010) ‘Experiences in developing a Micro-Payment 
System for Peer-to-Peer Networks’ 5(1) International Journal of Information 
Technology and Web Engineering, 23. 
Chuah, J (2000) ‘The New EU Directives to regulate electronic money 
institutions - A critique’ 15(8) Journal of International Banking Law, 181. 
Cuéller, M (2003) ‘The Tenuous Relationship between the Fight against 
Money Laundering and the Disruption of Criminal Finance’ 93(2/3) The 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 311. 
Dorward, DJ (1998) ‘Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial 
Protection of Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs’ 
19(1) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, 
141. 
Fairlie, RW Chatterji, A (2011) ‘High-Technology Entrepreneurship in 
Silicon Valley’ World Paper Series, Institute of the Study of Labour (IZA 
Discussion Paper NO. 5726), 1. 
Filipkowski, W (2008) ‘Cyber laundering: An analysis of typologies and 
techniques’ 3(1) International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences 233. 
Frieden, JD, Murray, LM (2011) ‘The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence’ 16(2) Richmond Journal of Law and 
Technology, 1. 
Garber, L, (2001) ‘Computer Forensics: High-Tech Law Enforcement’ 34(1) 
IEEE Computer Society's Computer Magazine, 22. 
Gill, M and Taylor, G (2004) ‘Preventing Money Laundering or Obstructing 
business?: Financial Companies’ Perspectives on ‘Know Your Customer’ 
Procedures’ 44(4) British Journal of Criminology 584. 
Gottfried, J (2004) ‘The Federal Framework for Internet Gambling’ 10(3) 
Richmond Journal for Technology, 26. 
Haney, C (2001) ‘Auction sites hit hard by electronic crime’ 23(3) InfoWorld, 
25. 
Hinsterseer, K (1997) ‘An Economic Analysis of Money Laundering’ 1(6) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control, 154. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
416 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Hughes, SJ (1991) ‘Policing Money Laundering through Funds Transfers: A 
Critique of Regulation under the Bank Secrecy Act’ 67(2) Indiana Law 
Journal, 283. 
Hunt, J (2011) ‘The new frontier of money laundering: How terrorist 
organisations use cyberlaundering to fund their activities, and how 
governments are trying to stop them’ 20(2) Information and Communications 
Technology Law, 133. 
Jacobson, M and Levitt, M (2010) ‘Tracking Nacro-Terrorist Networks: The 
Money Trail’ 34 Fletcher Forum for World Affairs, 117. 
Jailani, N, Yatim, NFM, Yahya, Y, Patel, A and Othman, M (2008) ‘Secure 
and auditable agent-based e-marketplace framework for mobile users’ 1(30) 
Computer Standard and Interfaces, 237. 
Joinson, AN (2001) ‘Self-disclosure in computer-mediated communication: 
The role of self-awareness and visual anonymity’ 31 European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 177. 
Kirtley, JE (2010) ‘Symposium Cyberspace & the Law: Privacy, Property, 
and Crime in the Virtual Frontier: Mask, Sheild, and Sword: Should the 
Journalist’s Privilege Protect the Identity of Anonymous Posters to News 
Media Websites?’ 94 Minnesota Law Review, 1478. 
Koker, L (2006) ‘Money laundering control and suppression of financing of 
terrorism: Some thoughts on the impact of customer due diligence measures 
on financial exclusion’ 13(1) Journal of Financial Crime, 26. 
Larguier, J (1965) ‘Civil Actions for Damages in French Criminal Procedure’ 
1(39) Tulane Law Review, 687.  
Lastoska, G and Hunter, D (2004) ‘The laws of the virtual worlds’ 92(1) 
California Law Review, 1. 
Leong, AVM (2007) ‘Chasing dirty money: domestic and international 
measures against money laundering’ 10(2) Journal of Money Laundering 
Control, 140. 
Levi, M (2002) ‘Money Laundering and Its Regulation’ 582 The ANNALS of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 181. 
Levi, M, and Reuter, P (2006) ‘Money Laundering’ 34(1) Crime and Justice: 
A Review of Research 289.  
Lucchi, N (2011) ‘Access to Network Services and Protection of 
Constitutional Rights: Recognizing the Essential Role of Internet Access for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
417 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
the Freedom of Expression’ 19(3) Cardozo Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 647. 
Manning, RB (2010) ‘A Computer-Generated Catalog of Types: By Product 
Data Processing In Museums’ 12(2) Curator: The Museum Journal, 134. 
Moore, S (2009) ‘The Challenge of Internet Anonymity: protecting John Doe 
on the Internet’ 26 The John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information 
Law, 469. 
Mueller, M (1999) ‘ICAAN and Internet Governance: Sorting Through the 
Debris of Self-Regulation’ 1(6) Journal of Policy, Regulation and Strategy 
for Telecommunications 497. 
Murphy, E (2009) ‘Manufacturing crime: process, pretext and criminal 
justice’ 97 Georgetown Law Journal, 1435. 
Nichols, PM (1997) ‘Outlawing Transnational Bribery through the World 
Trade Organisation’ 28(1) Law and policy in International Business, 305. 
Nkhasi, SS (2007) ‘Western Unionizing the Hawala?: The Privatization of 
Hawalas and Lender Liability’ 27 North-western Journal of International 
Law and Business, 475. 
Norton, J and Shams, H (2002) ‘Money laundering Law and Terrorist 
Financing: Post-September 11 Responses – Let Us Step Back and Take a 
Deep Breath’ 13 International Law Journal, 103. 
Ó Ciardhuáin, S (2004) ‘An extended model of cybercrime investigations’ 
3(1)International Journal of Digital Evidence, 1. 
Perkel, W (2004) ‘Money Laundering and Terrorism: Informal Value 
Transfer Systems’ 41 American Criminal Law Review, 183. 
Philippsohn, S (2001A) ‘Money Laundering on the Internet’  20(6) 
Computers & Security 485. 
Philippson, S (2001B) ‘The Dangers of New Technology - Laundering on the 
Internet’ 1(5) Journal of Money Laundering Control Thomason 89. 
Pieth, M, Aiolfi, G (2003) ‘The private sector become active: the Wolfsberg 
process’ 10(4) Journal of Financial Crime 1. 
Ping, H (2004) ‘New Trends in Money Laundering – From the Real World to 
Cyberspace’ 5(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control, 50. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
418 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Presley, JR (1979) ‘Marcel Labordere: A Neglected French Contribution to 
the Trade Cycle Theory’ 1(32) Kyklos: International Review for Social 
Sciences 809. 
Reiter, MK and Rubin, AD (1998) ‘Crowds: Anonymity for Web 
transactions’ 1(1) Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) 
1. 
Rider, BAK (2002) ‘The Weapons of War: The use of anti-money laundering 
laws against terrorist and criminal enterprises — Part 1’ 4(1) Journal of 
Banking Regulation 13. 
Scholte, J (1997) ‘Global capitalism and the State’ International Affairs 73 
(3). 
Schopper, MD (2002) ‘Internet Gambling, Electronic Cash & (and) Money 
Laundering: The Unintended Consequences of a Monetary Control Scheme’ 
5(1) Chapman Law Review, 303.  
Sherman, JC (2008) ‘Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money 
Laundering in Developing States’ 52 (3) International Studies Quarterly, 
635. 
Stein, AR (1985) ‘Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-
Access Doctrine’ 133(4) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 429. 
Strafer, GR (1989) ‘Money Laundering: The Crime of the ‘90’s’ 27 American 
Criminal Law Review, 149. 
Straub, JP (2002) ‘The Prevention of E-Money laundering: Tracking the 
Elusive Audit Trail’ 25(1) Suffolk Transnational Law Review 515. 
Tomuschat, C (2006) ‘The Legacy of Nuremberg’ 4(1) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 830. 
Twitchell, M (1988) ‘The Myth of General Jurisdiction’ 101(3) Harvard Law 
Review, 610. 
Vincent, OR, Folorunso, O, Akinwale, O and Akinde, AD (2010) 
‘Transaction Flow in Card Payment Systems using Mobile Agents’  5 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Information, Knowledge, and Management, 154. 
Welling, SN (1989) ‘Smurfs, Money Laundering and the Federal Criminal 
Law: the Crime of Structuring Transaction’ 41 Florida Law Review, 287. 
Yar, M (2005) ‘The Novelty of Cybercrime: An Assessment in Light of 
Routine Activity Theory’ 2(4) European Journal of Criminology 407. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
419 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Yasinsac, AE, Marks, DG, Pollitt, MM, Sommer, PM, (2003) ‘Computer 
forensics education’ 1(4) Security &Privacy Magazine, 1. 
Zagaris, B (2004) ‘The Merging of Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-
Terrorism Financial Enforcement Regimes After September 11, 2011’ 34 
Law and Policy in International Business, 45.  
Zeldin, MF and Florio, CV (2007) ‘Strengthening Laws and Financial 
Institutions to Combat Emerging Trends in Money Laundering’ 2(4) Journal 
of Money Laundering Control 412. 
 
Unpublished works 
Jamali, MS (2009) Cyber Laundering  
A Master thesis submitted to the School of Computing Information 
Technology and Engineering, University of East London, in May 2009, in 
partial fulfillment of the requirement of Masters of Science in Information 
Security and Computer Forensics. Available at <http:// www .scribe .com 
/resources/cyberlaundering09811> [accessed on 2 June 2010]. 
 
Leslie, DA (2010) Anti-Cyberlaundering Regulation and Control 
A Masters thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law, University of the Westen 
Cape, in October 2010, in partial fulfilment of the requirement of Masters of 
Laws in Transnational Criminal Justice and Crime Prevention. 
 
Manzoor, AKS (2008) E-Commerce Technology and Management 
DBA 1727, III Semester Course Material, Masters for Business 
Administration Degree, Centre for Distance Education, Anna University, 
Chennai, India. Available at <http://www .scribd. com /doc/ 40219342 /160 
/Ethics-Social-and-Political-issues [accessed on 2 August 2011]. 
 
South African Law Reform Commission (2012)  
‘The Review of The Law of Evidence - Draft discussion paper on the review 
of the law of evidence’ Committee Paper 02/2012 Project 126, 29 September 
2012.’ 
 
 
Internet resources 
 
Internet articles 
Abelson, R (2001) ‘By the Water Cooler in Cyberspace, the Talk Turns Ugly’ 
New York Times, 29 April 2001 available at <http://www.nytimes.com /2001 
/04/29/technology/29HARA.html?searchpv=site14[accessed 24 July 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
420 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
American Academy of Forensic Sciences (2011) ‘Academy News’ Vol. 41, 
Issue 3 available at <http://www.aafs.org/files/default/pdf/ [accessed on 12 
April 2011]. 
ArcSight (2010) ‘Report details the economic impact of cybercrime’ 
available at <http://www.prosecurityzone.com/News/It_security/Anti-virus _ 
and_anti-malware _software/Report_details _economic_impact_of_ cyber _ 
crime_14551.asp#axzz1SXb9xLFJ> [accessed 24 July 2011]. 
ArcSight (2011) ‘Second Annual Cost of Cyber Crime Study: Benchmark 
Study  of US Companies’ available at <http://www .arcsight .com /collateral 
/whitepapers/2011_Cost_of_Cyber_Crime_Study_August.pdf> [accessed on 4 
April 2011]. 
Baker, R Dawson, B, Shulman, I, and Brewer, C (2003) ‘Dirty Money and its 
Global Effects’ International Policy Report, available at <http://www. 
ciponline.org/documents/pdf/> [accessed on 24 April 2011]. 
Bank for International Settlements (2012) ‘Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision’ available at <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/> [accessed on 4 July 
2012]. 
Basel Institute on Governance: Assets recovery Knowledge Centre (2007) 
‘Anti-Money Laundering’ available at <http://www. assetrecovery.org/ kc / 
node/82bce589-7805-11dd-9c9d-d9fcb 408dfee.3> [accessed on 5 February 
2012]. 
Baran, D (2011) ‘Will Google quit Italy like China?’ <http://www.web 
guild.org/20110103/will-google-quit-italy-like-china> [accessed 24 July 
2011]. 
Baran, D (2010) ‘Google embarrasses China because it would not win’ <http 
://www.webguild.org/20100115/google-embarrases-chinese-because-it-could-
not-win-here [accessed 24 July 2011]. 
Bartlett, BL (2002) ‘The Negative Effects of Money Laundering on 
Economic Development’ Research paper for the Asian Development Bank 
Regional Technical Assistance Project No.5967 Countering Money 
Laundering in The Asian and Pacific Region, available at 
<http//:www.adb.org/documents/other/ogc-toolkits/> [accessed on 24 April 
2011]. 
Bloomberg Business Week (2006) ‘Gold Rush: Online payment systems like 
e-gold ltd are becoming the currency of choice for cyber crooks’ available at 
<http://www .businessweek .com /magazine /content /06_ 02/b3966094.htm> 
[accessed on 1 September 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
421 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Bluejay, M (2012) ‘Is Online Gambling Legal in the US?’ available at 
<http://vegasclick.com/online/legal.html> [accessed on 8 August 2012]. 
Borck, J (2001) ‘Leave the cybersleuthing to the experts’ available at 
<http://www.infoworld.com/articles/tc/xml/01/04/09/010409tccounter.html.> 
[accessed on 2 March 2012]. 
Bortner, M (1996) ‘Cyberlaundering: Anonymous Digital Cash and Money 
Laundering’ available at <http://osaka.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/seminar / 
papers /bortner .htm> [accessed on 12 April 2011]. 
Bumeter, BH (2001) ‘Cyberlaundering: Low Tech Meets High Tech’ Maven 
Mappers Information available at <http://www.softduit.com/maven mapper 
sinformation/2001/06/07/1cyberlaundering-low-tech-high-tech/> [accessed 
on 21 July 2011]. 
Business Dictionary (2011) ‘Electronic Payment System’ available at <http:// 
www.businessdictionary.com/definition/electronic-payment-systemn.html> 
[accessed on 25 July 2011]. 
Chawki, M (2003) ‘A Critical Look at the Regulation of Cybercrime: A 
Comparative Analysis with Suggestions for Legal Policy’ available at 
<http://www.crime-research.org/articles/Critical/2> [accessed on 21 July 
2011]. 
Cherrayil, NK (2011) ‘Pirates still making headway in cybercrime’ available 
at <http://www.gulfnews.com/mobile/business/technology/pirates [accessed 
on 4 April 2011]. 
Companies and Markets (2011) ‘The Future of Online and Mobile Payments’ 
available at <http://www.companiesandmarkets.com/Market-Report/the-futu 
re-of-online-and-mobilepayments-625842.asp> [accessed on 4 August 2011]. 
DBMS2: A Monasch Research Publication (2010) ‘Examples of Machine-
Generated Data’ available at <http:// www.dbms 2.com /2010/04/08/machine-
generated-data-example/> [accessed on 22 February 2012]. 
Drug Enforcement Administration (2007) ‘2007 National Money laundering 
Strategy’ available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/nmls.pdf> 
[accessed on 29 July 2011]. 
E-gold (an undated website document) ‘About’ available at <http://www.e-
gold.com/ unsecure/qanda.html> [accessed on 14 August 2011]. 
E-gold (an undated website document) ‘Contact’ available at <http://www.e-
gold.com/unsecure/ qanda.html> [accessed on 14 July 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
422 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Encyclopedia (an undated website document) ‘E-Cheques’ available at 
<http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O12-electroniccheque.html> 
[accessed on 4 August 2011]. 
eHow (an undated website document) ‘How SWIFT wires funds’ available at 
<http://www .ehow .com /swift/> [accessed on 14 May 2011]. 
eHow (an undated website document) ‘What is an Internet Content Provider?’ 
available at <http://www.ehow.com/about_6695350_internet-content-
provider_.html> [accessed on 2 March 2012]. 
Ehrenfeld, R and Lappen, AA (2007) ‘Terror Criminal Links Growing’ 
available at <http://archive .frontpagemag .com /read Article.aspx ? ARTID = 
28124> [accessed 24 July 2011]. 
Evans, S (2012) ‘UK launches Regional Cybercrime Hub’ available at 
<http://security.cbronline.com/news/uk-launches-regional-cybercrime-hubs-
100212> [accessed on 13 February 2012]. 
Evron, G (2008) ‘Cybercrime: An economic problem’ CircleID Internet 
Infrastructures available at <http://www.circleid.com/posts/89610_cyber_ 
crime_an_ economi c_problem/> [accessed 24 July 2011]. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (2012) ‘Manhattan US Attorney and FBI 
Assistant Director in Charge Announce Extradition of Russian Citizen to 
Face Charges for International Cyber Crimes’ available at 
<http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2012/manhattan-u.s.-attorney-
and-fbi-assistant-director-in-charge-announce-extradition-of-russian-citizen-
to-face-charges-for-international-cyber-crimes> [accessed on 11 February 
2012]. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2012) ‘Frequently Asked Questions 
About the FDIC’ available at <http://www.fdic.gov/about/affaq.html> 
[accessed on 2 September 2011]. 
Federal Register (2010) ‘Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Renewal 
with Changes to a Currently Approved Collection; the Registration of Money 
Service Businesses (MSB); FinCen Report 107, To Incorporate Changes to 
The MSB Definitions and Add Provisions for Prepaid Access’ available at 
<https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2011/10/06/2011-25607/proposed-
collection-comment-request-renewal-with-changes-to-a-currently-approved-
collection-the> [accessed on 20 April 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (an undated website document) ‘About the 
FATF’ available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/> [accessed on 21 
February 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
423 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Financial Action Task Force (an undated website document) ‘What is money 
laundering?’ Basic Facts About Money Laundering available at <http://www 
.oecd.org/fatf.> [accessed on 15 April 2011]. 
Financial Action Task Force (2012) ‘Frequently Asked Questions: Money 
Laundering’available at <http://www.fatf-gafi.org /pages/ 0,3417,en_3225 
0379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html> [accessed on 21 March 2011]. 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2012) ‘About’ available at <http 
://www.fincen.org/resource> [accessed on 17 June 2011]. 
 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (2010) ‘Stanley Morris address to 
Congress Banking Committee’, available at <http://www.fincen.org/resource 
[accessed on 17 June 2011]. 
Forester (an undated website document) “US Online Retail Forecast, 2010 to 
2015” available at <http://www.forrester.com /rb/Research /us_online_retail 
_forecast,_2010_to_2015/q/id/58596/t/2> [accessed on 12 August 2011]. 
Forester (an undated website document) “European Online Retail Forecast, 
2010 to 2015” available at <http://forrester.com/rb/Research /European_ 
online_retail_forecast%2C_2010_to_2015/q/id/58597/t/2> [accessed on 12 
August 2011]. 
Fourman, M (2002) ‘Informatics’ available at <http://www. inf.ed. ac.uk/pu b 
lications/online/0139.pdf> [accessed on 17 June 2011]. 
Fowler, G and Qin, J (2007) ‘QQ: China’s New Coin of the Realm?’ 
available at <http ://www.onlinewsj .com/public/article /SB11751 96701 
14653518 -FR_svDHxRtxtvNmGwwpouq_hl2q_20080329> [accessed 20 
April 2012]. 
Global Information Inc. (2004) ‘Consumer e-payment: What does the Future 
Hold?’ available at <http://www.the-infoshop.com/press/iv/> [accessed on 2 
February 2011]. 
Grow, B, Cady, J, Rutledge, S and Polek, D (2006) ‘Gold Rush: Online 
payment systems like e-gold Ltd are becoming the currency of choice for 
cybercrooks’ Business Week available at <http: //www .busines 
sweek.com/magazine/content /06_02/b3966094.htm [accessed on 1 January 
2011]. 
Guadamuz, A (2003) ‘Electronic Money: A viable payment system?’ 
available at <http://www.era.lib.ed.ac .uk/bitstream/1842/2255/1/electronic 
money.pdf> [accessed on 4 August 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
424 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Groen, K (2011) ‘American ISPs take action against online piracy’ available 
at <http://www.futureofcopyright.com/home/blog-post/2011/08/24/american-
isps-take-action-against-online-piracy.html> [accessed on 9 August 2011]. 
Hughes, T (2010) ‘Internet borders: Where the information stops’ available at 
<http://www.praxmatrix.com.au/digital-diplomacy/internet-borders-where-
the-information-stops/> [accessed 24 July 2011]. 
ICAAN: The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (an 
undated internet article) ‘About Us’ available at <http://www .icann 
.org/en/about> [accessed on 2 May 2012]. 
Ieong, RSC (2006) ‘FORZA – Digital forensics investigation framework that 
incorporate legal issues. Proceedings of DFRWS2008’ available at 
<http://www.dfrws.org/2006/proceedings/4-Ieong.pdf> [accessed on 29 
February 2012]. 
IGNOU ‘Electronic Payment Systems’ available at <http://webserver.ignou. 
ac.in/virtualcampus/adit/course/cst304/ecom2.htm>  [accessed  4 July 2011]. 
Interpol (an undated internet webpage) ‘About Us’ available at <http: 
//www.interpol.int/about/> [accessed on 11 February 2011]. 
Interpol (an undated website document) ‘Cybercrime’ available at <http:// 
www.interpol .int/Crime-areas/Financial-crime/Payment-cards> [accessed on 
11 February 2011]. 
Investopedia (an undated internet article) ‘Electronic Money’ available at 
<http://www. investopedia.com /terms/e/ electronic -money.asp> [accessed 
on 4 August 2011]. 
Ivory, R (2008) ‘Criminal Assets: A Little Lateral Thinking’ Freedom from 
Fear Magazine available at <http://www.freedom fromfearmagazine.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=98:criminal-
assets&catid=37:issue-1&Itemid=159> [accessed on 12 December 2011]. 
Javelin Strategy & Research (2010) ‘Online Retail Payments Forecast 2010 – 
2014: Alternative Payments Growth Strong but Credit Card Projected for 
Comeback’ available at <https://www.javelin strategy .com/ research 
/Brochure -171> [accessed on 4 August 2011]. 
Keh, D (1996) ‘Drug Money in a Changing World: Economic Reform and 
Criminal Finance’ UNDCP Technical Series: Vienna, United Nations 
International Drug Control Programme, No 4. available at <http://www 
.unodc.org/pdf/technical_series_1996-01-01_2.pdf> [accessed on 27 July 
2012]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
425 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
King, P (an undated website document) ‘Corruption Ruins Everything: 
Gridlock over Suharto’s Legacy in Indonesia (Part 1)’ The Asia-Pacific 
Focus: Japan Focus available at <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Peter-
King/2679> [accessed on 12 December 2011]. 
Kiviat, B (2010) ‘Driver’s License for the Internet’ <http://curious 
capitalist.blogs.time.com/2010/01/30/drivers-licenses-for-the-internet/> 
[accessed 24 July 2011].  
Kreß, C (2010) ‘Nulla poena nullum crimen sine lege’ Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law available at <http://www.uni-
koeln.de/jur-fak/kress/NullumCrimen24082010.pdf> [accessed on 17 
February 2012]. 
Lawrence, S (2008) ‘Money laundering and the insurance industry’ AIR 
Insights available at <http//:www.asiainsurancereview.com> [accessed on 20 
May 2011]. 
Leslie, W (2012) ‘Hits, and Misses, in a War on Bribery’ available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/03/11/ business/corporate-bribery-war-has-
hits-and-a-few-misses.html?pagewanted=all > [accessed on 4 March 2012]. 
Lilley, P (2007) ‘E-Money and Cyberlaundering: Virtual Dirty Dealing’ 
available at <http://proximalreview.squarespace.com/e-money-cyber-laund 
erring/> [accessed on 12 July 2011]. 
Little, AD (2009) ‘Global M-Payment Report Update – 2009’ available at 
<http:// www .adl.com/ uploads/tx_extthoughtleadership /ADL_Global_ M_ 
Payment_Report_Update_2009_Executive_Summary.pdf> available at 
[accessed on 12 September 2011]. 
 LivingInternet ‘Cryptography’ available at <http://www.livinginternet .org 
/file_crypt> [accessed on 16 August 2011]. 
Living Internet (an undated internetarticle) ‘History of the Internet’ available 
at <http://www. living internet.com> [accessed on 10 February 2011]. 
Nakamoto, S (2009) ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to Peer Electronic Payment System’ 
available at <http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> [accessed 8 August 2011]. 
New York Times (2010) ‘Swiss Reject US Request to Extradite Polanski’ 
available at <http://www. nytimes.com /2010 /07/13 /movies/ 13polanski . 
html?src=mv> [accessed 24 February 2012]. 
Noblett, MG, Pollitt, M and Presley, LA (2000)  
‘Recovering and Examining Computer Forensic Evidence, Forensic Science 
Communications’ available at <http://www.fbi.gov /hq/lab /fsc/ backissu /oct 
2000 /computer.htm> [accessed on 19 February 2012]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
426 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
NUA (an undated website document) ‘Surveys’ available at <http://www 
m.nua.org> [accessed on 3 September 2011] 
Mandujano, S (2003) ‘Towards the Preservation of a Key Feature of the 
Internet: Policy and Technology for Cyberspace Anonymity’ Center for 
Intelligent Systems (CSI) of ITESM. In proceedings of the 7th International 
Conference on Technology Policy and Innovation (ICTPI ’03). Monterrey, 
Mexico available at <http://citeseerx. ist.psu.edu /viewdoc/ similar? doi 
=10.1.1.61.488&type=cc> [accessed on 27 July 2012]. 
Maton, J (an undated internet article) ‘Recovery of Assets Case Study: The 
Dariye Proceedings in the United Kingdom’ available at <http://www. 
assetrecovery.org/kc/resources/org.apache.wicket.Application/repo?nid=62ba
6a53-c5fb-11dd-b3f1-fd61180437d9> [accessed on 14 December 2011]. 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary (an undated internet article) ‘Jurisdiction’ 
available at <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jurisdiction> 
[accessed on 22 February 2012]. 
Messner, E (2000) ‘Networld: Ebay acts to curtail Internet fraud’ available at 
<http://www.nwfusion.com> [accessed 8 April 2012]. 
Mobile Enquirer (an undated internet article) ‘Mobile Payments to Grow to 
$200 Billion by 2012’ available at <http://www.mobileinquirer.com 
/2011/mobile-payments-to-grow -to- 200-billion-by-2012/ [accessed on 12 
September 2012]. 
Mollenkamp, C, Grow, B, and Wolf, B (2012) ‘Exclusive: Senate 
Investigating HSBC for Money Laundering’ available at <http://www 
.reuters.com/article/2012/01/25/us-hsbc-probe-idUSTRE80O1FH20120125 > 
[accessed on 12 January 2012]. 
Mulig, EV, and Smith, M, (2004) ‘Understanding and Preventing Money 
Laundering’ available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091011> [accessed on 6 
December 2011]. 
Online Poker News (an undated internet article) ‘Italian Online Gambling 
worth €4.8 billion’ available at <http://www.onlinepoker.net/poker-
news/poker-law-industry-news/italian-online-gambling-worth-48bn-rising-
legislation/9394 [accessed on 3 September 2011]. 
Oxford English Dictionary (an undated webpage) ‘Activity’ available at < 
http://oxforddictionaries .com/definition/activity> [accessed on 6 June 2011]. 
Palmer, G (2001) ‘A Road Map for Digital Forensic Research’ Digital 
Forensic research Workshops (DFRW - Utica, New York, August 7 – 8) 
available at <http://www.dfrws.org/2001/dfrws-rm-final.pdf > [accessed on 
22 February 2012]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
427 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Palmer, J and Bergund, M (2002) ‘Anonymity on the Internet’ available at 
<http://people.dsv.su.se/~jpalme/society/anonymity.html> [accessed 24 July 
2011].  
Patzakis, J (2003) ‘Computer Forensics as an Integral Component of the 
Information Security Enterprise’ available at <http://www.computer-
tutorials.org/ebooks/computerforensics.pdf> [accessed on 19 February 2012]. 
Pemberton, G (2000) ‘Money laundering through the Securities market’ The 
Money Laundeing Bulletin available at <http://bcbqatar .com/English 
/Articles/LAUNDRY.pdf [accessed on 14 September 2011]. 
Philipsohn, S (2002) ‘Fraud and Money Laundering’ available at <http:// 
www.pcbsols.com/hssiejwsw [accessed on 23 May 2011]. 
Pollitzer, B (2001) ‘The Future of Electronic Payments’ <http://www. 
bakersonline.com/e-banking/> [accessed on 24 September 2010]. 
Recording Industry Association of America (an undated website document) 
‘Who Music Theft Hurts’ available at <http://www .riaa.com /physical piracy 
.php? content_selector=piracy_details_online> [accessed on 9 September 
2011]. 
Red Plc (an undated website document) ‘PRISM Merchant System’ available 
at <http://www.redplc.com/about/> [accessed on 16 February 2012]. 
RTHK (2011) ‘HK seizes $330 in Megaupload raids’ available at 
<http://m.rthk.hk/news/20120121/813246.htm> [accessed on 16 February 
2012]. 
Robbins, J (2000) ‘An Explanation of Computer Forensics’ available at 
<http://www .computerforensics.net/forensics.htm> [accessed on 16 February 
2012]. 
Rundle, G (2010) ‘Did he or didn’t he?’ available at <http: //www 
.theage.com.au/national/did-he-or-didnt-he-the-murky-politics-of-sex-and-
consent-20101211-18tie.html> [accessed on 15 July 2012]. 
Second Life (an undated website document) ‘About us’ available at 
<http://www.secondlife.com /corporate /vat.php> [accessed on 23 July 2011]. 
Second Life (an undated website document) ‘Current User Metrics for 
Second Life’ available at <http://secondlife.com/xmlhttp/secondlife.php> 
[accessed on 22 July 2011]. 
Searching Cloud Computing (an undated website document) ‘Cloud 
Computing’ available at<http://search cloud computing .techtarget .com / 
definition/cloud-computing> [accessed 24 July 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
428 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Schjolsberg, S (2011) ‘An International Criminal Court or Tribunal for 
Cyberspace (ICTC)’ A paper for the East West Institute (EWI) Cybercrime 
Legal Working Group available at <http://www .cybercrime law.net / 
documents/International_Criminal_Court_or_Tribunal_for_Cyberspace_%28
ICTC%29.pdf> [accessed 24 July 2011]. 
Schroeder, S (2007) ‘Censored: List of Countries That Banned YouTube’ 
available at <http://mashable.com/2007/05/30/youtube-bans/> [accessed on 
10 July 2012]. 
Schneier, B (1998) ‘The Risks of Key recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted 
Third Party Encryption’ available at <http://www.schneier.com/paper-key-
escrow.html> [accessed on 20 February 2012]. 
Schneier, B (2010) ‘Schneier on Security: Anonymity and the Internet’ 
available at <http://www. schneier.com/ blog/archives/ 2010/02 /anonymity _ 
and_t_3.html> [accessed on 24 July 2011]. 
Scrofina, S (2011) ‘If one were to make a competitor for Bitcoin, what would 
it be?’ available at <http://www.quora.com> [accessed 5 August 2011]. 
Smith, J, Pieth, M, Jorge, G (2007) ‘Recovery of Stolen Assets: A 
Fundamental Principle of the UN Convention against Corruption’ available at 
<http://www.u4.no/pdf/?file=/themes/uncac/documents/U4Brief2_2007_asset
-recovery.pdf> [accessed on 7 December 2011]. 
Smith, RG (2003) ‘Investigating Cybercrime: Barriers and Solutions’ 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Pacific Rim Fraud Conference 
available at <http://www. aic.gov.au/about _aic /research _programs /staff/ 
~/media/conferences/other/smith_russell/2003-09-cybercrime.ashx> 
[accessed on 19 February 2012]. 
Spiegel (2007) ‘Sweden Opens Virtual Embassy in Second Life’ available at 
<http://www.speigel.de/international/01518,463073.00html> [accessed 5 
April 2012]. 
Streak Gambling (an undated website document) ‘Online Gambling worth 
2bn in Europe’ available at <http://www.streakgaming.com/forum/online-
gambling-worth-2-billion-greece-t22194.html> [accessed on 3 September 
2011]. 
SWIFT (an undated website document) ‘Company Information’ available at 
<http://www.swift.com/about_swift/company_information/index.page? 
lang=en> [accessed on 15 September 2011]. 
Techradar (an undated website document) ‘Online fraud worth billions’ 
available at <http://www.techradar.com/news/internet/online-fraud-trade-
worth -billions-says-symantec-488116 [accessed on 9 September 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
429 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Telephone Tribute (an undated website document) ‘Phone Phreaking’ 
avaialble at <http:// www. tele phonetribute.com/phone phreaking.ht ml> 
[accessed on 16 September 2011]. 
The Royal Mint (2012) “Legal Tender Guidelines” available at <http://www 
.royalmint.com/aboutus/policies-and-guidelines/legal-tender-guidelines> 
[accessed on 22 April 2012]. 
Times (an undated website document) ‘Online Gambling’ available at 
<http://www.times online.co.uk /tol/news/ politics /article 6208 34.ece > 
[accessed on 21 July 2011]. 
The Daily Attack (2011) ‘A comprehensive critique of the weaknesses of 
Bitcoin’ available at <http://thedailyattack.com/2011/07/23/a-comprehensive-
critique-of-the-weaknesses-of-bitcoin/> [accessed 5 August 2011]. 
United States Department of Justice (an undated website document) 
‘Computer Crime’ available at <http://www.cybercrime .gov /ssmanual 
/05ssma.html> [accessed on 22 February 2012]. 
US Legal (an undated internet article) ‘Jurisdiction’ available at 
<http://civilprocedure .uslegal.com/jurisdiction/> [accessed on 22 February 
2012]. 
Wallace, JD (1999) ‘Nameless in Cyberspace, anonymity on the Internet’ 
CATO Institute Briefing Papers, December 8, 1999 available at <http://www 
.cato.org /pubs/briefs/bp-054es.html, http:/ /www .cato.org /pubs/briefs /bp5 
4.pdf  [accessed on 22 July 2011]. 
Web Developers Note (an undated internet article) ‘What is web server - A 
computer of a program’ available at <http://www .webdevelopersnotes 
.com/basics/what_is_web_server.php> [accessed on 1 March 2012]. 
Van Auken, B (an undated internet article) ‘“Baby Doc” Duvalliers Arrested’ 
World Socilaist Website available at <http://www.wsws .org /articles 
/2011/19january/> [accessed on 24 January 2011].  
Virgin Cards (an undated internet article) ‘About us’ available at 
<http://www.virgin.co.uk/pre-paidcards> [accessed on 15 July 2011]. 
Visa Corporate Site (2010) ‘Financial Inclusion - Pakistan eases burden of 
displaced citizens by delivering financial support through Visa’ an undated 
internet webpage available at <http:// www. currency ofprogress .com/ 
_media/pdfs/case_studies/VISA_Inclusion-Pakistan.pdf> [accessed on 4 
October 2010]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
430 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Walker, J (1998) ‘Modeling Global Money Laundering Flows’ available at 
http://members.ozemail.com.au/born1820/m/method.htm> [accessed on 23 
January 2012]. 
Webopedia (an undated internet article) ‘Digital Cash’ available at 
<http://www .webopedia.com/ TERM/D/digital_cash.html> [accessed on 4 
August 2011]. 
Wise Geek (an undated website document) ‘What is data storage?’ avail 
able at <http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-data-storage.htm> [a ccessed on 
22 February 2012]. 
Wise Geek (an undated website document) ‘What is online banking?’ 
available at <http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-online-banking92338> [acce 
ssed on 9 February 2011]. 
World Bank (2003) ‘Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Definitions 
and Explanation’ available at <http://www.worldbank .org/ finance /assets /I 
mages/> [accessed on 15 April 201]. 
Yahoo Finance  (2010) ‘Revenue of Online Payment set to hit $2700 billion 
by 2015’ available at <http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/Revenues-From-
Online-Pay ment-businesswireuk9382019.html?x=0> [accessed on 04 August 
2011]. 
Yoshida, J (2001) ‘Eurobank notes to embed RFID chips by 2005’ available 
at <http://www.eetimes.com/story/OEG20011219S0016> [accessed on 22 
April 2012]. 
 
 Websites 
Bitcoin  
Available at <http://www.bitcoin.org> [accessed on 8 August 2011]. 
 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)  
Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8548190.stm>[accessed 24 July 
2011]. 
 
 CyberAngels  
 Available at <http://www.cyberangels.org/> [accessed on 4 April 2012]. 
 
CyberCash 
Available at <http://www.cybercash.com> [accessed on 4 August 2011]. 
 
Drug Enforcement Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
431 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
Available at <http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/money.html> [accessed 
on 30 January 2012]. 
 
Ecash  
Available at <http://www.ecash.com/online/> [accessed on 4 August 2011]. 
 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
Available at <http://www.fincen.gov/about_fincen/wwd/> [accessed on 9 
August 2011]. 
 
Financial Sector Assessment Program 
Available at <http://www.imf.org/about/projects/worldbank> [accessed on 13 
August 2010]. 
 
Freedom Eagle Card  
Available at <http://www.freedom-card.co.uk/> [accessed on 2 September 
2010]. 
 
Gold and Silver Reserve Inc 
Available at <http:www.e-gold.com/unsecure/pgpkey.htm> [accessed on 13 
February 2012]. 
 
 Internet Hotlines Providers 
 Available at <http://www.inhope.org/gns/home.aspx> [accessed on 4 April 
2012]. 
 
International Telecommunications Union  
Available at <http://www.itu.int/africainternet2000/Documents/doc7_e.htm> 
[accessed on 13 June 2011]. 
 
Internet Watch Foundation 
 Available at <http://www.iwf.org.uk/> [accessed on 4 April 2012]. 
 
Internet World Stats  
Available at <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats/htm> [accessed on 15 
July 2011]. 
 
Interpol 
Available at <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Financial-crime/Payment-
cards> [accessed on 11 February 2011]. 
 
NetCash  
Available at <http:// www. netbank.com/~netcash> [accessed on 4 August 
2011].  
 
Treaties Office of the Council of Europe 
Available at <http://conventions.coe.int/> [accessed on 9 February 2012]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
432 
   The Legal Regime for Anti-Cyberlaundering / Daniel Leslie 
United States Department of Justice  
Available at <http://www.justice .gov/criminal/ceos /Press%20 Releases /DC 
%20egold%20indictment.pdf> [accessed on 13 February 2012]. 
 
Wolfsberg Group of Banks 
Available at <http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/index.html> [accessed on 
6 November 2011]. 
 
 
 
 
